



IFIMES

International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies

2003



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The world of the 21 century is becoming more and more global, so to say interwoven. On the other hand, our common goal to live in peace, prosperity and wealth is more and more distant and unattainable. Despite the strengthened efforts of individuals, nations, states and the international community, it is still shaken by local and regional conflicts. While the international community manages to soothe one burning point, another breaks out.

The greatest threats are those regions where, for several decades, the nations, their political representatives and mediators of international organisations have not been able to find the common language, possibilities and basis to live together in peace. Those regions generate new conflicts in the wider area and, since the terrorist forces changed their tactics, practically throughout the world.

In such world we are all obliged to take action for peace. No one can pretend it does not concern him/her. We should be aware that skilled diplomats, security treaties and trained peacekeeping missions can not alone bring peace to our – one and only – planet.

Violence is not only the language of weapons, it is the result of what we are taught from experience. Violence is always triggered by words which denote rejection, incite intolerance, conceal fear from something different ... Such language must be confronted by open and responsible words which reveal in that

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INFORMATIONS ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

IFIMES - International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana - Slovenia, gathers and selects various information and sources on key conflict areas in the world. Based on the selected information, the Institute analyses mutual relations among parties with an aim to promote the importance of global conflict resolution of the existing conflicts and the role of preventive actions against new global disputes.

Idea to establish IFIMES Institute is a reflection of our common reality and the needs of the world to reach for common solutions - now more than ever in the past. Common interests and bonds among different policies, nations, religions, world regions and diverse interest parties in the unipolar world are essential. Constant search for differences and rejections is like searching for a needle in a pack of hay, while insisting on cooperation and respect for diversity provides a chance to create a better world.

The area of research and work of IFIMES Institute is the Middle East (Gulf states) and the Balkans (South-Eastern Europe), where relations among different entities are based on religious, ethnic, national and racial grounds. Associates of the Institute are respected experts, scientists, managers, journalists and researchers, who are introducing younger colleagues from all over the world to work, with a purpose of additional education, promotion of knowledge and scientific achievements with an emphasis on the political and economic connections within the region, among the regions and on the global level.

The IFIMES Institute is through organizing seminars, symposiums, conferences, round tables, (with participants from various interest groups: scientists, politicians, managers, representatives of religious institutions, journalists, artists and others), performing analyses, studies and projects, as well as through its own publications presenting the results of its work and achievements, also targeting leading international media.

IFIMES will in the future cooperate with relevant institutions from the USA, EU, Gulf states and countries from South-Eastern Europe on projects, studies and analyses prepared individually or based on specific demands from a known party. The activities of IFIMES are especially directed towards the areas of international (foreign) politics and economy, international relations, counselling the state institutions, companies and individuals and more.

IFIMES is searching for and recommending political solutions to the governments of the world, especially and foremost for the regions of the Balkans and the Middle East.

FOUNDERS OF ICTAC - INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

The International Counter-Terrorism Academic Community (ICTAC), was established at ICT's third international conference in September 2003. The ICTAC's members include leading counter-terrorism researchers and research institutes from countries around the globe. Among ICTAC's goals: developing and expanding academic cooperation in counter-terrorism; conducting research that will lead to more efficient decision-making in counter-terrorism; promoting new policies and initiatives to fight terrorism:

1. International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (IPT), Israel
2. International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES), Slovenia
3. Unconventional Concepts, Inc., USA
4. Georgia International Law Enforcement, Exchange-Dept of Criminal Justice, Georgia State University, USA
5. Center for Tactical Counter-Terrorism for the NYPD
6. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore
7. International Foundation Experimental Creativity Center, Russia
8. Center for High Studies on Counter-Terrorism and Political Violence (Ce.A.S.), Italy
9. Oklahoma Regional Community Policing Institute, USA
10. National Center for Emergency Preparedness at Vanderbilt University Medical Center, USA
11. Environmental Planning Specialists, Inc-and-Georgia State University, USA
12. Counter-Terrorism Research Center of Georgia, Georgia
13. Center of Security & Terrorism Research, Institute of Political Studies, SCG
14. Center for Globalization Studies, SCG

The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has specially for the September issue of "Obramba" ("Defence Monthly"), a Slovenian professional journal dealing with defence-military issues, prepared the analysis of events going on in Iraq and the region. Since it is a very complex question concerning not only the regions of the Middle East but the whole global community, the experts of the Institute have, together with their co-operators, analysed the present situation in Iraq and in the wider region as well as the factors which have contributed to the dispute between Iraq, i.e. Sadam Husein and the USA.

THE ANALYSIS OF EVENTS IN IRAQ AND THE REGION A HURRICANE OVER BAGHDAD?

The question which arises at the very beginning is whether present events are the continuation of the conflict between Sadam Husein and George Bush Sr. – which is the opinion of some politicians and analysts – or there is something else in the background – as the experts from the IFIMES Ljubljana Institute believe. Is the reason for the dispute simply the fact, that Iraq does not respect the Resolutions of the Security Council Nos. 687, 688 and 949? Or was it triggered by 11 September last year and the events related to that date, or by the crisis of the American economy and the decay of American corporate giants? Perhaps there are also some indirect factors such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Can it be the crisis in Saudi Arabia, the relationships in the royal family itself? Is it the crisis of the reformation movement lead by Mohamed Khatami, the present Iranian president? Or perhaps the (non)success of American war against terrorism?

Konstantin Spilioti, political researcher at the Dartmouth College, said: "The war against terrorism following 11 September is the focus of the historical mission Mr. Bush has to accomplish during his term of office. At the beginning of his office, Bush did not manage to revive American economy, reduce the budgetary deficit and influence the capital market. If he fails in all that, his political term of office will be weak and his political future vague. A president can always benefit from a war as long as it does not turn into a catastrophe."

In fact, all the above mentioned factors have significantly influenced the present flow of events and the envisaged denouement in the future.

IRAQ FOR THE SECOND TIME WITH THE SECOND BUSH

In 1991, Norman Schwarzkopf, the American general, already reached the shooting range of Baghdad and American forces were making a progress. In 14 provinces (of 18 altogether), the power was assumed by the rebels, i.e. the present

opposition. However, President George Bush Sr. decided to end the war so as to prevent Iraq from disintegrating which would not have been acceptable in the context of circumstances in the world then due to the stability in the region. In 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions Nos. 687 and 688 with the consent of Saddam Husein who therewith approved of the introduction of United Nations control system.

During his residence in the White House, President Clinton followed the policy of sustainment of the existing situation in Iraq. Periodic missile attacks on marginal goals in Iraq and continuous American-British air control of the sky above the 36th parallel and below the 32nd parallel were having only psychological effects. President Clinton tried to help the Iraqi opposition and unite it. At first, his influence met a response since the Iraqi National Congress (INC) was established in 1992 in Salahaddin (Iraqi Kurdistan) as the umbrella organisation of all opposition political parties – ranging from the left-wing to Islamic, from nationalist Kurdish and Arabic to liberal. In 1998, President Clinton achieved the adoption of the Law on Liberation of Iraq in the American Congress, which enabled the INC to gain a subsidy amounting to USD 100 million. However, internal disagreements (fracturing) eventually led to a situation where the Iraqi National Congress became only one more party instead of the umbrella congress of all parties.

A serious incident took place during the same year (1998) when Iraqi authorities accused Scott Ridder, the head of a group of UN inspectors, of espionage in behalf of the USA and Israel. Ridder later admitted the act in his memoirs. Consequently, Iraq banished UN inspectors and the Desert Fox operation commenced, although with no effect.

When George Bush Jr. assumed power, great changes occurred in American foreign policy, followed by 11 September which shocked not only the USA but the whole democratic world. That triggered the introduction of the American policy of punishment of terrorists outside the border of the USA and territories of NATO alliance member states. Unilateralism and criticism of the North Atlantic Alliance for losing its role but not importance was even more intensively present in American politics. This was most evident in Afghanistan in providing help to the Afghanistan North Alliance and the opposition, when the USA took over the dominant role in fighting against Al-Kaida and the Taliban.

In American politics, the world has been re-divided into the states which support terrorism on one hand and those which fight against terrorism together with the USA on the other hand. Iraq has been labelled as one of the axes of the evil forces. The evidence against Iraq was provable, but its links and associations with the Al-Kaida terrorist network could not be proven in spite of the rumours that there is evidence of the meeting in Prague between an Iraqi diplomat and Mohamed Atta, one of the terrorists who was in one of the planes which hit the WTC in New

York. Due to lack of evidence, the USA are looking for confirmation in the UN Resolutions Nos. 687, 688 and 949. In spite of all evidence and non-evidence, Ms Condolizze Rice, Security Adviser, believes that Saddam Husein is too dangerous which is good enough reason for him to leave the stage.

As the anniversary of 11 September is approaching, the USA are intensifying their expectations regarding the important decision to take away power from Iraqi dictator, Saddam Husein. President Bush made it clear in June 2002 that the USA are not willing to observe indifferently those who possess or even produce weapons of mass destruction.

"We have to attack in order to defend our freedom" Bush said and his words echoed everywhere, not only among the allies. Nevertheless, Pentagon and the State Department have different opinions on how to overthrow Saddam Husein. The influential Republicans Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz are in favour of the classic invasion of Iraq and collapse of the regime. On the other hand, Collin Powell, Secretary of State, shares the opinion of the majority of allies, i.e. that the control of Iraqi armament should be made more severe.

Stephen Walt, the dean at Kennedy School of Management at the Harvard University said: "There are no indicators that Iraq could become more dangerous. We can maintain status quo for a few more years". In his second statement he continues: "As far as the time schedule of the operation is concerned, it all depends on the situation in domestic politics. Those in the Administration who are in favour of the war are in the minority but still very influential. They are neo-conservatives, gathered around Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz."

Undeniably, the use of force in order to overthrow Saddam Husein would be contrary not only to the provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia but also to the modern international law which permits the use of force in self-defence in case of grounded threats and not in case of merely expressed suspicion.

WHO IS IN FAVOUR AND WHO IS AGAINST

European allies, with the exception of United Kingdom, oppose the attack on Iraq since the intervention can not be grounded on the Resolutions of the UN Security Council. Moreover, the financing of such an operation is also questionable. This was pointed out by the German Chancellor Schroeder who stated on the occasion that Germany is not a bottomless bag.

The Islamic world, especially the Islamic masses, oppose above all the USA believing that they are the traditional enemy of Islam and eventually of the Muslims. This mood of Muslim masses is above all the result of unsuccessful peace negotiations in Wy Plantations in the USA which took place in 2002 (Clinton - Barak - Arafat) and the beginning of the second stage of Intifada.

The Arab regimes will not have a significant influence on the American decision, among other due to their internal problems. For example, Saudi Arabia is facing problems in the royal family and the fight for the succession to the throne of king Fahd who is because of his severe sickness only artificially kept alive. The economic crisis following the drop in oil prices has limited ambitious medium-term economic plans for the country which are being questioned now.

Moreover, the Islam movements which sympathize with and help Al-Kaida are very influential. Loaram Morawic, the analyst at Rand Corporation (which unites some very prominent members such as D. Coel, H. Kissinger, J. Shliessenger, H. Braun, N. Gingrich and T. Folli), believes that Saudi Arabia is hostile to the United States of America and that the Saudis are very active in international terrorism including planning, financing, sympathizing and realization of terrorist acts.

The official politics of Iran are anti-American, although it was neutral in 1991 in the Gulf war. Since the reformers entered the stage, the winds of change have been felt in the relations between Iran and the USA. This could be clearly observed in the role which Iran played in the Afghanistan war as well as in the composing of the new Afghan government and bringing under control the Shiitic leaders under the Karzai government. In the nineties, the Supreme Council of Islam Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is the main Shiitic opposition party in Iraq with its headquarters in Teheran, opposed any kind of American help to Iraqi opposition. Thanks to improved relations between Iran and the USA, SCIRI took part at the meeting of the opposition with the American Administration on 9 and 10 August this year in Washington. Iran has expressed great interest in the period following the regime of Saddam Husein, and SCIRI will assume the appropriate position in the interim government (about 60%).

From the very beginning, Turkey has opposed any kind of intervention against Iraq. Prime Minister Bulend Edževit has written several times to Saddam Husein advising him to allow UN inspectors to enter Iraq, since the whole Turkish economy was suffering great losses due to the isolation of Iraq.

Most of all, Ankara is afraid of the disintegration of Iraq and the proclamation of the Kurdish state in the North of Iraq, as that would encourage Turkish Kurds to take similar actions. The meeting of Peter Gallbright, a former American ambassador to Croatia, who is a recognized expert in the Kurdish issue and professor at the National Security College, with the representatives of the Kurdish power and Iranian Kurdish opposition, which took place in Iraqi Kurdistan in July 2002, has perhaps strengthened the fears of Ankara that the Kurdish and Azerbaijani issues might be actualised and the international community might eventually interfere in internal political matters where those minorities actually live.

We should not forget the fact that the province of Mosul (Iraqi Kurdistan), which is rich in oil, belonged to Turkey until 1924 when it became part of the Kingdom

of Iraq. It was agreed then that Turkey would get 10% of oil extracted in that territory, but the agreement was never realised. However, Turkey has its “Trojan horse” at the North of Iraq where there are about 300 to 500 thousand Turkmen. Ankara even states that there is a round million of Turkmen and is doubtlessly ready to use this fact to justify an eventual intervention in this part of Iraq (behind the veil of protection of Turkmen) in order to prevent the establishment of the Kurdish state. This was also discussed in talks between American Vice President Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz and the Turkish military leadership which has critical influence in the Turkish politics.

What are Turkey’s expectations? Firstly, a “stand-by” arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, secondly, rescheduling of military debt to the United States of America, and thirdly, a firm assurance given by the USA that there would be no disintegration of Iraq. Turkey is striving for a direct cooperation in military operations in Iraq and not only passive participation as was the case in Afghanistan (police units in ISAF).

The reactions of India and Pakistan will represent the greatest and perhaps most dangerous enigma. Namely, they might use the new “rules” of the world policy in their conflict which could lead to a new war (the policy of first strike).

As regards Russia, the majority of analysts believe that it will give its consent to the actions in Iraq in exchange for American consent to nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran (not only concerning the nuclear reactor in Bushehr, but also five new reactors). This is the subject of negotiations of a mixed American – Russian commission. President Putin has promised President Bush that Russia would not oppose the intervention in Iraq despite the publicly declared policy and opposition in the UN Security Council (however, without exercising the power of veto). Russia strives for cooperation with the USA especially in order to gain support in the International Monetary Fund and to get its piece of the Iraqi cake.

What about Israel? If the Iraqi regime attacks Israel with unconventional weapons, Israel will strike back with a nuclear attack. Israel will respond to attacks on Tel Aviv or Haifa with retaliatory nuclear attack on those Iraqi towns where no American forces are present. The USA promised Israel to inform it of the attack 60 hours prior to the commencement and let it make a free decision on the response.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERVENTION IN IRAQ

The analysts of our Institute share the opinion that the change of regime in Iraq will lead to a new drawing of maps in the region. As regards the natural resources, Iraq is potentially the richest country in the Middle East today since it is the only country with both oil and water. Iraq has the second largest stocks of oil found in

the world. At the moment it extracts the permitted 2.1 million barrels per day (one barrel contains 159 l) but its capacity is 6 million barrels per day, while its intentions are to pump 10 million barrels per day. This will significantly contribute to the collapse of economic plans of the countries in the region. Greatest losses will be suffered by the OPEC states, especially Saudi Arabia which earns 90 - 95 % of revenues from exports and two thirds of all national revenue with the sale of oil. This was confirmed by Brad Portland, head analyst at Saudi-America Bank. The OPEC oil cartel would surely lose some of its present international influence. Less "obedient" states and regimes will definitely have less important influence on the formation of oil prices. The new Iraqi government will most probably have a more liberal attitude to the policy of price formation and supply of oil to the West. Moreover, the new government will not respect the contracts for supply of oil and modernisation of oil industry, signed with the companies from Russia, France and China, which were concluded during the regime of Saddam Husein. The Institute's analysts believe that those are actually only draft contracts since the existing sanctions against Iraq prevent the conclusion of contracts which would bind both parties.

According to Raad Alkadiry, the leading analyst at Petroleum Finance Company, there is a treasure in Iraq which threatens to cause an oil-rush similar to the real gold-rush which hit the USA in the mid-nineteenth century.

Filip Mareni from the budget committee of the French senate said: "The war against Iraq will collapse all economic forecasts of the government since France as well as other European states are facing budgetary difficulties based on the hypothesis of the 3 % economic growth."

René Defonsée, analyst at CDC Exis, stated: "The business environment in the USA is reserved towards the American intervention in Iraq since the investors and consumers are losing their confidence. During the Gulf war in 1991, investments in the USA fell by 6.9 %."

Iraq may expect high revenues from tourism. The two most important Shiitic holy cities, Kerbela and Naif, are located there, as well as the city of Uruk where Abraham, father of Jews, Christians and Muslims, lived before he moved to Jerusalem. Moreover, Iraq prides itself in one of the Seven Wonders of the World - the Hanging Gardens - and the Ishtar Gate in the ancient city of Babylon.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE PRESENT EVENTS?

Iraq has an important geographic position and a significant role in the spiritual life of Muslims. We should not forget that there was the centre of one of the four caliphates, i.e. the headquarters of Abbasids, which was the leading caliphate for centuries and contributed greatly to the formation of Islamic history. As regards

its geographic-religious position, Iraq is located between the Turkish (Sunnite) and Iranian (Shiite) state. The former is in the NATO alliance while the latter is one of the evil forces according to the definition of American President Bush. This is the American strategic area stretching from the Balkans and Turkey through the central Asia and Afghanistan and ending in Iraq in the form of a ring.

The success of American policy in Iraq is likely to have positive effects on the peace process in the Middle East. Syria will remain isolated and forced to continue negotiations with Israel to resolve the issue of the Golan plain (water reserves for Israel covering as much as 37 % water reserves for the needs of Israel). The Palestinians will realize that the USA are determined to get rid of compromised and bad regimes. After all, President Bush promised the proclamation of the State of Palestine already during his term of office.

The Arabs believe that the way to Baghdad goes through Jerusalem. The Americans now have to prove that the way to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad, or in other words, that the solution of the Palestine issue will follow the solution to the Iraqi question.

THE OPERATION HURRICANE

The wrong idea might be detected in hints given by several media that the USA have no clear strategy for the intervention in Iraq. As a matter of fact, the USA have rich experience in interventions: Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan. The American Administration is facing a strategic decision and not a tactical one and the decision is based on staying in Iraq and the region. The Administration will not allow anyone to share the Iraqi cake with it. The USA wants the reconstruction in Iraq to be carried out by American companies.

America has found the best ally for the century following 11 September 2001, since the Iraqi nation is educated and secularised.

At the beginning, the operation Hurricane will be a one-sided military intervention without allies – except United Kingdom and Australia – in the form of air assaults for the protection of the population below the 32nd parallel. The American idea is that the intervention is to be carried out in the form of a snowball. It will gradually progress from Basra to Mandali on one side while combat operations will be performed by the SCIRI armed wing (Badr corps) on the other side. The Kurdish forces (100,000) are near Mandali therefore closing the ring around Baghdad.

American infantry units (75 - 200,000 soldiers) will invade from Jordan and Kuwait – especially from Jordan due to the modern highway link between Aman and Baghdad. Americans will descend on three airports in the North Iraq which is controlled by Kurdish and American forces. Heavy bombing of positions held by Iraqi Republican Guard in the vicinity of Baghdad and Tikrit is expected. Baghdad

will not withstand the fierce attack. The operation might become difficult in case of displacement of the Republican Guard units into the city centres and the use of weapons of mass destruction.

American air forces will not use the Prince Sultan air base in Saudi Arabia. The USA are reconstructing the Odedh airport in Qatar (investment value of USD 1.4 billion). Aircraft carriers will be located in the Red Sea and the Gulf. The air bases of Diego Garcia, Turkey (Incirlik, Aski Şehir), Georgia (Tbilisi), Bulgaria, Belgrade, Niš, Podgorica and Fair Forth in Great Britain will be employed.

Military analysts anticipate joint operations of the opposition (KDP, PUK and SCIRI) - with the support of allied air forces and special units for the liberation of Baghdad - to last one week.

THE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT

The USA play the role of an assistant in uniting anti-regime political parties on the basis of agreed political starting-points. Americans will act as a surgeon who has to remove a tumour and keep the body alive and healthy. Donald Rumsfeld has warned representatives of the opposition that the military overthrow of Saddam Husein is of American concern and stressed the importance of what the government in Iraq will be like after Saddam Husein and what direction will it strive for.

The USA will have the final say in the formation of the new joint Iraqi government (representatives of Shiites, Sunnites, Christians) of the Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians. This can be proven by the fact that the USA did not take into consideration different drafts of the constitution proposed by the opposition. The new constitution will suit American wishes. Iraq will be divided into two to three entities with one central government. American representatives Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld presented the above intentions to the representatives of six opposition parties at the meeting in Washington which took place on 9 and 10 August 2002. They discussed the organisation of the opposition conference of broader extent somewhere in Europe during the next weeks with the aim of forming the new Iraqi government, taking into consideration the interests of different ethnic, religious and political groups. At the Washington meeting they also discussed the question of Kurds, the issue of oil-rich Kirkuk, the forms of national institutions and the role and organisation of the army.

The new Iraqi government has to show readiness to cooperate in the settlement of two out of four million Palestinian refugees who represent the heart of the problem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, recognition of the state of Israel and active participation in the peace process, even though Iraq does not border on Israel.

It can be concluded from the above that the military intervention in Iraq will be inevitable in the next six months. The regime of Saddam Husein will be eliminated

and a new interim Iraqi government appointed. As a result, all these events will influence strongly the political and economic changes in the Middle East.

IRAQ The Republic of Iraq covers the area of 437,072 sq. km and counts about 23 million inhabitants. The capital is Baghdad with 3.9 million inhabitants, who are by nationality 75 % Arabs, 20 % Kurds, the remaining 5 % are Turkmen and Assyrians. By religious belief there are 60 % Shiites, 35 % Sunnites, 4 % Christians, 1 % Jews and Yeizids and other. The working population counts 4.4 million inhabitants (44 % employed in agriculture, 26 in industry, 30 % in the service sector). Gross domestic product is USD 57 billion, per capita USD 2,500. Inflation is 100 %. Natural resources: oil, phosphates, sulphur. Iraq borders Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria.

Iraqi Kurdistan - Ten years of self-rule and future prospects

An International Conference

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Paper presented by

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THE FEDERALISM AND THE FUTURE OF IRAQ

INTRODUCTION

Principles of Federalism in Future Iraq:

The nature and system of government in Iraq is responsible for most of its external and internal problems since its inception in 1921 and until the present time. A deficiency exists in the political and constitutional structure for Iraq since the first established constitution “Basic Law” of 1925 until the last constitution of 1970, characterized by excessive centralization and the rule of an individual especially since 1979 the year Saddam Hussein ascended to power. This iron fist central authority contradicts with the establishment of a democratic society and civil society especially in a country like Iraq with a diverse ethnic and religious population and varying political parties and movements. As a result, the Kurdish population was subject to war crimes and the crime of genocide. Other ethnic groups were not spared from such crimes including the majority Arab Shiite.

In order to establish a democratic system, rule of the law and constitutional institutions it is necessary to change the type of government and nature of rule form a simple state based on centralization to a federal compound union, whereby the authorities are distributed among the regional governments and institutions. Such a set-up is compatible with Iraq’s diverse population and an introduction to resolve the Kurdish issue and to recognize their legitimate rights for which they have submitted huge sacrifices. Thus, the Kurds will have independence inside the Kurdish region, which is part of the one state of Iraq that will ensure peace,

security and stability inside Iraq and outside of it. This would dispel fear of a break-up of Iraq and would emphasize the principles of democracy and freedom that cannot be obtained in a dictatorial system because federalism and democracy are interrelated.

Stability and peace cannot be secured in future federal Iraq without recognizing the following bases;

1. Ensure respect for democratic freedoms such as freedom of opinion, expression, thoughts, assembling, belief, peaceful congregation and the likes.
2. Ensure respect for transfer of power by peaceful means through the free and democratic elections.
3. Respect for the principle of multi-political parties and for peaceful political opposition.
4. Emphasize the separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.
5. Separation of state and religion.
6. Maintain the independence of the judicial branch of government.
7. Separate the military establishment from politics and party affiliation.
8. Establish High federal constitutional court in charge of overseeing the application of law or the breach of law in light of the rule of law.
9. Grant equal rights for women to that of man in rights and responsibilities, also secure the maintenance of child's, handicapped and elderly rights.
10. Ensure freedom of religious belief. Institute the principle of religious, ethnic and intellect tolerance. Respect for human rights in accordance to the international charter for human rights and other international declarations.

FIRST - THE KURDISH POSITION IN FUTURE IRAQ

The Kurdish position sees the solution to the Kurdish issue through their independence in managing the affairs of Kurdistan Region. The constitutional relationship between the Kurds and the Arabs ought to be regulated through a federal form of government after the simple form is dismantled and a compound federal union is established. This will ensure that the Kurds will manage the affairs of their region and participate in the political decision-making process of the central federal government based on the decentralization of authorities and policies.

The rest of the ethnic groups such as the Turkuman, Assyrian, and others enjoy full citizenship, parliamentary and judicial rights whether they lived in the Arabic regions or the Kurdish region. These rights include the use of their national language in special schools, establishing their political parties, publishing their own newspapers and fully representing and participating in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. These rights are regulated through the

constitution and a special decree for regulating the rights and responsibilities of ethnic groups. These principles are declared in the draft presented by the Kurdish leadership.

SECOND - POLITICAL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS AND INDEPENDENTS POSITION TO FEDERALISM

Iraqi political parties, movements and independents that participated in Salahuldeen Conference in 1992 adopted Federalism as a solution for the Kurdish issue, which has drained Iraq's resources and affected peace and stability in the area. Moreover, many Iraqi political parties, movements and independents have openly declared the Federal option through their declarations, publications and announcements such as;

1. Iraqi Communist Party.
2. Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
3. Iraqi National Coalition.
4. Iraqi National Congress.
5. Military Conference organized by the Military Coalition in July 2002.
6. Free Iraq Council.
7. Declaration for Iraqi Shiite.
8. Many Independent Iraqi Political Figures.

THIRD - THE POSITION OF OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS (TURKUMAN, ASSYRIAN AND OTHERS)

1. the Position of the Turkuman; Distinction must be made between two parts of Turkuman; the first part represents the majority of Turkuman, live in peace and tolerance in Kurdistan, they are represented in the Kurdish Regional Parliament, participate in the Regional Government and enjoy full citizenship rights as mentioned above. The position of this group of Turkuman is clear and known; they respect the strong bond with Kurds, Arabs and Assyrian. They have real attachment to the soil of Iraq and have no problem with the Kurds enjoying Federalism against securing their citizenship rights. The second part represents a minority, are the Turkuman Front, which has strong ties to Turkey. This group demands self-independence within a large illegitimate geographical border.
2. The Position of the Assyrian; this group is involved in a battle over historical identity among themselves. The Assyrian believe that they and the Chaldean are from the same ethnic origin while some Chaldean reject this notion of

ethnic assimilation. This group live in the Kurdish Region and the Arabic Region. The ones in the Kurdish Region enjoy full citizenship rights similar to the Turkuman, while the ones in the Arabic Region suffer from dictatorship, which persecute all Iraqis of all ethnic backgrounds.

Risks and Hurdles;

1. The Turkish Position; The objections made by Turkey through public announcements and the threat to enter and occupy Kurdistan-Iraq is based on the assumption that a Federal Kurdistan or a Kurdish State represents a danger to the national security of Turkey. There are grave internal problems with the Kurdish population inside Turkey whereby the Kurds human and national rights are abused. Moreover, Turkey demands ethnic rights for the Turkuman and is trying to find a self-government or a federal government for them despite the lack of legal basis for that.
2. Some Iraqi Opposition; Some Iraqi Opposition parties may not accept the concept of Federalism presented by the Kurds as they see fit in light of their legitimate right for self-determination. The fear is that Federalism is the break-up of Iraq; therefore some of the Iraqi Opposition submits a different type of Federalism, which does not conform to Iraq's society. Finally, no Iraqi Group is willing to sacrifice Federalism especially the ones that follow a democratic path.
3. The Kurdish House; The rift inside the Kurdish house is preventing the Federalism for being applied. The last meeting between the two Kurdish Parties (October 2002), the KDP and the PUK is playing a major role in removing these rifts, helping establish Federalism and draw the new Iraq correctly.
4. The struggle for Kurdish Kirkuk; which is inhabited by a majority Kurdish population (48%) as per the 1957 census.

Recommendations, Legal and Political Solutions;

1. International Guarantees for Respecting and Applying Federalism; Any application for Federalism in future Iraq needs international guarantees to ensure stability, security and respect for the Kurdish choice in its relationship with the Arabic Regions and with the other minorities. These guarantees need to be presented by the USA to avoid breach in the form and structure of the Federal State of Iraq and the new civil rule. International guarantees shall dispel concern from all ethnics and religious groups in future Iraq.
2. Internal Guarantees; is achieved through a declaration by the Iraqi Opposition for Federalism for the Kurdish People on Kurdistan Region, during their General Meeting scheduled for November 2002. The Federal choice needs to

be part of the works of the next Transition Government in post Saddam Iraq in accordance to the proposed federal constitution for the state of Iraq.

3. Solving the Kurdish Issue is Key to Solving the Iraqi Issue; through building democratic principles, respect for human rights and democratic institutions, recognition for all ethnic groups without discrimination based on origin, language, religion and others in accordance to the legal and constitutional rights in the new Iraq. Democracy is not the rule of the majority, but is the rule of all and the participation of all.

Based on the above prelude, the constitution needs to be based on a union among THREE regions; (Two Arabic Regions and One Kurdish Region):

- FIRST: Constitution for Federal Iraq
- SECOND: Constitution for Kurdistan Region
- THIRD: Constitution for Arabic Region in the South based on geography
- FOURTH: Constitution for Arabic Region in the Middle based on geography.

Naturally, the option for Federalism for Iraq is an application for the Kurdish people right for self-determination and thus the Kurdish people will decide the nature of the relationship with the Arabic Regions without the need to ask the Arabs through a referendum about their position in regards to Federalism as a future option, but to have a referendum for a draft permanent constitution for the Federal State of Iraq. Consequently separate referenda are needed for Regional Constitutions for each Region.

Legislative Authority: (Parliaments Required in Federal Iraq)

- FIRST - Central Federal Parliament (Legislative Federal Authority)
 1. Representatives' Council
 2. Regional Councils
- SECOND - Local Parliament Elected in Kurdistan (Legislative Authority)
- THIRD - Local Parliament Elected in Arabic Region in the South
- FOURTH - Local Parliament Elected in Arabic Region in the Middle

Executive Authority for Central Federal State:

- FIRST- President of the State (Ceremonial Position for a 4-year term subject to one time extension).
- SECOND- Council of Ministers (Upper Executive Authority)

Upper Federal Constitutional Court (based in Baghdad) looks into specific cases such as;

- The elected President shall read the oath of office in front of the head and

committee of this court.

- Look into and take resolutions in regards to conflicts among the regions or between a region(s) and the Federal government.

Authority's Borders:

The borders between the Kurdish Region and the Arabic Regions shall conform to the proposal submitted by the Kurdish leadership (Draft for the Constitution for the Federal State of Iraq) – The base for the said borders is geographic.

Right for Other Ethnic (Turkuman, Assyrian and others)

Their rights are guaranteed through the citizenship rights in accordance to the constitution, law and international guarantees referred to above.

Responsibilities of the Federal Government;

1. Draw the foreign policy and diplomatic and consulate representation.
2. Sign international treaties and agreements.
3. Defence and armed forces whereas the army is for defence and not offence, joining the military needs to be voluntary and not compulsory for both genders.
4. Print the national currency plan the bank reserve policy and execute federal loans.
5. Economic and development planning.
6. Manage the General Balance of Payment.
7. General Federal Security.
8. Citizenship, immigration and residency for foreign nationals.
9. Power and national resources.

THE ADVANTAGES TO A FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

There are many advantages to a federal democratic republic especially in Iraq where we can find multi-Ethnics, different religions and different opinions. Federalism does not exist in a dictator regime. In Iraq there are two main nationalities (Arabs and Kurds) besides the other minorities such as (Turkuman, Assyrian, Arman).

Federalism should therefore become a corner stone of the new Iraqi body legal-politics. Federalism also abolishes the discrimination between the different nationalities in Iraq, distribute the equity and justice and respect human rights. It can confirm the participation in authorities between regions governments. Therefore federalism has many advantages in countries, which has different nationalities and religions. It is the best solution for the Iraqi problems especially the conflicts between Iraqi government and the Kurd for several decades. The most important advantage to a federalism democratic republic is to keep the unity of the Iraqi state.

Which civil and political rights should be enumerated in Iraq's future constitution?

The civil rights that should be enumerated in Iraq's future constitution are:

1. The life right.
2. The right of the physical safety.
3. The thinking and the expression freedom.
4. The right of the religious belief and the non-religious belief and the right of changing religious belief.
5. The agreement freedom.
6. The move and travel right without restrictions.
7. The right of ownership and non-confiscation of properties.
8. Each person should have a nationality. And should not be dropped does from him.
9. The correspondences and communications secrecy right without any espionage from any authority.
10. And many other rights which are mentioned in the international declaration of human rights.

Which women's rights should be highlighted in the future of Iraq?

The women's rights that should be highlighted are:

1. The complete equality in the rights and the duties with the man.
2. The work right by equal wages with the man.
3. The right of equal chances between the man and the woman.
4. The body protection right from any violence treatment, rape crimes and circumcision.
5. The Right of husband selection.
6. Protection from the honour killing.
7. Protection from the polygamy.
8. The kindergarten rights.
9. The Right of free travel and movement without limits (without Mohram).
10. The right of undertaking of all of the political positions and the judicial and administrative one.
11. The right of voting and candidature.
12. Protection Right from the coercion on the marriage. And the right of non-marriage before the maturity.
13. The abortion Right.
14. Law legislation about sexual harassment is needed.

IN HOC SIGNO VINCES

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM IN THE BALKAN WARS 1991-1995

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*See now, how men lay blame upon us Gods
for what is after all nothing but their own folly.*
Homer, The Odyssey, 1st Book

DISCOURSE OF IRRATIONALIZATION

Some of the most common explanations for the Balkan wars of the 1990s have been that they were, in the final instance, religious wars, or the consequence of national incompatibilities and cultural differences, or a return of old myths, or a thirst for revenge for historical injustices, or the logical result of the bloodthirsty »national character« of the Balkan peoples, etc. Deliberately or not, both local and foreign commentators perceived these developments as being rationally inexplicable, spontaneous, completely unreasonable, contrary to any sense. In sharp contrast to – for example – the Gulf war, the Balkan wars were comprehended and portrayed as obscure, dirty, mean, uncivilised, cruel, etc.

Needless to say, every social action – in our case war – has parallel »rational« and »irrational« dimensions which must be studied carefully. Belligerent groups were very often from different religious and ideological backgrounds. If we limit ourselves to the »profanized« 20th century, we find mythic constructs, religious rhetoric and archaic iconography at different times and in different parts of the world. Many nations perceived themselves as the Most Ancient, even Holy, Sacred, Heavenly, as the Christ among nations, as the Elected, or on a God-given mission to fulfil; others are self-declared warrants of democracy or cultured nations; military campaigns were labelled Crusades; various dictators were glorified as being sent (or chosen) by God Himself, or as the incorporation of the Will of the Nation; politicians often refer to religious tradition and values and swear before God at their inauguration; the struggle of the proletariat against the ruling classes was interpreted in terms of a cosmic struggle between Good and Evil; Holy Wars were fought in different parts of the world by different religious fundamentalists; the cleansing of their different enemies was constitutive for many new states and régimes; an "Eternal Allies versus Eternal Enemies" opposition could be found on many of the warring sides, as could the notion of the Last Bastion of the religion or civilization in question; borders were perceived as sacred, historic, untouch-

able; enemies were often demonized, animalised, bestialised etc.

It is, of course, not my intention to exonerate belligerent South Slav religious nationalists – I disapprove of them as much as I do of any other militants or fundamentalists. I simply wish to emphasise that the battle cry *In hoc signo vinces* was heard across the world throughout the »age of the extremes«, to borrow a phrase from Eric Hobsbawm. In other words, the catastrophic Hobbesian war of all against all is certainly not some kind of Balkan peculiarity, nor is the significance of the role of religion, its rhetoric and its symbols. Therefore, the same questions must be asked anytime such phenomena appear anywhere in the world. Other than the hasty and overly simplistic explanations mentioned above, I view and treat the use – or misuse – of religious iconography, symbols and discourse, and mythological rhetoric in the last Balkan wars in the following context: as a very specific version or and regional manifestation of the broader phenomena of the religionization of politics, the nation, place, time, neighbouring groups, etc.

In my opinion, the »irrationalization« of the Balkan wars in first half of the nineties (un)intentionally hides their main motives and causes which, in chronological order, are as follows: firstly, the plan to reunite Yugoslavia under the leadership of the non-reformist segments of the League of Communists and Army hard-liners; secondly, prompted also by the ineffective policies of the international community, the great-national policies and aggressions towards Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. All these goals – reunitarization and territorial conquests – and the methods in which they were realised were undoubtedly strategically well organized, »rational« and pre-planned.

The obvious attempts to irrationalize recent Balkan history – i.e., to reduce the conflict to a matter of nationalist madness and religious zeal, to a spontaneous and somewhat naive barbarity, a revival of age-old hatreds, etc. – combine two particular aspects. Firstly, the theoretical, is the discourse of Orientalism and the thesis – one of the most popularised in the 1990s – of unavoidable cultural conflicts in the contemporary world (in place of the political and ideological conflicts of bygone eras). The second is political: the deliberate avoidance of responsibility and feigned ignorance by the main culprits for the war.

INSTRUMENTALIZED OR INSTRUMENTALIZING?

If we limit ourselves to the religious aspects of the wars, we are faced with a fundamental dilemma. Were religions and religious communities and symbols used by nationalist politics/policies in their grand nationalist schemes? Or, conversely, did they exploit nationalist euphoria and policies in achieving their own religious goals? Were they instrumentalized or did they instrumentalize? In short, did they play an active or passive role in the most recent Balkan history?

I think both. My answer to these question might seem paradoxical only initially. To certain religious integrists, political developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s presented an excellent opportunity for the long-awaited re-Christianization and re-Islamization of the national, political and cultural identity of »their« nations, and the reaffirmation of their dominant position in society. The already belated modernist differentiation and pluralization of these societies seemed to have lost to radical pre-modernist de-differentiation. Religious institutions rapidly became an important part of the dominant national / political / religious / cultural meta-platform and strategy.

This total – and totalitarian - alliance between nationalist policies and religious communities and institutions was one of mutual benefit: national, political and, ultimately, military mobilization could not be achieved without religious legitimization, whilst, on the other hand, religious communities were unable to achieve their goals without the active support of nationalist parties and politics in general. Religious elements became an important part of the process of »the ethnification of politics and the politicization of ethnicity« (as described by Vrcan, 2001).

In other words: in this integristic process of religio-national re-traditionalization , the one needed and strengthened the other: religious institutions lent legitimacy to and opened perspectives for chauvinist politics, and vice versa. Or, in the words of Radovan Karadžić, not a single important decision was made without the Church (Mojzes, 1998, 89; for a similar quotation, see Radić, 1998, 176, 177). Likewise, Bosnian ex-Franciscan Provincial Petar Anđelović admits that the Church initially supported the major Croatian political party, but later reversed its policies and became critical of it (Anđelović, 2000, 207, 208). The major Muslim/Bosniak party was also influenced by Panislamic traditionalist groupings and currents within the Bosnian Islamic religious community (see Bougarel, 1999; L. Cohen, 1998, 58; Zulfikarpašić, 1995).

The long Balkan tradition of pluralism dates to the Middle Ages: the Balkans have been a place of meeting, symbiosis, conflict, collaboration, syncretism, etc., for several religions (and different sects within them): Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, Bosnian Church, Jewish, Uniate (Greek Catholic), and some others. In clear contrast to their self-declared universalistic character , religions in the Balkans (as elsewhere!) feigned specific regional, national, local characteristics: they were/are all »ethnized« or »nationalized« in a similar way. This becomes particularly obvious in the religio-national mythologies of these nations. The Christoslavic religio-national mythology – in our case that of the Serbs and Croats – consists of two basic beliefs: that Slavs are Christian by nature and that any conversion from Christianity is a betrayal of the Slavic race (Sells 1996, 36, 47, 51). In short, Christoslavism represents radical Orthodox Pan-Serbian or Catholic Pan-Croatian mythology , whose ultimate goal is a mono-confessional, nationally

(and preferably politically) homogenized state.

But almost identical mytho-logic can be observed also on the third side: according to the advocates of the Bosniak religio-national integrist mythology, all Bosniaks are inevitably Muslims. One-and-a-half years before the outbreak of war, Izetbegović characterized the Muslims/Bosniaks as a religious nation (L. Cohen, 1998, 60). Although the role and influence of religious communities and hierarchies before and during the last wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were quite different, all the warring parties also employed religious symbols in their nationalist/political mobilization and military efforts. As a rule, dominant religious communities sided with the major political parties of »their« nations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the result of such collective politics on a largely secularized population soon became evident.

Opinions about the nationalist and militaristic role of religious communities in the Balkans from the late 1980s differ considerably from author to author. However, the majority claim that the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church was »the most harmful« (Mojzes, 1998, 84), in comparison to the other two major religious communities. Sells even points out that in Bosnia, the Serbian Orthodox Church became a servant of religious nationalist militancy (Sells, 1996, 79), and - at the beginning - supported Slobodan Milošević's politics (Markotich, 1996, 30). According to L. Cohen, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was inclined towards the largest Croatian political party, which was openly pro-Christian, but also wished to preserve its hard-won autonomy (L. Cohen, 1998, 63). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were considerable differences in this regard between the stands of Catholic clergy and the Franciscans in Herzegovina and in Bosnia. For Bougarel, the role of the Islamic Community in the nationalist mobilization of the Bosniaks was particularly blatant (Bougarel, 1996, 96).

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM IN THE BALKAN WARS

Only if we recognise the similarities between the broader phenomena can we emphasise the specific characteristics of a certain process or area. My presentation will concentrate only on one aspect of the recent Balkan wars, namely, the spectrum of use of religious symbolism by the three warring sides: Orthodox on the Serbian, Roman Catholic on the Croatian and Islamic on the Bosniak side. These examples must be treated and understood in a broader context of the above-mentioned integrist, religio-national mythologies, Christoslavic or Muslim/Bosniak. A comparative and socio-historical analytical approach can, to some degree, elucidate how traditional religious symbols were renewed and how new religious symbols were »traditionalized« during that period; how they were »nationalized« and »politicized«; what elements of religious heritage were most often applied;

and how these symbols were exploited for military operations and the politics of ethnic/religious cleansing. Due to restrictions on space, I shall only present the basis for a further, more profound analysis.

1. Use of traditional religious symbols

Universal religious symbols (the cross for the Orthodox and Catholic; the Crescent, the colour green, and Qur'anic inscriptions), or religious symbols that had already been »nationalized« (e.g., the Serbian Orthodox symbol /four S-es surrounding a cross/, or the combination of the cross and the Croatian coat-of-arms /the so-called chessboard/), were used regularly by the warring sides, either individually or as part of broader political or military symbolism. They were worn on uniforms, as personal military decor (e.g., badges bearing religious symbols, green bands tied around the forehead with(out) Qur'anic inscriptions, rosaries), and on military equipment and weapons, flags etc. Uniforms and appearance were sometimes inspired by religious or religio-national tradition, e.g., beards and Islamic outfits on the Bosniak side, and Chetnik-like attire on the Serbian side. Some Bosniak military units assumed names that were inspired by their religion, and in which rigorous religious customs were practised (e.g., the Green Berets, El Mujahidin, the Green Legion, Muslim Brigades). Among their number were volunteers from various Islamic states.

2. Use of traditional religious slogans and salutation

Some of the most common traditional religious slogans and synthagmas used in military and nationalist rhetoric over the last ten years have been God and the Croats; God protects the Serbs; A Serb is protected by St. Sava and God; God is most Great , etc. Salutations included So help you God, Heroes! , the three-finger Serbian Orthodox salute, benediction under the sign of the cross, the use of the expressions brothers and sisters, and many more. Army chaplains – Christian and Muslim - were to be found in almost every military unit; religious practices, customs and symbols were introduced to military life, barracks and units. Religious services and rituals – including the blessing of units and weapons - were often conducted by local religious dignitaries; the most important services and rituals were conducted by senior clergymen, such as bishops. They regularly visited their troops in the liberated territories. On such occasions, the images of (erstwhile) political leaders and military commanders were displayed alongside icons, images of important religious personalities and symbols.

The sites of dramatic historic and religious events became the destinations and sites of religio-national pilgrimages and rituals (Medjugorje for the Croats, Ajvatovica for the Bosniaks, the tombs of second-world-war Ustasha victims for the Serbs); religious feasts were turned into national holidays (Easter, Assumption,

Christmas, St. Vitus' Day, the Bajram, commemoration of the battle of Badr, and the night of the Might) and were celebrated in public buildings. Marching songs and political hymns declared religio-national unity and unanimity.

On the eve of war, the skeletal remains of fallen and tortured compatriots from were exhumed and ritually reburied; the ceremonial procession carrying the remains of Prince Lazar through Serbia proper, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1988 was of a similar nature. A number of high-ranking religious dignitaries - victims of the second world war or post-war violence, who were tortured and killed for religious and national causes - were canonized: Orthodox Metropolit Dositej Vasić and bishops Petar Zimonjić, Sava Trljajić and Platon Jovanović in June 1998, and Catholic Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac in October of the same year. In some of the more militant Croatian Roman Catholic circles, similar homage was conferred on a number of important personalities from the wartime Ustasha régime , and on the Serbian side, to Chetnik commanders.

Contemporary political and military leaders received a flattering religious reputation as well: Karadžić and Ratko Mladić were said to be following the thorny path of Christ. The first received a decoration from the Greek Orthodox Church, which declared him one of the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ working for peace (Sells, 1996, 85). Similar courtesies, exaltation and consecration were afforded by high-ranking Orthodox dignitaries to another controversial protagonist of the Balkan wars - Željko Ražnatović Arkan. For some Islamic believers, Izetbegović became a fighter for Islam, sent by God to lead the Muslims along the true path (Zulfikarpašić, 1995, 144, 172), the first person after Muhammad to reveal and fulfil the ultimate truth (Miroslav Jančić in Mojzes, 1998, 94). Saudi King Fahd awarded Izetbegović with a medal for his contribution to the spread of Islam.

3. Interpretation of political developments in religious terms

As Hastings points out (1997, 18), »the Bible, moreover, presented in Israel itself a developed model of what it means to be a nation – a unity of people, language, religion, territory and government«. In the Balkans, historical and contemporary developments were interpreted in religious terms: analogies were made between contemporaries and episodes and personalities from the Scriptures or the religious history of their own nation. In some Orthodox circles, for example, the Serbs were referred to as Christ's Nation, the Holy or Suffering Nation, the Bearers of the Truth and Divine Justice, the avant-garde of the Slav world and Orthodoxy. Serbia was again referred to as Heavenly, etc. Similar constructs were also to be found on the Croatian side (Eternal or Holy Croatia; protected by the Virgin Mary). The triumphant Croatian military operation »Tempest« in August 1995 was seen as testimony that this nation (Croatia, remark by MV) is at certain times touched by

God (Vrcan, 2001, footnote 11 on page 207).

In both cases, tragic episodes from the past and present of both nations have been variously interpreted as Golgotha, the Crucifixion, Calvary or the Way of the Cross, their land has been declared Sacred, as our Jerusalem or our Palestine, etc. The self-victimizing discourse – such as »only our nation/religion suffers« – exculpated political action and military operations. In Karadžić's words, our deaths, suffering and endurance, we accept as God's grace (Powers, 1998, 236). Bosnian Muslims were said to be making sacrifices to safeguard Islam by identifying its enemies (Zulfikarpašić, 1995, 172).

As a rule, political decisions and military operations received religious argumentation and legitimation, and were openly supported by some religious media and in public statements made by religious dignitaries. Thus, they were exalted as actions - for example - in the name of God, Manifestations of the Faith, Struggle for Christ and Europe, Sacred Duty, self-defence, war of liberation, fight for the Holy Cross, etc. Fallen soldiers became martyrs or Knights of the Faith (and the Nation) who made voluntary sacrifices for their religion and nation in the struggle against the infidels. Their tombs and monuments were designed as religious objects (in form and with religious inscriptions and symbols, etc.). All sides searched for the help of their co-religionists, who suddenly became Ancient if not Eternal Allies: there were initiatives to create a so-called Orthodox Circle (an association of all countries with an Orthodox majority), or a narrower Balkan Orthodox Union ; the Bosniaks »discovered« a long-lasting friendship with Muslim (Arabic) countries; whilst the Croats found the same in Western (Catholic) countries and the Vatican.

4. Demonization of the enemy

In religio-national policies and military operations, the first step towards the destruction of the enemy is their symbolic inferiorization and dehumanization. In the racist discourse, they become inferior, animal-like creatures; in the religio-national discourse, they are cursed by God. This infernalization and demonization of adversaries was characteristic to all three sides: as though entrapped in some kind of "laboratory of hatred", the enemy was condemned as genocidal, diabolical, etc. Myths about religious conspiracies emerged: for Serbian religious nationalists, these were about the Vatican (and German) plot, and the Pope's servants - Italy, Austria and Germany; the conspiracy of Western Powers ; the Green Transversal (Ankara-Tirana-Sarajevo) and the conspiracies by Islamic fundamentalists (and Ustasha butchers).

If we limit ourselves only to insults related to religious identities, the Serbian extremists (and the Croatian during Croatian-Bosniak clashes) labelled the Bosniaks as jihad fighters, mujahidins, janissaries, brothers in fez, whose final

ambition was to turn Bosnia into a state modelled on the Qur'an, an Islamic fundamentalist state, or a Libya-style Jamahiriyyah, in which non-Muslims would become slaves, etc. In the chauvinistic media, Izetbegović became the world's foremost soldier of the jihad or the leader of the Muslim terrorists. Croat religious nationalists feared Orthodox conspiracies or alleged plans to create an Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alarmist discourse also appeared in some Bosniak circles, which identified evil-minded plots, the Crusades launched by both enemies sides and by a Christian Europe. Thus, religio-nationalist extremists from all sides justified their policies not only as a defence of their own nation, but also as shields, last bastions or fortresses of – respectively – the Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim world. An obsessive paranoia of being surrounded by the enemies (of the faith) triumphed. As Hobsbawm wrote, “there is no more effective way of bonding together the disparate sections of restless peoples than to unite them against outsiders” (Hobsbawm, 1995, 91).

If our faith is the only right and righteous one, then that of the enemy (or of religious minorities within their own nations) is scorned as being false, foreign, heretical, superstitious, and even sacrilegious. According to this logic of symbolic diades, the elimination of other faiths – religious and ethnic cleansing - became a religious duty; killing is no longer considered as “homicide”, but as a “malicide”, the liquidation of the evil. Many clerics were killed or injured during the clashes and ethnic cleansing campaigns. However, political adversaries and critics within a nation were also demonized by militant religious nationalists: for example, after abandoning his Greater Serbian policy, Milošević was characterized as the Anti-christ from Dedinje, his ideology as sombre and his régime as alien to Orthodox tradition and the essence of the Serbian nation (whereas those in Knin and Pale were exemplary). According to Panislamist Latić, secularized Bosniak intellectuals are more dangerous to us than the Chetniks (Bougarel, 2000, 90).

Non-integrist ideas, political parties and individuals were also many times condemned by religious nationalists on all three sides as atheistic, nihilistic, a(nti)-national, foreign, modernist, pro-Western, liberal, left-oriented, etc. Similarly, the Socialist régime was perceived as being (in)directly responsible for the outbreak of hatred and violence because of its desertion of the Bible/Qur'an and because of its immorality and Godless, soulless, secularist and anti-Serb/Croat/Muslim orientation. The false and dangerous logic that there exists only one type of conflict, namely, between faith and nihilism, and that *Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*, reappeared.

5. Destruction of the enemy's sacral objects

In militarist logic, victory is complete when it is accompanied with the symbolic triumph over the enemy. The buildings that were most often systematically de-

stroyed throughout the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina - either in military operations or following conquest - were religious objects: mosques, churches, chapels, monasteries etc. According to some estimates, 1,000 to 1,100 mosques were ruined, in addition to approximately 340 Orthodox and 450 Roman Catholic churches and monasteries (Powers, 1998, footnote 68 on page 240; Velikonja, 1998, 309). As has been the case throughout history, the religious symbols of the conquerors were built over the ruins of the sanctuaries of the vanquished. Territory must be symbolically appropriated and the sign of victory "engraved in stone": e.g., Croatian forces erected a huge concrete cross in place of a destroyed mosque in Počitelj (Vrcan, 2001, 22).

First to raze, first to erect: it is also very symptomatic that sacral building (churches, mosques, etc.) were among the first objects to be restored or rebuilt after the war. Reconstruction was often sponsored by foreign countries or their religious communities (Greek Orthodox Church, Islamic Community /often from Saudi Arabia/, Roman Catholic Church etc.). The first synagogue to be built in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1945 is expected to be completed in Mostar by the end of 2002; the foundation stone was laid in early May 2001. Such reconstruction is practically impossible on territory conquered by the adversary: the recent events in Trebinje on May 5 and Banja Luka on May 7, 2001 - when Serbian extremists held violent protests against the ceremonies at which foundations were to be laid for new mosques intended to replace the destroyed ones - are sad and not uncommon examples. These (and other less obvious) examples clearly show that in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina - here I invert Clausewitz - peace is just the continuation of the war »with other means«.

6. Eloquent silence

In such situations, that which is not uttered is as important as that which is: silence can be more eloquent than words. Not only explicit, but also another - indirect - symbolic act of religious institutions must be pointed out here: namely, their sinister silence regarding the obvious and systematic persecution and liquidation of believers of other faiths, and the destruction of their (religious) infrastructure. In other words, significant was not only »hate-speech« but also »hate-silence«. Only rarely have the moderate representatives of the religious hierarchies reacted and condemned the act committed by their compatriots/co-religionists, distanced themselves from the blatant manipulation of religious justification, rhetoric and symbols, and explicitly rejected religious nationalists of »their own« faith/nation.

UNSUITABILITY OF APRIORISM

Religions, their traditional symbols and rhetoric remain important and extremely persuasive elements of contemporary national and political mythologies and their

iconography. Although latently present all the time, they are particularly exposed during the critical periods in a nation's history. As such, they must not be treated as something that is neither a priori tolerant nor militant; neither in advance conciliative nor destructive; neither necessarily oriented toward friendship nor toward enmity; neither a priori zealot nor well-intentioned. In short, they are neither hateful nor peaceful in advance: their current interpretations and practical activities make them become such. The cross and the crescent are easily transformed into the sword, and the brilliance of faith, as comprehend by believers, into the glare of the blade. The step from mythomaniac theory to bloodthirsty terror is a small one; any creed can be transformed into a ruthless beast.

This short introductory presentation illustrates how nationalized, politicized and militarized religious symbolism (and religious communities in general) was not only the consequence of the recent catastrophic events in the Balkans, but also one of the sources; not only the conclusion but also one of the origins. The hidden hypothesis of this outstanding attention to the religious dimensions and iconography of Balkan warfare – promoted by local religious nationalists and some foreign or local simplistic or malevolent interpreters – is that the problems between these nations are irrational and cannot be solved in a rational way. In such a narrow-minded or malicious and destructive discourse, the differences – between Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and other nations; Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims, Jews, other believers and atheists – seem too large to be bridged and, as such, the predominant source of the recent hatred and warfare and an instant explanation for it.

Such inciting and irrationalizing discourse can be successfully rejected, firstly, by carefully studying the whole complexity of the causes of the tragedies, i.e. the parallelism between the well-planned, »rational« causes (i.e. Realpolitik) and the »irrational«, mythical and symbolic causes; secondly, by a profound analysis of this particular aspect, namely, the statements, behaviour and actions of religious institutions, the clergy and, indeed, the believers themselves; and thirdly, by recollecting the rich multinational, multireligious and multicultural tradition of the Balkans. Only after doing this can all the involved parties and institutions – including religious – indeed reflect on their attitudes and activities during this period.

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DEMOCRATIZATION - WEAPON AGAINST TERRORISM

For the majority of political analysts and experts the question is no longer whether there will be a war in Iraq or not, but when, how and ... what (is) will be its purpose? Regardless of the fact that the Iraqi regime has agreed to the return of inspectors who were barred from Iraq in 1998 prior to the operation the Desert Fox.

Once again, the question of overthrowing Saddam Hussein has become the major issue: because of the production of weapons of mass destruction or because of the Iraqi oil stocks. The latter amount to 220 billion barrels, and the country also has 30 trillion m³ of gas stocks. Is the reason hiding in the fertile Mesopotamia where two million Palestinian refugees could be settled, or in the new political map of the Middle East where the USA would replace the non-democratic regimes with the democratic ones? Iraq is the beginning of one of the series of democratisation processes of the Middle East which according to Dr. Bernard Lewis, professor at the Princeton University, metaphorically presents a game of dominoes. Baghdad is the dice and when it is cast the other dominoes will start to fall successively.

US President George Bush has announced the course of events in relation to Iraq at the United Nations General Assembly Session: 1) in his speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, President Bush was clear that the American goal is not only the return of inspectors but also additional conditions inherent in former resolutions of the Security Council (No 1284 of 17 December 1999, No 1051 of 17 December 1999, No 715 of 11 October 1991, No 707 of 15 November 1991) binding Iraq to destroy the weapons of mass destructions; 2) the Iraqi regime has to resolve the conflict with Kuwait, i.e. the questions of missing persons and war indemnity (Resolution No 686 of 3 March 1991 and No 687 of 3 April 1991); 3) resolutions No 688 of 5 April 1991 and No 949 of 15 September 1994 bind Iraq to stop persecutions of civilian population and minorities.

In his speech to the General Assembly, Bush advocated the dissolution of the Iraqi repressive apparatus and public prosecution of the Iraqi leaders. However, Saddam Hussein definitely can not fulfil these conditions, since it would mean the end of his authority. In that case, Bush has checkmated Saddam Hussein.

Undoubtedly, there is a plan for overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but there is also a chance that no real scenario has been prepared. According to STRATFOR, American intelligence analyses agency, the American Administration has several variants of the scenario and is ready to initiate at any moment one or even more scenarios simultaneously: 1) The desert turbulence: a fierce air assault with radar-guided invisible bombers to command posts; 2) The desert chopping: a strong and continuous offensive which would chop off some areas and regions from Baghdad and transfer their governance to the opposition; 3) The desert storm II: a strong

offensive from air which would cause a military and economic collapse of the country; 4) The desert thunder: bombing of Baghdad and of the positions of the Republican Guard with various weapons and in various ways.

The experts and co-workers of the IFIMES institute believe the Iraqi forces (except Israel) still to be the strongest in the Middle East, although at least 40% of its capacities were lost during the Desert Storm operation. In the regular composition, Iraqi forces count 430 thousand soldiers and the incredible 6.6 million reservists ("the Jerusalem Army"). Iraq has 2,200 tanks (of which 700 are type T-72 tanks), 3,700 armoured personnel carriers, 2,400 artillery weapons – they have preserved some 20-50 SCUD rocket missiles, 316 aircraft (air force is composed of 30 thousand men), while the navy counts 2,000 men and is armed with land-to-sea missiles and sea mines.

The two strongest components of the Iraqi forces are the Republican Guard (60,000 men), which occupied Kuwait in a lightning three-hour military operation, and the Special Republican Guard (15,000 men) under the command of Saddam's son Qusey. The Republican Guard provides the defence of Baghdad and of the cities of Kirkuk and Basra.

AMERICAN EXPORT OF DEMOCRACY

There is no doubt that the Americans already have a silent agreement and consent of Russia and China for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. France is changing its viewpoint and the European Union, according to Prime Minister Rasmussen from EU presiding Denmark, believes that the Americans need no special resolution since they are already backed by previous resolutions.

The Arab regimes have the form of monarchies or presidential monarchies (Saddam appointed his son Qusey successor to the throne, Hafez al Asada was succeeded by his son Bashaar, eventually Hosni Mubarak also appointed his son Jamal successor...). The Arab regimes will, instead of shedding tears for Saddam Hussein, fear their own fate in spite of the declared resistance to the intervention. As vividly described by sheik Hamad ben Jasim Al-Thani, foreign minister of Qatar: "The Americans and the United American HQ have been at the Alidedh base for three years. We have informed the Gulf states thereof, even though they say now they were not informed..."

"The Arab states will not hinder action against Iraq" said Lieutenant-General of Israeli defence forces to the audience at the auditorium of Institute for Political Studies in Hertzli.

THE RESPONSE OF THREE HUNDRED MILLION ARABS AND ONE BILLION MUSLIMS

Bush Administration has recognized that the end of totalitarian regimes in the Middle East is approaching. During 50 years of cold war the Americans defeated the communist regimes in East Europe and Central Asia. Iraq is the first phase of a new long lasting process in the Middle East.

In any case, the Arab masses are sceptical about American plans. The regime-controlled media in those states present the USA as the aggressor against their traditional values and the war against terrorism as the war against Islam. The Arab media have not mentioned Bush's speech immediately after the attack on the WTC which he delivered at the Islam centre in New York nor the speech given by the very prominent Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, both saying that the USA are not at war with the liberal Islam. America has not succeeded in bringing its view point closer to the Muslim masses despite the appointment of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (Charlotte Beers), nor has it managed to present the goals of American politics such as peace in the Middle East, tolerance and promotion of democracy in the Arab society.

Nevertheless, majority of Iraqis will await American liberators in the streets, expecting them to bring the democracy and human rights they have waited so long for, as Vice President Cheney clearly put it in his speech delivered on 29 August 2002. Perhaps Cheney founded his statement on the opinion given by Dr Fuad Ajmy, professor of political studies at the John Hopkins University, who recommends the USA not to pay too much attention to the reactions of Arab masses.

EQUATION: DEMOCRACY AND WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

Democracy and war against terrorism are two strongly interrelated ideas. All radical Islam organisations have emerged in non-democratic Arab states which suffer great political and social pressures. Islam Jihad, Jamaa Islami-GIA in Egypt and other organisations are the results of social and political repression exerted by Naser, Sadat and their bloody revenge on Muslim brothers, communists and trade unions. Hamas is the product of irrational policy of corrupt Palestinian authority led by Arafat and of Likud-led repression under the leadership of Prime Minister Sharon. In Iraq, SCIRI is the reaction of the majority Shiite population, in Algeria, GEA has resulted from the socialist reign of Hawari Bomidien, Osama bin Laden and al-Quaeda are products of official policy of certain Muslim countries. Al-Quaeda was a tool used during the cold war in Afghanistan, Kashmir etc. where Islam was the disguise for achieving goals in the global context.

According to the opinion of Graham Foller, known American analyst, the end of

Saddam Hussein's regime will positively affect the atmosphere in the region. The Iraqi regime is the worst of the bad Arab regimes. Eventually, the nations in the region will be convinced of the sincere intentions of American Administration.

The IFIMES Institute proposes constant presence of Americans in Iraq and setting up of military bases in Iraq. Present deployment of forces is namely irrational and American Administration will have to take advantage of the positive effects of intervention to support the reform movements in the region and in this way clearly express a threat to those most resistant who can await a similar fate as Saddam Hussein. The USA have rich experience in interventions and establishment of democracy: Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan etc.

Radical Islam organisations have taken advantage of the suffering of Islam masses in order to impose its (destructive) ideologies of solution. Events following 11 September have beyond doubt caused a heavy blow for those movements and weakened their political and manoeuvring position. In the ideological sense they have lost credibility among the followers and are consequently facing the stage of internal conflicts and fractioning. Their fate and consolidation depend on what democratic alternative can they offer in their countries. However, there are almost no such alternatives or they are weak due to lack of democratic tradition, economic-social crises and overall state corruption.

Radical organisations such as Al-Qaeda did not manage to recruit Muslim masses against the intervention in Afghanistan in spite of fierce and mortal American bombing and consequent civil victims or even revengeful march of the North Alliance (Mazari Sharif) against Taliban. Today, radical organisations actually live only thanks to the differences in interpretations of the idea of terrorism between Islam and the West.

The "Conspiracy Theory" prevails in all analyses of terrorist organisations in relation with American politics towards the Arabs and Muslims. Fundamentalist organisations are divided on the basis of ideology and goals. Some call for military resistance and terrorism while others, on the contrary, condemn those methods. Certain movements have a national connotation, such as the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Palestine. These organisations see themselves as national liberation movements in contrast to Vehab ultra radical movements which have expanded since 11 September even in some countries with no history of such movement (Lebanon and Morocco). Fundamentalist organisations in the Gulf have expanded and strengthened in the past two decades as a result of powerful missionary activities in Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan and eventually in Bosnia, and mainly due to vast funds allocated in the framework of humanitarian organisation. During the 1980s, they were also supported by the West in neutralising the Soviet interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Examples are Shiitic export of Islam revolution to Egypt and the Gulf states and support of Islam groups in Bosnia as a counterweight to Serbian nationalism. Present

organisations are facing a major crisis as they operate in groups that are too small to sustain the opposing influence of their governments.

The USA have recognised that there would be no 11 September without the silent support of such (terrorist) organisations by certain regimes. Iraq is beyond doubt one of them. The basis of such ideologies is hatred towards the West expressed in the media, educational programs, activities of humanitarian organisations etc. After all, this was at least symbolically confirmed by a group action brought against three Saudi princes by the relatives of victims of 11 September. American Senator John McCain has clearly accused Saudi Arabia of supporting terrorism since 15 attackers of WTC were Saudi citizens. Some states took the message from Washington very seriously. Saudi Arabia was one of them and at the meeting between Bush and Saudi Prince Bandar it was agreed that Saudi Arabia would finance half of the costs of intervention in Iraq. However, nobody has denied nor confirmed the agreement until now. Crown Prince Abdullah has called the religious leaders at a meeting to openness to the world, tolerance and spreading of real values of Islam instead of hatred. Libya has agreed to pay the indemnity for relatives of the victims of aircraft tragedy in Lockerbie, Iran has handed over 16 members of Al-Qaeda to Saudi Arabia which later delivered them to the Americans.

Dr Bernard Lewis from Princeton University believes that hatred of Muslims towards the West is partly hidden in support which the USA provided to inhumane and repressive Muslim regimes. He told that to President Bush at a private dinner. However, Lewis also believes that the USA will win favour and trust of the Arab people who have been waiting much too long for democracy. This support is a much better weapon than all available nuclear and conventional armament America possessed which proved to be of no use on 11 September last year.

The experts and co-workers of the IFIMES institute share the opinion that the USA are making progress in their efforts to achieve reforms and democratisation in the Middle East. The USA should establish direct communication with Muslim nations instead of through corrupt and hateful regimes and regime-controlled media. Those nations will eventually become partners and allies of the USA and the West.

America should consider a variant of the Marshall Plan for the Middle East. Not only in the economic scope but also, and above all, in political and social sense. As regards the security, it would be recommendable to consider the establishment of military alliance as a factor of stability in the region, such as the NATO Partnership for Peace in Europe.

The European Union has to be more actively involved in the resolving of accumulated problems in the Middle East. The latter should not become the stumbling block and reason for competition between EU and the USA. The European Union, having the neighbouring position with the Middle East (which the USA do not have) should play an active role in the economic and political reconstruction of the Middle East.

The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has specially for the September issue of "Obramba" ("Defence Monthly"), a Slovenian professional journal dealing with defence-military issues, prepared an analysis of events going on in Sudan. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below.

SUDAN: TERRORISM YESTERDAY, OIL TODAY

During the 1990s, Sudan was of central interest to the world public, since this poor country, though rich in unexploited resources, gave shelter to Osama bin Laden after he lost his Saudi citizenship. In Sudan, the idea of al-Quaeda developed and reached its final stage – realisation and establishment of the infrastructure network. The Saudi millionaire took good advantage of the welcome expressed by the then Islamic Sheriat government led by Alturabi. He invested money in the construction of religious schools and some factories, especially pharmaceutical plants in Khartoum, thus gaining the ultimate favour of the government and especially of the Sudanese people.

Osama bin Laden was exiled from Sudan under the pressures of the USA and different targets in Sudan were bombed including a pharmaceutical plant and terrorist training centres in Khartoum (1998). In 1997, the UNO Security Council sanctions were introduced. America started to openly support the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which has been fighting the Sudanese government back since 1983.

Today, Sudan is of central interest due to the Machakos peace agreement (Kenya, 20 July 2002) between the SPLA and the Sudanese government, which is perhaps one of the results of the antiterrorist fight after 11 September. The Sudanese government has namely finally shown understanding about the south regarding its autonomy and changed relations with the central government in Khartoum. The peace agreement at the same time represents a serious step towards the end of bloody violence between the Muslims and the Christians. However, it contains only certain complex issues such as the state and religion while the issues of oil revenue and of the borderline between the north and the south remain open and perhaps a hard nut to crack. The South does not recognise the administrative border drawn by the British and strives to gain certain territories in the east and west of the country. Basically, the agreement envisages a six-year transitional period followed by a referendum on self-determination of the south. The central government has committed itself to increase investments in this part of the country in order to encourage the people of the south to vote for unity of the state after the interim period of six years expires.

All sides are in favour of the ultimate peace. At the meeting of Christian churches

(organised by the World Church Council) in Kenyan Kosom, the SPLA agreed under the pressure of WCC to continue talks in Machakos (in November this year). General John Garang said that the south would vote for unity if the relations in this part of the country changed significantly.

In relation to the issue of Sudan we should not forget that we have seen yet no end to mutual accusations between Israel and Sudan. Sudan is accusing Israel of providing weapons to and training the SPLA members. As Israel's ally, Eritreia is actively involved in this activity providing logistic support to the SPLA. On the other hand, Israel is accusing Sudan of training Palestinian engineers from the Hamas terrorist group for the preparation of explosives. The IFIMES Institute believes the truth about these mutual accusations is to be found on both sides.

AMERICAN INTEREST IN SUDAN

Due to oil stocks in Sudan, especially in the south, Chinese and European companies have been offensively penetrating this country. The USA have become interested in these movements. President Bush has named special US envoy for Sudan, John Danforth, former influential Republican senator from Missouri. The USA have shown strong interest in being present in the region as well as stabilising the situation and restoring bilateral relations with the country which, not long ago, supported terrorism but has now become member of the world antiterrorist coalition.

Sudan has rich intact oil stocks. Beyond doubt, oil was never only an economic and commercial category but always related to the context of politics and its geopolitical goals and interests. Since 1974, the American oil company Chevron held the concession for oil for as many as 40 sites in Sudan. Daily production was 120,000 barrels oil. In 1984, Chevron ceased its operations due to political (the USA government pressures) and security (SPLA attacks) reasons.

In 1991, the new government of Islam solution acted in two directions: firstly, exploitation of Abu Jariba oil fields where Chevron had its concessions, and secondly, establishing contacts with companies which are not under the influence of the USA. These actions were supported by a private Sudanese company Concorp. The first contract was concluded with the Canadian State Petroleum. Later, a consortium for oil exploitation was established with the following stakes: 40% China (National Oil Corporation), 30% Malaysia (Petronas), 25% Canada (Talisman) and 5% Sudanese government. The oil consortium built the port in Baasher, from where 160,000 barrels oil are exported daily while the rest is left for domestic use. The arrival of Asian tigers, such as China and Malaysia, and announced appearance of European companies (Russian, Austrian and Swedish) have, of course, provoked the Americans. Those companies namely not only develop oil industry

but also construct roads, bridges, electrification, and plan and build communications, water supply systems etc. The most interesting is Chinese penetration, which is actually an offensive. Obviously, China is not interested only in oil but also in being constantly present in the area from where it can easily control the Red Sea as the artery through which all sea routes for oil lead to Europe. China therefore has political and military interests in this strategic area.

The national Chinese oil corporation plans to triple the production by the year 2005 to reach 15 million tons. Namely, China has no own large oil resources and is therefore looking for solution to this problem abroad.

The USA should therefore, through special envoy, former senator Danforht, act quickly and effectively and treat equally both, the formerly rebel SPLA and the Sudanese government. American sanctions against the twelve Sudanese companies (of 22 October 2002) and aid to the South in the amount of 100 million dollars annually for the next five years are probably the right direction to follow before the November peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLA in Kenya take place.

The IFIMES Institute believes that American Administration should not attribute great importance to the African lobby in its Congress. Special envoy for Sudan, former senator Danforth should continue his peace mission not only in the political but also economic sense. This is the only way for the Americans to balance the Chinese penetration which could have a negative influence on the Sudanese people and consequently on the peace in the region. The American authority will definitely positively effect the future peace negotiations, which should go beyond the influence of religious communities (muftis and the Catholic church of Sudan).

SUDAN

The Republic of Sudan covers 2,505,810 km²; Inhabitants: 37.090.298; Religious structure of inhabitants: 70% Muslims (Sunnites), 25% animists, 5% Christians; BDP: USD 1,360 Labour force: 11 million, of which 43% in agriculture, 17% in industry, 40% in service industry.

The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana constantly analyses events in the Middle East and brings them to the attention of international public. One such contribution is this analysis of the conflict and present events between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

WHERE ARE THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS??? ***THE OSLO PEACE AGREEMENT IS DEAD***

Two years after Intifada, seven years after Yitzhak Rabin's assassination – where are the Israelis and the Palestinians?

One of the results of the military defeat of Iraq in 1991 was the initiation of peace negotiations in Oslo and the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement by Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yaser Arafat. Millions of Palestinians could then start to realise their dreams of the independent Palestinian state, and on the other hand, the Israeli people could realise their dreams of living together in peace with their Arab neighbours. PLO abandoned the prevailing ideology of the removal of Israel and throwing the Israelis into the sea.

The Palestinians gained autonomous power, the Legislative Council, the government, the negotiation group for resolving the disputed issues of the refugees, Jerusalem and the borders of the future Palestinian state. The Palestinian leader made the worst mistake in December 2000 when he refused the Camp David Peace Plan according to which the Palestinians would gain sovereignty over the Arab part of Jerusalem while Israel would keep the West Jerusalem and the Armenian Quarter.

As regards the border, the American plan suggested that Israel gain certain settlements on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the compensation if the Palestinians gain certain areas in the Nagav desert. Obviously, there is no solution which would provide an answer to the return of Palestinian refugees.

Meanwhile, however, corruption has gained ground in the autonomous power and the life of Palestinians was not improved despite enormous help arriving from the EU, USA and the Islam countries. This was the perfect atmosphere for the development of militant Islamic organisations and groups (Hamas, Jihad). Such organisations wanted to assert themselves as partners and negotiators in the peace process, but in this way they only further exhausted the already weak Palestinian power.

What did the Palestinians get? They got fanatics willing to die since they have no hopes of the better future. The Palestinian territory has become the second Somaliland with each part of the area having its own militia. Thousands of killed, injured, city blockades, exiled, disabled, unemployed, leadership isolated from the people etc. Dreams of the Palestinian own state have in reality reduced to dreams

of ending the stand-off of the Church of the Nativity and the complex in Ramallah.

During this time, Israel gained a lot in foreign policy. The United Nations withdrew their previous resolutions, during two years of Intifada they increased the number of settlements and the number of Jewish inhabitants on the West Bank. On the internal political field, moderate Israeli groups lost their influence and distinctiveness while LIKUD gained more political trust and continued with the even more determined politics and response to terrorism. Their political strategy is based on the persecution of Arafat and transfer of Palestinians from the West to the East Bank.

Ten years after the Oslo Peace Agreement Palestinians gained more than in the past 30 years of war. However, the Palestinians were deluded by their leaders and Arab allies into thinking that terrorism and suicidal attacks could help them achieve the desired goals. They forgot or disregarded the fact that during the last 50 years Israel has become a modern state with strong democratic institutions. We can compare the acts of Palestinians with IRA and ETA terrorist attacks which did not succeed in overthrowing the British nor the Spanish government with their bombs and assassinations.

The Oslo Peace Agreement is dead, or better, makes no sense any more. The new round of negotiations with the future LIKUD government (to take place on 28 January 2003) will have to include other organisations, such as the moderate Palestinian political organisations. The election of Amran Mitzna to the leader of Labourites in Israel will not alter the situation. Mitzna's promise regarding the transfer of Palestinians from the West Bank is not realistic since such intentions have been expressed for years but no progress has been made in this direction. There is more realism in the opinion shared by LIKUD and the Prime Minister Sharon (most likely the winners of the next elections) on the one hand, and the IFIMES Institute on the other hand, that is necessary to find the common points in the Road Map Plan as the starting point for further negotiations. There is more realism noticed also on the Palestinian side. Minister for information of the Palestinian autonomous power, Yaser Abd Raba (who is a high official in PLO) stated at the conference of the European Green Parties in Brussels that the Palestinians are ready to resolve the question of return of refugees on the basis of Clinton's plan which does not envisage the return to Israel but the settlement in Gaza, the West Bank and other countries, where they are located at the moment and can stay there as citizens with equal rights.

The negotiations should be initiated on the basis of the Michelo's recommendation and the Road Map plan.

The IFIMES analysts believe that the peace agreement can gain additional impetus if all the sides are ready to support it. Pursuant to Articles 4, 6 and 7 of

the National Security Strategy which President Bush submitted to the Congress, the USA have to look for the solutions regarding the Middle East. Article 4 of that Strategy envisages co-operation with others in preventing conflicts, Article 6 provides for support of the free market and Article 7 establishes the broadening of the circle of economic development through the development of democratic infrastructure. The USA have started with the activities from Article 7, i.e. democratisation of the Middle East, the first piece in the mosaic being Iraq which should, following the regime of Saddam Hussein, turn into an example of democracy for others and take an active part in the peace process by assuming certain obligations related to that process.

International Institute IFIMES believes that the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Desert Storm actually meant the defeat of Arafat and therefore forced the Palestinians to come to Oslo in 1992. Most Arab states are dictatorial and the main deficiency of the region is lack of democracy and of instruments for its implementation as well as for the implementation of respect of human rights. IFIMES is stressing that the West will have to start direct communication with the Muslim and the Arab nations and give up the practice of communicating through state media and corrupt regimes which have been creating the atmosphere of hatred instead of dialogue and understanding. For example, they refer to Israel as the «occupied territory» or the «Zionistic formation» and to the Jews as Zionists etc.

The Middle East should be regionalised by creating a formation similar to the Europe of regions. Iraq could be divided into four cantons (Shiitic, Sunnite, Kurdish and Turkmen) or two entities (Kurdish and Arab), Egypt could have a Coptic entity, Saudi Arabia should be united into four federal units (Najid, Hijaz, Aseer, the East province), while the division of Sudan should be prevented by giving the SPLA a greater role in the Sudanese federal government. This seems to be a good recipe also for other conflicts in the region (Algeria, Somaliland, Syria, Lebanon) since it would provide the conditions for resolving the ethnic and religious problems in the Middle East and open the door to a new regulation of the circumstances in the region.

The Arabs should realise that the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel is not possible since it would endanger the existence of Israel as the Jewish state. According to the well-known analyst, Yehud Litani, the dream of the division of Palestine is unfeasible, nor is it possible to put up protective walls between the West Bank and Gaza. After sixty years of hardship in refugee camps, the Palestinian people expect the solution of their status either on certain areas of the West Bank or by settling in other Arab states. Until 1991, in Iraq and other Gulf states there were over half a million Palestinians who were exiled due to the alliance between Saddam Hussein and Arafat after the invasion of Kuwait. The priorities for the Palestinian people are the regulation of civil status, housing, education and other

basic conditions needed for a dignified human life. For a Palestinian, these needs have priority over all other issues.

The Israelis and the Palestinians should talk openly with the new leaders of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan on the legalisation of status and granting of rights to Palestinian refugees on equal terms with other citizens.

International Institute IFIMES believes that the role of certain institutions should be transformed or even replaced and new institutions established in order to look for (and find) solutions for the whole region. As a guideline we recommend the establishment of the Middle East Partnership for Peace which would replace all the so far existing ineffective institutions: the Arab League, the Gulf States Co-operation Council (GCC) and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana constantly analyses events in the Middle East region. By promoting the idea of "Partnership for the Middle East" we try to contribute to the stabilisation in the region. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below.

PARTNERSHIP FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

In its previous analyses, the IFIMES International Institute called upon the USA to start applying a different policy towards the Middle East, for not only the USA and its interests but also the whole democratic system in the world has been endangered since 11 September 2001. As a method of a different policy we have proposed the USA to establish an organisation modelled on the NATO Partnership for Peace which would be called "Partnership for the Middle East".

On 12 December 2002, the democratic world received positively the initiative of the American state secretary, Colin Powell, in the Washington Heritage Centre, where he announced the establishment of "Partnership Initiative between the USA and the Middle East". However, the European allies and the political nomenklatura in the Middle East responded with scepticism to this initiative while the Arab media answered by accusing the USA of interfering in the internal affairs of those countries.

In contrast to the initiatives of the former century, this one aims at integrating whole nations in the reforms of political systems, helping in education, fighting against illiteracy, implementing women's rights, establishing civil society organisations and supporting the public and private sector in the region in order to reform the economy.

The main initiators of the idea of the USA and the Middle East partnership are Dick Channey, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, Gary Schmitt, Robert Kagan and Bruce Jackson, all coming from the line of American Neoconservatives who formulated their attitude at the beginning of 1970s, based on two ideas: rejecting the isolationism of the Democrats and rejecting the realism of the Republicans. On those two bases they regard the USA as the superior-force which is spreading the ideas of democracy and protection of human rights in the world. They published their views in the project "New American Century" (1997) and various magazines such as *The Weekly Standard*, where they expressed their demands for a more intensive role of America in the Middle East, the abolition of undemocratic regimes and the drawing of a new political map.

The IFIMES Institute is of the opinion that the idea of the New American Century should be integrated in Powell's plan and offered to the people in the Middle East through independent media and institutions to help in the formation of the civil society bodies. In the beginning it would have the form of joint ventures with

similar institutions in Europe, especially in the Balkans, where the people can, after 50 years of communism and a decade of war, freely vote their representatives in free and democratic elections and create a progress in the political and economic reforms. The Balkan nations, among which there are also ten million Muslims, are positive towards American interventions in the region and participation in the peace process. However, the Balkan reality is not accessible to the millions of people of the Middle East because the media, obviously intentionally, still create the image which prevents the presentation of positive effects of the West and of American intervention in the Balkans.

IFIMES believes that, initially, contacts should be established in the Middle East with the financial and religious leaders of such organisations, professors and students in order to explain the plan of changes and stress that the changes would not endanger their status and interests – financial, religious, tribal – nor interfere in their tradition. They could thus become the generators of new changes, since they know the West well due to many years of various forms of co-operation through investments, education etc. According to IFIMES, those people are the hostages in their states of the cold war ideologies (Baath's socialism and Naser's Pan-Arabism, radical Wahhabism, Shiitic export of revolution). All these groupings should be invited to participate in seminars and symposiums of independent institutions of the civil society in Europe (independent institutes and NGOs) in order to show and present them the achievements of democratic standards (elections, free media, human rights, social and health security). Moreover, the relevant structures from Israel should be invited to take part in this kind of co-operation where they could get to know each other, exchange experience and build the bridges. In this way, we could promote ideas which would unite those nations instead of distancing them from each other in order to create a better life for all the inhabitants of the region. Therefore, Israel should also be included in the "Partnership for the Middle East" initiative since it is by national structure a multiethnic state with democratic institutions where, for example, the Arab parties take part in the elections and have their representatives in the Israeli Knesset.

The "Partnership for the Middle East" initiative comprises three main goals:

1. reform of education,
 2. reform of the economy and
 3. reform of the political systems.
-
1. Religious teaching should be liberated from the burdens of historical events which were marked by the crusade (the Christian and Islamic war and the wars between Jews and Arabs, as well as Christians and Jews in Europe in the 15th and 20th century). These and similar ideologies endanger the stability in the

region. Reforms of educational system should, according to IFIMES, include the erasing of the constitutional chapter which states that Islam is the state religion in most countries of the Middle East. Religious teaching should be separated from the curriculum, especially in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Iraq, since it pours oil on the flames in these multi-religious countries. Religion should be taught in specialised schools and theological universities and it should be based on scientific and historical research work.

2. Economic reforms are related to political reforms since tens of millions of people in the Middle East are unemployed. In those countries there are no efficient state institutions while social and health security does not even exist. Those people have no hope. The politicians, professors and journalists accuse the West of causing this situation. That is why they are becoming volunteer recruits in certain organisations (religious, humanitarian and other) which promote the fight against the West and its interests as their main ideology.
3. According to Richard Hass, Director of Policy Planning in the State Department, the USA will not impose the outmoded freezing formula of political reform but rather work individually with each state in order to gradually form their election systems. Hass admitted that the USA made a mistake by not giving the priority to the democratic processes in the region. During his visits in Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other states, Director Hass was convinced through communication with ordinary people that they feel disappointed with the failure of the USA in promoting democracy in the region and with American support of totalitarian regimes.

The IFIMES Institute believes that the 21st century will be more favourable to the nations in the region since the “Partnership for the Middle East” initiative will help the people of the Middle East to gain their long awaited freedom and democracy and to integrate in the modern world.

On the occasion of parliamentary elections in Israel which are to be held on 28 January 2003, the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana has prepared the pre-election analysis. The most interesting sections are given below:

LIKUD OR THE LABOURITES?

On 28 January 2003, the 16th Israeli parliamentary elections are to be held since the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948.

The parliamentary elections will take place in this delicate and sensitive moments for Israel and the region, in the light of American attack on Iraq and overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein who generously financed Palestinian terrorist actions during the second Intifada when, in contrast to the first Intifada, the bombs and suicidal belts replaced the stones and peaceful protests of the Palestinians who were dissatisfied with the results of the Oslo peace negotiations.

As regards its internal political affairs, Israel is facing a serious economic and political crisis. The economic crisis has been further aggravated due to the continuation of Intifada and the re-occupation and blockade of most of the West Bank which used to be under the civil and security administration of the Palestinian autonomous power. On the other hand, the political crisis has been caused by the withdrawal of the Labourites from the government of national unity.

At the Tuesday elections, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will according to the estimations ensure its Likud party 32 to 38 parliamentary seats, which would provide the right-wing parties including Likud with 60 to 65 parliamentary seats in the newly elected Knesset.

The election campaign in Israel, starting with the internal elections in the Labourites party in October last year and in Likud in November last year, was dirty and with many low blows. Both sides tried to wash in public as much of each other's dirty linen as possible.

The loudest were the Labourites led by the new leader Amran Mitzna, accusing Likud for the fall of the government, that is to say, for their withdrawal from the government, which was triggered by their disagreement with the proposed Budget Act for 2003 and by subsequent full boycott of the voting by the Labourites representatives during the second and third reading of the bill.

The Labourites were trying very hard to make the voters forget their responsibility for the fall of government in the sensitive moments for the state (Intifada and suicidal actions, the slump in tourism and investments, the Road Map peace initiative presented by the USA, Russia, EU and UN). They presented the public with completely different reasons for withdrawing from the government, such as opposing the government policy towards the Palestinians, in order to gain the votes of

Israeli left-wingers and Israeli Arabs who traditionally vote for the Labourites. The voters are fully aware that the initiative for putting up the protective wall at the green line between the West Bank and Israel has been given by the then Labourite defence minister Benjamin Ben Eliazer and that the unsuccessful diplomatic attempts to resolve the Palestinian issue were taking place in the department of foreign affairs of the then Labourite minister Shimon Peres.

It is also obvious to the Israeli voters that the politics of the Labourites during the term of office of Ehud Barak and the withdrawal from south Lebanon have led to the second Palestinian Intifada.

The IFIMES Institute believes that Likud will win the majority of votes in the 120 member Knesset. However, this will not suffice for independent formation of the government. It is necessary to form the government of a broad coalition comprising the Labourites and ultra left-wing parties such as Shinui and Meretz as well as the ultra right-wing parties such as Shas.

The future government will have to take up a clear position as regards the unemployment problem, the economic crisis in the state, the inclusion of orthodox religious people in the security and political issues and as regards the definitely most sensitive Palestinian issue.

As regards the national foreign affairs, the new Israeli government is expected to actively participate in the American initiative of Partnership for the Middle East and to try to find, in the framework of the initiative, the models and solutions for the reform of the Palestinian administration, incorporating the Palestinian reformatory forces and the Arab neighbours in finding the answers to the question of the status of Palestinian refugees in the neighbouring Arab states.

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***STUDIES ON THE FUTURE OF IRAQ
DISABLING THE CONSTITUTION AND ABSENCE OF LAW IN
THE PERIOD OF GOVERNING OF THE BAATH PARTY AND
SADDAM HUSSEIN (1968 - AS YET)***

The constitutional lives in Iraq have been unstable through more than half century. Eight constitutions had been presented, Iraqi Basic Law was presented on March 21, 1925, and which revised twice, Firstly in July of 1925 and second time in October 1943. Constitution of July 14, 1958 which was followed by constitution of April 1963, then constitution of April 22, 1964, constitution of April 29, 1964, constitution of September 1968 and the temporary constitution of 1970, which was revised many times but its governance was absent considerably, neither the governor nor the regime has respected it.

After the ceasefire between Iraq and Iran in 1988 many phantasmal talks took place about the permanent constitution, the political plurality and the developing democracy. On July 30, 1990, the last constitutions was presented and which include 179 paragraphs, that explain the political form of the country and its political, social foundations and the philosophy of the regime absolute panoptic governing and in this connection 69 paragraphs has been specialized for the proprieties of the dictator Saddam.

In this context, our point of view is not just about the necessity of making proposals, that is related to life basic rules, but the important thing is to respect the clauses by the judges and without making any exception for the judgments of any law.

The constitution has impeded since 1968 to nowadays and that has resulted in a huge repression of human rights and militarization of the society in a serious level that has not happened in the world since the fall of Nazismen.

Repeatedly the people of Iraq has become victims for the absence of the constitution as the crisis of March, 1970, regarding the agreement between the Kurds and the Arab and which was ended in a disaster by missing a huge part of Iraqi national wealth and by creating disappointment among all Iraqi people for missing a possibility to live in peace with the Kurds according to the laws in the constitution. The same fault happened again, when the national front formed with the

Iraqi Communist party and other political parties. The Iraqi Communist party became victim for the same reason after a short time.

Because of the war with Iran the regime got all enough opportunities to stop any changes of legal, political, social and economical toward the better are in the country and the society. The war and the external dangers were excuses used by the regime to hanging the constitution and to violate human rights in Iraq.

According to constitution of 1970 (paragraph 42) the absolute proprieties, which have been exerted by president Saddam, included 120 paragraphs for execution (Death penalty). Generally about the paragraphs whether they have been found or not, the dictator Saddam has used his absolute power according to nature of this regime. If we go back to constitution of 30 July 1990 then we find all laws has been impeded and violated even though this constitution has not be legislated because it was not submitted to any voting by the Iraqi people.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE FUTURE OF IRAQ

The clauses of Iraqi constitution have been violated since 1968, and the situation has become extremely worse in 1979 as yet and by this, the meaning of having the constitution become useless under this regime. Therefore we think of rebuilding the present legal system and revise it in conformity with the future of Iraq as state with constitutional foundations, therefore the law and nothing but the law should be the basic for all reforms that creates harmony between the laws on one side and harmony between the society reforms in connection with the principles of reforms in the world on the other side.

In place of the present legal system of the regime, we believe in new changing as follows:

1. Forbidding the torture of political prisoner and abolish the law of amputation and tattoo. The people who have carried out such crimes must be punished for that.
2. Reforming the Iraqi law of granting citizenship, which is representing a bad example and which is in a disagreement with International Conventions concerning the human's rights.
3. Carrying out a new law that legalizing the return of all immigrants, who had been forced to leave their homeland Iraq. The law has also to ensure those people their rights such as compensating the losing of their properties.
4. Abolishing all resolutions, that has been carried out through the Governing Revolution Council because of its disagreement to the constitution in Iraq and that will require a long time to find out all resolutions and clauses numbers and the date of the issuing.

5. Abolishing all clauses that has deprive people their job because of there marrying to Iraqi women and to Arabic women and the women of foreigner. Those clauses in our opinion are pointing to a racial, nationalistic and religious discrimination and must be eliminated.
6. Abolishing all restrictions from the laws and the resolutions concerning the foreigner's currencies and to give the people possibility to deal freely with those currencies according to a free economic program.
7. Abolishing Arabzation policy against the Kurd and the policy of racial cleansing and compensate those people for those crimes against them.
8. Studying the situations in the prisons and carry out a radical reform about it by using concept of treatment instead of the punishment through the education, rehabilitation and compensation of the prisoners.
9. Abolishing all restrictions of habitation and nullity all a clauses, that restricts the rights of moving and the residency in any part of the country according to constitutions, Iraqi laws and the international conventions among these the paragraphs 13 of human rights, that include free rights for residency and paragraphs 12 from (International
10. Nullity all laws and resolutions about carrying out mass punishment and instead respecting concept of individual punishment and also to compensating all people for loss and damage that affected them because of the covert and the overt resolutions.
11. Abolishing all resolutions and instructions that restrict freedom of religion. Granting the rights to exert the religious ceremonials that do not provoke the general public.
12. Abolishing the law of forbidding the activity of (Behave people) and which was carried out in 1970 against this group because that has been against the International Conventions too such as the law of execution of their activists.
13. Abolishing the penalty of execution from all Iraqi civil resolutions and military punishments laws.
14. Abolishing all laws and resolutions that create superiority for one caste in proportion to other, because that infracts the constitution and the international compacts.
15. Issuing a special law to froze balances that have been embezzled from the Iraqi treasury and punish the people who have participated in this crime, because the Iraq wealth does not belong to any person but to the Iraqi people.
16. Abolishing the rent estate of 1978 and the state has to provide people appropriate habitation and prevent the exploitation. It is important to encourage the private sector to provide habitations unities too in order to provide the people a comfortable housing policy.
17. Carrying out a new law that prevent tacking a statement from the accused

- unless that happens by a clerk in law and a lawyer to be present.
18. The penalties laws must be revised and replace by rehabilitation in order to grant the prisoners a decent life.
 19. Changing the laws of military service of 1940 and consider Iraq as neutrality country, therefore the military service will be voluntarily for the woman and the man in the next two decades.
 20. Improving the role of woman in the society and to fight against discrimination policy between man and women.
 21. Support the women rights by improve the conditions of their life and stop abusing their rights in the society and to protect them of sexual harassment.
 22. Forbidding the ideology of Baath Party because its foundations and policy based on extremely fanatical nationalistic point of view.
 23. Fighting against all forms for religious fanaticism and terrorism and instead of that popularise the culture of tolerance and to respect the humans rights principles.

The Judicature of Iraq is representing a fundament guarantee for achieving justice in the society. In the countries that are identical with the constitutional institutions the judicature is sovereign and independent and nothing but the law is above it. All Iraqi constitutions is based on this point too (principle of Sovereignty of judiciary system) .

One of the foremost assignments the state of the law of Iraq in future has to work for is to protect the imposingness of judicature and to protect its sovereignty according to the principles of the constitution. This will accomplish an internal harmony between the laws and implement them in the society on one side and achieving justice on other side. Therefore it will be important to concentrate on developing judiciary system, the judicial career and to establishing proper courts for interpleading.

By improving the legal system and justice system in the next two decades must also concentrate on motivating the role of Iraqi women in different fields, and which has not been allowed for women to exert career such as legal adviser in court of appeal (Civil Division, Criminal Division), and high court.

The reform must also include closing down some courts such as "Revolution court" that has serious shortage in performing and applying the law because of representing the regimes attitude in judgment, and on the other hand must the employment procedures be important in order to have a qualified people in this field, because that plays a central role to have secure and an effective legal system and therefore even employee in the police system must be graduated in law. The judiciary system has to belong to Justice Ministry.

In transitional period we have to think of creating a specialised authority with

high knowledge to study the law and legislation in conformity with the constitution, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Conventions. The high constitution court in fact will urged this work and in addition will consider a new plan to legislation laws for the future of Iraq like a civilized country believing in peace and tolerance.

THE LAW OF NATIONAL FRONT

We think of the coming political system must be based on wide national front and their point of view is to tack the mistake of the Saddam's regime in consideration and to focusing on not to let them happen again. Therefore it is important to establish the law of the national front that works to implement human rights principles in all fields and issue the law of general amnesty can be a start for that aim but not for the very dangerous crimes.

We think also about abolishing all the present laws concerning the trading, the Central Bank, and companies and instead, issue new laws that give more aspect to free market and encouraging the private sector in order to create rational economic policy.

A large part of the laws that is carried out right now in Iraq is returning in fact to India, Osmannisc time, the British colony time, and the dictatorship at last.

Therefore the situation of judiciary has always been unstable and far from the Iraqi people influence and Iraqi society benefit. Consequently the specialised committees of judiciary in future have to clarify the confusion about judiciary environments and devise new and solid process to improve it and to help the people of Iraq to create a positive attitude toward it after many years of suffering and repressing.

The concept of "discrimination" has been a part of the regimes politic programs concerning the ethnical question, religious believe and women rights. For this reason, the question of Iraqi women rights must be recognized and be protected through issued laws concerning many fields such as the Iraqi civil laws, the Iraqi penalty laws.

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
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Conference: The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq

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WAR CRIMES

Ladies and Gentlemen: I would like first to thank you for your kind invitation to speak at this important conference concerning "Wither Iraq." I wish to express my gratitude to the friends of the Iraqi people in the United States who are trying to help them gain their freedom, build democracy, and establish the rule of law. This desired future for Iraq could only be achieved through two important means: First, Trying the Iraqi officials accused of committing international crimes in order to affirm the principle of retribution, establish justice, apply the law, and respect human rights. This is the point of departure intended to accord the law the leading role in the land of Mesopotamia that established the first laws in human history.

Second, Modifying the shape of the Iraqi State towards a united, federal, parliamentary state, dismantling the organs of the dictatorial regime, and rebuilding the organs of the new Iraqi state which would be committed to pursue the following:

1. Establishing the federal system.
2. Respecting human rights and the rule of law.
3. Declaring state neutrality and never engaging in any war in the future.
4. Constructing democracy and civil society.

My participation in this panel on war crimes, which is the second panel of this conference, is intended to discuss the transition in the justice system. I thus state my legal opinion in the form of my responses to the questions put to me by the Chair, Mr. Christopher:

QUESTION ONE: HOW CAN SADDAM HUSSEIN AND OTHERS BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE FOR THEIR CRIMES?

Answer:

There is not the slightest doubt that Saddam and a large number of the high officials around him have committed serious, international crimes against the Iraqi people (the Shi'a Arabs in the south, the Kurds in Halabja and in the Anfal campaigns, and the Faili Kurds), including crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as well as crimes of terrorism and of aggression against neighbouring states and the regime continues to constitute a threat for peace and security in the region and in the world.

All these crimes violate international laws and conventions. Saddam and his rule has killed no less than two million Iraqis in his internal and external wars, and he is the cause for the dispersal of an additional four million Iraqis in different countries in the world.

As for the external wars, Saddam's regime launched war against Iran 1980-88, in which he deployed all kinds of internationally banned weapons such chemical weapons, deliberate hitting of civilian targets, and poisoning water sources. Saddam's regime is a dictatorial regime that practices state terrorism. On August 2nd 1990, Saddam's regime committed a criminal aggression and occupied the State of Kuwait, from which he refused to withdraw, forcing the international community to build a coalition to liberate Kuwait. Moreover, Saddam's regime hit civilian targets in the State of Israel with 39 missiles, which constitutes a crime of aggression in violation of UN-Charter. And Saddam's army set most of the oil wells in Kuwait on fire before its forced withdrawal, causing the greatest environmental catastrophe in the world that involved the annihilation of a large number of living beings as well as serious environmental pollution.

Neither Saddam nor his regime has ever complied with international decisions. He secretly pursued dangerous programmes to produce lethal weapons and weapons of mass destruction, thus threatening peace, security, and stability, both internal and external, regional and international.

Any fair trial, in accordance with international standards must have the following four ingredients:

1. A defendant accused of a crime. There are many persons who committed war crimes in Iraq; some work for the Baath Party, some for the army, the security and even many Iraqi officials. In my legal opinion we cannot try all these suspects, but only those who are responsible for sever violations of international law. Trials against all Iraqi defendants could take several years. So we should first be sure of how many Iraqi leaders are responsible for those war crimes, which are committed after the 17th of July 1968. Other Suspects

and defendants should, after the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee and under certain conditions to governed by law, get general pardon.

2. Legal proofs.
3. A just, impartial court (open trial, right of appeal, victim and witness protection...)

We already have these three ingredients in place, but a new Iraq must show a new leaf, and what better new leaf than the abolishment of the death sentence-even for war criminals, for I support the abolishment of the death penalty, as death penalty is regarded as a violation of the fundamental rights of life and contravenes inalienable rights enshrined in Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights conventions from all Iraqi laws and indemnite judiciary all victims.

Most of the accused of war crimes (i.e. Saddam and other high Iraqi officials) live inside Iraq and some reside outside Iraq. The legal proofs, like records and documents, are available in the United States and with the London organization INDICT and there are also surviving victims and witnesses of the international crimes committed by the Iraqi regime inside and outside Iraq.

The Court Models:

Regarding the special court that looks into the war crimes committed by Saddam and the Iraqi officials, we can consider the following possibilities:

1. The International Crime Court, the Statute of which was adopted Rome 1998 and came into force on April 11, 2002, cannot bring these criminal to trial because Iraq is not a party to the Statute of this Court and the Courts temporal jurisdiction is to try only crimes committed after September 1, 2002. The crimes of Saddam and the officials of his regime occurred before this date.
2. A Special International War Crime to try Saddam and the Iraqi officials could be set up by a resolution from the United Nation's Security Council, similar to the Special International War Crimes for former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, on the condition that its headquarters be in The Hague, Holland.
3. A National Iraqi Court could be set up, by recruiting a group of Iraqi judges, jurists, investigators and administrative specialists. This choice would maintain the integrity of the national sovereignty of the Iraqi State. The local court system to try Iraqi war criminals under Iraqi law created four categories of crimes, each with different punishments:

- The first category relates to individuals “whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression”. These individuals should include persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, governorate, communal or sector level, or in a political party, the army and militias, and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes.
 - The second category: relates to individuals “whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of international homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death”. These include participants in individual murder cases, where it is clear that a defendant participated in such crimes, but where it may be difficult to prove a tie between such individual crime and those of the crimes listed in the first category.
 - The third category: relates to individuals “whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other serious assaults against the person”. This category would involve individuals who participated in serious assaults against Iraqis, such as torture but where it is difficult to prove particular a murder case against such individuals.
 - The fourth category: addresses persons who committed offences against property and the environment. This would involve accused who participated in the destruction of villages in Kurdistan, the drying up of the marshes and the oil spills following the Gulf War of 1991.
5. A mixed court composed of judges appointed by Iraq and by the United Nations, similar to the one established for Sierra Leone.
 6. Call Saddam and the other Iraqi official for trial in an American court specialised in international terrorist crimes in accordance with American federal legislation. This is justified by several indications that point to a connection between Saddam’s regime and the international terrorist acts, especially those committed by the al-Qa’ida criminal organization.

QUESTION TWO: HOW CAN A NATION RECOVER WHEN ITS MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED IN GENOCIDE AGAINST THEIR OWN PEOPLE?

Answer:

Iraq can never recover its strength and rise again to live as a civilized country that respects human rights and the principles of law unless the following conditions are met:

1. Building democracy and civil society.
2. Respecting human rights to all the ethnic nationalities, recognizing pluralism, and combating extremism, fanaticism, and terrorism.
3. Identifying the ideology of the Baath Party as being similar to Nazi ideology, accordingly banning it in Iraq. Creating a culture of tolerance and civilized democratic dialogue among the members all ethnicities, religions, and ideologies.
4. Securing international support for Iraq, pursuing a Marshall plan for its reconstruction of Iraq, and defining a direction for its path of peace, and economic, cultural, religious, and intellectual freedoms.
5. Declaring Iraq a neutral country that does not engage in wars and is led by civilians elected through constitutional institutions. In this new Iraq, women, representing half the society, play an active role.
6. Establishing good neighbourly relations with the countries in the region and other countries in the world, normalizing relations with the State of Israel, and respecting all international treaties, conventions, and legitimate resolutions.
7. Paying compensations from the Iraqi treasury to all Iraqis who suffered as victims of the successive dictatorial regimes that ruled the country (the Iraqis from among the Arab Shi'as, the Kurds, the Faili Kurds, the Jews, the Turkmen, the Caldeans, the Assyrians, and the others) as well as the victims of wars and the crimes against human rights.
8. Promulgating a permanent constitution and reforming the legal system in Iraq.

QUESTION THREE: HOW CAN THE EXPERIENCES OF THE OTHER POST-TOTALITARIAN STATES INFORM IRAQ'S FUTURE?

Answer:

We can benefit from the successful experiences of the countries that preceded Iraq in this realm after they have been liberated from totalitarian dictatorial regimes, such as Rumania, Yugoslavia, and others. We can pursue the establishment of a civilian government elected democratically under the supervision of the United Nations, the respect of peaceful succession of power, the dissemination of the culture of peace, tolerance, and the recognition of the other, as well as the abolishment of the death penalty. Moreover, we need to maintain the independence of the judiciary as in all civilized countries, separate religion from the state, and establish a secular state that recognizes and respects the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and issues the Bill of Rights of Iraqi Citizens.

We can also examine Yugoslavia's experiment and adopt from it whatever is beneficial to the Iraqi society, since there are some similarities between the two countries in certain aspects, especially in the realm of ethnic, religious, and ideological diversity in the two countries. For such pluralist countries, the federal system suits them best.

We observe that Yugoslavia has solved the problems concerning the regime and multi-ethnicity according to the Dayton Accord that organized governance and peaceful succession of power, through a presidential council, whose chairmanship alternates between members representing the three main ethnic nationalities that constituted ex-Yugoslavia. The shape of the governing system of the new Iraq has been dealt with in the constitution proposed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party for the Federal State of Iraq in which the new Iraq will consist of two regions, Arabic and Kurdish, within which the rights of the other minorities are respected. This proposed constitution comes very close to the ideas that I drafted and introduced in the blueprint of a project for the constitution, and which was published in *Al-Mutamern* newspaper, no.305.

Moreover, we can benefit from ex-Yugoslavia's experience by seeking the expertise of some political personalities like Mr. Richard Hallbrook, the former American Ambassador to the United Nations, and Peter Galbraith, the former United States ambassador in Croatia. Finally, in spite of the great differences between the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are many positive aspects that took place in post-Taliban Afghanistan that could be beneficial for Iraq such as having a civilian as a head of state, unifying the different tribes, and activating the role of women.

Iraqi Kurdistan - Ten years of self-rule and future prospects

An International Conference

University of Southern Denmark, 30th November – 1st December 2002 in Odense, Denmark

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THE FEDERALISM AND THE FUTURE OF IRAQ

INTRODUCTION

Principles of Federalism in Future Iraq:

The nature and system of government in Iraq is responsible for most of its external and internal problems since its inception in 1921 and until the present time. A deficiency exists in the political and constitutional structure for Iraq since the first established constitution “Basic Law” of 1925 until the last constitution of 1970, characterized by excessive centralization and the rule of an individual especially since 1979 the year Saddam Hussein ascended to power. This iron fist central authority contradicts with the establishment of a democratic society and civil society especially in a country like Iraq with a diverse ethnic and religious population and varying political parties and movements. As a result, the Kurdish population was subject to war crimes and the crime of genocide. Other ethnic groups were not spared from such crimes including the majority Arab Shiite.

In order to establish a democratic system, rule of the law and constitutional institutions it is necessary to change the type of government and nature of rule form a simple state based on centralization to a federal compound union, whereby the authorities are distributed among the regional governments and institutions. Such a set-up is compatible with Iraq’s diverse population and an introduction to resolve the Kurdish issue and to recognize their legitimate rights for which they have submitted huge sacrifices. Thus, the Kurds will have independence inside the Kurdish region, which is part of the one state of Iraq that will ensure peace, security and stability inside Iraq and outside of it. This would dispel fear of a

break-up of Iraq and would emphasize the principles of democracy and freedom that cannot be obtained in a dictatorial system because federalism and democracy are interrelated.

Stability and peace cannot be secured in future federal Iraq without recognizing the following bases;

1. Ensure respect for democratic freedoms such as freedom of opinion, expression, thoughts, assembling, belief, peaceful congregation and the likes.
2. Ensure respect for transfer of power by peaceful means through the free and democratic elections.
3. Respect for the principle of multi-political parties and for peaceful political opposition.
4. Emphasize the separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.
5. Separation of state and religion.
6. Maintain the independence of the judicial branch of government.
7. Separate the military establishment from politics and party affiliation.
8. Establish High federal constitutional court in charge of overseeing the application of law or the breach of law in light of the rule of law.
9. Grant equal rights for women to that of man in rights and responsibilities, also secure the maintenance of child's, handicapped and elderly rights.
10. Ensure freedom of religious belief. Institute the principle of religious, ethnic and intellect tolerance. Respect for human rights in accordance to the international charter for human rights and other international declarations.

FIRST - THE KURDISH POSITION IN FUTURE IRAQ

The Kurdish position sees the solution to the Kurdish issue through their independence in managing the affairs of Kurdistan Region. The constitutional relationship between the Kurds and the Arabs ought to be regulated through a federal form of government after the simple form is dismantled and a compound federal union is established. This will ensure that the Kurds will manage the affairs of their region and participate in the political decision-making process of the central federal government based on the decentralization of authorities and policies.

The rest of the ethnic groups such as the Turkuman, Assyrian, and others enjoy full citizenship, parliamentary and judicial rights whether they lived in the Arabic regions or the Kurdish region. These rights include the use of their national language in special schools, establishing their political parties, publishing their own newspapers and fully representing and participating in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. These rights are regulated through the constitution and a special decree for regulating the rights and responsibilities of

ethnic groups. These principles are declared in the draft presented by the Kurdish leadership.

SECOND - POLITICAL PARTIES, MOVEMENTS AND INDEPENDENTS POSITION TO FEDERALISM

Iraqi political parties, movements and independents that participated in Salahdeen Conference in 1992 adopted Federalism as a solution for the Kurdish issue, which has drained Iraq's resources and affected peace and stability in the area. Moreover, many Iraqi political parties, movements and independents have openly declared the Federal option through their declarations, publications and announcements such as;

1. Iraqi Communist Party.
2. Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
3. Iraqi National Coalition.
4. Iraqi National Congress.
5. Military Conference organized by the Military Coalition in July 2002.
6. Free Iraq Council.
7. Declaration for Iraqi Shiite.
8. Many Independent Iraqi Political Figures.

THIRD - THE POSITION OF OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS (TURKUMAN, ASSYRIAN AND OTHERS)

1. the Position of the Turkuman; Distinction must be made between two parts of Turkuman; the first part represents the majority of Turkuman, live in peace and tolerance in Kurdistan, they are represented in the Kurdish Regional Parliament, participate in the Regional Government and enjoy full citizenship rights as mentioned above. The position of this group of Turkuman is clear and known; they respect the strong bond with Kurds, Arabs and Assyrian. They have real attachment to the soil of Iraq and have no problem with the Kurds enjoying Federalism against securing their citizenship rights. The second part represents a minority, are the Turkuman Front, which has strong ties to Turkey. This group demands self-independence within a large illegitimate geographical border.
2. The Position of the Assyrian; this group is involved in a battle over historical identity among themselves. The Assyrian believe that they and the Chaldean are from the same ethnic origin while some Chaldean reject this notion of ethnic assimilation. This group live in the Kurdish Region and the Arabic

Region. The ones in the Kurdish Region enjoy full citizenship rights similar to the Turkuman, while the ones in the Arabic Region suffer from dictatorship, which persecute all Iraqis of all ethnic backgrounds.

Risks and Hurdles;

1. The Turkish Position; The objections made by Turkey through public announcements and the threat to enter and occupy Kurdistan-Iraq is based on the assumption that a Federal Kurdistan or a Kurdish State represents a danger to the national security of Turkey. There are grave internal problems with the Kurdish population inside Turkey whereby the Kurds human and national rights are abused. Moreover, Turkey demands ethnic rights for the Turkuman and is trying to find a self-government or a federal government for them despite the lack of legal basis for that.
2. Some Iraqi Opposition; Some Iraqi Opposition parties may not accept the concept of Federalism presented by the Kurds as they see fit in light of their legitimate right for self-determination. The fear is that Federalism is the break-up of Iraq; therefore some of the Iraqi Opposition submits a different type of Federalism, which does not conform to Iraq's society. Finally, no Iraqi Group is willing to sacrifice Federalism especially the ones that follow a democratic path.
3. The Kurdish House; The rift inside the Kurdish house is preventing the Federalism for being applied. The last meeting between the two Kurdish Parties (October 2002), the KDP and the PUK is playing a major role in removing these rifts, helping establish Federalism and draw the new Iraq correctly.
4. The struggle for Kurdish Kirkuk; which is inhabited by a majority Kurdish population (48%) as per the 1957 census.

Recommendations, Legal and Political Solutions;

1. International Guarantees for Respecting and Applying Federalism; Any application for Federalism in future Iraq needs international guarantees to ensure stability, security and respect for the Kurdish choice in its relationship with the Arabic Regions and with the other minorities. These guarantees need to be presented by the USA to avoid breach in the form and structure of the Federal State of Iraq and the new civil rule. International guarantees shall dispel concern from all ethnics and religious groups in future Iraq.
2. Internal Guarantees; is achieved through a declaration by the Iraqi Opposition for Federalism for the Kurdish People on Kurdistan Region, during their General Meeting scheduled for November 2002. The Federal choice needs to be part of the works of the next Transition Government in post Saddam Iraq

in accordance to the proposed federal constitution for the state of Iraq.

3. Solving the Kurdish Issue is Key to Solving the Iraqi Issue; through building democratic principles, respect for human rights and democratic institutions, recognition for all ethnic groups without discrimination based on origin, language, religion and others in accordance to the legal and constitutional rights in the new Iraq. Democracy is not the rule of the majority, but is the rule of all and the participation of all.

Based on the above prelude, the constitution needs to be based on a union among THREE regions; (Two Arabic Regions and One Kurdish Region):

- FIRST: Constitution for Federal Iraq
- SECOND: Constitution for Kurdistan Region
- THIRD: Constitution for Arabic Region in the South based on geography
- FOURTH: Constitution for Arabic Region in the Middle based on geography.

Naturally, the option for Federalism for Iraq is an application for the Kurdish people right for self-determination and thus the Kurdish people will decide the nature of the relationship with the Arabic Regions without the need to ask the Arabs through a referendum about their position in regards to Federalism as a future option, but to have a referendum for a draft permanent constitution for the Federal State of Iraq. Consequently separate referenda are needed for Regional Constitutions for each Region.

Legislative Authority: (Parliaments Required in Federal Iraq)

- FIRST - Central Federal Parliament (Legislative Federal Authority)
 1. Representatives' Council
 2. Regional Councils
- SECOND - Local Parliament Elected in Kurdistan (Legislative Authority)
- THIRD - Local Parliament Elected in Arabic Region in the South
- FOURTH - Local Parliament Elected in Arabic Region in the Middle

Executive Authority for Central Federal State:

- FIRST- President of the State (Ceremonial Position for a 4-year term subject to one time extension).
- SECOND- Council of Ministers (Upper Executive Authority)

Upper Federal Constitutional Court (based in Baghdad) looks into specific cases such as;

- The elected President shall read the oath of office in front of the head and committee of this court.

- Look into and take resolutions in regards to conflicts among the regions or between a region(s) and the Federal government.

Authority's Borders:

The borders between the Kurdish Region and the Arabic Regions shall conform to the proposal submitted by the Kurdish leadership (Draft for the Constitution for the Federal State of Iraq) – The base for the said borders is geographic.

Right for Other Ethnic (Turkuman, Assyrian and others)

Their rights are guaranteed through the citizenship rights in accordance to the constitution, law and international guarantees referred to above.

Responsibilities of the Federal Government;

1. Draw the foreign policy and diplomatic and consulate representation.
2. Sign international treaties and agreements.
3. Defence and armed forces whereas the army is for defence and not offence, joining the military needs to be voluntary and not compulsory for both genders.
4. Print the national currency plan the bank reserve policy and execute federal loans.
5. Economic and development planning.
6. Manage the General Balance of Payment.
7. General Federal Security.
8. Citizenship, immigration and residency for foreign nationals.
9. Power and national resources.

THE ADVANTAGES TO A FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

There are many advantages to a federal democratic republic especially in Iraq where we can find multi-Ethnics, different religions and different opinions. Federalism does not exist in a dictator regime. In Iraq there are two main nationalities (Arabs and Kurds) besides the other minorities such as (Turkuman, Assyrian, Arman).

Federalism should therefore become a corner stone of the new Iraqi body legal-politics. Federalism also abolishes the discrimination between the different nationalities in Iraq, distribute the equity and justice and respect human rights. It can confirm the participation in authorities between regions governments. Therefore federalism has many advantages in countries, which has different nationalities and religions. It is the best solution for the Iraqi problems especially the conflicts between Iraqi government and the Kurd for several decades. The most important advantage to a federalism democratic republic is to keep the unity of the Iraqi state.

Which civil and political rights should be enumerated in Iraq's future constitution?

The civil rights that should be enumerated in Iraq's future constitution are:

1. The life right.
2. The right of the physical safety.
3. The thinking and the expression freedom.
4. The right of the religious belief and the non-religious belief and the right of changing religious belief.
5. The agreement freedom.
6. The move and travel right without restrictions.
7. The right of ownership and non-confiscation of properties.
8. Each person should have a nationality. And should not be dropped does from him.
9. The correspondences and communications secrecy right without any espionage from any authority.
10. And many other rights which are mentioned in the international declaration of human rights.

Which women's rights should be highlighted in the future of Iraq?

The women's rights that should be highlighted are:

1. The complete equality in the rights and the duties with the man.
2. The work right by equal wages with the man.
3. The right of equal chances between the man and the woman.
4. The body protection right from any violence treatment, rape crimes and circumcision.
5. The Right of husband selection.
6. Protection from the honour killing.
7. Protection from the polygamy.
8. The kindergarten rights.
9. The Right of free travel and movement without limits (without Mohram).
10. The right of undertaking of all of the political positions and the judicial and administrative one.
11. The right of voting and candidature.
12. Protection Right from the coercion on the marriage. And the right of non-marriage before the maturity.
13. The abortion Right.
14. Law legislation about sexual harassment is needed.

IFIMES – The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies in Ljubljana analyses events going on in the world. The analysis of the situation in Turkey is the contribution to the better understanding of events in Iraq and the region. The most interesting sections are given below.

TURKEY: THE ARMY SIDES WITH THE AKP ISLAMISTIC GOVERNMENT

An Eastern legend says that miracles can happen only to prophets and... politicians. Well, in case of the Turkish Justice and Welfare AKP Party and its president Recep Tayip Erdogan, we have seen a double miracle happen.

Erdogan has become a prophet in the eyes of the Turkish people and an influential politician with absolute majority in the Turkish parliament, although he has got no political function yet in the Parliament nor in the government.

The victory of AKP shocked all the protagonists, who were carefully observing the functioning of all Turkish governments. In this respect we should point out the Turkish army which has played a crucial role in the national policy ever since the founding of the state on the ruins of the old Ottoman Empire in 1920. The army has always regarded itself as the guardian of the secular and pro-European heritage. During political and economic crises, it has even intervened and overthrown legitimately elected governments several times (1960, 1971, 1980 in 1997).

Today, Turkey is facing a double political and economic crisis, therefore the army has, in accordance with all the rules of Turkish political heritage, the reason for another intervention and takeover of the power. When his AKP party won, Erdogan denied the office of prime minister to Abdullah Gul. This was prohibited by the constitution since he was sentenced to four months in prison for his notorious intolerant poetry (Mosques are our barracks, minarets are our bayonets, the believers are our Mujahids...).

The analysts were of the opinion that AKP would, as the other preceding Turkish leading parties, preserve the conventional political approach in resolving the burning issues and that it would, in the best case, implement the pro-islamistic policy related to other islamistic parties around the world.

American pressures on Turkey to pass its demands for 62,000 American soldiers to be placed on its territory and to agree to co-ordinated collaboration with the Kurdish forces on the north of Iraq (when the north front opens under American command) in exchange for \$ 30 billion in form of aid and loan security fell through after the voting in the parliament. AKP's political manoeuvres prove that this declared pro-Western party with islamistic roots has an utterly new approach not only towards dealing with the Iraqi crisis but also in all other issues such as the EU, Cyprus and orientation towards the Islamic states. At the same time, these

tendencies have no negative effect on close alliance with the USA and on military-strategic agreements with Israel.

The voting in the Turkish parliament can be regarded as the double victory of the party leader, Erdogan. He made it clear to all the protagonists of the political and military Turkey who runs the show.

He won his first victory at the repeated parliamentary elections in the Siirt region (9 March 2003) which opened him the door to take over the office of prime minister. As the prime minister he will most probably send American demands to the parliament for the second discussion and as the charismatic leader order his deputies with the majority in the parliament to vote for the adoption of the package. And that would be his second victory.

According to American-Turkish agreement, Turkey would have an important role in the after-war regulation of the region. This item therefore presents the main gain for Turkey in order to show the West that it is not "the patient from Bosphorus", as the Ottoman Empire was named at the beginning of the 20th century and also after the voting in the parliament in the beginning of March 2003 on placing the American forces.

Erdogan is well aware that the future role of Turkey in this regulation would give Turkey the position it used to have during the period of the cold war and the USSR. However, the Americans are giving serious thought to substitute bases in the Turkish neighbourhood (the constant – Romania, Bulgaria, Tbilisi – Georgia, Iraq...).

Erdogan succeeded in having the army side with the government in this internal crisis. The preceding prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, did not manage to resolve (dis)agreements with the army and was deposed in 1997 from his office of prime minister.

According to the opinion of the IFIMES Institute, the Turkish recipe can be useful also for other countries which face doubts in taking sides towards different world crises – one of them being also Slovenia – and find themselves at the internal political crossroads not between the army and the government (and the parliament) but between the government and the citizens.

The Turkish government has to look for better solutions which would take into account the will of the people as well as the American demands and at the same time to find as many political and economic items as possible (according to this equation). Of course, that is not enough, since it should not be in contradiction with Turkey's position of the future member of the EU which does not have a unified common policy not only towards the issue of resolving the Iraqi crisis but also towards other issues (such as the North Korea and Palestinian-Israeli crises etc.).

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana constantly analyses events in the regions of the Balkans and the Middle East. The most interesting sections of the comprehensive analysis of events in Macedonia are given below.

IS THE MACEDONIAN SUN GOING TO SHINE?

After the Republic of Macedonia gained independence in the early nineties it seemed the country would avoid conflicts, especially those based on ethnic grounds. The Macedonian government of the nineties, which was - like the present government - burdened with the communist past in several respects, believed it would once for ever freeze the harmful ethnic virus. However, it turned out that the virus survived and that the government prognoses became ironical.

The Albanians, as the majority ethnic population in the western part of the country, started to organise themselves politically and to take actions establishing the PDP political party (Party of Democratic Prosperity). PDP had no sophisticated political party program, and it could not have had it if we take into account the intellectual and social (political) awareness of Albanians which was on the margins at the time. The Albanians wanted to become a political factor in Macedonia. In 1994, PDP won the trust of 21% of voters from the total electoral body in Macedonia. The failure of Macedonians and their government to deal with the problems of ethnic minorities resulted in the emergence of a new political party of Albanians in Macedonia called DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians) which was more radical in comparison with PDP, especially regarding human rights and freedoms and the process of integration in the vital national structures in Macedonia. The political and ideological magic wand did not work and eventually the Albanians, emotionally moved with the ideology, took over the action into their hands. There was a culmination of Albanian radicalism in view of achieving their own goals without any understanding of other ethnic minorities in Macedonia, i.e. the Turks, Macedonian Muslims (Torbesi), Romanies etc. This sociological turbulence, which was raging through Macedonia, resulted in the war in the west part of the country in 2001. Armed Albanians withdrew to the mountains forming para-military groups supported by the Albanian mafia, the diaspora and powerful lobbies from across the Atlantic Ocean.

After the war ended, former combatants sponsored by their political mentors formed a political party called the DUI (Democratic Union for Integration). This time the Albanians, having learnt by previous mistakes which they paid dearly not integrating and participating with the other ethnicities in Macedonia, decided to cooperate and actively integrate in their own ranks of intellectuals as well as to collaborate with the other ethnic communities such as the Turks and Macedonian

Muslims. The Turks in Macedonia have in addition to co-operation with the Albanians established their own political party which had been marginalized until the Republic of Turkey interfered through its embassy in Skopje. All these activities resulted in the TDP (Turkish Democratic Party) or the Turkish minority having three deputies in the Macedonian parliament, one ambassador and Counsellor to the Minister of Economy.

DUI is currently the most influential Albanian political party in Macedonia. According to its program determination it is oriented towards the Euro-Atlantic Integrations and acts on the principles of liberal democracy.

During the pre-election campaigns, the DUI leaders advocated the union of two entities in Macedonia alluding to the current Dayton solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina which proved to be useful for stopping the war but not for the functioning of a stable and modern state. The post-Dayton development of Bosnia and Herzegovina has already shown that ethnic political organisation can not ensure the consensus for the development of the state and its integration in the Euro-Atlantic Integrations. DUI can be described according to the representative of the party, Gezim Ostreni, who said at a press briefing in Tetovo in 2001: "DUI is the party for all those who consider themselves deprived in the Republic of Macedonia." Their alleged flexibility, adaptability and understanding of different views and interests articulated in a multi-ethnic political reality of Macedonia was confirmed by a deputy from the DUI coming from the Turkish ethnic minority as well as by a deputy from the ethnic minority of Macedonian Muslims. This is the first case of the affirmation of non-Albanians in the Albanian political party in Macedonia. The DUI has 16 deputies in the Macedonian parliament of the total 26 Albanian deputies. Seven Albanian deputies come from DPA which is the second party according to its influence among the Albanians. From the other Albanian political parties, there are two deputies from the PDP (Party of Democratic Prosperity) and one deputy from NDP (National Democratic Party).

The present leading coalition composed of SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) and DUI is facing the pressure of international as well as domestic public in relation to achieving consensus regarding the development of international relations which are relevant even for the existence of Macedonia as a state. Since the political demagogies of ethnic national policy are not to be relied upon, the conclusion of events in Macedonia will depend on the pace of integration of Macedonia in the Euro-Atlantic Integrations and on the support that the USA offer to the states in the Balkan region. This is even more significant due to the unfavourable attitude of Macedonia's neighbouring countries.

The IFIMES International Institute believes that the Republic of Macedonia has to continue to be actively involved in the development of sound international relations – taking into account that it is a very complicated multinational, multire-

ligious and multicultural society. The leading Macedonian and Albanian parties play a special role in developing such relations. In the same way as the DUI included representatives of other ethnic communities in the region, the Macedonian parties should include the representatives of ethnic communities of Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and others since only the integration of minority communities based on human rights and freedoms in the social life of Macedonia and the economic development can create the conditions for stability and prosperity of Macedonia. The Macedonian sun will then shine again.

The IFIMES International Institute is of the opinion that the government of the Republic of Macedonia may face additional destabilisation of the state and the escalation of military conflict supported by the plans to establish an ethnic Albania. This is further aggravated by the coming political crisis in Belgrade and the weakened Macedonian state. Destabilisation of Macedonia will enable the so called Balkan mafia to operate undisturbedly and to gain enormous profit. Its interest in Macedonia has further increased after the assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, since the present Serbian authority is going to undertake a series of actions in order to prevent the functioning of mafia in Serbia, which had been thriving undisturbedly until now.

THE GENOCIDE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN SOUTH OF IRAQ

By Dr.Munther Al Fadhal

Summary of the speech at University of London - School of Oriental and African Studies SOAS

Genocide is aiming to kill people by different devices and it is considered as a dangerous acts that threaten security and safety of society because it result in extermination and persecution of human totally or partially because of the nature of their nationality, their race or their religion. Genocide is not a political crimes but it is a usually deliberate crime even if it's committing by a political motivation. Genocide is an International Crime.

Historical development this crime goes back to time of Babylon and it was committed in the First World War by Germans who used the poisonous gasses in France and during the Second World War too in 1939-1945. Kurds inside Kurdistan and other places of Iraq has also suffered from this crime and what the Faily Kurds has been exposed to emigration, disappearing and execution out of judiciary girdle. The same crimes have been committed against Shiaa in central and south Iraq before and after uprising 1991.

Genocide committed by the Iraqi regime was always comprehensive and against all Iraqi people regardless of ethnical, religious or cultural considerations. For instant, the Assyrians who are the indigenous people of Iraq and a tiny & peaceful national and Christian minority have been subjected to ethnical and religious cleansing even they were not forming any threatening or dangerous to the existing regime.

Because of Genocide is an awful crime and affecting human rights, therefore has FN issued tow international agreements and that was resulted in holding assembly in Rom to establish an International court in 1988 and that came to light in 11/4 -2002, where the agreement was deposited to FN and the judges would research in different International crimes among these is genocide crime.

Denominational repression policy is another kind of genocide that the Iraqi regime has committed in central and south Iraq against citizens. Discrimination and humiliation of Shiaa through series of articles that was published in regime newspaper following the uprising in April 1991 was a part of this crime and especially when the regime has doubted about the identity of Marshlands residents as Arabs and as Iraqis and by that the regime got excuses to bombing their cities by different weapons and establishing (Saddam rivers). No doubt these people living in area where the oldest civilization historically began and where the old law as Sumerian, Babylon law born.

Violation of human rights that is committing by dictators is no longer an interior matter, where the International community interfering is not possible to cease repression of the civil or remains as a sightseer for all kinds of genocides crimes in the world. But respecting human right has shown to be matter for International community and must not be limited as long as that situation become a source for insecurity and instability and that would affecting international peace situation especially when the repressions is within the state terror.

In Iraq has violation against human rights been since 1968 very seriously especially concerning the Kurds, Shiaa, Turkmen and Assyrians. The situation became worse when the war between Iraq and Iran broke out, chemical weapons was used in 1988 against the Kurds and during invading Kuwait in 1990. Drying the Marshlands, destructing environment, poisoning the waters and bumping the cities in South has been a clear infracting to legislations, international commitments and not least all religions. In this connection the research is divide op as follows:

- Restricting concept of genocide crime
- International crimes against human-being in South Iraq

1. Restricting concept of genocide crime

Convention of forbidding committing genocide in 1946 was about that extermination means whipping out human being for their race, religion on purpose and expression of genocide became associated with Nazism because of massacring people for their race and religion and that was considered as crime against humanity even thought that was not an infractions to law of those regimes.

1. Killing members of groups
2. Physical and mental torturing of the members of groups
3. Forcing the group totally or partly to a critical materialistic life situation
4. Enforcing facilities that prevent birth in the group
5. Removing the children of the group to other group

All these International crimes do not fall by time and a punishable by the law whether it has been carried out or work for at carry it out. Every one who committed this kind of crime is responsible for that apart from his position such as constitutional responsible or ordinary public staff.

Killing the groups happens in different ways and by different facilities as following:

- Bodily genocide and the ethnical cleansing: it is about killing the people by poison gas, execution and buries the people alive, and that what happened in Iraq in 1991 and later on against the Shai inhabitants in South Iraq. The Iraqi regime killed in one day 2000 of the Shai through a process called “cleaning

of prisons". The crime against South of Iraq have been very huge and through the Satellites these crimes was filmed and show the destruction of Marshlands by construction of dams and draining the Marshlands, which caused forcible migration of local populations. The human rights, Europeans Parliament in year 2002, and the human rights condemned the crimes and it was definite as International crime following a declaration from Ambassador David Shiver in USA.

- Biological genocide: it is about sterilising the men and aborting the women in order to wiping out the race of that group.
- Cultural genocide: it is about forbidding a nation to converse with own native language and that has happened to the Kurd in Iraqi Kurdistan and In Turkey against the Kurds. Though this crime has result in assimilation and ruining of that groups existence, still the "The international family " has not given enough attentions to this crime. The reasons for this crime could be pointed out as follows:
 - Religious reason: One of the worse crimes in our time has been crimes of Iraqi regime against the South Iraq such as poisoning the water, drying the Marshlands, bumping their city and terrorising their people especially the religious, who disappeared and killed.
 - Political and social reasons: it is bout assimilation and arabisation of non-Arab people in Iraq as it has been carried out by a series of resolutions against the Kurd generally and Faily Kurd, who has been offer for this crime because of their nationality and as follower of Shiia belief. It is needless to mention in details about the Ba'ath Arabization tyrannical policy against small minority i.e. the Assyrians who were not allowed to mention their ethnicity during the official Iraqi census of 1977 and 1987 and they were forced to refer to themselves as Arab, since there are a lot of human rights organizations reports dealt with this matter.

PART TWO

International crimes against the humanity in South Iraq

1. Introduction

Before reporting the International crimes in South Iraq, it is necessary to clarifying the three parts of it as following:

1. War Crimes
2. War against peace
3. Crimes against Humanity

The International crime: It is a high crime and committed on purpose which means criminal intent exists. Therefore the International crimes is considered to be Infamous Crime that tremble the International security and peace not just that country but the whole International community and the punishment has to be carried out by the International community.

2. The International crime against humanity

1. Legitimacy background: It is about the law clause that condemn the event through International conventions as conventions of forbidding genocide that exterminate human like what the Iraqi regime done against Shiaa in South Iraq, where thousands of people buried a live during the uprising 1991 and in Kurdistan concerning Anfal and Halabjha.
2. Materialistic background: it is about acts or that constitute an International crime like demolishing environment, disappearing of people and using people for biological and chemical experimentation. Almost 300.000 people abandoned there places and more than 100.000 live in Iran as refugee because of the disaster that hit the environment like water poisoning and extinction of major part of birds and fishes of that area.
3. Mentally background: because of the International crime commits on purpose and threaten the peace in the world therefore the crime is considered to be.

3. War crime in south of Iraq

Although war is not result in any thing but huge violations of human rights, therefore the international conventions which concerning the rules of war must be taken into consideration as following:

1. Den- Haug convention in 1899 – 1907
2. Rules in forbidding using
3. Geneva protocol for 1925 in forbidding using poison gas and biologic

The international Security Council condemned the Iraqi regime for using chemical weapons in 1988 against the Kurds in accordance to introduced resolution in 26-8-1988. Using the chemical weapons, drying and poison marchlands committed against the inhabitants in South Iraq besides storing chemical weapons in mortuary of Nejaf and Kerbala.

4. Example of the international war crime in Iraq

1. Genocide, the crime of genocide committed against Kurd in Kurdistan and in other part of the country like against the emigrations of the fairly Kurd, who become offer because of their belief in Shiaa.
2. Genocide the humanity by using chemical weapons against the Kurd in 1988 and shaia in 1991.
3. Bumping the civil target against the Kurdish villages, inhabitants of Najef, Kerbala, Basara, semaow and Dewania and against Iran.
4. Burying the people a live. Thousands hundreds of the Kurd in Iraqi Kurdistan and of shaa in South were buried a live. This crime is a war crime and do not fall by time and the international criminal can not claim any politician excuse to commit that crime and must not be given asylum.
5. Execution crime of the captives: killing, executing or burying the captives alive is an international crime and must the accuser be prosecuted as a war criminal.
6. Torturing the captives and interrogate them by force is war crime.
7. Violation against woman: this crime as committed in Kurdistan and in Kuwait during the occupation.
8. Mines implantation against human: The Iraqi regime has implanted more than 10. Millions mines against people in Kurdistan.

According to rules of International law the people who commit an International crime can not be granted political or humanist asylum and must be punished by law for their crime that can not be fallen because of time. Fallen a crime because of time is not considered in situation of Benoshe, former president of Chile and Slobedan Melosafech of Serbia.

Amnesty International in this connection has taken initiative to tallying rules of International Law according to agreement of Geneva in 1949-8-12, agreement of Den-Haug in 1899 and protocol Geneva in 1925. To protect the human. Amnesty International has also provided many rules to protect human in the war situation such as forbidding killing the civil people and the injured captive, to treat the injured people and the sick, to insure the people a fair court, and no part in the war has to choose the weapon or the manner of the war. But unfortunately the Iraqi regime did not take any of these rules in consideration in the war with Iran and in suppressing the uprising in Kurdistan and South Iraq or in Kuwait.

5. Crimes against peace

The people at time of peace have many rights that should not get violated such as civil rights, political rights, economical rights, and social and cultural rights.

Therefore in a war situation must these rights be taken in consideration and if not then the International crime is in force such as offensive against other country as the case of Kuwait in 1990, participating in conspiracy to invading another country, or affiliating other country's territory by force.

6. Crimes against Humanity

The crimes that against humanity has been considered by Vatican as crimes against God and human. These crimes were specified by Nuremberg court and considered as International crimes and must be punishable. A big part of theses crimes has been committed by Saddam regime such as killing and whipping out the civil in Kurdistan- Kirkuk such as destroying 4500 villages. In 1976-77 over 200 Assyrian ancestral villages in northern Iraq were razed by the Iraqi regime. Scores of churches were also destroyed. Nearly every village had a church and/or monastery and some of the ancient churches were as much as 1400 years old and totally were levelled with the ground without any consideration to its historical account.

7. Crimes against South Iraqi Shia

...such as forcing hundreds thousands of them to leave Iraq to Iran because of their believe, torturing and killing their religious leadership in all holy city of Iraq such as Nejaf, Kerbal.

8. Recommendation and conclusion

- Because of the brutality of repression of human rights in Iraq, it has been necessary to carry out follows:
- Activating and revising resolution 688 in order to be introduced according to chapter seven of the compact for set up teams of researching to investigate the situation of human rights in Iraq.
- Establishing an especial court for International crimes to call to account that has been responsible for committing the International crimes against the Shia and Kurds.
- Pay compensation to victims who life got ruined because of International crimes offences and cancel a particular court.
- Cancelling the execution punishment from all Iraq laws and it is necessary to International community to carry out retribution against regimes which abusing human rights.
- Establishing high constitution court to watch constitution of the law and

obligating the state and all in governor.

- Activating of the UN 's role to help Iraqi people.
- Freezing all stolen balances from the Iraq state.
- The UN has to work for paying a part of the return oil as compensation to Iraqi people, who has become refuge before and after the Gulf war.
- Establishing a high committee of Iraqi experts in law in order to investigate the crimes that committed against Iraqi people and pointing out the compensation to pay those people.
- Carrying out through media to the world all crimes against Iraqi people and focusing on International community role to stop the continued ethnical cleansing of Iraqi people.
- Rehabilitation of the environment in South Iraq and work for renovating all damaging in the Marshlands by removing all dams and help the refugee to return to their place in those areas.

Now we are waiting the result: Bringing Iraqi war criminals to justice!

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana has in line with current events in Iraq constructed an analysis of the situation. Here only the most interesting parts of a more extensive study are highlighted:

***AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE WAR FOR THE LIBERATION
OF IRAQ
SIMULTANEOUSLY REACHING SIX GOALS WITH AN
ASSISTANCE OF SIX FACTORS***

36 hours after the beginning of the War for the liberation of Iraq, which is a political name for the military operations, called SHOCK AND FEAR, we can clearly state that the American forces surprised the Iraqi forces with an invasion of the 3rd and the 7th cavalry division through the desert. The named forces are by now already half way to Baghdad in order to avoid direct confrontations with the Iraqi army located at the traditionally positioned defense lines.

The American strategy of avoiding the Iraqi forces is extremely important for the advance towards Baghdad. With this they would avoid massive surrendering of the Iraqi soldiers and civilians, which would present logistic difficulties to the advancing forces (identification, welfare, lodging in prisons). The mentioned difficulties will in the future undoubtedly influence further quick advance towards Baghdad, which is the main goal of the operation.

American strategy is based on six factors to achieve six strategic goals:

The first factor is the 'beheading' of Saddam Hussein and his closest associates, which is the basic and the most important task. The Allies will in the course of the operation fire missiles at all the suspicious locations where Saddam might be situated. Simultaneously other special planned operations will be carried out.

The second factor is taking over two thirds of Central and Southern Iraq in 72 hours. The Northern Iraq is in any case under the American control on the basis of the agreement between the Kurds and the USA, concluded in Ankara on March 19th 2003, with which the Kurdish units came under the American command. All this would smooth the progress of the operation to surround Baghdad from all sides, where there is a possibility of a revolt within the city itself or a state coup within the political elite.

The third factor, which is the bombardment of military facilities, will strongly damage meager missile capacities of the armed forces of the Iraqi regime.

The fourth factor is the simultaneous performance of three operations. The first one is strong bombardment, followed by ground troops and special operations of

the marines in the hinterland. This represents a new tactical approach, as opposed to the liberation of Kuwait operations, when the gap between air and ground attack accounted for 39 days.

The fifth factor: The Iraqi leadership is not aware enough, or is neglecting the fact, that the Americans possess some new kinds of weaponry with great demolition force, which will be used for the first time.

The sixth factor: The Allies estimate they will be fighting only 80.000 Iraqi soldiers, since the other 350.000 that are within the regular Iraqi army and are not loyal to the regime, might surrender at the first opportunity. This, though, is made more difficult due to the fact that every army unit includes firing squad composed of members of Iraqi military intelligence services.

Saddam Hussein follows two incorrect defense theses. First of all, the use of the chemical weapons would damage his units more than the allied ones, since these are quite well protected. The second mistake is that Saddam is playing the card 'Baghdad - Stalingrad'. In each case, Baghdad cannot become Stalingrad that was resisting the Nazis during WWII. In Baghdad there are more than 2 million oppressed Shiites that would, similar to April 1991, rebel against the regime of Saddam at the first given opportunity.

According to the opinion of military analysts of the International Institute IFIMES, the Iraqi regime will crumble within a week after the arrival of the American troops into the suburbs of Baghdad, what might according to the expectations, occur already within next 20 hours. Simultaneously, the northern front would be activated, American marines and a part of the 101st air-strike division would together with the Kurdish troops enter Kirkuk and take control of the oil fields. The liberation of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, depends on the arrival of the Turkish units as logistical support under the American command (in order to avoid unnecessary incidents with the Kurdish units in the north of Iraq).

According to the opinion of political analysts of the International Institute IFIMES this war is one of the most complicated and demanding in the history of mankind due to the fact that they are simultaneously trying to achieve six goals in the shortest period of time and within one single operation.

Goals:

1. Neutralization of the Iraqi army and a part of the Republican guard within first days of the war.
2. To defeat the Iraqi army without destroying it in order to use it in the post-war rebuilding of the country.
3. To reach Baghdad within 72 hours, surround it and wait for the further

developments in the city.

4. To destroy as quickly as possible the supporting pillars of the regime (the Republican guard, Intelligence services, etc.).
5. To prevent the process of mass-revenge of the people on the members of the regime, a process that can lead to a civil war.
6. To preserve the unity of the Iraqi territory and to prevent interference of the neighbors, meaning especially Turkey and Iran.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana has been regularly analyzing the events in Iraq and those connected to it, especially now with the ongoing Iraqi crisis. Here only the most interesting parts of a more extensive study are highlighted:

WITH THE OPERATION TO LIBERATE IRAQ, SADAM HUSSEIN'S MORTAL ENEMIES REMAIN NEUTRAL WILL RUSSIA FILL THE VOID?

In the south of Iraq, specifically on the southern battleground on the line Basra-Nasiriya-Najaf, the Americans are experiencing unpredictable difficulties. The International Institute IFIMES is analyzing the causes for the current situation that can prolong the duration of the operations, even failure in this phase.

From September 7th till 22nd 2002 four retired Egyptian generals had on invitation of the Iraqi government visited Iraq in order to consult the Iraqi government on their defense plan before already then probable American attack on the country.

The generals have on the basis of geographic, armament and national presumptions that influenced the defense plans, reexamined the important points of the Iraqi strategy. The generals were convinced that the Iraqi Kurdistan has been in fact under the American control since 1991. The two important cities in the North with rich oil deposits are located too closely to the borderline with the Kurdish troops. Kirkuk is removed 30 km and Mosul 40 km from the administrative border with Kurdistan and they are therefore in military sense in fact lost. In this case the Iraqis would not have any great possibility to defend themselves against an attack from north and therefore the first defense lines of Baghdad had been set up next to Hamrin some 100 km from the capital, which simultaneously represent the Kurdish ethnical border.

The generals were drawing their conclusions from the fact that Turkey will immediately open its air space and allow unhindered arrival of the American troops to the North. But the Turks have not complied with the American demands and the northern front has for the first days of war remained actually inactivated.

In connection to the Iraqi south the generals advised Saddam Hussein to try and run in the south of the country a media campaign in his own favor, being aware of the fact, that the Americans have already in 1991 left the Shiite population in the South of the Country to the mercy of Saddam Hussein. The latter has with millions of dollars bought the loyalty of the Shiite tribes that at the moment show no support for the military action.

The Americans had to change their strategy in the last moment and the 4th division with its 30 ships of military equipment waiting for the Turkish consent in

Mediterranean, had to be redirected towards the Suez Canal. Thus the division will be losing, in best case, a week of combat activity: The Americans simultaneously had to relocate part of the marines and of the 101st air-borne division to the North, so the plans had to be changed in the first days of the operation. With this they have quite weakened their capabilities in the southern part of the front next to Basra, which had a negative psychological influence on the units in this sector waiting for the simultaneous opening of the northern front.

Hereby the first reason for the (un)success of the American elite units of marines and of the 3rd and the 7th division at Um-Qasr, Basra, Nasiriya and Najaf is stated. The second reason for the mentioned unsuccesses can be probably found with the deadly silence of the Shiite population of the Southern Iraq, meaning 10 million people, on which the American planners seriously counted. They were counting on the Shiite uprising that would with the advance of the American troops become mortal enemies of Saddam Hussein's regime. This would be similar to March 3rd 1991, when on the sign from American president George Bush Sen. they started a magnificent popular uprising that has afterwards spread to 14 Iraqi provinces (out of 18). The insurgents, lead by the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), remained in power for 17 days.

Perhaps the greatest American mistake after the victory in the Gulf War was that they succumbed to fear that a pro-Iranian Shiite government would be established in Baghdad, in other words: the conspiracy of the rulers of the Gulf (except the Kuwaiti sovereign). The Americans allowed Saddam Hussein to use helicopters and simultaneously without a UN Security Council resolution established a No Fly zone for the Iraqi planes above the 36th and under the 32nd parallel for the protection of Kurds and the Shiites. Following this, the world public was shocked and appalled at the brutal reprisal of the Republican guard against the Shiite south. It has been estimated that some 110.000 people were killed.

Through the 1990-ties the Shiite opposition has been very skeptical and even opposed to American involvement in the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Their view was that the regime should be brought down from within and not from outside. This opinion was changed only on December 9th 2002 on the Iraqi opposition conference in London, when the American plans for the future of Iraq were approved. The credit for this goes to the Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani and to the secret US pressures on the Iranian government, where the seat of SCIRI is located. Despite apparent cooperation they remained skeptical towards the American plans, as for instance, to install an American general as a military leader of the country after the fall of Saddam. The USA has in the meantime changed its position and has expressed readiness to transfer the power after the liberation to the Iraqis. The Americans have not conceded to the cooperation of SCIRI in the military operations to liberate Iraq.

The Shiite south is very interesting in its political opinions, the most interesting fact being that the first communist party in the Arab world at all was founded in the city of Nasiriya in Iraq in the year 1936. Its founder Fahd was a representative of poor and oppressed Shiites, who played no role in the state since the establishment of the Kingdom of Iraq in 1921 that was under control of the Sunnite Arabs.

After the revolution in 1958 and the establishment of the Iraqi republic, the president general Adbulkarim Kasim I was a pro-communist patriot from the Shiite south to which he returned the rights, they were entitled to under the constitution. The state coup of the Baas Party on February 8th 1963 and the murder of Kasim stopped this process until 1972 when the vice-president at that time, Saddam Hussein, nationalized the oil and the country had to face, due to the sanctions of the western oil corporations, a harsh crisis. Saddam Hussein founded the Popular Progressive Front with the Communist Party and even presented it with some ministerial portfolios. In the same year an agreement of friendship and cooperation was signed with the Soviet Union and thus Iraq fell into the Russian hands (where it has with slight cooling of the relationship remained up to this day).

Russia, which has excellent relations with Iran and has despite American opposition constructed a nuclear reactor in Bushehr and is planning to construct another six in the future, has an open door to influence the SCIRI and is probably already thinking of filling the void in the South of Iraq, especially now, when the Americans have found themselves in great crisis on this front.

Russia has immense interests in the south of the country, since Russian oil corporations (Lukoil, Transneft, etc.) have multi-billion contracts for the oil deposits at Basra. In addition, SCIRI is enjoying absolute support in the South of Iraq, and its military council - Failak Badr - The Badr Corpus, is controlling 10.000 fighters situated alongside the border with Iran that have since 1991 up to this day conducted a serious of guerilla actions.

The Russian vultures are with a support of the powerful oil lobby pressuring the president Putin to support the strategic interests of Russia in Iraq and to immediately realize several confidential plans of cooperation with the Badr Corpus. Therefore they propose immediate entry of these units into the Iraqi territory, to which Americans strongly oppose, since this would repeat the scenario from Kosovo, when the Russian units in SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999 entered the Prishtina airport before the arrival of the Americans.

Probably such a plan would be especially liked by Saddam Hussein in these critical moments, since he would choose the Russian units with Badr Corpus as a lesser evil than the present one. The Shiites would thus gain their autonomy, similar to the Kurdish one in the North. The difference would be in the fact that the guardians of this autonomy would be the Russians, as opposed to the Kurdish one, which is supported by the Americans.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has in light of the military operation 'Iraqi Freedom' run by the USA and her Allies been analyzing diplomatic and military (un)successes of the operation. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below:

IS USA LOOSING THE WAR - MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY?

The operation 'Iraqi Freedom', planned for more than a year has run into troubles. Already from the beginning itself, the military allies encountered fierce resistance, even and especially in the Shiite south that traditionally hates the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Allied forces are with their advance experiencing only partial successes in the populated areas from Um Qasr, Basra, Faw, Nasiriya up to the holly Shiite city of Najaf. The fastest advance occurred in the desert, away from urban centers and military strongholds of the Iraqi army. Para-military militias, called the Fedayin, inflicted harsh blows to the Allied troops, a fact that presented a shock to the military planners of this operation.

In any case, the plan of general Tommy Franks went through a thorough change. These changes have a tactical purpose with a goal to win the war and march into Baghdad. USA can win the war in the military sense, but despite this victory, the war can be lost in a political sense, so therefore radical changes of political, diplomatic and media plan of the operation in whole are needed.

On the political plane US found itself in a troublesome position due to the unilateral action that was from its beginnings questionable in the eyes of the whole world, including the three permanent members of the Security Council – France, Russia and China. Saddam Hussein has used and abused well the lack of unity in the international community and has in the eyes of the international public become a statesman defending his country from an aggression. In the eyes of the Islamic world he became a martyr, who is defending the whole Islamic world against the worst enemy of Islam. Saddam Hussein looked for support in the seventh chapter of the UNO Founding Document, while the USA had only moral backing in being the only (remaining) superpower helping the Iraqi people and trying to protect the whole world from a dictator, that has (already) used and is ready to use again the weapons of mass-destruction not only against his own people, but anywhere the world.

The greatest fiasco in the beginning of the American operation is in the act that 10 million Shiites in the south of Iraq remained in best case passive and in most cases hostile towards their arrival. They haven't welcomed the liberators with flowers, as the Allied expected, but have instead with their guerilla attacks, become a nightmare for soldiers on the outskirts of towns and villages into which they haven't even entered.

The reaction of the Shiites was expected for two reasons:

- First, due to the American support for the popular uprising against the regime of Saddam Hussein in 1991 in the south of Iraq, followed by a later consent given to Saddam Hussein to use helicopters to quell the same popular uprising that has spread all over the country. This American behavior disappointed the Shiites, who felt cheated and betrayed and who apparently did not wish to repeat the same mistake twice.
- Second, due to the political stance of the Shiite political leaders (SCIRI, Aldawa, etc.), which are under political influence of Teheran and Damascus and have preferred to choose neutrality rather than participation in action, where the outcome is not known, and which are in best case opposed to an appointment of an American general in place of Saddam Hussein.

The American forces are for now advancing through the Shiite area, where neither Saddam Hussein nor Americans are liked. A question is rising on the nature of American advance through the Sunni part of Iraq that has been traditionally supportive of Saddam Hussein and is afraid to lose great privileges, gained by the Iraqi constitution from 1921, when the state was founded. Certainly, the resistance in the Sunnite western Iraq will be even more fierce on the line Haditha – Rumadi – Falujja – Baghdad and in the East on the line Baquba – Khalis – Baghdad, but also on the northern line Mosul – Bejji – Tikreet – Baghdad.

A breakdown of the political part of the 'Iraqi Freedom' operation occurred as an outcome of the fact that the USA had been in previous decade communicating with the Iraqi people through a mediation of an oppositional fraction The Iraqi National Congress INC, which had no political stronghold on the ground. The US cooperation with the opposition was constantly in crisis. USA was repeatedly accusing them of abusing the allocated resources (these being ten million dollars instead of a promised one hundred millions, which were allocated according to the Iraqi Liberation Law, approved by the Congress in 1998). Other visible and influential members of the opposition were far away and marginalized. Another reason for the political unsuccess of the USA can be located in the influence of the neighboring countries on particular oppositional fractions (Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia). This interference with their interior affairs is best shown by the events, as they occurred, for instance, in 1996 with the bloody intra-Kurdish war between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Turkey and Iraq supported KDP, while Iran supported PUK. Today, Turkey supports PUK and is at present in a media war with KDP, which is controlling a part of the Iraqi Kurdistan at the southern border of Turkey. USA is aware of the gravity of the situation and therefore the secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell warned the neighboring countries against any interference with the Iraqi affairs.

The military operation to topple Saddam Hussein could in case of a total success not only in military, but also in political sense become a precedent and a model case to cope with later (similar) global cases. The operation has no support in modern international law, but it might have a support in the classical theory of the international law development, deriving from the 1648 Westphalia Treaty, 1918 Versailles Treaty and 1945 San Francisco Treaty. USA urgently and as soon as possible has to open the communication channels with the nations of the Middle East and explain them in a simple language the positive and noble goals of this operation that will certainly have a positive influence on their future, as well.

The International Institute IFIMES warns that the military liberation of Baghdad does not represent an end to the destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime, it is only a beginning of a political process that might become painful to both sides, Iraqis and Americans. The case of Soviet Union in Afghanistan can repeat itself in Iraq, but in different roles. Russia, France and Islamic countries will support Iraqi mujaheds against the American aggressors with a repetition of events from the eighties, when they were recruiting suicide killers and fighters all over the Islamic world.

According to the opinion of IFIMES, USA urgently has to change its politics towards the specific fractions within the Iraqi opposition as a precondition for the establishment of a dialogue with the Iraqi people. Most of the Iraqi oppositional groups have almost no support among the people, while their political activities are being conducted in the offices of luxury villas in London, Dubai, Damascus, etc. The American ambassador with the free Iraqis, Zalmay Khalilzad, has already made his first steps in the direction of these changes. A lot of work expects him, since it is upon him to build foundations of a new relationship with the Iraqi people and to repair the damage that occurred during the Clinton administration and its special envoy Frank Richardony.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has in light of recent events in Iraq and the beginning of the military and political part of Baghdad operation been analyzing the mentioned events. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below:

STREET FIGHTING - A NIGHTMARE FOR THE ALLIES

With the arrival of advance units of the American Marines and the 3rd Infantry division up to the outskirts of Baghdad and taking over the International Airport 'Saddam', the war for the liberation of Iraq is coming to its final phase that will determine the success of the whole operation.

In the military sense, the Allies are expecting in the city of Baghdad itself the Golden brigade of the Republican guard, counting 16.000 best trained men, showing utmost loyalty to Saddam Hussein, the 20.000 members of the para-military militias Fedayeen and also 200.000 members of the Army of Jerusalem, composed of the Baath party members. On the outskirts of Baghdad three divisions of the Republican guard are located: Baghdad, Nida and Hamurabi. To these, another three divisions can be added. Adnan is situated 60 km away from the Iraqi capital into the direction of Teekrit. The division Medina can be found between Karbala and Najaf, while the division Nabukudnasser is stationed north of Baghdad. The latter three divisions are still not directly involved into fighting the Allied forces, since they are not located in Baghdad and cannot be besieged in it. A possible tactics may be that these three mentioned divisions will be included into a possible surrounding of the Allied forces from behind.

In any case, the Iraqi strategy is based on drawing the Allied units into a fight in the city center itself. Street combat is a nightmare for every commander. In street fights the civilians become subjects and potential soldiers for the attacking forces, while technological superiority (air superiority, speed, mobility and fire-power) is losing its meaning in a city combat. American forces will be trying to avoid street fighting in Baghdad. The Americans do, due to a lack of official and public support of the international community, not wish to use the Russian tactics and demolish Baghdad, as the Russians demolished Grozny. This would be in opposition to the goals of the 'Iraqi Freedom' operation. The fear of Allied forces from entering Baghdad is even greater because of the (un)successes on the route to Baghdad in cities like Um Qaser, Basra, Nassirya, Shatra and Najaf.

In a September 2002 document from Pentagon, called 'The Operational Strategy in Cities', a Chinese strategist from the 6th century is quoted, saying that the worst tactics is the siege of a walled city. In the present time, the Republican guard represents for the Allied forces a wall, protecting Baghdad.

According to the opinion of John Feres from the University of Calgary in Canada,

there is no victory in street combat without demolishing the whole street. Dean Novovisky from the Brookings Institute in Washington, who states that Saddam Hussein is surrounded by units that will fight to their end not only because of Saddam Hussein, but also because of their own destiny and the privileges they possess, complements his opinion. The American Rand Institute has in the year 2000 analyzed the influence of the demographic factor on future wars in the world. Half of the global population resides within cities. Terrorists and poorly armed countries wish to position their main battlefields in city centers, since technological superiority becomes in such circumstances unimportant and all depends on the soldiers that are in city centers lightly armed and dressed in uniforms or civilian clothes. This can in comparison to separating the civilian population from the soldiers, cause even more trouble to the Allies, but would serve well Saddam Hussein in the media war, since he will be able to accuse the Allies of killing innocent civilians, despite the fact that these would be soldiers in civilian clothes.

In Baghdad, Saddam Hussein is ready to fight to the end, while sacrificing himself and the five million inhabitants with him - this would be the Samson scenario from the Old Testament, when he tore down the temple on himself and on all the present within. This scenario could already be planned in the head of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in order to fight to the end. The difference between him and Samson is that Saddam does not possess any divine power, but he does possess chemical weapons that he will probably use in a primitive form to consolidate the being of international public opinion on his side, while accusing the Allies of using the chemical weapons.

The American strategy saw the entry into Baghdad as the last option from the beginning. The strategy itself is being based on the 'Shock & Awe' doctrine, written in 1996 by Harlan Olman from the National Defense University in Washington. This strategy is based on quick control and destruction of the military morale of the enemy. Two weeks after commencing the operation, the Allies still haven't destroyed the morale of the Iraqi regulars, like in Basra for instance, and let's not even consider the Republican guard, with which true fighting hasn't even begun yet. The task of the Allied soldiers will be very hard to fulfill and risky in Baghdad, since the metropolis is surrounded by artificial and natural lakes alongside the river Tigris (the area of Baghdad covers 100 km X 80 km). Meters and not kilometers measure advance in Baghdad - per each meter both sides can lose one soldier. Baghdad is predominately a Sunni city (three million Sunnites and two million Shiites that will remain neutral as did the Shiites in the South of Iraq).

Arrival of the American troops to the Baghdad International Airport 'Saddam', removed 20 km from the center of the city is, according to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES, a beginning of the political part of the operation Iraqi Freedom. Baghdad will be surrounded and the Iraqi leadership will be iso-

lated from the rest of the country and the military units in other parts of Iraq. The airport will serve as the seat of Allied Command and as a temporary capital of Iraq. From the airport the future civil, diplomatic and humanitarian structures will start to operate. Arrival of the future temporary administrator of Iraq, the retired American general Jay Garner, is expected in a company of several opposition leaders, now situated in Kuwait. The rest of the opposition; the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the Supreme Shiite Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Wifaq movement, are all located in the Iraqi Kurdistan alongside the Kurdish leaders Baryani and Talabani and the American ambassador to Free Iraqis Zalmi Khalilzada. Iraqi experts that are now residing in USA and are members of numerous commissions, which have put together projects on the future of Iraq in cooperation with 'The Future of Iraq' Department of the US Administration, are also expected to arrive.

From the temporary capital the Allied forces will draw together fighters from the opposition (Shiites, Sunnites and Kurds), which will lead the mentioned military operations for control over the strategic points (power plants, hospitals, waterworks, government buildings...) in Baghdad, supported by Allied forces. Simultaneously, they will continue with the activities to negotiate the terms of surrender for Baghdad with the present top leadership of Iraq. The surrender of the city to the Iraqi oppositional forces is of crucial importance for several reasons. First, due to the civilian population that is skeptical towards the Allied forces. Second, the international community, and especially the Islamic world, will react differently to the takeover of the city by the Iraqi opposition then by what would seem as a Christian occupation of an ancient city, once a center of Islamic civilization under the dynasty of Abbasids, the main center of the Islamic world.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has been analyzing the latest situation in Iraq with an emphasis on Rebuilding Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below:

WHO IS GOING TO REBUILD IRAQ: COALITION OR UNITED NATIONS?

Before the intervention in Iraq there were disagreements in the Security Council of the United Nations among the United States and Great Britain on one side and the opponents of the military intervention on the other side - Germany, France and Russia that were seriously planning to use the right of veto against any resolution that will allow the use of force against the regime in Baghdad. The UN Security Council has after days of discussions shown itself as an organ that cannot adapt itself to the needs of time and has become a prisoner of political demagoguery, deriving primarily from enormous economic interests of the opposing countries. The opposing countries have softened their position just before the fall of the Iraqi regime. The Russian president Putin stated that the breakdown of USA does not represent an economic or political interest of Russia. The French president Chirac and the German chancellor Schroeder have welcomed the fall of the dictator Saddam Hussein and have also expressed their wishes to the Iraqi people to decide upon their future by themselves and to choose a new political leadership. The French and the Russian concerns originate from their large and yearlong economic interests in Iraq. France invested into the Majnoon (with an estimated reserve of 26 billion barrels of oil) and West Qurno oil deposits (with a reserve of 15 billion barrels of oil). The Russian companies Lukoil and Transneft represent the largest investors in the Iraqi oil, especially into Baihasan next to Kirkuk, alongside several smaller investments in north Rumaila next to Basra.

After the fall of the Iraqi regime tensions and disagreements appeared among the members of the Coalition that has toppled the Iraqi regime and the opposing camp in the Security Council - particularly Russia, France and Germany. These countries wish for the UN Organization to have a determining role in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. The representatives of the American Administration, State Secretary Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, have clearly stated that they have no desire for the United Nations to have a leading role in the post-war rebuilding of Iraq and its administration.

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES, the post-war rebuilding of Iraq is a very demanding and sensitive issue due to the fact that it includes several questions: humanitarian, political, social, ethnical, economic and others as well. The UN Organization is not ready to properly respond to such a

demanding task, as confirmed by the experience from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and of course Afghanistan.

Iraq as a state is threatened from within and from outside. The internal troubles of Iraq originate in an undefined political system after the fall of the regime and in a lack of agreement among the local ethnical groups, such as the Kurds, the Sunnites and the Shiites.

The external threat to Iraq comes from several directions: Turkey is threatening the Kurds on the north of Iraq, Iran is interfering with the internal Shiite affairs, especially in the south of the country, while the greatest danger comes from Syria into which the complete Iraqi state and party leadership has fled and which will probably serve as the future center of destabilizing the new regime in Baghdad. In Syria a sister-party of the Iraqi Baath party, the Syrian Baath party, holds the power.

A smallest mistake and an untimely response in solving the Iraqi question can cause an explosion in the entire region from Israel and Lebanon all the way to Iran, traditionally in close relations with Syria. In this context the UN Organization is an out-dated and unreformed organization reacting very slowly almost by rule only when the events on the ground are getting out of control (IFOR has replaced the UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The Iraqi opposition shares the view of the United States and wishes for the UN Organization to have a secondary role in rebuilding the country, particularly in the humanitarian field within the framework of the 'Oil for Food' Program and in the area of political restructuring of the country and its international recognition. Thus the Iraqi opposition accepted the retired American general Jay Garner as the future leader of the civil administration. Next week members of the provisional government will be chosen from a line of experts in emigration or at home.

Some analysts and members of the International Institute IFIMES, who are also outstanding and important members of the Iraqi opposition and members of the future provisional government as well, participated in various Committees closely cooperating with the Future of Iraq Department at the American State Department. According to their opinion USA will favor the countries that were on the American side during the 'Iraqi Freedom' operation, which are Great Britain, Australia, Spain, Poland, Bulgaria, Georgia and Romania. Other countries will gain contracts from the UN 'Oil for Food' Program, already in place since 1996 in a regular way through international and public tenders; in other words, they will only symbolically participate in reconstructing the country.

Russian companies will receive one sort of guaranteed role, but not the main one as they had before. Such a position was earned by Russia because of the mediation services between the Coalition and the Iraqi regime they provided in course of the 'Iraqi Freedom' operation, especially due to their role in the quiet departure

of the Iraqi leadership. We cannot neglect the excellent relationships of the Russians with the Kurdish regional government in Erbil and the Shiite opposition, positioned in Iran. France on the other hand is trying to use a part of the Iraqi opposition that was active from its territory in the last 20 years, but also the bilateral agreements that they have with Great Britain (conversations of the foreign ministers Jack-Straw - Dominic De Villepan).

The International Institute IFIMES is warning that companies from Southeastern Europe do not have real chances to participate in the big business of the century, the Rebuilding of Iraq, except some countries such as Macedonia and Croatia that had in the past ten years been having constant and regular contacts with the Iraqi opposition and were all this time present at the Iraqi market. The same holds for companies from Jordania, Egypt and Syria that were in a privileged position (duty-free zone) during the regime of Saddam Hussein.

The main projects of the rebuilding process will occur within joint consortiums under the leadership of the US and the Provisional civil administration of the Iraqi state. Israel will also play an important role in the reconstruction projects due to its technological superiority. Israelis and Iraqis have already agreed to open the Mosul - Haifa pipeline that ceased its activities with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The Israeli Minister for Infrastructure Yosef Baretzki is already counting on Haifa to become soon Rotterdam of the Mediterranean.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has been analyzing the newest events in connection to Syria in light of the establishment of 'The New World Order'. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below:

SYRIA - WILL IT BE PUNISHED OR REWARDED?

The quick fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad has changed settled-in equations concerning the Middle East and the international politics in general. The April Ninth of this year represents a historical date for the Middle East and the region that was marked by wars, violence, terrorism, tyranny and more, in other words things not fitted to a modern man. At the same time, on the day when in Berlin, Paris, Damascus and Cairo the demonstrators were burning American flags, the liberated Iraqis were kissing them.

On the tenth of April this year, the former opponents of the war France, Germany and Russia (according to the Russian daily 'Izvestia' they were called the defeated ones) came together in St. Petersburg and started to change the political course while simultaneously forgetting the words uttered during last sessions of the Security Council weeks ago. All of them congratulated the Iraqi people, wished them peace and expressed their readiness to cancel the Iraqi debt - the money used by the Iraqi regime to construct palaces for themselves and torture chambers for the people. The day of the liberation of Baghdad will certainly serve as a milestone not among the centuries, but rather due to a fact that Baghdad has entered the new century with an exit from the mediaeval darkness.

The collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime was also a collapse of the United Nations Organization and its Security Council, caught among the economic interests of Russia, France, China and some dictatorial states that were not permanent members and were afraid that a similar fate might occur to them as well, as said by Richard Pearle from the Defense Politics Council at the American Pentagon.

The first reactions are arriving from Russia from the meeting of the presidents Putin, Chirac and Schroeder at the 'Peace and International Law' tribune. The Russian President Putin said 'that the world is changing and that the international law system has to change as well in order to adapt itself to the present time'. The reactions of the Arab regimes to the changes in Baghdad are very cautious, since for them a change in Baghdad means a change in the whole region. Some countries are taking these changes very seriously. One of these is Saudi Arabia that has already announced a reconstruction of the government and establishment of expert commissions to explore the urgently needed changes in the society, economy and educational system. The road to changes in Saudi Arabia will be problematic and slow with an uncertain outcome since the ruling dynasty Al Saud

is as a system closely connected to the ongoing processes in the Saudi society – rigid educational system, limited rights of women (e.g. prohibition to drive cars, women do not possess identity cards), unreformed and more than conservative religious leaders.

The changes will include also Iran. Two hundred Iranian religious leaders (among them also the ultra-conservative former president Rafsanjani) and prominent intellectuals have in their open letter to the president Khatemi demanded from him to speed his reformatory efforts. The conservatives are well aware that if the President Khatemi won't reform the country, the Americans surely will. The price then would be too high and there is even a possibility that the Islamic regime would fall. The fears of Iran are superfluous since Iran is not a part of the Middle-Eastern region in which the reforms should take place. Iran belongs to the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asia and is treated in such a context. A proof that Iran is not a part of the Middle East lies in the fact that Iran never threatened the security in Persian Gulf, except minor incidents during the Iran - Iraq War.

Syria as a country under the rule of the left wing of the Baath Party is in a very delicate and sensitive position. Damascus is ruled by a young, pro-western London ophthalmologist Bashar Al-Asad, who inherited an out-dated political structure and individuals that were surrounding and serving his father, the late president Hafez Al-Asad, including: present Vice-President of the country Abdulhalim Khadam, the Foreign Minister Faruk Al-Sharaa, the Defense Minister Mustafa Telas, etc. and the complete party apparatus in itself being a remnant of the 'Cold War', when Syria was an exponent of the Soviet Union in the Middle east. Each attempt of the President Al-Asad is condemned to fail unless thorough and radical reforms are undertaken.

In Damascus seats of the most radical organizations are found: Hamas, Jihad, Hezbollah, National Front and People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in Damascus tens of the leading functionaries of the Iraqi regime and tens of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological program scientists found refuge. Among them is also Izet Al-Douri, the Number two of the former Iraqi regime. The presence of the remnants of the Iraqi regime in Syria represents a potential danger for the new administration in Baghdad. To this we should add the transfer of the Iraqi chemical weapons to Syria in the beginning of March 2003, which only added to the existing danger.

The Syrian regime is using its military presence in Lebanon and the presence of the mentioned organizations in Damascus to direct the Syrian people to the external political enemy in order to forget the interior troubles of the country with 17 million inhabitants, of which 10% are the Kurds and the Armenians (500.000 of them do not have a Syrian citizenship). The political system is similar to the former Iraqi one; one-party system (Baath), permanent emergency measurements

and the military that is in every way trying reach the weapons of mass destruction.

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES, the Syrian leadership and especially the President Al-Asad have to perform some urgent interventions in the state structure. Syria has to define its position towards the future government in Baghdad and cooperate with Iraq on the new basis of friendly neighboring relations and respect of the territorial integrity and unity of the Iraqi state. Because of this there is an urgent need to expel all the personnel of the former Iraqi regime, to fully cooperate with the new government in Baghdad and the Coalition forces and to inform them on the names and the dates of departure of the 4.000 fighters (mujaheds), among which there are 1.000 Syrians, from its territory to Iraq. This represents an important step and a clear sign that Syria wishes peace with Iraq and has no desire to have a country in a civil war on its eastern border. The second condition is to cease the activity of radical organizations from Damascus, a first step towards peace with Israel. The third conditions is a reduction of influence and interference with the internal affairs of Lebanon, so that Syria can become a cohesive factor among the diverse ethnical and religious groups in Lebanon, and also a total withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Syria comprises an important part of the American plan called 'Partnership for the Middle East' into which Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Autonomy belong. In these countries democratic elements are present, while in some countries democracy is under way, like in Iraq or among the Palestinians. The present-day Syria does not fit into the above-mentioned efforts and plans. Syria has on the internal plane to abolish one-party system, end the emergency measurements and legitimize oppositional parties. Syria has to respect human rights into which belongs the revision of the citizenship law, which would provide a citizenship to half a million of its inhabitants, mostly of Kurdish and Armenian origin. The revised citizenship law also has to give the right to 400.000 Palestinians, so they can voluntarily acquire Syrian citizenship.

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES, if Syria positively responds to the mentioned requests it will be positively rewarded by the U.S. and the new Iraqi government with a participation in rebuilding Iraq as a sub-contractor, while in opposite case it will be punished. The USA has already promised such rewards to Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. These countries have indirectly participated in the Coalition and also posses an additional advantage since the price of their labor force does not exceed 300 EU monthly and are in close proximity to Iraq or are bordering on it. Great Britain, Poland, Bulgaria and Rumania will be treated as members of the Coalition and will as such gain a status of business contractor in Iraq.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has been analyzing the latest events in connection to Iraq or the emergency summit of the foreign ministers of the countries bordering Iraq: Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, but also Egypt and Bahrain – in the Saudi capital of Riyadh. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below:

THE LOSERS: FROM SANKT PETERSBURG TO RIYADH

The capital of Saudi Arabia – Riyadh has on the 19th of April 2003 hosted foreign ministers of the countries bordering on Iraq: Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Kuwait and the foreign ministers of Egypt and Bahrain, the chairman of the Arab League. The conclusions of this ministerial summit are very similar to the conclusions of the presidential troika summit of Russia, France and Germany in Sankt Petersburg after the fall of Baghdad. In accordance with the Russian daily »Izvestia«, which on its front page called the St. Petersburg summit the summit of the »losers«, we can call the summit in Riyadh the summit of the »frightened«.

The countries participating in the Riyadh summit can be divided into two groups. The first one is a group of countries supporting terrorism, like Iran and Syria, while the second one is composed of the countries allied to the U.S.A., which are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey. In the final statement the ministers demanded that the »occupying« forces should leave Iraq as soon as possible. At first it appears that these countries are with such a statement misleading the Arab public, since it is precisely these countries that have been for several years hosting on their territory American units because of the financial aid they are receiving, such as Turkey and Egypt or because of securing their own safety (like the Gulf states).

The final statement is demanding from the U.S.A. to allow the Iraqi people to elect their own government in a democratic way. This statement is raising a question whether the governments in these countries (except Turkey) were by themselves chosen by the people in a democratic manner and why these countries in the last 35 years haven't demanded for the Iraqi people that same right, i.e. to choose its government by itself?

The ministers believe that the provisional administration of Iraq possesses no legality and has no right to administer the Iraqi oil. This opinion is raising yet another question: Has the regime of Saddam Hussein had the right to administer the Iraqi oil by using its revenue to murder a million of Iraqis and to wage two military adventures against Iran and Kuwait?

The foreign ministers of these countries repeated the demands of Russia, France and Germany to abolish the sanctions after the establishment of a chosen government that could be appointed in two years from now. This is a reflection of their

fears that Iraq might be returning to the oil market. Some countries, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt depend on the quantity and the price of the oil on the world market, while others, like Turkey, Jordan, Syria and also Egypt earned tens of billions of dollars from illegal sale of the Iraqi oil through a privileged status in the UN »Oil for Food« program trade framework.

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES, both summits in Sankt Petersburg and in Riyadh overlooked two important facts concerning every Iraqi, such as security and non-interference with their internal affairs in this transitional and critical period of time. Here we have in mind the role of the pro-Saudi politician Adnan Pachachy and the pro-Iranian Shiite leader Adbulaziz Al-Hakim, who in fact became the press representatives of Riyadh and Teheran. Another important fact represents the debts of the regime that amount up to 47 – 127 billion \$. According to the data of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington Iraq owes (in billion dollars) to Saudi Arabia 25, other Gulf states (without Kuwait) 17, Kuwait 5, The Paris Club (without France) 12.5, France 8, Russia 8, to commercial banks 6.2, to Eastern European states 4 billion dollars and the list goes on. The question of debt cancellation (in whole or partially) is a matter of a good will gesture and depends on the intentions of these countries to start a new political and economic cooperation with the new Iraq.

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES every minister that arrived to Riyadh has had its own reasons for doing so, except Kuwait that is only interested in stability and peace with its northern neighbor. The meeting would be of great interest and would be praised if in the background wouldn't have been hidden bad intentions of the participants with unified position despite their mutual ideological hatred. With this we refer to NATO Turkey, Shiite Iran, Conservative Sunnite Saudi Arabia, Baath Syria and so forth.

- TURKEY is well aware of the fact that its historical role is coming to its end: American bases in Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan and in Iraq can gradually replace the bases in Turkey that have become dangerous due to the influence of the Islamists and the expensive track of the weak Turkish economy. Turkey wishes to have a word and share in the post-war Iraq and possesses a Trojan horse in the form of a small Turkmen party with a seat in Ankara, which is lead by Sanan Aga and has been for the last decade boycotting an entry into the Regional Government of Kurdistan.
- IRAN has greatest fears due to the American presence on its western border that will certainly be permanent on the airfields of Baghdad, H3, Talil and Harir. The fears of Iran became expressed through the SCIRI (The Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq) boycott of the opposition meeting in Nasiriya in the middle of April, 2003 and through daily Shiite demonstrations

against the American presence. The banners on these demonstrations are copies of similar demonstrations in Teheran against the »Great Satan«.

- SAUDI ARABIA is in fear as well, since it is well aware that it is the next domino to fall after Saddam Hussein. According to the opinion of the John Alterman from the Center for International and Strategic Studies: »... in is in the interest of Saudi Arabia for Iraq to be unstable in order to prove the failed politics of the U.S.A. in this region and as to avoid the winds of change that are increasingly blowing precisely to its territory.« Saudi Arabia is well aware that every smallest democratic change signifies a danger to the monarchy, built on the basis of radical Wahabite teachings. It was these teachings that have contributed mostly to the hatred of the Muslims against the West and its values. According to the opinion of a prominent Saudi publicist Turki Al-Hamada: »Each and every country is concerned about the existing situation, especially Saudi Arabia, since it can choose between reforms or fall-down of the regime according to Saddam Hussein model – there is no third alternative.« A similar opinion is held by the Saudi analyst Mashari Thaidi, who believes: »... that it is about time for a political, social and economic reform of the country with 250 billion \$ of public debt, 10 billion \$ of current budget deficit and with three million unemployed.«
- SYRIA is on this conference found in the weakest position. It has to prove to the U.S.A. that it is not offering a shelter to some leading men of the former Saddam's regime. Syria was also left without a billion dollar of earnings from the sale of Iraqi oil (the Kirkuk – Baniyas pipeline).
- JORDAN has exclusively economic interests. This country is without oil and without water and has in the last two decades been surviving thanks to Iraq. In the times of Iraq-Iran war it served as a logistic hinterland of Iraq. After the Gulf war it had the same role and served as the only Iraqi window to the world. Through Jordan a large part of the illegal oil trade was conducted. Iraq was delivering to Jordan half of the country's oil needs at a symbolic price of 7\$ per barrel, while the other half was donated to the Jordanian people. Today, Jordan has in order to exit this crisis give some painful concessions to Israel and to the new Iraqi government.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has been analyzing the Turkish political system and the efforts of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to reform the Turkish constitution. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below:

TURKEY: ON THE TRACK OF RADICAL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared last week that he is planning to reform the parliamentary system in Turkey. It should become similar to the American system, which is characterized by great power in the hands of the president. The reform of the Turkish presidential system with great power represents a great blow to the military hierarchy, possessing large autonomy and authorizations that go well beyond those of the president of the country or the prime minister.

The Turkish army has had on the basis of wide authorizations it has received, a great influence on the Turkish political life and has by now already three times (1961, 1970 and 1980) intervened with the politics and toppled the legitimately elected government. Most recently the army intervened in 1997 when they indirectly through the Constitutional Court forced the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign.

The present attempt to reform the constitution is not the first one in the history of modern Turkey. Thus, Turgut Ozal and especially Suleyman Demirel in the middle of the 1990's advocated the reform of the Turkish presidential system. The army accused Demirel of wanting to reduce the role of the parliament and responded by demanding a referendum. Perhaps the greatest advocate of the constitutional reform was Mesud Yilmaz, who was as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the negotiations with the European Union. Yilmaz was aware of the fact that without reform and without defining the role of the army, the entry into the EU cannot be accomplished, since the army has to be under total civilian supervision.

THE TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

The main characteristic of the Turkish constitutional order lies in the fact that the state is in constant state of readiness to confront the enemies of secularism and in the enforcement of Turkish nationalism, a point that serves as the main pillar of the Turkish state and identity. The Turkish nationalism wishes to erase (in)famous Turkish Ottoman heritage and is denying the existence of other nationalities or ethnical groups. On the basis of this they had already exiled and / or killed a mil-

lion of Orthodox Armenians. Later on, the Kurds were denied the right to self-determination as Kurds and the Turkish authorities classified them as the Mountain Turks. The same rule applied also to half a million of Arabs in the Province of Iskenderun in the Hatai Region. Thus, Turkey forcibly became a one-nation state with an identity crisis, where the identity was being searched for between the secularism of Atatürk, defended by the army and the Ottoman heritage (Islam) that has by now already several times surfaced in a form of Islamist parties.

THE HISTORY OF TURKISH CONSTITUTION

First attempts to introduce the Ottoman constitution reach back to the times of Sultan Selim III (1789 - 1807). The Ottoman Empire was then found under the influence of the French Revolution, which meant readiness to a new European order. In the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan possessed an absolute power. The first constitution was called »The Fundamental Law« and was received on December 3rd 1876. »The Fundamental Law« included 12 chapters and 119 articles, mostly taken from Russian and Belgian constitution. This Law was received during the reign of Abdulhamid II, who was deposed on December 7th 1908 and who prevented the application of the law until the year 1906. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of the Republic of Turkey was on the ruins of its forerunner in November 1922 adopted a new constitution, which was formed in the image of the Swiss constitution. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was on the 29th of October 1923 chosen as the President of Turkey, who officially terminated the Ottoman Empire. On March the 3rd 1924, Atatürk published an edict separating religion and state. This represented a historical milestone between the old and the new pro-European Turkey. First interference with the constitution occurred on the 27th of May 1961, when the army bloodily deposed the Democratic Party, which came to power after more than two decades of Atatürk's People's Republican Party rule. The Democratic Party was accused of an attempt to Islamize the state and to destroy the heritage of Atatürk. The president of the country Celal Bayar, the prime minister Adnan Menderes and the chairman of the parliament Refik Kalkan were all condemned to death. Later on, the Turkish army intervened twice more, for the last time in September 1980, when the general Kenan Evren overthrew the legitimate government and later on became the President of Turkey. The present Turkish constitution was written in the period of Kenan Evren, in the year 1982. This constitution recognized a limited amount of human rights; nevertheless the pro-reform constitutional judge Sami Saljuk declared after the constitution was approved that it represents an ordinary political report on the torture of citizens. The 1982 Constitution is repeating the introductory text of the document stating that Kemal Atatürk is an immortal hero, while its second amendment is defining

Turkey as a secular state. It was this, the 2nd amendment on the basis of which in 1997 Prime Minister Erbakan was ousted. The constitution is also including regulations on the unity of Turkish Republic and a prohibition for the minorities to use their own language and culture. Officially, no minorities are recognized in Turkey, there are only so called Turkish dialects. In the nineties of the previous century President Turgut Ozal was attempting to solve this problematic. Finally, in August 2002 Turkey, after the EU pressure, allowed the unofficial use of other dialects, among others the Kurdish, in the daily life of the Turks. Turkey did not have the courage to recognize the mentioned nationalities and their languages, with which injustice was done not only to the citizens, but also to sciences, such as philology and history among others.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

1. The National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey is composed of 550 deputies chosen according to a proportional election system for a mandate of five years.
2. The President of the Turkish Republic is elected from among the members of the National Assembly with a 2/3 majority. The President appoints the Prime Minister and officially serves as the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces (through the function of a President of the National Security Council).
3. Premier is appointed from the winning party (or coalition) for a mandate of five years by the President.
4. The Constitutional Court is composed of 11 regular and four reserve members, chosen by the President of the country from among civil and military judges. The Constitutional Court is playing a very important role, while the judges are mostly under the military influence due to the presence of five military judges within its ranks. The Constitutional Court in 1997 toppled premier Erbakan exactly on the basis of a recommendation from the constitutional judges from military ranks.
5. The National Security Council is the strongest organ in the Turkish state and possesses an unlimited power over every development in the country: interior and foreign policy, defense, economy, culture, etc. We could be talking of a state within a state or a parallel government with the above mentioned other branches of the government. It is composed of the Chief of Staff and other four Commanders of the Turkish Army branches (air-force, infantry, navy and gendarmerie), Premier, Ministers of defense, interior and foreign affairs. The President of the country is a President of the National Security Council, which is actually an instrument of the army to interfere with all the questions and details within the country. The mentioned influence is familiar to all the

citizens of Turkey irrespective of different interpretations and definitions of this totalitarian body, supported by the Turkish constitution. It is this exact army that is most strongly through the Council influencing the political and economic development of Turkey, and it is the Council that is representing a stumbling-block and an obstacle to the entry of Turkey into EU, which was also put on paper by the EU in the annual 2000 report. The unsolved question of Cyprus is also deriving from the mentioned role of the army, despite the efforts of the UN, EU and premier Erdogan to solve the Cyprus question on the basis of a UN February 2003 plan.

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES the efforts of the premier Erdogan deserve praise. Even more so, the premier should be further encouraged in his efforts to reform the constitution. The changes in the constitution in themselves should not focus solely on the role of the president of the country; a reform of the constitutional court is also needed in order to prevent the election of judges from the military. Greater powers in the hands of the president would at the same time represent a reduction of military jurisdiction in Turkey that at the first sight appears to be a democratic state with permanent internal emergency measurements. The change of Turkish constitution is a significant step towards a reform of the Turkish democracy that was tolerated by the West in the past. Turkey played in the »Cold War« a historical role for a defense of the West because it was bordering on the southern parts of the former USSR. Today, the same northern neighbors of Turkey represent a part of a democratic world and are active members of the »Anti-terrorist Coalition« and the »Iraqi Freedom Coalition« and without second thought allowed the Allies to use their bases, while Turkey received only a role of a passive observer.

Reforms are in the interest of Turkey due to two reasons:

1. With this it can enter in a more recognizable fashion and more realistically into the process of the Middle East democratization as the only Islamic state that is a member of NATO and with a directly and democratically elected parliament. The Turkish system in its present form cannot represent a model for other Islamic states (such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc.) on their path of reforms and approaching the parliamentary democracy.
2. It is in the interest of Turkey to join the EU as soon as possible, despite the fact that Turkey is like a tree growing in Asia with only one branch in Europe (as said by Vallery Giscard d'Estaing, President of the EU Future Convention).

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES, entering of Turkey would represent a historical opportunity to solve the economic problems of

60 million Turks. Turkey has to be aware of the fact that time is not working in its favor and that some processes will go on irrespective of whether Turkey will participate in them or not.

Turkey can become a bridge connecting Europe and the Middle East in political and also in economic sense. Now it is the turn of the pragmatic premier Erdogan, who is supported by the parliament, U.S.A. and the EU, especially by the President of the European Commission Roman Prodi, who by the end of his mandate wishes to join to the EU a unified Cyprus and to prepare Turkey for the entry by the year 2007 (alongside Croatia and other membership candidates).

IFIMES - The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies in Ljubljana has been analyzing the coming presidential elections in the Republic of Montenegro, that will take place on the 11th of May 2003. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below:

MONTENEGRO: ON THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE AND AUTOKEPHALITY

The population of Montenegro today is composed of 63% Montenegrins, 17% Bosniacs, 9% Serbs, 7% Albanians and 1% Croats. The religious affiliation provides the following picture: 72% Orthodox, 21% Moslem and 4% Catholic. These data are based on the population census from 1991, but the announced census will probably provide more reliable data on the composition of the population. Today there are 662.000 inhabitants, while on the coming elections for the president of Montenegro on the 11th of May this year there are 458.367 citizens with a right to vote. The elections will cost at least 1.3 million Euros.

To become a candidate the candidates had to submit at least 4.569 signatures as a proof of voters' support. This will be already the third attempt to elect a president, since the previous two were unsuccessful due to a too small amount of the voters who attended the elections, which in both cases did not reach half of all the voters. As a consequence a law was passed according to which for the elections to be successful at least 30% of the electorate needs to attend the elections.

This time there are three candidates on the elections: Filip Vujanovic from the ruling coalition »For a European Montenegro« composed of DPS - The Democratic Party of the Socialist, SDP - The Social Democrat Party and The Bourgeois Party. The next candidate is Miodrag Zivkovic, a political leader of The Liberal Union of Montenegro and the independent candidate Dragan Hajdukovic. The opposition from the pro-Serbian and pro-Yugoslav parties does not have its own presidential candidate.

The election campaign is a campaign of unequal contestants. The absolute favorite is Filip Vujanovic, who is enjoying the greatest support of the electorate and is at the same time the candidate of the ruling coalition »For a European Montenegro«. His elections for the President of Montenegro would mean a continuation of the continuation policy and economic reforms, undertaken by the Montenegrin government under the leadership of the prime minister Mile Djukanovic. Election of Djukanovic would represent a step forward towards independence and proclamation of the independent Republic of Montenegro and a beginning of an end for the state union between Serbia and Montenegro. The present Montenegro government was forced to enter the state union between Serbia and Montenegro that is according to the opinion of IFIMES Institute only a passing solution towards

final independence of Montenegro. The election of Vujanovic for the president would further complicate the position for the Prime Minister Djukanovic, since he will be left without a maneuvering space and he won't be able to blame for the lack of success anybody else, since he will have an absolute power. The economic situation in Montenegro is extremely difficult; there is a general apathy in the society. The Premier Djukanovic government will have to speed the existing reform processes and start new ones with which existing economic development would be fastened and new ones would be started, with which development of economy would be strengthened and the number of employed would be enlarged. New and fresh personnel would have to be taken in, including to the political option of the Prime Minister Djukanovic, since for several years it is functioning only as a troika Djukanovic-Vujanovic-Marovic.

Miodrag Zivkovic, the political leader has only small chances on the presidential elections, since he did not succeed ensuring even the support of the position. His political program is based on the conflict with Mile Djukanovic and his supporters for which as the existing power structure he is not choosing words, including that the government is single-party, mafia-type and criminal. The reputation of the Montenegrin liberals was badly damaged and punished by the disappointing election results on the recent parliamentary elections, in which they connected themselves to the pro-Yugoslav and pro-Serbian parties (which do not have their own presidential candidate on these elections), despite the fact that they are from the beginning of their political activity being classified as the advocates for the independence of Montenegro.

Dragan Hajdukovic, an independent candidate, entered the election race promoting an idea of Montenegro as an ecological state. This time he is entering the elections as the presidential candidate for the fourth time!

On the road to final independence of Montenegro there will be a need to solve the status of Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church in connection to the question of autokephality. Autokephalous is a church that is not ruled by any other church and is independently choosing its bishops – including the first one, without a need for anyone's consent. For the Montenegrin Orthodox Church to become autocephalous it has to receive consent of the »Mother Church«, in this case the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The International Institute IFIMES believes that there are no canonical obstacles for the existence of the autocephalous churches in Montenegro – The Montenegrin and the Serbian one. In the three-years interim period all the opened questions between the two churches should be solved bilaterally, taking into account the fact that the Church in Montenegro had from 1766 until 1920, when the Patriarchy in Pec was established a specific status. It was almost autonomous and was living in the mountains of Montenegro with priests from people according to the canon

of the Orthodox Church. The mentioned question should be solved as quickly as possible, since otherwise that could damage the secularity of the Montenegrin state with an impression that the state is favorizing one or the other church.

The independence of Montenegro is connected with events and processes in Kosovo, where they are with their independent processes approaching the total independence. Present Montenegrin government would have to offer its own solution of the Kosovo question. With this we should not forget the clear position of the EU that the borders of the existing countries should not be changed. EU is in this connection more cautious, since it is aware that the change in borders and proclamation of independence of Kosovo could also cause similar scenarios in Catalonia, Corsica, Northern Ireland, Belgium, etc. USA is on the other side in favor of the Kosovo independence, especially due to the strong Albanian lobby. There is also a possibility of a compromised solution in creating a loose connection between Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro. Solving these questions on the Balkans will soon become a very popular topic. American administration desires after the Iraqi intervention to show its ability to solve all the unsolved questions on the Balkans, such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. According with this there will be a need to stop the transfer of the powers from UNMIK to the government of Kosovo, to speed the process of solving the question of refugee return, human rights and economic development. On Kosovo in the power all the ethnical groups have to cooperate, which would certainly reduce all the inter-ethnic tensions. We can expect a harsh battle on the diplomatic field in connection to the Kosovo question. For now all the options are opened except the »Great Albania« and the »Great Serbia«, since the USA have clearly warned that they will not tolerate terrorism to accomplish goals. The American war on terrorism is continuing!

The International Institute IFIMES believes that the present government in Montenegro has succeeded in preserving the international trust and good inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations (between Montenegrins, Bosniacs, Serbs, Albanians and Croats) in the Montenegrin society. These in Montenegro have not succeeded the scope and the level of the neighboring countries. At the same time IFIMES is pointing to a too small participation of women in the politics of Montenegro, which could already be noticed during the previous parliamentary elections. Also this time there is no woman candidate for the presidential post.

LEGAL POSITION OF CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Religion has always played a significant part in society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given that this is a country where different religions and cultures meet, we may come across plenty of shining examples of tolerance between the followers of different religions, but unfortunately, there are also a many instances of religious intolerance, including the destruction of religious buildings and the persecution and expulsion of members of other religions.

The relationship between religion and politics as a whole, and between the state and religious communities in particular, is a complex one, and has given rise to various mediating mechanisms. The complexity derives from the wide range of crucial facets of social life that occupy a prominent place in the relationship between the state and religious communities. Among them are the legitimacy of the state itself, the issue of who has a monopoly over the truth, administrative independence (formerly of the state, and now of the religious communities), education, funding religious communities, religion in the armed forces, and religious rights and freedoms, particularly those of minorities.

The circumstances in which the interaction between religious communities and the state takes place are wholly different now from what they were in the Middle Ages, which fundamentally alters the conditions of dialogue. These new circumstances are reflected in the fact that the power or authority that could be used (or abused) against other religious communities, formerly in the hands of religious groups, is now largely held by the secular authorities. Although there are exceptions, it has become more likely that political entities will use force against religious groups than the other way round. Naturally enough, thinkers were formerly chiefly preoccupied with ways of protecting an emerging state from an aggressive church. Nowadays, it is quite the contrary: it is the modern state that usually represents a potential threat to the religious and other rights of its citizens and groups.⁽¹⁾

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Freedom of religion and the legal status of religious communities in BiH have been regulated in various ways over the centuries. As long ago as the 1878 Berlin Congress, provisions were introduced guaranteeing freedom of religion to all

those under Austro-Hungarian rule.

On 19 September 1919 the Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye was signed, which included provisions on the protection of minorities. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes acceded to this Treaty on 5 December, which was proclaimed to be an interim treaty on 10 May 1920, but declared to be a permanent law following the St Vitus' Day Constitution. As such, it represented the basic source of positive law for the protection of minorities.

Under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the principle of »recognized religions« applied. Article 12 of the St Vitus' Day Constitution states: »Freedom of religion and conscience is guaranteed. Adopted religious beliefs are equal before the law and may publicly profess their religious doctrines.«

The following religions were recognized at that time: Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, Islam, the evangelical and reform Protestant churches, Judaism, the Baptist Church, and the Croatian Old Catholic Church.

With the end of World War II in 1945, the model of the secular state was introduced in the new Yugoslavia, characterized by the separation of religious communities and the state. Religion was declared to be the private affair of each individual, and the enjoyment of civil rights to be independent of affiliation to any religion or none.

The adoption of this model of regulating the relations between religious communities and the state necessarily resulted in religious rules and regulations losing their legal force; no citizen, regardless of affiliation to a particular religion or religious community, could enjoy more rights than others or be deprived of certain rights. Given that the war of national liberation fought in Yugoslavia during World War II was accompanied by a socialist revolution that led to society being structured on Marxist principles, it was naturally that the new authorities would follow this doctrine in its attitude to the relations between the state and religious communities. Marxist doctrine saw the existence of religion in a given society as an indicator of alienation, and as a result religion was seen in a negative light.(2)

The constitutional position of religious communities in the new Yugoslavia was stipulated by Articles 21, 23 and 25 of the 1946 Constitution of the Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia, which read:

Art. 21.

All citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are equal before the law and in rights regardless of nationality, race, or religious belief. No privileges on the grounds of birth, position, property or level of education are recognized. All acts that accord privileges or restrict the rights of citizens on the basis of differences of nationality, race or religious belief are contrary to the Constitution and subject to penalties, as is all propagation of national, racial or religious

hatred and dissension.

Art. 23

All citizens, regardless of sex, nationality, race, religious belief, level of education and place of residence, and who have reached the age of 18, have the right to vote and to be elected to any body of the state authorities.

Art. 25

Citizens are guaranteed freedom of conscience and freedom of religious belief. The church is separate from the state. Religious constitutions whose doctrines are not contrary to the Constitution are free to conduct their religious affairs and perform their religious rites. Religious schools for training priests are free, under the supervision of the state. The abuse of religion for political ends and the existence of religiously based political organizations are prohibited. The state may provide material assistance to religious communities.

While guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religious belief, the 1946 Constitution of FNRJ in fact proclaimed the separation of religious communities and the state and declared religion to be the private matter of each citizen; the state was not interested in whether its citizens were believers or not.

Freedom of conscience implied that every individual was free to choose whether to believe (to be a theist) or not (to be an atheist). This was an absolute freedom, part of the most private innermost being of each individual, and the state had no business interfering in this domain or seeking to legislate for it.

Freedom of religion is the free will of every individual to adhere to the worldview or religion of his or her choice. The way in which religion is professed is the subject of the legal norms of individual states and, of late, increasingly of international legal instruments. Freedom to profess one's religion is defined by state legislation and is not, therefore, absolute, but limited by the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, public law and order, morality, customs and so on. The restrictions on freedom to profess one's religion are also prescribed by law, so as not to jeopardize legal security and to avoid arbitrariness on the part of the state authorities.(3)

In everyday life in the new Yugoslavia, however, and particularly in the early 1960s, practice did not match the constitutional principles.

Given that in a society run by a one-party system there was in effect no difference between the party and state apparatus, or between party and state aims, there was an operative symbiosis between state and party in every domain of social life. It was entirely logical, therefore, given that Marxist doctrine was the official ideology of the single, ruling party, that the policy towards religious communities was

to seek to limit their influence in society, and to exercise control and pressure on leading representatives of religious communities to show loyalty to the state authorities.(4)

In theory, the state wished to treat individual believers as citizens with full rights, but in practice there were many departures from this principle, particularly at the local level. These departures were tolerated and even encouraged, to the extent that it could be said that the state authorities applied double standards to religious communities: declaratively, they upheld positive laws, but in practice they resorted to extra-institutional means. Any kind of behaviour that did not coincide with the legal prescriptions was regarded as evidence of inexperience, incompetence, sectarianism and so on. But no one in local government was ever held responsible for his or her conduct. For the most part, it did not go beyond verbal condemnation.(5)

Religiosity became the private affair of believers, but naturally enough religious communities did not wish to relinquish their influence on society. The weight and nature of this influence was often a contested subject between the religious communities and the state. Religious communities were not willing to be marginalized, while the state authorities denounced every action by the religious communities of any significance which they, the authorities, regarded as transgressing the legitimate bounds of the religious communities' actions as clericalism, or the politicization of religion and the religious sentiments of the country's citizens. The authorities thus made use of all kinds of repression, including physical attacks, prosecution, persecution, abuse of the priesthood, threats, economic deprivation and so on. Furthermore, the state did not regard all religious communities in an equal light, although equality of treatment was prescribed by the Constitution and the arms' length view of every religious community was almost invariably emphasized.(6)

In addition to the ban on religious education in ordinary schools, religious communities also saw vast extents of their land holdings expropriated under the terms of the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonialization (23 August 1945), under the slogan »the land belongs to the people who work it«. The expropriation of land belonging to religious communities was justified in various ways, including the need to build the future unity of the Yugoslav nation.

Article 8 of the Agrarian Reform Law stipulated the maximum extent of the land that could be held by religious communities for their own needs, while everything else belonged to the state: »Places of worship, monasteries and religious institutions may, pursuant to local conditions, in each individual instance be permitted to retain gardens, vineyards, orchards, meadows, pastures and forests to a maximum total area of 10 hectares for their own use or for humanitarian institutions and national associations. If these institutions are of major historical importance they

may retain ownership over a maximum of 30 hectares of cultivable land.«(7) The provisions of this Law almost entirely wiped out the economic basis of the religious communities, which were compelled to survive on the voluntary contributions of their congregations and, to some extent, on state aid. There is a good example of the justification for these measures in a lecture given by Vaso Čubrilović, Agricultural Minister, written for the Soviet embassy in Belgrade in 1945: »To anyone who knows a little about internal relations in Yugoslavia it is clear that there can be no unity among its peoples until the influence of religion is curtailed and focused solely on immediate religious aims and operations. The only way to achieve this is to weaken the economic, cultural and political power of the church hierarchies. This is why a range of measures must be introduced, from civil marriage through the secularization of education to agrarian reform, so as to reduce the influence of the churches to the proper proportions, that is to prevent them from raising future generations in Yugoslavia as they have until now, in religious isolation and hatred; this is one of the major reasons why it is necessary to apply agrarian reform to religious land holdings too.«(8)

Although the authorities did not in principle differentiate between religious communities, their position in the new state, in addition to the specific features of each religious community and their relations with the state authorities, depended to a large extent on internal political relations and also on international political trends in the international standing enjoyed by Yugoslavia. The first stage can be defined as lasting from the end of World War II to the clash with Stalin in 1948. During this period the state authorities attempted, along with all the measures they were introducing for the purpose of separating the religious communities from the state, to find a *modus vivendi* with the representatives of all the religious communities, avoiding fierce attacks on the communities, whether to consolidate internal relation or because of Yugoslavia's international position.

As a result of the break with Stalin and the political situation as a whole, both internal and international, the next stage was characterized by the use of tools and methods aimed at confining religious activities solely to the spiritual domain and by pressure on the dignitaries of every religious community to identify with the state regime. Following this stage, which ended with the adoption of the 1953 Law on the Position of Religious Communities (Official Gazette of FNRJ no. 22, 27 May 1953), relations between the communities and the state eased somewhat when religious officials were granted to right to social and health insurance, freedom to issue religious publications, and the introduction of religious education in the premises of the religious communities. However, religious communities were still successfully excluded from public life and relegated to the margins of society. Article 8 of this Law stipulated that »Religious communities and their bodies are juristic persons pursuant to civil law.«

Article 174 of the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) guaranteed freedom of religion, but treated religion as a private matter. The same article stipulates that religious communities were separate from the state and that it was unconstitutional to abuse religion and religious affairs for political ends.

2. PRESENT SITUATION

In 1976 the then Socialist Republic of BiH adopted a Law on Religious Communities which remains in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina to this day. The Law set out the following rights:

- right to perform religious rites and to conduct religious affairs
- right to provide religious education
- right to establish schools to train priests and imams
- right to religious publishing
- right to acquire, hold and own material goods

Although the Law is fairly flexible given the date of its adoption, it can fairly be said to be outdated and to have quite a few shortcomings. These are just some of them:

article 2 para. 2 states that »The profession or non-profession of religion is the private affair of the individual.« Religious communities are prohibited by Article 6 from any activities of »general and particular significance«.

In addition, religious communities were banned from setting up general private schools. Article 20 para. 1 states: »Religious communities may establish only religious schools for the training of religious officials...«

The restrictions applicable to foreign nationals were particularly stringent. Article 17 states that foreign nationals may attend religious meetings only if they report beforehand to the municipal authorities. Article 22 states that »Classes in schools for the training of religious officials may be conducted only by nationals of the state.«

As regards the registration of new religious communities, the Law is fairly flexible. Thirty founders (all nationals) are required for registration purposes, and registration takes the form of registering with the municipal authorities in the municipality where the religious community has its headquarters. In practice this often led to problems of jurisdiction, with certain municipalities not accepting registrations of new religious communities because they had no department responsible for doing so.

3. LEGAL CONDITIONS - LEGAL SOURCES, CURRENT NORMS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Constitution of the Federation of BiH and the Constitution of Republika Srpska all deal separately with freedom of religion.

Article 2 of the Constitution of BiH reads:

1. Human Rights

Bosnia and Herzegovina and both Entities shall ensure the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. To that end, there shall be a Human Rights Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina as provided for in Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement.

2. International Standards

The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law.

3. Enumeration of Rights

All persons within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to in paragraph 2 above; these include:

(g) freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

Article 2 of the Constitution of the Federation of BiH reads:

The Federation will ensure the application of the highest level of internationally recognized rights and freedoms provided in the documents listed in the Annex to the Constitution. In particular:

(1) All persons within the territory of the Federation shall enjoy the rights:

(l) to fundamental freedoms: free speech and press; freedom of thought, conscience and belief; freedom of religion, including private and public worship; freedom of assembly; freedom of association, including to form and belong to labour unions and the freedom not to associate; and freedom to work.

Article 28 of the Constitution of Republika Srpska reads:

Freedom of religion shall be guaranteed.

Religious communities shall be equal before the law and shall be free to perform religious affairs and services. They may open religious schools and perform religious education in all schools at all levels of education; they may engage in economic and other activities, receive gifts, establish legacies and manage them, in conformity with the law.

The Serbian Orthodox Church shall be the church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.

The State shall materially support the Orthodox church and shall cooperate with it in all fields and, in particular, in preserving, cherishing and developing cultural, traditional and other spiritual values.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article have recently been deleted from the RS Constitution at the request of the international community.

4. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

Religious education is available in all primary schools and some secondary schools in the Federation of BiH. Religious studies are an optional subject, which means that children do not have to attend classes in the subject, but if they do elect to do so, the subject is treated on an equal footing with other subjects.

In Republika Srpska children attend religious education classes in primary school but not in secondary schools.

Given that this is a highly sensitive issue for BiH society, the WCRP office in Sarajevo held a series of round tables (in Banja Luka, Tuzla, Mostar and Sarajevo) followed by a conference on the subject of religious education in public schools in BiH. The round tables and conference were attended by representatives of interested groups such as religious communities, political parties, government institutions, non-governmental organizations, religious teachers, school principals etc.

Following the conference, the view was taken that religious education could play a positive role in the education and upbringing of schoolchildren, but that three issues must be taken into consideration. First, pupils or their parents must have the right to choose whether they will attend religious education classes or not. No one may be compelled to attend religious education classes against his or her will. Second, the background and qualifications of religious teachers must meet

the general standards required of teachers. They may be appointed by religious communities, but must be trained teachers. And third, the curriculum must be designed with due regard for religious tolerance and include material on other religions in BiH.

These are some of the conclusions reached by participants in the conference, which was held in Mostar:

- religious education in the current BiH education system is confessionally-based;
- the subject of religious studies in schools is not in question and has no alternative;
- the subject of religious studies should be treated equally with other subjects (timetables, marking, inclusion in average grades, employment status of religious teachers etc.);
- religious studies should be an optional subject;
- the basic objectives of religious studies are (a) to inform, and (b) to guide and form;
- religious communities and churches should draft curricula and the relevant ministries should check them;
- the three essential components of the curriculum in religious studies are:
 - brief history
 - the essence of the theological concept
 - the ethical framework
- other religions must be referred to in an authentic and appropriate manner;
- it is recommended that religious studies textbooks be copy-edited by two kinds of editors:
 - theologically competent people
 - experts in teaching methods

5. RELIGION IN THE MASS MEDIA

The attitude of the most influential media towards religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an extremely complex problem that is dependent on a number of factors. Prominent among these is the attitude of politicians, political parties and other political factors, which commonly see the other and different as hostile; lack of knowledge of others; subordination to stereotypes and to historical »truths« that are set in concrete, models inherited from the former system relating to the Other; the indifference of public opinion and the lack of commitment by the general public to improving the general social atmosphere. Given that the information provided by the media is almost always taken for granted as the definitive truth, we regard it as very important to bring to the forefront the attitude of the air media in

our country towards universal religious values in general, particularly in the context of building harmonious relations in the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is suggestive that for the air media in BiH the only subject that is of interest is formal religious observance, particularly Eid and Friday prayers, although the mandatory formal prayers are the most intimate element of religious manifestation, while for the majority of so-called independent magazines and periodicals the subjects that are of greatest interest are those that are imbued with mundane political concerns. Since our country has a great many private radio and television broadcasters, they fill – not always in the most desirable way – the media vacuum as regards religious issues. There are broadcasters who degrade and folklorize religious doctrines by their inappropriate treatment and unselective approach. We have no doubt that a more serious approach to the media treatment of fundamental religious values could contribute to establishing more harmonious relations within the family and society and between different religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An example of this is the BH Radio 1 religious programme, which receives frequent accolades from listeners, and the FTV Mosaic programme, which is unfortunately broadcast at a very unattractive time of day. Religious and national relations in our country are often highly tinged with emotion, so it is of the greatest importance to highlight in the media the subjects that lead towards a better understanding between the followers of the same as well as of different religions and traditions. The universal values of religion are fundamental human values, and unless they are accorded their full worth and duly redefined, our society cannot possibly function normally – this cannot be emphasized enough. Above all, therefore, the media should not deal only with exclusivist and »intriguing« topics that raise doubts in the minds of followers of the same religion, let alone those of different traditions.⁽⁹⁾

In March this year the WCRP office in Sarajevo held a conference on Religion in the Media in BiH, which was attended by representatives of the religious communities and journalists, who took an active part. The representatives of the religious communities were of the view that there are not enough religious programmes or enough journalists specializing in the subject. Journalists complained that it was sometimes hard to make contact with the religious communities. The general impression gained at the conference was that religion can and should occupy an important place in the media.

6. LABOUR LAW AND FAMILY LAW

The Labour Law stipulates that every employee has the right to four days' leave for religious holidays in each calendar year. Each employee has discretion to choose which four religious holidays he or she will treat as non-working days. Two of the

four days are paid leave and two are unpaid leave.

Religious marriages are often entered into in BiH. Citizens may enter into a religious marriage only after a civil marriage ceremony with the relevant state authorities. In terms of civil law, religious marriages have legal consequences of a moral and religious character.

7. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

As regards future relations between religious communities and the state, it is safe to say that they will be defined consistent with European standards. The only unresolved issues is just how much influence the specific features of Bosnia and Herzegovina's society will have on the definition of those relations.

8. DRAFT LAW IN REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

The draft Law on religion, churches and religious communities in Republika Srpska has been drawn up by the Ministry of Religion of Republika Srpska on the basis of an initial draft by Dr. Kosta Čavoški. The bill has not yet had any readings in parliament, let alone been passed. Some of the articles read as follows:

III. Equality of the historically established churches and religious communities.

Article 3.

The Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Islamic and Jewish religious communities, as historically established spiritual communities in Republika Srpska, are equal in every respect before the law.

Article 7.

Churches and religious communities autonomously manage and freely dispose of their property, funds and endowments within the confines of current law. Churches and religious communities and their component elements and institutions may without any restrictions collect contributions, receive legacies and establish funds and endowments for the purpose of renovation or construction of places of worship, monasteries, religious schools and charitable institutions, the education of priests and religious officials, and other religious charitable or benevolent purposes or purposes pleasing to God.

Churches and religious communities and their component elements and institutions may, within the confines of the law, perform commercial or other profit-making activities for the benefit of their own maintenance.

The property of churches and religious communities shall be used only for their own purposes and may not under any circumstances be expropriated or used for any other purposes, other than in cases of expropriation provided for by law and in exchange for proper compensation.

VI. Legal subjectivity of churches and religious communities.

Article 8.

Churches and religious communities as defined in Article 8 of this Law and their individual component elements and institutions provided for in their own constitution, canon or statute have the status of juristic persons with all the rights appertaining thereto, such as the acquisition of movable and real property, the right to dispose of their own property, the acquisition of rights and obligations, etc.

Other religious communities may operate as citizens' associations provided they are so registered pursuant to the Law on Citizens' Associations.

The public and private legal interests of churches and religious communities before the state authorities and third parties shall be represented by authorized executive officers as stipulated by their constitution, canon law or statute.

VII. Religious schools and religious education

Schools and institutions of higher education may be established; in ordinary schools religious studies shall be taught consistent with the principles and canons of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Islamic Religious Community and Jewish Community, as the case may be; the appointment of religious teachers, curricula, textbooks and other teaching aids for religious studies shall be by agreement with the higher authorities of the relevant church or religious community (Articles 9 and 10).

This is not the place to raise in detail the issue of the degree to which this draft law is consistent with the provisions of the Dayton Constitution of BiH. However, it is clear that it does not conform to European legislation, as is also the case with the Law on the Legal Position of Religious Communities of SRBiH, which is *de jure* still in force.⁽¹⁰⁾

Draft Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Religious Communities and Churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed by the Inter-religious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The members of the Inter-Religious Council of BiH (IRCBiH) are dissatisfied with the legislation currently in force in BiH, the 1976 Law on Religious Com-

munities. In this regard the members of the IRC came to the decision that change was needed, and to this end formed the Legal Experts' Group, which drew up the proposed draft text of the Law. The text defines issues relating to freedom of religion, the legal status of churches and religious communities, the registration of religious communities and churches, and the relationship between religious communities and the state. The proposed draft text of the Law conforms to European standards on freedom of religion.

The text of the Law has been agreed by the members of the Interreligious Council of BiH. The text was drawn up by the Legal Experts' Group (PEG), comprising prominent lawyers from the four traditional religious communities and churches (the Islamic Community, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish Community). Other religious communities and Churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been consulted as well.

The members of the PEG are: Mr. Muhamed Salkić, Mr. Edah Bećirbegović (The Islamic Community), Father Vanja Jovanović, Father Nemanja Dražić (Serbian Orthodox Church), Ms. Ljiljana Zita, Mons. Franjo Tomašević, Mr. Tomislav Lucić (Roman Catholic Church), Mr. James L. Cairns, Prof. Cole Durham, Mr. Ahmed Žilić, Mr. Emir Kovačević (WCRP). Here I shall set out some of the basic principles by which the members of the Legal Experts' Group were guided when drafting the proposed Law:

1. All religious communities and churches are equal in rights and obligations, without discrimination on any basis whatsoever;
2. In relation to legal standards in future legislation, in place of the phrase »religious communities«, the phrase »religious communities and churches« shall be used;
3. The title of religious communities and churches as defined in their internal statutory (constitutional, canonic) regulations shall be their sole official title in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
4. Each religious community and church shall independently define its own internal organization by its statutory (constitutional, canonic) and other internal regulations;
5. The continuity of the legal personality of the historic religious communities and churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be recognized: the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church and the Jewish Community;
6. All religious communities and churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have the status of legal person;
7. All other religious communities and churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina heretofore recognized shall retain their legal personality;
8. Newly formed religious communities and churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina

- shall also be able to obtain legal personality (be legalized);
9. Religious communities and churches are separate from the state;
 10. Religious communities and churches may found charitable, educational, commercial and other profit-making organizations in conformity with the laws of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and international law;
 11. Religious communities and churches own property, freely use, enjoy and administer it, and may acquire new property;
 12. All religious communities and churches have the right to restitution of expropriated property.

The draft can safely be said to uphold the theory of the separation of religious communities and the state and the »theory of adjustment and cooperation« by which the state and religious communities may assist one another as long as the church does not favour any religious community over others in the provision of aid. The draft is currently under consideration by the Ministry for Human Rights of the Council of Ministers of BiH, which has agreed to be the formal proposer of the bill.

9. ENDNOTES

1. Ahmed Alibašić, »Modeli uređenja odnosa između države i vjerskih zajednica u Evropi i SAD i njihove konsekvence«, *Znakovi vremena* vol. 3, no. 9-10 (2000), 142-43.
2. Enes Durmišević, »Šerijetsko pravo i nauka šerijatskog prava u BiH u prvoj polovini 20. stoljeća«, doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo, 2003.
3. Radmila Radić, *Država i vjerske zajednice 1945-1970*, Belgrade: Institute for the Modern History of Serbia, 2002, Vol. I, pp. 195-196.
4. Enes Durmišević, *ibid.*
5. Radmila Radić, *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 639-640.
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7. Radmila Radić, *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 180.
8. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 179.
9. Nedžad Grabus, »Religija u medijima«, paper presented at the conference on Religion and the Media, Sarajevo, 2003.
10. Ahmed Žilić, »Pravni status vjerskih zajednica u BiH«, paper presented to WCRP, Sarajevo, 1999

IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies in Ljubljana analyses events in Iran in the light of American and Russian secret diplomacy on both sides of the Persian Gulf. The most important and interesting sections of the comprehensive analysis are given below.

AMERICAN BASES IN IRAN - RUSSIAN BASES IN SAUDI ARABIA?

Data on the state:

- Official name: Islamic Republic of Iran.
- Area: 1,648,000 km², population: 68.960.000.
- Iran borders on Afghanistan (639 km), Turkmenistan (992 km), Azerbaijan (611 km), Armenia (35 km), Turkey (499 km), Iraq (1.458 km) and Pakistan (909 km).
- The coast is 2440 km long, 740 of which is the Caspian Sea, the rest is the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
- Ethnic structure: Persians 51%, Azeri Turks 24%, Kurds 7%, Gelaki and Mazanderani 8%, Arabs 3%, Luri 2%, Balochi 2%, Turkmen 1% and others 1%.
- Languages: Persian (official), Turkish, Kurdish, Luri, Balochi and Arabic.
- Religious structure: Muslims 99%, of which Shiites 89%, Sunnites 10%, Jews, Christians, Bahayi and others 1%.
- Administrative regulation of the state: 28 provinces.
- Economy (data from 1999): GDP \$347.6 billion, external debt \$21.9 billion, GDP per capita \$5,300 and oil stocks 99 billion barrels.
- Working population: 15.4 million of which 21% are employed in agriculture, 34% in industry and 45% in services. Unemployment: 25%.
- Import: \$346 billion.
- Export: \$34,9 billion.
- Main foreign trade partners: Germany, Japan, France and Italy.
- Transport infrastructure: railway 5600 km, roads 140.200 km of which 49.440 asphalt and 74 km motorways, inland waterways 904 km. Airports: 288, ports: 15.
- Pipelines: for crude oil 5900 km, for derivatives 3900 km, for natural gas 4550 km.
- Armed forces: 545.600 of which 350,000 foot soldiers, 20,600 navy, 50,000 air force.
- War budget: \$5,787 billion.
- Political system: The main characteristic of Iranian political system is the diversity and numerousness of the seven branches of power whose

competence and authority interweaves. All the branches of power are under ultimate authority of (Murshid) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who was chosen for the supreme religious leader at the Assembly of Experts on 6th of April 1989.

The branches of power are:

- Murshid
- The executive power: Mohammad Khatamy has been president of the state since 3 August 1997
- The Parliament counts 290 deputies elected at general elections; the reformers have 70% of the seats or 170 deputies and the conservatives 30% of deputy seats in the Parliament
- Judicial power
- Assembly of Experts
- Supreme National Security Council
- Guardian Council
- Political parties: 8.
- Independent organisations of the civil society: 12.

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iranian politicians have become aware of the urgency for a reform not only in the political system but including a revision of the all-embracing role of Iran in the »new world regulation« following the great changes in the Middle East.

Since he was elected president in 1997, Khatamy has been aware of the urgency for reforms and, after a fierce struggle with the conservative side, managed to get support for some radical reforms especially in the domestic political field including: freedom of media, opening towards the west European countries after the crisis in relations following the Mykonos affair concerning Germany.

The loudest call for reforms comes from Tehran. On 7th of May 2003, 153 reformer deputies presented a public letter to the Parliament warning the conservatives who have strong control and a decisive role in the other branches of power that they may await the destiny of Saddam Hussein unless they agree to proceed with the reforms in the Iranian domestic and foreign policy.

The reformers demanded urgent changes in foreign policy in order to establish relations with all countries – among others also the USA, as the American-Iranian relations have been a prohibited issue since the diplomatic relations between the two states were discontinued after the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran by the students in 1980 – this is the burning issue of discussions in the field of domestic affairs.

As the first step in establishing the dialogue with the USA, the reformers propose direct quadripartite (the USA, Iran, Iraq, the UN) talks regarding the future regulation of Iraq. This is the first time after the Islamic revolution in 1979 that the

USA and Iran take part in direct talks.

The reformers are aware of seriousness of the situation and of urgency of the dialogue with the »Great Satan« as the USA have been called for two decades. The reformers stress the fact that although Iran does not border geographically on the USA, the latter govern two neighbouring countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) and are also present in Turkey, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.

President Khatamy started carrying out reforms with different intensity soon after taking over the power in 1997 which has caused unfriendly attitude of his voters. In 2005 he will stand as a candidate for the second term of office. The president has the majority in the Parliament but the control mechanisms, i.e. unlimited and final power of the other five branches of power (1., 4., 5., 6. and 7.) render his position difficult. Those branches are controlled by the conservatives who have the power to prevent final adoption of any legislative document although it was already passed in the Parliament. The office of the great religious leader, the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts have legislative power to wholly or partly stop any legislative act of the Parliament or the president of the state. President Khatamy proposes radical legislative reforms in order to enable the system or each branch of power to act independently within its legislative framework. He presented two proposals which were adopted in the Parliament. The first legislative change was to extend the power of the president to defend the legislation without impediments and limitations of the Supreme Court. The second legislative change is related to the law on elections and suggests that the election system should not be influenced by the Guardian Council.

Another important public appeal was expressed in Tehran in 2003, but this time it did not come from the president of the state or the Parliament but from a group of intellectuals who have warned by means of a public letter of the danger threatening Iran. Some intellectuals demand that students and journalists who are prisoners of state be released and that the power of the Council of Legislation Guardians be limited. Their appeal has raised the temperature on the streets of Tehran as never before and now both the reformers and the conservatives are aware that a worst-case scenario may come true unless the state changes its domestic and foreign policy. The first reactions were expressed by the conservative leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president of the state and present president of the conservative Guardian Council who believes that the establishment of relations between the USA and Iran are a priority task and proposes a referendum to be carried out on this issue. The results of such referendum are already known – over 80% of the citizens would vote in favour of establishing rapidly diplomatic relations with Washington.

The official reaction of American administration is rather vague. It has only been confirmed that secret talks are going on in Geneva. However, there have been

some unofficial reactions expressed by influential institutions in the USA: on 6th of May 2003, the American Enterprise Institute organised a conference on the future of Iran which was attended by the prominent representatives of American politics and Iranian exiles in the USA, among others Republican Senator Sam Brownback, member of the committee for foreign affairs. Brownback appealed to the administration saying that the people of Iran are their ally in the democratisation of Iran and stated that he had proposals for several legislative documents which he would present the Congress for adoption, among others the Iran Democracy Act which can be compared with the Iraq Liberation Act, 1998.

The strongest reactions come from the Neo-Conservatives who have the real power in the American administration. The influential politician, William Kristol in an article entitled *The End of the Beginning* published in *Weekly Standard* analyses the American victory in Iraq as the beginning of the great war against terrorism.

Kristol defines the Middle East and Islamic world as the core of the problem while North Korea does not represent a grave threat and can be isolated with diplomatic moves. It is Iran that Kristol foresees as the next fight for democratisation in the Middle East, although he hopes that this fight will not be in the form of a war but the combination of national diplomacy and secret operations.

The third important reaction was expressed on 7th of May 2003 in Moscow by the American state secretary assistant John Bolton, who demanded from Russia to stop supplying nuclear technology to Iran. Bolton's reaction is very important since it comes from Moscow where the IFIMES diplomatic analysts have noticed the cooling of relations between Russia and Iran and at the same time the warming of relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia following the visit of Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud Alfaisal, to Moscow on 9th of May 2003, preliminary to the visit of the crown prince Abdullah to Moscow in the coming weeks. Saudi Arabia was the traditional ally of the USA since the establishment of the Kingdom in 1921 till the terrorist attacks on the USA in which 15 Saudi suicidal terrorists took part. Russia would like to fill the vacuum in Saudi Arabia since the role of Americans there not so important any more after the fall of the Talibs and Saddam Hussein. The Saudis have been giving serious thought to allowing the Russians certain advantages in their ports as the beginning of military co-operation.

The IFIMES Institute believes that Iran is at a turning point. As regards the internal affairs, the parliamentary and presidential elections are to be held soon. Relations between the conservatives and the reformers are becoming increasingly strained. As far as the foreign policy issues are concerned, the American armed forces have surrounded Iran almost at all sides. Iran is under constant pressure of the USA and the demands for the democratisation of the state and revision of foreign policy.

Under those conditions there have been some positive moves on both sides. On 11th May 2003, the Americans disarmed and gained control of the terrorist group Mudjahidin Khalq which had had its base in Iraq for 20 years. President Khatamy visited Beirut in order to define the role of the Lebanese Shiitic organisation Hezbollah which threatens Israel and the peace process in the Middle East.

The IFIMES Institute recommends the USA to continue its policy of exercising pressure on Teheran since such actions of Washington will undoubtedly encourage reform forces in Iran and let the conservatives know that they may await the same destiny as the Iraqi regime unless they continue with the reforms.

At the same time, the IFIMES Institute proposes the Iranian leaders to send more positive messages to Washington such as to:

- Not interfere any more in the internal regulation of Iraq and to establish discipline in the SCIRI.
- Re-establish relations with Syria and support peaceful relations between Syria and Israel.
- Contribute to regulating the situation in south Lebanon which is not controlled by the Lebanese army but by the members of the Hezbollah militia who receive material and military support from Iran.
- Stop supporting radical Palestinian organisations such as Hamas and Jihad and to establish a dialogue with the newly elected Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmud Abas. This would be a very useful move and a contribution to the successful beginning of the realisation of the American Road Map Plan.
- Iran should unconditionally allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to control the disputed nuclear facilities.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana has been regularly analyzing the events in the Middle East and the Balkans. IFIMES is analyzing the causes for the emergence of terrorism with an emphasis on the culture of hatred, ideological terrorism, school systems and the media.

THE MIDDLE EAST: REARING FOR TERRORISM?

The wave of terrorist attacks that have in May 2003 quite shaken the Middle east, is just a beginning of an outbreak of the »middle-eastern volcano«, in which no one will feel safe in the Middle East and in Europe. The American President George Bush has stated that the U.S.A. will be chasing the terrorists into every dark corner. The same terrorists that were mentioned by Bush, are now chasing the U.S.A. on every bright spot of the Middle East, which may occur in future in Europe as well. The terrorists for now are not considering attacks within the United States but will be attacking American interests in the Middle East and in Europe in order to drag Europe into something, Europe has no desire for, since Europe does not concur nor with the acts of America neither with the acts of the terrorists. There are many causes for terrorism. They originate from the known facts connected to the political systems, religious hierarchies and the overall social condition of the society in general. We are trying to analyze certain segments of this phenomenon, which will serve only as an introduction to further extensive analyzing of each particular segment.

1. THE CULTURE OF HATRED

When the culture of hatred reaches a peak in a certain society, then fascistoid political organizations, ready to exterminate whole ethnic or religious groups simply because they are not of their faith or race (an example of Germany and the Holocaust).

The same holds for the Middle East: within the atmosphere of hatred towards the regimes hatred towards the West has developed, especially towards the U.S.A., the only western super-power. Radical Islamic organizations across the Middle East that promote the idea of hatred and killing, were not born overnight and do not represent a kind of RE-action on the American politics towards the region. The European politicians would like to put all the blame exclusively on the U.S.A., but that theory is insufficient and ill intended.

Causes for the formation of such organizations go back to the time after WWII, when the European colonizers (Great Britain, France, Spain, etc.) left the Middle East and a political vacuum was created. Former colonizers relinquished the area into the hands of military juntas, tribal leaders and sheikhs and to presidents for

life. And let's not talk about the historical injustice done to several peoples, such as for example the Kurds, the Copts, the Eritreans, peoples of Southern Sudan, the Berbers, etc.). The condition of the Middle East after the WWII can be described in one word as disastrous. The Arabs were not only four times (in war) defeated by Israel, but the main blow came from the local leaders themselves, who returned their economies, educational system and social services to the level of the beginning of the century. These rulers have used the national treasuries foremost for internal wars against their own citizens. In such manner have for example Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria and others been building large mansions and palaces in period, when most of their citizens were unemployed without any social rights and benefits with in addition to that a totally inadequate educational systems. And it is this atmosphere of defeat that has been afterwards giving birth to radical Islamic organizations, which chose terrorism as a mean to achieve their dark goals. The place of formation of such organizations was mostly mosques and Islamic centers, financed with petrodollars. These organizations have afterwards very successfully entered the media, school system, arts and culture, etc. They are literally controlling the pace of these countries. Their power is deriving from the alliance with religious leaders and billions of dollars, though officially intended to humanitarian mission and purpose. Greatest encouragement for these organizations came with the victory of Khomeini Islamic revolution in Iran and the establishment of the Islamic republic in 1979. The leaders of Iran introduced a new political term: »the export of Islamic revolution«. Thus the goal of all these organizations everywhere where it was possible became the establishment of an Islamic state. This was necessarily followed by great conflict among these organizations and Arab leaders that were supported/abused by their western allies with a purpose of keeping quiet their peoples in order of preserving their own thrones. Of course, a bloody countdown of the regimes against these organizations followed (in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia). The terrorists have unilaterally declared a holly war against the new crusaders, being the West and of course against the USA as a symbol and a leader of the West. Unfortunately, the West tolerated their underground activities in the name of respecting the human rights. Al Kaida terrorists were preparing terrorist attacks on the U.S.A. on September 11th from London, Hamburg, Paris and Brussels and have by such passed all the limits of American tolerance. And not only towards such organizations, but also towards all the countries, that are in this or the other way supporting terrorism (US attack on Afghanistan and Iraq).

The optimists are saying that the terrorists are a minority, which is correct, but the question is raised, whether it wasn't the minorities that have in the past planted a bomb here and there and whether it wasn't the people that belonged to the minority, who toppled the government in the past through a military coup?

If we analyze the more recent history of the Middle East, we can see that the syndrome of radicalism is reoccurring within certain temporal and geographical intervals, when these ideas spread with speed and infect the whole area in the region. The governments in such cases deal with these groups ferociously, but only in a military sense. They therefore cut only the trunk without destroying the roots of these phenomena also on a scientific and sociological level. And therefore on these same »roots« again and again spring even worse groups, which are not hesitating in their choice of methods in fighting the governments only, but also the countries supporting these regimes, U.S.A. for instance.

2. IDEOLOGICAL TERRORISM

Things that occurred on September 11th 2002 in New York and later on, on Bali, in Mombassa, Riyadh, Casablanca, etc., without even mentioning the events in Israel, can calmly be called »ideological terrorism«. The roots of ideological terrorism are coming from several Islamic groups, such as BAATH in Iraq and Syria as an ideological-political movement and Al Kaida as a religious-political movement, originating in the Wahabite teachings. Not the least, to these we could add the untouchable divine cults of the presidents for life and kings (Iraq, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, etc.).

Ideological terrorism deals violently with everyone that is trying to think differently than the system. Thus it is permitted to kill every converted Muslim – murdered and to confiscate his property and already the liberal minded are considered converts, which is an abuse of the term. The ideological terrorism is describing every Christian as a crusader and every Jew as a Zionist, who needs to be killed.

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES the dangerous ideas of the ideological terrorism cannot be rooted out with prison and death penalties, but only on the basis of a tolerant dialogue between the governments and the civil society organizations.

3. SCHOOL SYSTEM

The school system in every advanced country represents one of the pillars of national security. Progress in school system means progress in all areas of life. The data of the World Bank and UNESCO show that the Arab countries yearly spend for the educational system almost the same amount of money as the USA, Europe, Canada and Japan. The Americans spend 5.5% of their GNP on education, while the Arab countries, according to the data of the Arab League, spend 5.8% (exceptional are Morocco with 20% and Algeria with 30%). But the lack of proper planning brought to catastrophic results. For example, a quarter of a million of

Egyptians with high education is unemployed! Similarly, in Saudi Arabia 20% of the citizens are without employment.

The institution for following the peace effects CMIP that is promoting peace and tolerance among nations and citizens analyzed the school books in Israel, Palestinian Autonomous Region, Egypt, Syria and in Saudi Arabia, came to a datum that most of these books describe Islam as the only true faith and that the West is responsible for all the failures of the Islamic world and that the danger is coming from the western cultures and western ideological influence. The school texts are the most important means with which every nation not only transmits the nurture, but the whole value system of the younger generation. Here we can see how the roots of terrorism develop - grow actually in schools, where the first recruitment of the recruits - future terrorists occurs.

4. THE MEDIA

Illiteracy in the Middle East is experiencing a terrible growth and the number of illiterate people is exceeding 65 million inhabitants. Another interesting and as catastrophic fact is that less and less literate people read newspapers and thus know less and less about the events outside their own countries. In the year 1985 the Arab world consumed 3,3 kg of newspaper per 1000 inhabitants, while in the year 1995 this consumption fell to 2,7 kg. At the same time in Europe the consumption of newspaper rose from 55,7 kg up to 82,2 kg per 1000 inhabitants of the Old continent.

The flow of freethinking Arabic media from the West to the Arab states is due to the censorship almost impossible, with an exception of those financed by the middle-eastern regimes. Such an example is the daily newspaper Al Quds, published in London and promoting the ideas of Saddam Hussein and Yaser Arafat. The peoples of the Middle East thirst for independent media that are tolerating the diversity and are discussing the daily life of the citizens. The Saudi newspaper Al Watan, founded in 2000, was the first liberal newspaper in Saudi Arabia and has become a gathering point for the reformers that wish to fight the ideas of terrorism in the state, in which the teachings of Ibn Taimia (the father of the Wahabite movement) are the constitution of the state.

The editor-in-chief Jamal Khashogchije has after the bomb attacks in Riyadh in the editorial of the Al Watan wrote for the local circumstances a revolutionary article with a title »Is Ibn Taimia more important than the person and the homeland?« Khasogchi was on the 27th of May 2003 deposed! According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES the democratization of the Near East is a precondition for reforming the entire society and to finally settle accounts with the terrorism. Without a freedom of thought there is no reforms. American un-

dersecretary for the Far East William Burns has on the 23rd of May 2003 named three elements that are:

- Establishment and support of the civil society organizations;
- Construction of the state of law and justice and fight against the corruption;
- Transparent elections as an entry into the democratization of the country.

According to the opinion of the International Institute IFIMES, the U.S.A. is as the only superpower politically and before all morally obliged to act out the ideas that are being promoted. Therefore the U.S.A. has to use all the means (financial assistance, credits, isolation and selective punishment, etc.) to accomplish the goals that are in the interests of the peoples of the Middle East and the U.S.A. In such an atmosphere the U.S.A. will convince in their favor the masses and not the hated regimes, left from the cold war period.

IFIMES - The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies in Ljubljana has been regularly analyzing the events in the Middle East and Balkans. The most interesting sections of the analysis »The Middle-Eastern Region - The Beginning of a Third Phase?« are given below:

THE MIDDLE-EASTERN REGION - THE BEGINNING OF A THIRD PHASE?

With the removal of the intolerant and radical Taliban movement the ideology of terrorism is far from being removed. This can be clearly shown by the suicide attacks in Israel. Totalitarian regimes that possess weapons for mass destruction or have knowledge and technology for its production are very dangerous. Their danger lies foremost in the fact that they are or may become a hotbed for radical or terrorist thinking. Even if the countries do not include terrorism in their programs and even if they are consciously not encouraging it, they by activities within their own country, by trampling basic human rights combined with bad economic results and by allowing religious fanaticisms assist and encourage the terrorism. The only present global superpower bears the responsibility to react to such, evidently very dangerous, phenomena. The 11th of September was only one form of terrorism; its most visible and resounding reflection. Nevertheless, this terrorism can start with destruction of oil springs, hindering oil routes, destruction of gas-pipes and can in its final phase bring the world economy into an extremely serious situation.

In Iraq it was therefore necessary to achieve the abolition of the regime that is oppressing the population, which can quite easily find consolation in radicalism, if not solely in religious, perhaps in such that is based on the hatred towards the developed world. Such radicalism can with its fanatical activities through terrorist actions paralyze the supply of oil and thus shake the global economic system. It could also become an example for other oppressed masses of people in this region, a development that would only further shake the global political equilibrium. In Iraq it is therefore necessary to establish a regime, which would in a more contemporary and more democratic manner offer its population more freedom, more perspectives for a better life and would by thus be reducing the power of destructive ideologies.

Of course, Iraq cannot be the only goal. It is necessary to establish a proper situation also in Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia, but in smaller Gulf States as well. This does not mean that it will be necessary to use the military power again. Perhaps other ways will suffice; perhaps also some regimes will be commencing the processes of deconstruction by themselves and will by thus enable a less violent transition into a more normal situation. By all means it must be clear to us that the

settlement of conditions in only one (Iraq) or rather two (Afghanistan as well) countries does not suffice. The critical mass of democracy in this explicitly non-democratic area is with these two democratizations far from being met.

The whole region of the Middle East produces around 25 million barrels of oil per day, which represents approximately a third of the world production. Saudi Arabia is of special importance since the country is with 8,2 million barrels of daily produced oil its main world producer, while at the same time serves as the main Islamic religious center, a fact that can by many terrorist elements be abused for their own evil purposes. Iran is with 3,7 million of daily produced oil on the second place among the OPEC members, while the country possesses huge reserves of natural gas. With this, especially interesting for the terrorist activities would be the Strait of Hormuz, through which travel all the tankers from Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and of course Iran, which represents around two fifths (ca. 13,6 million barrels daily) of the world production. The terrorists can on this geographical spot cause an immediate oil crisis of global dimensions without any need for modern sophisticated weaponry. The pipelines would represent important terrorist targets, as for example the Saudi east-west pipeline, the Iraq-Turkey pipeline (from Kirkuk) and the pipeline through Syria.

It is also important to mention the Caspian reserves of oil and natural gas, since according to the estimates they account for around 15% of world reserves and the transport routes are or will be in large part passing through territories, where the conditions for the terrorist activities are relatively convenient.

The international community desires for the situation in the countries in the Persian Gulf and its vicinity to change. The community obviously desires an establishment of such a condition, where the power would be in the hands of as democratic as possible regimes, which would in some manner be loyal to the global economic system and would at the same time establish a domestic climate, which would not be suitable for the activities of terrorist organizations. Strategically is this whole region far too important to be left to chance and complete obstinacy, the whole economic stability depends far too much on this region and the investments into this region have been far too large, as well.

Besides the democratization and the reduction of a possibility for terrorist activity, a goal is also to reduce a possibility of such measures that would destabilize the presently relatively stable world oil economy. Namely, Iraq had been in connection to oil sales leaning towards relinquishing the American dollar, which is momentarily the only currency in oil trade, and wished to trade with other currencies, most probably with euros. This action would threaten the American dollar as the only world reserve currency and would shake the current world economic system.

Some reached the conclusions that the main goals of the Iraqi crisis are the es-

establishment of the U.S.A. as the only global hegemony, its domination over the energy and therefore immense influence on the global economy. A more serious analysis cannot provide support for such a thesis. The U.S.A. is even now strong and influential enough to act alone and to enforce its hegemony policy even more expressively. Despite the fact that the States are strong and influential enough, they were intensively talking to the United Nations, were seeking coalitions of support and were tuning in with the diplomatic interests of countries that are not members of the Security Council. It is a fact, despite the many opposing opinions, that the U.S.A. has been respecting the other members of the international community far more than it in fact had to. Actually, the U.S.A. was found in front of a dilemma: whether to respect the multilateral legal arrangements and by thus risk shaking of the global economic and political system (including the security component) or to act unilaterally with a support of coalition partners and by thus sustain the stable global economic situation. In rational terms, they decided correctly.

After the Second World War relatively strong and stable regimes were being established in the Middle East. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were solid states, which were progressing and gaining strength relatively successfully. In the beginning of the 1970's they felt that they became strong enough to blackmail, even though their wealth wasn't based not on their knowledge nor on their investments and of course neither on their internal markets. OPEC has with blackmailing the new oil prices caused an oil crisis; the world economic system was slightly shaken, though the consequences weren't too harsh, but the signal that something has to be done was clear enough.

The second phase, the phase of the internal instability of the Gulf States has commenced, even though the phase hasn't commenced just by itself. It was encouraged or at least permitted by the great powers. Not just the U.S.A. permitted this, but more or less quietly all the important countries of the world agreed to the situation, while less stable countries of the Gulf region, which have besides their internal political also economic problems can in any case not influence the global economy and possess no power to repeat such blackmail. In Iran the revolution was allowed (the leader was operating from the Western Europe, from where he triumphantly reached Iran) and the revolution by rule always brings a period of instability and economic weakness. The Iran-Iraq war was not prevented and that further weakened both countries. Iraq was still showing signs of stability, but was after the attack in 1991 on its knees, though the regime of Saddam was according to the strategy of supporting the weak and instable regimes in this region, not completely crushed. If Saddam fell at that time, the West would have no option but to establish a democratic, stable and solid regime, which would not be in compliance with then prevailing strategy. Instability in the third important country, the Saudi Arabia, has been constantly growing. Dissatisfaction of the masses of

people due to a total lack of respect for human rights and the tremendous differences in wealth do not exactly represent stabilizers for this with oil extremely rich country.

According to the data of OPEC, the average growth rates of the real national product of its members stood in the year 2001 at the level of 2,7%, in the year 2002 at 1,6%, while it is predicted to be at 1,4% for the year 2003, which is under the world average, which is estimated at 2,9% for the year 2003. The GNP growth in these countries is falling in addition to the already low basis, while the growth of the national product in OECD countries, i.e. in the developed world with approximately fifteen times higher GNP per person, has in the same period grown from 0,8% to 1,7%. Of course, the regimes in these countries do not blame their dictatorial and outdated form of government for their poor economic results, but rather the developed western countries, especially the United States, with which these regimes only encourage the terrorism.

We have to know that the weapons for mass destruction is only one of the reasons, even perhaps more of an excuse or a good presentation for the urgency of the military strike in Iraq. It is not the main reason and not the main motif. We could be talking of settling the internal political relations in a strategically important region. Saying bluntly, a sort of a third phase started, a period with a strategic goal of establishing such regimes in the region that will offer more perspectives to the people, more democracy and where the desperate and from the negative propaganda blinded inhabitants will not be seeking refuge in terrorism as a method that in its final phase enables the dictatorial regimes to stay in power. At the same time the newly established regimes should not be disloyal to the current globalization processes and would in connection to the oil not be accepting or encouraging such decisions, which could weaken the currently relatively stable world economic situation.

The military chapter of the Iraqi crisis is over. The process of internal consolidation, democratization and establishment of the system has begun, in which the basic needs of the masses of people will be met at least in some manner and will be at the same time under such efficient supervision, as to make the danger of internal destabilization, appearance of terrorism (or not ceasing of it where it already exists) and its »export« minimal. Simultaneously it is expected from the newly established democratic regime not to make any decisions that would be changing the status quo in the area of the oil trade system.

The International Institute IFIMES believes that the processes of transforming the unstable and radical regimes, where the human masses represent an explosive mixture and where hidden aspirations appear for the change in system in the oil area, will occur more spontaneously. Radical military interventions will not come into consideration. The contours of the strategic goal of the great powers are

more and more expressive, more perceivable and with this do not represent only the interests of the strongest great power the U.S.A. If the regimes of this region comprehend this basic truth and find at least a bit of internal strength to assist this process, the processes of stabilizing the region will continue in a less dramatic manner. IFIMES believes that there is a small probability for these regimes to be able to see the situation and that due to the internal stiffness of these regimes, because of which they are even less capable to react, most probably the stabilization process of this region will even after the end of the Iraqi episode be encountering dramatic moments.

IFIMES has been as The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies in Ljubljana analyzing the post-war events in Iraq in the light of daily attacks on American soldiers and the destruction of infrastructure that belongs to the Iraqi people. The most interesting sections of the analysis are given below:

HOT IRAQI SUMMER

Iraq has after the liberation from the regime of Saddam Hussein become a scene of quotidian attacks against the Coalition soldiers, especially the Americans in the central Sunni part of Iraq. Would this represent only a beginning of an overall Sunni uprising against the Americans, who have marginalized their absolute political role despite them being in minority at the expense of the Shiites, ethnic Kurds and Turkmen, who represent a majority? Or is this a beginning of the activity for the newly established organization Al-Qaida II, which acted out excellently planned and performed terrorist actions in Riyadh and Casablanca? And, not the least, who is giving them support and who is praising their terrorist acts? Would this be the Arab states with some European ones that were opposing the operations to liberate Iraq from the regime of Saddam Hussein?

Attacks on the American troops are occurring exclusively in the Sunnite part of Iraq, stretching from Ramadya and Falujja in the west to Tikrit in the north, including the Sunnite parts of Baghdad till Balada and Baquba. The analysts possess different opinions on the level of organization and the goals of such terrorist actions. Arabic and certain European media, especially the German and the French ones, are presenting these terrorists as rebels, who wish for the Americans to leave their country. Such media are thus trying to prove that the war in Iraq was not a war of liberation but rather a war of occupation. Pentagon believes that these are the remnants of the toppled regime from among the Baath Party members.

The truth is of course somewhere in the middle, or better put, a mixture of all these factors. Followers of these local organizations are former members of the disbanded Iraqi army and the secret services, accompanied by tens of Arab volunteers, who came to defend Saddam's regime from the attack and are still freely crossing the Iraqi borders from the direction of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but in all probability also from the direction of Iran. The latter are composed primarily of the Al-Qaida members, who after overthrowing of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan found refuge in Iran. Followers of these organizations are despite the up-to-now mutual ideological opposition among the Islamist Al-Qaida and the nationalistic Baath Party united against their common enemy.

The International Institute IFIMES is sharing the views of the American commanders, who claim that the Iraqi summer is going to be hot and that the tendency of culmination of such attacks is growing stronger, a claim confirmed also

by the civil administrator of Iraq Paul Brenner in his letter to President Bush in the middle of June 2003. According to the opinion of the analysts of the International Institute smaller groups numbering less than 5 members are performing these attacks. The attacks are being prepared in secret house hideouts within the limits of the inner city center, meaning that practically every house is a potential ambush for the Coalition troops.

In some cities, Falujja for instance, the mosques were turned into minor armories, while the imams (the Islamic priests) have become local commanders recruiting followers to perform such terrorist actions, following examples of the Hamas organization and the Islamic Jihad. Probably the members of these organizations have already infiltrated these groups as well as to offer them their experience acquired through the terrorist attacks in Israel. The American actions of searching after the prohibited weapons in houses and mosques are further hindered by the media attacks of Arab satellite TV networks, which are presenting these searches as attacks against the Islamic shrines and as dishonoring of the Islamic family traditions (while performing house searches). The Arab regimes and some skeptical European politicians share the opinion that these actions are a reaction to the occupation of the country and are expressing their sympathies with the suffering of the Iraqi people. These circles wish for the U.S.A. to loose the war for rebuilding of Iraq and thus prove the legitimacy of their opposition. With this their hypocrisy is exposed towards the solving of the Iraqi question. Thus, for example, the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the courtyard of the Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount is presented as the greatest insult to the Muslims, which inflamed the Palestinian uprising, while at the same time they are denying the mass graves of a million Iraqis. Saudi Arabia herself has in the past two years through diverse religious funds contributed 4 billion dollars in support of the Intifada and proliferation of intolerance over the world, a fact about which a complete report was written for the American Congress by the senators Richard Shelby (R) and Carl Levin (D).

The seriousness and the sensitivity of the situation in which Iraq is found is well understood also by the UN Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, who has decided to visit the Iraqi neighbors and will probably on the meeting of the UN Security Council on the 22nd of July 2003 demand that the Iranians stop interfering with the Iraqi interior affairs.

The International Institute IFIMES is proposing to the newly elected governing council of Iraq to accept the following decisions:

- To open diplomatic missions in the neighboring countries with a focus on the security and economic questions.
- To accept the 12th article of the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's vision published in the Wall Street Journal on the 27th of May 2003, which

presupposes a de-baathization of the country and healing of the wounds, according to the Eastern European model after the fall of communism.

- To immediately establish relations with Israel with rich experience in the economic and security field.

The International Institute IFIMES is proposing to the American civil administrator the following:

- To prohibit all the branches of the Islamic humanitarian organizations in Iraq, which are usually under the humanitarian guise performing Saudi-wahabite or Iranian-Shiite missionary activities. The assistance distribution should be entrusted to the international organizations.
- To introduce domestic liaison officers to be stationed with every active unit on the ground. Such officers would advise the Americans on the issues of respecting the privacy and other Islamic regulations, which were in the last period a common reason for attacking the soldiers. Exactly in connection to this, for instance, the killing of 6 British soldiers occurred in the peaceful southern Iraq.
- To prohibit all the media that are disseminating intolerance – here the experience of Germany after 1945 is valuable, as is the founding of the press council in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- The Balkans are an American success story after a decade of war and engaging of the politicians, who participated in the construction of Bosnia and Herzegovina (for instance, Westendorp, Klein). The relocation of the American ambassador in Sarajevo Clifford Bond to Baghdad certainly represents a step in the right direction and an implementation of the positive experiences of the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia and Herzegovina and her neighborhood.
- To support the organizing of civil society in Iraq to promote the liberal ideas, women rights, market economy, tolerance, etc.

The International Institute IFIMES is proposing to the American Democratic Party and the counter-candidates of the president Bush on the next elections not to use the characteristics of the president and his associates (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, Tenet) for the internal settling of accounts in the pre-election campaign. A failure to stabilize Iraq can destroy all the positive effects of the intervention, a development that can directly threaten the whole Middle East and the American national security.

IFIMES - The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies has been regularly analyzing the events in the Middle East and the Balkans. IFIMES is currently analyzing the demographic movements and the demographic situation in Vojvodina in light of a possible destabilization of this northern Serbian province and is as such proposing solutions, which will contribute to the stabilization of the situation and will use the national communities in Vojvodina as a bridge of Serbia with its neighbors. The most interesting and important sections of the analysis are given below:

VOJVODINA: NEW (OLD) OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT

Events, which have started on the territory of former SFRJ at the end of the eighties of the previous century, have left traces in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina as well. The Republic of Serbia or rather the regime of Slobodan Milošević has after the proclamation of the 1989 Constitution abolished the existence of Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces, even though the borders of both provinces were recognized by the federal constitution of Yugoslavia as intrafederal borders within the framework of the existing state and as such represented a special case within the federal state.

Vojvodina is with its extremely varied ethnical, linguistic and religious composition undoubtedly representing one of the greatest jewels of Europe, and is a special case within the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and present-day Serbia. In Vojvodina today, there have been residing at least 17 different ethnic groups, whose presence in this northern Serbian province is recorded for at least 90 years. In addition to this, we can encounter here also the communities of Bulgarians, Montenegrins, Bosniaqs, Macedonians and Albanians, whose arrival could be dated within the period after the establishment of the Yugoslav monarchy in 1918.

At the beginning of the 18th century, when the transfer of Vojvodina from under the Turkish rule to the Austrian rule is completed, in Vojvodina we can already speak of at least five general ethnical groupings: Croatian-catholic, Serbian-orthodox, who in this area develop one of their national centers, Hungarian, Romanian and Romani. In this period we can also observe the remnants of Muslim population, who have not departed with the retreating Ottoman forces, as well as smaller communities of Jews, Armenians and Greeks.

Intensive colonization of these extremely fertile planes of Vojvodina begins with an official blessing at the time of Austrian empress Maria Theresa in the second half of the 18th century, a process that was continuing until the end of the Dual monarchy in 1918. Even though we can encounter these processes also in Slavonia and Barania, which is due to its diversity more like Vojvodina than the rest of Croatia,

Vojvodina nevertheless represents a unique example. For this period a settling of diverse ethnical groups residing in the empire is typical. These groups include Slovaks, Czechs, Slovenians, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Poles, Central-European Jews and of course Germans and Austrians. In Vojvodina we cannot only speak of settling in larger towns and cities, where concentration of diverse groups in one city encourages mixing and assimilation of smaller into larger communities, the emphasis is rather put on the existence of smaller countryside settlements, where a certain ethnical community represents an absolute majority. Thus in Vojvodina we can observe not only Serbian, Croatian, Romanian and Hungarian villages, but also Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian and German ones. This holds true for today as well, when we can still locate villages, where not only traditional ethnical communities are in majority, but even Montenegrins, Bulgarians and Macedonians.

The ethnical make-up has with the establishment of the first Yugoslavia not changed much and according to the 1931 census we find on territory of the present-day Vojvodina 395.000 Hungarians (around 25% of the general population), 341.000 Germans (less than 20% of the population), approximately 100.000 Slovaks and Czechs and 25.000 Ruthenians and Ukrainians. Before the Second World War there were also 17.000 Jews in Vojvodina. An additional meaning to all this is foremost a fact that the Serbs represented less than half of the population and become a majority only after the WWII (in 1948 they represent 50,6% of the population). The World War II and the events afterwards meant for the ethnical picture of Vojvodina primarily the end of two communities, the Jewish and the German. The Jews of Srem and Banat were killed already in 1941, while the Jews of Bačka met the same fate in 1944. Only 2.000 Jews survived the Holocaust in Vojvodina. The German community met its end with the conclusion of the war. Then a large part of the German community leaves with the retreating German soldiers or is expelled by the new authorities due to their cooperation with the occupying forces. Some of them voluntarily depart in later years. Thus in 1948 we can find 32.000 Germans in Vojvodina, while in 1961 only 11.000 are left.

Establishment of the second Yugoslavia brought some other consequences for the ethnical composition of the area as well. On the vacant German areas not only Serbs from outside Vojvodina start to settle, but also Bosniaqs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and members of other nations and ethnicities of the Federation. In general, we could state that the period of second Yugoslavia was very positively inclined towards the ethnic diversity of then Autonomous Province within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, since all the ethnical groups were by the constitution guaranteed all the minority rights, which enabled their cultural and ethnical development and survival. Thus in Vojvodina of that age we can witness tri-lingual official documents, Slovak theater performances, Ruthenian high schools (which were the only ones in the world teaching in that language) and also German

radio shows. According to 1981 census, 1.100.000 Serbs (54%), 385.000 Hungarians (19%), 120.000 Croats (6%), 70.000 Slovaks (3,5%), 48.000 Rumanians (2,5%), 43.000 Montenegrins (2,1%), 20.000 Ruthenians (1%), 20.000 Romani (1%), 19.000 Macedonians, 5.000 Ukrainians, 5.000 Bosniaqs, 4.000 Germans, Slovenes and Albanians each, 3.000 Bulgarians, 2.000 Czechs, 1.000 Russians and 600 Jews, in addition to 170.000 non-ethnic Yugoslavs, are populating Vojvodina.

In the 1990's, when the autonomy of Vojvodina was abolished and when the dark clouds covered the Serbian sky, considerable changes in the ethnic composition of Vojvodina occurred, despite the fact that this area (as opposed to other regions of the former Yugoslavia) did not experience events of mass slaughter or ethnic cleansing. The share of Croats and Hungarians was reduced, while the share of Serbs rose not only due to the emigration of other groups, but also due to a large number of refugees that arrived to this area from Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While in the case of Croatian community we can talk about emigration due to the national conflict between them and the Serbs, the case of Hungarians is slightly more complex. The number of Hungarians in this period fell not only due to the reduced minority rights and the economic crisis, but also due to the politics of the Hungarian state, which through its legislation encouraged immigration of the Hungarian minorities from all the areas in which they resided outside of Hungary. In addition to this, in this period it is very hard to rely on the data from the 1991 and 2001 census. The data from these two censuses are not only incomplete, since they ceased to mention smaller ethnical groups and because there is a possibility that these data were adapted to the needs of the official statistics, but also because it is known that in cases of national conflicts and a certain measure of repression, members of minorities tend to identify less with their own minority group for the purpose of official identification.

The International Institute IFIMES believes that with the new decade, when the situation in Serbia is being improved daily, we can expect further changes in the ethnical composition of Vojvodina's population. With democratization of all the regions of former Yugoslavia and with ceasing the armed conflicts in these areas it can be expected that a certain part of the refugee population will commence returning to the locations of their former residence. In case of Vojvodina it means growth in the share of minority ethnical groups. A similar case is known from the neighboring Bulgaria where we are witnessing a process of return for a million of ethnical Turks, who started to return after the conditions improved and when Bulgaria started to enter the Euro-Atlantic connections.

In addition to this, the introduction of market economy and democratic political system in Serbia can mean also that a part of the Hungarian population that moved to Hungary will return. In general, better times are beginning for all the

minorities in Vojvodina. As a rule, the introduction of liberal democratic political and liberal capitalist economical system is increasing the urgency and the need for tolerance among the diverse ethnical, linguistic and religious communities, since it is this diversity and the respect for the diversity that represent one of the keys to the success of democracy and market economy, while simultaneously being one of the strongest cards of the region.

The International Institute IFIMES believes that Vojvodina is the new (old) opportunity for the Government of Serbia, which could use the ethnic minorities of the region for connections and cooperation with the neighbors, as the cooperation with neighbors represents one of the preconditions to enter the European Union. A possible destabilizing of Vojvodina will more than destabilize Serbia bring greater external damage, since it would represent a sign to the international community that the conditions in Serbia are not improving and especially a sign to foreign investors not to participate in the privatization Serbia is undergoing, on which depends the economical and political stability of the state or rather of the existing power structure.

With a proper politics of tolerance and multiculturalism, where all minorities are guaranteed all the rights determined by the United Nations, Vojvodina that in her past (with some exceptions) does not know examples of extreme forms of hatred and annihilation, can set an example for cooperation, coexistence and flourishing of all the regions, which are characterized by such a great diversity in the composition of population.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia, constantly analyses events in the regions of the Middle East and the Balkans. From its comprehensive analysis of the current political situation in Serbia the most important and interesting sections are given below:

SERBIA: G17 PLUS SECRET PLANS?

Until 5 October 2000 Serbia was ruled by Slobodan Milosevic and his Socialist Party supported more or less wholeheartedly by the satellite parties.

After the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March 2003 the turbulence at the political scene of Serbia has achieved its maximum extent. The expected profiling of political groupations – typical for the countries in transition – and emphasising of political differences have developed a new dimension – the fabricating of affairs.

The present Government of the Republic of Serbia led by Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic is supported by three strong parties: the Democratic Party (DS), the Liberals of Serbia (LS) and the Demo-Christian Party of Serbia (DHSS). The former two parties are the targets of all the attacks of the political opponents while the latter manoeuvres successfully hiding behind its campaign for the independent Serbia. Other members of the government from other parties are careful in their statements not to lose anyone's favour and trying patiently to establish their position in the coming election race.

Since Aleksandar Vlahovic and Branislav Lecic joined the Democratic Party there have been actually no more »independent ministers« in the Serbian government, especially if we are aware of the fact that Minister Milosavljevic is a member of DHSS and the man who was the main link between the Zoran Djindjic - Vladan Batic relation.

The current affairs (none of them are proved and received the court epilogue) and their sensational presentation to the public directed by G17 Plus clearly points to the creation of a political front with the Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Federation of Independent Trade Unions which announced mass strikes and marches along the streets to be held in October. Moreover, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) with their announcement of a meeting gives a clear picture of the political movements in the future period, i.e. the attempt to destabilize totally the positions of the Government and to provoke early parliamentary elections in Serbia.

According to the information of the IFIMES International Institute, already halfway through last year Mladjan Dinkic and Miroljub Labus had thought of a strategy which should have brought them the leading role in the Serbian state. According to that plan, the resources of the National Bank of Yugoslavia then

led by Dinkic as well as of those commercial banks the management of which is directly controlled by G17 Plus were to be activated, however, not for the public good and to the benefit of all the citizens of SRJ and Serbia but to the benefit of the party. This would ensure enormous financial support for any subsequent activities of G17 Plus. In their project, Dinkic and Labus also planned the systemic distribution of their favourite staff to the key positions in the state and the placing of the whole economy and finance under the direct control of the two strategists. That would turn the time in Serbia back to the period before 2000 when only two people, Slobodan Milosevic and Mirjana Markovic, made independent decisions on all the key issues in the state. However, the democracy which was brought to Serbia on 5 October 2000 could not support such a plan after its disclosure. The promoters of democracy are therefore in the way of the two collaborators.

The support to Dinkic's and Labus's strong desire to overthrow the present Government of Serbia arrived from where it was expected - Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Although incompatible on the outside, the two parties have more or less the same goal: the absolute power in Serbia. Both groupations are prevented in achieving such a regulation of Serbia by the parties which participate in the Government work at the moment. The contacts with the new ally were intensely built upon already at the beginning of 2003 and were at first very discrete.

The key goals of the Dinkic and Labus plan were: First of all, to ensure constant financing of the G17 Plus party which was formed in December 2002 from the previous non-governmental organisation with the same name. Another goal was to form the elite of financiers composed of the members of G17 Plus, their friends and co-operators as well as of all the frightened bankers and businessmen which would through its monopoly enable further loyalty of the employees in the private and public sector. The model is in many respect similar to the plans of the leaders of the notorious Yugoslav Left (JUL) to establish the so called interest control of everything and everybody in the country ruled by Slobodan Milosevic. Furthermore, in such a system it would be easy to increase the number of the staff enthusiastic about Dinkic and Labus.

However, while the JUL and Milosevic system of government was dominated by primitive and simple officials whose intentions were easy to find out, the new couple at the top of the G17 Plus party have a much more refined relation to the public, potential voters and the members. Their public speeches are full of concern for the democracy in Serbia and its economy and abundant in expressed wishes to improve the standard of the citizens. They can only be contradicted by arguments since they both master the skills of public appearance and know when and how to avoid the unpleasant and compromising questions.

After Djindjic, Dusan Mihajlovic is another target of the group. G17 Plus and

DSS agreed that Mihajlovic is unpopular among one part of the public especially after Slobodan Milosevic was arrested and that therefore attacks at Mihajlovic and at the Ministry of Interior which he leads can bring Dinkic and Labus plenty of votes from those who would otherwise not be in favour of them. Due to the pressure exercised by G17 Plus Mihajlovic would be forced to resign to the satisfaction of especially DSS so this is another point of common interest of the two parties. The IFIMES International Institute believes that the Liberals of Serbia (otherwise the members of the European Liberal Democratic Reform Party) led by Dusan Mihajlovic can be the bridge between politically opposing parties in Serbia bringing them together to pursue their common goal, i.e. accession of Serbia to the Euroatlantic integrations. The Government of Serbia is facing a long struggle with the organised crime and only if it wins this fight Serbia will regain its credibility in the international community.

One of the specific features of the current political situation in Serbia is the expressing of diametrically opposed political statements. The G17 Plus party as one of the main advocates of redefining the federation and Miroljub Labus as the signatory of the Belgrade Agreement – the basis for establishment of the union of Serbia and Montenegro – are now advocating the idea of independent Serbia using the slogan »Serbia at the first place«. Miroljub Labus has shown a negative political transformation from the modern Western politician (which he used to be at the recent presidential elections in Serbia) to the typical Balkan politician who manages to maintain his position in the political scene by producing affairs.

The present government in Serbia should be supported at all levels in order to be engaged as much as possible in the reforms instead of dealing with answers to various produced affairs. The National Assembly of Serbia meets regularly and passes laws which are of vital importance for the continuation of the undertaken reform process. The adoption of the laws mostly requires the support of a minor opposition group and usually it is the party composed of the members of the former Socialist Party of Serbia led by Branslav Ivkovic. Thus, the parliamentary majority exists but is always very tight. The parliament is also the subject of the present affairs which are aimed at invalidating retroactively the existence of the quorum as in case of the election of Kori Udovicki as governor of the National Bank of Serbia.

It is the general impression that the showbiz attitude and the intensity of the affairs eventually lead to saturation and the loss of interest of the public in those topics. Though the political benefit has been reaped at the moment, in the long run the affairs brought to the public during the past period will not leave a lasting impression on the voters especially if the trend continues and the creators of the campaign decide to carry on fabricating affairs.

Nevertheless, public opinion research shows that there have been no substantial

changes at the political scene of Serbia and that DSS, DS and G17 Plus still dominate. However, it is interesting to notice a sudden increase of the popularity of the Democratic Party Vice-President and present Defence Minister Boris Tadic as well as the constantly high rating of the former governor and Vice-President of G17 Plus Mladjan Dinkic. It should be pointed out that there is certain reservation about all the public opinion researches carried out and published since they are treated as biased and favourable to certain political groupations.

The media in Serbia represent a variegated picture. The newspaper media with largest circulation (Kurir, Blic, Balkan, NIN etc. are explicitly critical towards the government while the leading electronic media (Pink, BK and RTS as the national house) are favourable to the cabinet of Prime Minister Zivkovic. The influential – though limited in reach - B 92 radio station is also critical towards the activities of the government.

The IFIMES International Institute believes that the current political situation in Serbia can be regarded as normal for a country in transition taking account of all the specific features of the region and therefore the Government of Serbia and especially the Ministry of Interior should be supported in their efforts to fight crime. The political situation should be stabilised in order to carry out the presidential elections where Serbia would finally choose its president. If the fabrication of affairs continues there will most probably be a mass abstention of voters and another unsuccessful election. Serbia should continue with the democratisation and decriminalisation processes and prevent the creation of monopoly of any kind – especially of the monopoly of any party. Serbia must show the world that the Milocevic era is ultimately defeated and can never again be repeated, that there is no more room for secret plans in Serbian society which instead expects complete transparency and that Serbia wishes to become a respected and equal member of the international community.

GENOCIDE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AGAINST KURD IN IRAQ UNDER SADDAM REGIME

Genocide is an International Crime. It is killing or aiming to kill people by different means and is considered as an act that threatens security and safety of society because it results in extermination and persecution of people for the nature of their nationality, race or religion. Genocide is not a political, but a deliberate crime even if it is committed for political motivation.

Genocide committed by the Iraqi regime was always comprehensive and against all factions of Iraqi people regardless of ethnic, religious or cultural backgrounds. For instance, the Assyrians who are the indigenous people of Iraq and a tiny and peaceful Christian minority have been subjected to ethnic and religious cleansing although they are not forming any threat or danger to the Iraqi regime.

Denominational repression policy is another kind of genocide that the Iraqi regime has committed in central and southern Iraq. Discrimination and humiliation of Shia through a series of articles that were published in the government newspapers following the uprising in March 1991 was a part of this crime, especially when it was declared that the Marshland residents are not Arabs or Iraqis and therefore the regime had the right to bomb their cities and destroy their homeland. These people live in an area where the oldest human civilizations began and where the old laws of Sumerians and Babylon were written.

In Iraq, violations of human rights have been committed since 1968, when the Baath regime came to power, especially against the Shias, Kurds and Turkmens. The situation became worse when the war between Iraq and Iran broke out. Tens of thousands of Shias were rounded and mass executed. Chemical weapons were used in 1988 against the Kurds. Draining of the Marshlands, destructing the environment, poisoning the waters and burning complete villages in the South are clear violations of international laws and agreements. This paper comprises three sections:

- 1.) Concept of genocide crime
- 2.) International crimes against humanity in southern Iraq
- 3.) Recommendations

1. CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE CRIME

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

of 1948 was concerned with the extermination of human beings for their race or religion. The word 'genocide' became associated with Nazism because of mass-crimes against people for their race and religion and that was considered as a crime against humanity even though it was not considered as a crime under national law.

1.1. Forms of Genocide

- a. Killing members of the groups;
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in parts;
- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

1.2. Forms of killing the groups

- a. Bodily genocide and ethnic cleansing: it is about killing people by poison gas, executing and burying them alive. This happened in 1991 in Iraq and later on against the Shia inhabitants in southern Iraq. The Iraqi regime killed in one day 2000 Shias through a process called "cleaning of prisons". The crime against southern Iraq including the destruction of Marshlands by constructing dams and draining the Marshlands has been so horrendous that was filmed and shown to people all over the world through media. This caused forcible migration of tens of thousands of local population. In 2002, the European Parliament and the Human Rights Committee condemned these crimes as they were international crimes as declared by the ambassador David Shiver in USA.
- b. Biological genocide: it is about sterilising men and aborting women in order to wipe out the race of that group.
- c. Cultural genocide: it is about forbidding a nation to converse in their own native language which happened to the Kurds in Iraq. Although this crime has resulted in assimilation and destruction of the group's existence, the international community has not given adequate attention to this crime. This crime has been committed for the following reasons:
 - Religious reason: the worst crime in our time has been the crime of the Iraqi regime against the religious figures, who have been arrested and executed.
 - Political and social reasons: it is about assimilation and Arabisation of non-Arab people in Iraq. This has been carried out by a series of resolutions against the Kurds, particularly the Faily Kurds, for their nationality and their Shia belief.

2. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN KURDISTAN AND SOUTHERN IRAQ

Before reporting the international crimes in southern Iraq, it is crucial to clarify the following:

2.1. Crime against humanity

The crimes against humanity have been considered by Vatican as they are crimes not only against humanity, but against God. These crimes were specified by Nuremberg Court as International crimes and must be punishable. Such major crimes have been committed by Saddam regime by killing and wiping out the civilians in Kurdistan, destroying 4500 villages, and forcing hundreds of thousands of southern Iraqi Shias to leave Iraq for Iran because of their belief, torturing and killing their religious leadership in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq.

- a. Legal basiss: The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 1948 condemned all forms of genocide such as what the Iraqi regime has committed against Shia in southern Iraq and the Kurds in the north, where thousands of people were buried alive and thousands of people were killed in Halabja as well as during the campaign of Anfal and the uprising in 1991.
- b. Material basis: it is about acts that constitute an International crime like destructing environment, disappearing people and using people for biological and chemical experiments. More than 300.000 people were forced to abandon their places and now more than 100,000 of them are living in Iran as refugees due to the destruction of their habitat by poisoning water. This has also caused the extinction of some species of birds and fishes in that area.

2.2. War crimes

Although war results in a serious violation of human rights, the international conventions which refer to the rules of war must be taken into consideration. These are:

- a. Den-Hague convention in 1899 – 1907
- b. The Geneva Protocol of 1925, which forbids using poison gas and biological weapons. The international Security Council condemned the Iraqi regime for using chemical weapons in 1988 against the Kurds as stated in the resolution on 26 August 1988. Using chemical weapons, drying and poisoning the marshlands committed against the inhabitants in southern Iraq as well as storing chemical weapons in the vicinity of Najaf and Karbala by the Iraqi regime are all considered as war crimes.

Examples of the international war crimes in Iraq:

1. The crime of genocide committed against the Kurds in Kurdistan as well as other parts of the country. Also the forcible deportation of the Faily Kurds, who have become victims for their Shia belief.
2. Genocide against humanity such as using chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988 and Shias in 1991.
3. Bombing the civil Kurdish villages, inhabitants of Najaf, Karbala, Basra, Simawah and Diwaniya as well as the villages in Iran.
4. Burying people alive. Hundreds of thousands of the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan and Shias in the south were buried alive. This is a war crime and does not fall by time. Moreover, the international criminal can not claim any political excuse for committing that crime and must not be granted any sort of asylum.
5. Executing prisoners of war and burying them alive is an international crime and the accuser must be prosecuted as a war criminal.
6. Torturing the prisoners of war and interrogating them by force is a war crime.
7. The crime of violation against women which was committed in Kurdistan and in Kuwait during the occupation.
8. 10 Millions of mines, which the Iraqi regime has implanted against people in Kurdistan.

2.3. Crimes against peace

People at time of peace have many rights that should not get violated such as civil, political, economical, social and cultural rights. These rights during peace must be taken into consideration, otherwise the International crime would be in force such as an offensive against other countries as in the case of Kuwait in 1990.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

Due to the brutality of repression of human rights in Iraq, it is necessary to carry out the following recommendations:

1. Activating and revising resolution 688 in order to be introduced according to chapter seven of the UN Convention to set up teams to investigate the situation of human rights in Iraq.
2. Establishing a special court for International crimes to try those responsible for committing the International crimes against the Shias and Kurds in Iraq.
3. Paying compensation to victims whose lives got ruined because of the International crimes in Iraq.
4. Nullifying the death penalty imposed by the Iraqi regime.
5. Establishing a high constitutional court to oversee the implementation of the constitution.

6. Activating the UN 's role to assist the Iraqi people.
7. Freezing all assets stolen by the Iraq regime.
8. The UN has to pay a part of the oil for food programme as compensation to Iraqi people, who have become refugees before and after the Gulf war.
9. Establishing a high committee of Iraqi experts in law in order to investigate the crimes that have been committed against Iraqi people and decide on the compensation for those people.
10. Acquainting the world public opinion through media with all crimes against Iraqi people and focusing on the role of International Community to stop the continuous ethnic cleansing of Iraqi people.
11. Rehabilitation of the environment in the marshlands of southern Iraq and working for renovating all damages in the Marshlands by removing all dams and helping the refugees to return to their place of origin.

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana, constantly analyses events in the regions of the Middle East and the Balkans. Seven months after the liberation of Iraq IFIMES analysed the current events in the country. The most important sections from the comprehensive analysis are given below:

HAS PANDORA'S BOX BEEN OPENED?

April 9 is undeniably a historical day not only for the Iraqi people but for the whole region of the Middle East. Twenty million Iraqis joined the 4 million Iraqi Kurds who were liberated after the Gulf War in 1991. Masses eager for reforms in the region enthusiastically expected the wind of political and economic reforms in their countries (demonstrations of the civil society in Egypt at the end of August 2003, the first demonstrations in the history of Saudi Arabia in October 2003, elections in Oman, amnesties for political prisoners and reconstruction of the government in Syria, replacement of the crown prince in the United Arab Emirates).

The visitors of Arab forums at the Internet after April 9 were surprised at the liberal and tolerant debates and everybody hoped that the USA would be as successful in the political renewal of Iraq fast as they were in the 20-day war.

At the IFIMES International Institute we received thousands of letters and became the announcers of changes. Everybody wanted to know how the nations of Eastern Europe after the decades of tyranny built their states and started to overcome transitional problems with the help of America and the West. The idyll drew to an end with the increase of terrorist attacks which were aimed not only against the American Army but also against the vital infrastructure related to the everyday life of ordinary citizens.

Terrorist attacks in Iraq intensify every day and according to the Pentagon data there are on average 26 attacks a day. The main concern is their improving organisation, motivation and supply with money and weapons. The terrorists have autonomous command and each group can operate in its area, they select the time and date as well as the location of the attack and their enemy is an unprotected open target (infrastructure, soldiers and Iraqi police). In short, they are a real illegal army which attacks certain targets at their choice which may be of political, military, economic, psychological or humanitarian importance. In this fight the American superiority in technical equipment is losing its meaning since everything depends on the human factor. To achieve their goals, the Iraqi rebels spend millions while the Americans spend billions of dollars.

Perhaps the most important is their recruitment system – most of the recruits are former members of the dissolved Iraqi army and intelligence services, members of Palestinian terrorist organisations and the fugitive members of Al-Kaida from

Afghanistan.

American members of the infantry force research centre from Arkansas who visited Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar wrote in their report at the beginning of October 2003 that they expected 120 reports daily from the 69 intelligence teams on the field, but receive up to 30 reports which are mostly dated and useless.

According to the IFIMES International Institute the data on the number of terrorists are inaccurate as regards the national and political appurtenance of rebels in Iraq. Independent analysts estimate the number of foreign soldiers among them (prior to the union of the two organisations, JunudAllah and Usudbetween) to be between 850 and 1.000. If another 5.000 former Iraqi soldiers and agents are added to that number the total number of active sympathizers in the Sunnite triangle with logistics tasks is between 20.000 and 30.000.

Another concern is the increasing number of new terrorists. According to the data of Israeli informers foreign terrorists prevail in number over domestic terrorists. This was confirmed by the Syria's Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa in the »Sunday Telegraph« interview on 26 October 2003. The USUD organisation which is located in Syria is in charge of illegal border crossing to Iraq. Another direction from where the terrorists come is Iran. The members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard have recorded Al Kaida fugitives from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Chechnia in Mashad from where they are taken over by the Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi group which hands them over to the Ansar al-Islam organisation, an Al Kaida unit located in the north of Iraq, which was defeated in a joint American-Kurd operation from 22 to 25 March 2003, and from the north they continue towards their destination, i.e. the Sunnite triangle.

THE AMERICAN CONFUSION

The American confusion comes from Washington where the disagreement between the State Department and the National Security Council on one side and the Pentagon on the other side is more than obvious. In critical moments this disagreement turns into a rift when the President of the USA has to interfere in order to cool down the passions. The dispute between Pentagon and the National Security council at the beginning of October was won by the latter. The President appointed Condoleezza Rice head of the Iraq Stabilization Group. This confusion is already reflected on the field. In these circumstances Ambassador Bremer replaced General Jay Garner as the head of the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) which is responsible to the Pentagon.

Since Paul Bremer took over the chief position in the CPA, terrorist attacks have drastically increased. The CPA directly administers the state and the state institutions (the administrative council, the ministerial council). However, while in the

civil matters it has achieved excellent results (renewal of infrastructure, monetary policy, health care etc.), it has no clear security strategy regarding the situation in Iraq.

In this American confusion the Pandora's box has been opened and every day more and more evil spirits of terrorism escape while the hope remains at the bottom of the box.

As the solution to the present situation, the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) proposes:

1. Iraq should not be the subject of pre-election low blows between Republicans and Democrats. The victory of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq will definitely be regarded as justified and rightful in the American history.
2. CPA should be divided into the civil and the military department; we propose General Jay Garner as head of the military department and the forming of groups for combating terrorism composed of experienced experts from renowned institutes such as: AEI - American Enterprise Institute and JINSA - Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs.
3. The Iraq Stabilization Group headed by Condoleezza Rice should be of consultative nature.
4. The ideas of US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to establish an agency for ideological fight against terrorism should be realised.
5. An efficient Iraqi professional and depoliticized army and intelligence agency should be established. The training of such units should be based on the American »Equip and Train« programme used for training the army of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation.
6. Known companies in the field of security from the USA, Israel and Turkey should be hired for safeguarding the vital facilities such as the pipelines.
7. A regional conference of Iraqi neighbouring countries should be convened to discuss the efficient control of borders.
8. The »Middle East Partnership Initiative – MEPI« should be activated.

In view of the fact that Iraq has become the field for combating terrorism, the IFIMES International Institute proposed to the members of ICTAC (International Counter-Terrorism Academy Community) that the IFIMES department located in Baghdad be the head office of ICTAC during the first year so that the different institutes, universities and corporations can exchange opinions and look for answers to open questions on the field.

ICTAC - International Counter-Terrorism Academy Community - is headed by ICT - International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism from Herzlia, Israel. The IFIMES International Institute is the co-founder of ICTAC.

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VIOLATION IF WOMEN RIGHTS IN IRAQ

Women occupied a distinguished social, economical, political and religious position in different ages and played an active role in life affairs. The significance and types of this role and this position diverse in different ages. Woman used to be in a position of a goddess during the initial stages of history. Human beings used to worship her and requested kindness and salvation from her and her existence formed a symbol of blessing, reproduction and fertility. Moreover, for this purpose, there has been a strong relation between woman and creation. In fact, woman's existence associates with a fertile, productive land which nourishes mankind from her blessings.

Numerous texts were found in Hamurabi legislation to organize a family, to protect the position and role of Babylonian woman in ancient Iraq. Woman used to have a privilege to divorce from her husband, and had a privilege to take care of her children to practice a business and had a legislative facility and independent financial possession from her husband and had a privilege in guardianship and living. Severe scandals were put on a person who maltreated a woman or violated her constant rights according to the mentioned law.

Women occupied a distinguished role and a high position during Greek period and republic of Plato as well. Whereas such a position was not the same among Arabs before Islam. There was the burial of girls who were alive at that time because of the fear of their capture as prisoners of war during attacks and wars. This practice was a very significant social value at that time so as a woman did not become a slave for taking as a concubine during attacks. The social and economical position depends on the role of man in agriculture and wars up to the appearance of Islam which eliminates prevalent social problems at that time. However, women's position in social and economical rights did not improve at the level to be suitable to her humanist value and her humane role in family and society. The important thing here is to introduce the legal protection of women during the modern age and the discrimination of this protection between both sexes and conditions of violation of women rights in Iraq in order to clarify the essential recommendations to improve women's condition in Iraqi society in Iraq after Saddam regime and to stop violations against her constant humane privileges and try those who commit these crimes according to the law as principles of justice which require the trial of criminals about their crimes according to the international law and according to the national law as numerous international conferences were held to

investigate the issue of women rights and the attempt to limit these violations and among those was Pekin Conference in 1995 and among other conferences by the United Nations.

VIOLATION OF WOMEN RIGHTS IN THE IRAQI ACT OF PUNISHMENTS NUMBER 111, 1969

There are numerous of legal texts in the Iraqi Act of Punishments which reveal serious violations of women rights and tens of the issued decisions from the President of the regime which violate legislation and international obligations. The most serious violations are:

1. The punishment of execution for women in the Act of Punishments and out of the court and justice where execution against women is acted according to Iraqi punishment law which we requested to be cancelled from law. Operations of execution was practiced dangerously without trial and authorized by persons who were called (Fidaee Saddam) which means sacrificers for Saddam to cut the head and body savagely by sword which is a serious crime against human rights, should not keep it silent and those who committed it should be brought to trial and victims should be compensated according to law. Such barbarous actions should not be acted whatever excuses are. In addition, there had been murder, rape, and continuous torture against women in the prisons of the regime which needs investigation teams to be sent for investigating the reality of human rights in Iraq and handling the criminals who acted such crimes to the national and international court of justice.
2. The crime of adultery, honour murder and inequality of legal protection between man and woman; The crime of honour murder is considered a serious crime which threatens human rights and first women rights in civil society, for which it requires all the essential steps to redeem this serious problem in Iraq and other Arab or Islamic countries. The Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter in Swedish language on 22nd January 2002 published a part of this problem through the available statistics about this crime which refers to honour killing as follows:
 - about 25 to 40 crimes of murder urged by honour murder happen in Jordan annually,
 - about 400 crimes of murder occur to women in Yemen for honour murder annually,
 - about 60 crimes of murder occur to women in Iran for the same reason,
 - about 300 - 500 crimes of murder happen to women in Pakistan for the same reason annually,

- about 50 crimes of murder occur to women in Egypt for the reason of honour murder annually.

There is not accurate statistics about the condition in Iraq and this crime spread even in diaspora and even numerous crimes happened in Sweden and other countries for family honour murder which increases this crime.

The Punishment law in Iraq dismantles the inequality in legal protection between man and woman in this crime. The Punishment law backs man and put very severe punishments on women without punishing the person who commits it.

Torturing women and treating them badly during imprisonment period before their trial

Based on plenty of documents which were found during the victorious uprising in 1991, that there had been a serious policy acted by Saddam's regime against women in Kurdistan and various areas in Iraq, particularly in secret prisons, during trial and custody. It was obvious in the regime's prisons in Suleimanya and prisons of Duhok and other areas. A lot of women were exposed to rape, beating, maltreatment, and hanging them on their breasts by iron instruments fixed on the ceiling of the prisons.

Examples of violations of women rights in Iraq

In August 2001, Amnesty international announced a report. The Middle East Affairs Department (Document number MDE 14-008-2001) on the title (Iraq - The organized torture for political prisoners). The condition of women rights in Iraq was mentioned there under the title (Women exposed to torture operations, maltreatment, and execution out of justice as follows:

Women in areas under the control of central government were exposed to torture, maltreatment and executions out of justice in Iraq, for instance Dr. Suad Jihad Shamsadin 61 years was exposed to imprisonment and severe torture at her clinic in Baghdad on 29th June 1999 for suspicion of having liaisons with Iraqi opposition. Moreover, many women were exposed to rape and sexual abuse to pressurize the active relatives who were against the regime of Saddam. And the colonel N.S. received a video cassette on 7th of June 2000 which confirms this crime (p8 from the mentioned report).

In addition, tens of heads of women who were accused of prostitution were cut in October 2000 without any trials (p8). The heads of men who were accused of being pimps were cut. And these operations were performed by the attendance of Baath Party representatives and General Union of Iraqi Women. The militia militants of Saddam's Sacrificers had cut heads by swords in front of the houses in a grotesque way and murdered a lot of victims for political reasons (p8).

And Dr. Najat Muhammad Heider was slaughtered in October 2000 on the excuse

of prostitution but the real reason was that she criticized the corruption in health sectors and Institutions. Moreover, the head of other Iraqi women named (Um Haider) was cut without any accusation or trial in 2000, she was married and had three children because of her husband's active political role against the regime and who could manage to flee his homeland. The parts of the body were taken in plastic bags to unknown place but the fate of children remained unknown (p9 from Amnesty International report).

Following recent terrorist attacks in Istanbul, the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) from Ljubljana has analysed the events in Turkey and the region specially for the »Revija Obramba« (Defence magazine).

ISLAMIC TERRORISM KNOCKING AT THE EUROPEAN DOOR

TURKEY IN A QUANDARY BETWEEN THE SECULAR SYSTEM AND ITS ISLAMIC ROOTS

The November terrorist attacks in Istanbul were not an example of classical attacks aimed at collapsing the political and economic conditions in a state. The Istanbul attacks were so to say multipurpose and struck several targets at the same time. In other words: the terrorists sent several bloodstained messages to several addresses in Istanbul - the USA, Great Britain, Israel, NATO, EU and Turkey as the scene of dreadful acts.

The use of four truck bombs and suicidal attacks prove that the assaults in Istanbul were not another example of domestic terrorism which has been present in Turkey for several decades, but a case of international terrorism. It incorporated internal and external elements in all the phases from the planning to the realisation. After the attacks two organisations made themselves known simultaneously and admitted the act: al Qaeda as the sponsor and a Turkish organisation called the Islamic Front of Raiders of the Great Orient (IBDA/C).

The official Ankara has interpreted the attacks as the result of events going on outside the Turkish borders - it probably refers to the occupation of Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the economic crisis in the region. Turkish terrorist organisations had namely never in their history used such tactics nor such methods.

The IFIMES International Institute is of the opinion that Turkey is about to take a test in which the government will have to answer bravely, precisely and consistently the questions of vital importance for the stability and existence of the secular Atatürk republic of Turkey in its present form.

Terrorism has chosen new targets and used new methods. Turkey was not chosen by chance as the place of recent assaults. The terrorists used this target for political, geopolitical and security reasons. The Turkish religious fanaticism, which was born and grew in the secular Turkish regime under violent conditions characteristic of the states trying to do away with such religious organisations, certainly treats the pro-Islamic AKP government as the enemy number one since it strives to bring together the Islamic world and the West and to link Islamism and secularism which is of course not in the interest of the extremists who prefer constant confrontation and see the West in the light of dialectical materialism leading to

their self-destruction.

The Islamic Front of Raiders of the Great Orient counting about 600 militants was established by Saleh Mirza Bayoglu (now in Turkish prison) ten years ago during the bloody conflicts of the army and the terrorist PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in the turbulent south east Turkey. Some analysts compare their role with the role of the Turkish Hezbollah. The Turkish army supported the Front during the 15 years of fighting against the Kurds (PKK).

On the other hand, some other analysts connect the Islamistic attacks with the Turkish Intelligence Agency which is subordinate to the army, but opposes some of the AKP moves. This theory is supported by the statements of Prime Minister Erdogan following the attacks who criticised the Turkish Intelligence Agency for having in possession the information on the attacks but not forwarding it to the government prior to the attack on the synagogues. On the day of the attacks several security and information meetings were held on demand of Prime Minister.

On the other hand, the Arab analysts offer a completely different explanation for the attacks connecting them with the Israeli Mosad which is apparently interested in the destabilisation of the Turkish government which has become too close with Syria and the Arabs.

The IFIMES International Institute believes that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Turkish political folklore. During the first half of the 1970s the streets of Istanbul and Ankara were the scene of sanguinary clashes of the left and the right. The Turkish school of terrorism and violence was known also beyond the national borders. The fact is that Turkish leftists were regular visitors and instructors at the training grounds of Palestinian extremist left-wing organisations such as the Geroqe Habash's Palestine Liberation Front (PFL).

The Armenian terrorist organisations were also active during this period carrying out assassinations of Turkish diplomats around the world. Furthermore, the Kurdish Marxist Party PKK can be marked as the product of left-wing terrorism; its founder, Abdulah Oçalan, was a member of those organisations in the early 1970s. Unlike the Iraqi and Iranian Kurds who decided to take other ways, PKK chose the ruthless sanguinary terrorism to achieve the national goals of the 12 million Kurds in Turkey.

Many analysts relate the violence in Turkey to the Turkish secularism enforced by the founder of the modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk. This is evident from the role and the behaviour of the Turkish army in the political and cultural life of the state which has left the traces in the Turkish society. Although modern and secular, the Turkish school system, based on Ataturk's heritage which recognises violence, revenge and glorification of the Turkish history, contributed to such social guidelines.

However, such ideology of violence is not related only to the situation in Turkey

but also to the foreign policy of the state. Let us recall the Turkish conflicts with Europe, Greece, Cyprus, Russia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The economic problems are also the generators of extremist ideas which find their way to those who are desperate and who see the solution to the problem in the religious and salvation belief.

THE ROLE OF AL QAEDA

The al Qaeda terrorist network assumed the responsibility right after the attacks and thus confirmed the assumption of security experts that al Qaeda no longer carries out the operations itself but rather advises others on terrorism.

Al Qaeda decided to take this role after the defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and after suffering severe strokes against its infrastructure and financing. Its tasks are now realised by minor terrorist groups in individual countries operating autonomously and deciding freely on the time and the targets.

Al Qaeda, formerly the »University of Terrorism«, has become a universal international umbrella organisation covering at least 30 large organisations. They communicate most likely through the Internet and in this way receive advice, instructions and exchange experience for the preparation of attacks. The greatest problem for the security bodies is the fact that those groups are not located within certain geographic area.

THE ISTANBUL ATTACKS AND EUROPE

After the Istanbul attacks Europe raised the alarm fearing that the Turkish situation could affect the European security. After all, Turkey is a NATO member and therefore all the NATO states were assaulted. Greatest alarm was raised in Germany where the terrorism alert was heightened. The German fear is the product of a strong Turkish economic-political migration group of over 2 million workers or German citizens of Turkish origin among which Turkish extremist organisations most probably have their members or followers.

The alarming report of the criminal office in Wiesbaden further supports the reasons for concern. The office has confirmed the assumptions that the Islamic Front of Raiders of the Great Orient has its members and followers among the Turks in Germany and that (since the attacks) they have been under strict control.

The report is based on the information from which it is evident that the Front has been operating in Europe since 1995 and that one of its bases is located in Germany. The organisation carried out the first attack in 1996 when the Turkish demonstrators burnt the Turkish cultural centre in Hanover as a sign of disapproval of the pro-European politics of the government in Ankara. This was followed by an

attack at the Turkish consulate in Dusseldorf in 2001.

Yilmaz Zafir, member of the organisation, confirmed for the German television that the organisation has 8 independent units in Germany and that in case of German military participation in Iraq they would attack the targets in the state, adding that Istanbul was only a small test for the future greater action. In the interview Zafir confirmed that the organisation regularly sends 500 of its bulletins from Turkey to Germany.

The analysts believe that the organisation has several hundred sympathisers and about 40 members in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden. In such atmosphere of alarm the German politicians started the discussion on one hand in favour of and on the other hand against the fast association of Turkey with the EU. The leading coalition of SPD and the Green Party is in favour of the fast accession of Turkey while the right-wing conservative CDU-CSU opposition warns that the accession of Turkey would mean opening the European door wide to terrorism.

According to the opinion of the IFIMES International Institute Turkey stands at the crossroads and should take prompt action in order to resolve its internal problems and carry out its political and economic reforms according to the EU criteria. Turkey will have to revise its security policy and modernise its security services in line with the European standards so that the intelligence agency would no longer be subordinate to the army general staff but to the president of the state and to prime minister.

In its antiterrorist strategy, Turkey will have to differentiate between its internal terrorism and the terrorism aimed at the USA, Great Britain and Israel. These countries are facing no national, economic, political, cultural and social problems so that the possibility of their internal terrorism is so to speak ruled out.

IFIMES believes that the intentions of Syria in the relations with Turkey are not of serious nature. The handing over of 22 alleged terrorists responsible for the attack in Istanbul at the end of November 2003 represents only a political move of Damask in the framework of its foreign policy and does not comply with the spirit of the Syrian-Turkish Security Agreement which was signed in Adana in 1998.

The immediate handing over of the alleged terrorists by Syria is in contradiction with the bases it offers in its territory to various terrorist groups (Hamas, Jihad, Usud, Ansar alIslam, al-Faruk Brigades, the Army of Mohamed), and to the members of the overthrown Iraqi regime. Turkish co-operation with Syria and Iran, which support terrorism, should not only be aimed at resolving the so called Kurdish issue in Iraq, but rather to find the model for regional co-operation to combat terrorism which actually operates from Syria and Iran. Any other solution can inflame and bring up the Kurdish issue in Turkey (12 million Kurds), Iran (8 million) and Syria (1.5 million), the Armenian issue, the Cyprus issue and the is-

sue of Kurds, Arabs and Azers in Iran.

In the future Turkey will have to define clearly its viewpoints on the regional co-operation and accession to the EU. Following from the above it is certainly not in the interest of Turkey to request for the observer status in the Arab league as has been requested by Iran although the two states are not Arab at all.

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COMMUNICATING SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION, MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION INTRODUCTION

Communication is the lubricant of every society. Communicative interaction explains political behavior and preconditions any lasting communities of integration as they rely on: »a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it-in short, a matter of perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making.« (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36)

Also democracy and political stability in South-Eastern Europe today strongly rely on provisions for freedom of speech, professional media activity and responsible public communication. Through years media largely contributed to conflicts in the region not merely by biased reporting, but by systematic provision of legitimacy to totalitarian leaderships and by construction of the war itself - nationalizing, mobilizing and emotionalizing the public sphere by use of specific »patriotic journalism« and »war propaganda« techniques (Hrvatini & Trampuz 2000). Thus, the fall of previous non-democratic regimes and the end of war in the region brought about sudden changes for which the new elites were insufficiently prepared for. They have been facing major problems with general transition in the media sphere, establishment of media legal framework, professional work and education of journalists, public relations officers, state officials and other people involved with public communication. There exists a true danger of ill practices in the field of media regulation, media ownership and privatization, as well as in media relations and public communication activities. All these developments in the media field have been observed by most of the key international institutions involved with maintenance of peace, stability and human rights in the region and in Europe at large, which have also attempted to provide assistance in this respect. This paper will explore the role of public opinion, media and communication

activities concerning security, peace keeping and integration in societies of South-Eastern Europe. It attempts to move further from the common debates on the topic, not merely showing that media, public opinion and communication in the region do matter, but more importantly, how and why the interaction processes (can/should) take place in the real environments of South-Eastern Europe. First, it will introduce global trends in media and communication, reshaping international affairs, altering conduct and perceptions of foreign policy, diplomacy and war. In addition, the role of public opinion as the »new international force« will be discussed. Further on, I will address the question how (can/should) foreign policy and security »speak« to people. This will lead to an outline of main initiatives and projects by international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe and Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in particular) in the media and public diplomacy field. I will conclude with a study of (potential) Slovene involvement in this respect, with some relevant proposals and other policy recommendations to this aim.

BRAVE NEW MEDIA WORLD

In today's world of a revolution in communications and information as well as of global interdependency, a medialised politics became a general reality. One can observe such a trend specifically in the field of international and foreign affairs where state and other actors use communication channels and public relations to a large extent to improve on the content and in particular, on the image of their policies. In a new media-dominated governing system international television networks like CNN brought about »the constitution of a worldwide homogeneously time-zoned bios politikon, instantaneously affecting world wide political action or interaction via press conferences or public resolutions transmitted around the world« (Volkner, 1999: 3 & Thussu, 2000: 12). One argues that a major share of bilateral and multilateral relations among states is shaped by the international media, or vice versa, that all major »wars« are »fought« through the media (Ammon 2001; Gilboa 2001; Thussu 2000).

Furthermore, »the realpolitik of the new era is cyberpolitik« in which the actors are no longer just states and raw power can be counted or fortified by information power. Internet technologies enable virtual communities to unite to counter government efforts, from use of violence to the closing off of existing media channels. These take their cases to the international court of public opinion, whose influence over states has grown as its means to reach an ever greater audience has multiplied. A worldwide network is the key feature of the environment in which diplomats and generals operate (Rothkopf, 1997: 325-330).

These revolutionary changes have altered the meaning and understanding of

power in contemporary world politics. A nation or leader's image and control of information flow, and not just their military and economic power, contribute to their status in international affairs. Power is passing from the »capital-rich« to the »information-rich«, »soft power« counts more and more. This is the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others (Nye 1990; Nye & Owens 1996).

Therefore, nowadays political leaders spend as much time explaining or justifying a conflict to their public opinion and to the media as they actually do running them. Or as put in the words of NATO spokesman: »The ability of the media to dramatise events and create a global audience for a conflict puts policy makers under pressure to take decisions faster and with less time for reflection than at any previous time in human history.« (Shea, 1999: 5) However, one must and can keep in control: »Leaders have to dominate the media and not be dominated by it. Successful conflicts cannot be media driven. Winning the media campaign is just as important as winning the military campaign.« (Shea 1999: 8) This realisation holds true also for peace keeping operations: »No matter how convincing one's strategic rationale for a given policy might be, it must, above all, be understood by a broader public, or else it might not be politically sustainable.« (Robertson 2001a) Thus, to secure a steady progress of the stabilisation process in post-war regions like the South-Eastern Europe, it has to be managed carefully, if it is to succeed in the long run, with determined engagement, patience and cooperation, also in respect to media and public communication (Robertson 2001b).

PUBLIC OPINION - MAY FORCE BE WITH YOU

Public opinion, largely shaped by the media, has become even more influential in foreign affairs as before and nowadays represents the common arbiter among competing policies, politicians, and statesmen (Ammon 2001: 84-86). When debating the role of public opinion, two contradictory lines of thought can be distinguished, the first arguing about the volatility and inadequacy of public opinion as a stable and effective foreign policy, whereas the second considers public attitudes quite stable and consistent over time and actually exercising a strong influence on foreign policy-making (Risse-Kappen 1991). Some authors claim that the analysis of public opinion is usually one-sided, taking into account only the impact of something called »the populace« on the statesman, the diplomat or the military leader. »Public opinion, however, is not an autonomous force; it is frequently organised by voluntary organisations or a specific political group«

(Sofer 1991: 73).

Empirical research proved that the policy impact on public opinion does not depend solely on the specific issues involved or on the particular pattern of public attitudes as more on the domestic structures and the coalition-building processes in the respective country (Risse-Kappen 1991). Here, also the foreign policy elites take a considerate role while translating their decisions, moves, positions to public opinion (Almond 1960). Thus, a study suggests that public possesses general orientations that help to inform and anchor its opinions on specific foreign-policy issues. While political judgments in the international sphere must be made under considerable uncertainty and without many of the interpretative aids commonly used in the domestic arena, public relies on its general knowledge to guide the processing of more specific information (Hurwitz&Peffley 1987). Therefore, one should analyse public opinion and foreign policy, as well as diplomacy, as in the process of interaction, constructing each other through existent domestic coalitions and policy networks, in the context of domestic societies (Plavšak 1996).

The public's understanding in the respective post-war region is initially influenced by perceptions of how and why the peacekeeper is there in the first instance (Kiehl 2001: 136). Publics, thus, do not exist in a vacuum, patiently awaiting an Information Operation message from the interveners. In the absence of a coordinated information policy on the part of the multinational force, the information vacuum will be filled by those whose intentions are hostile to the interests of the force. Political and/or military leaders may misrepresent public opinion to justify their own agendas (Kiehl 2001: 139).

It is important to note that public opinion across the region is dominated by day to day concerns such as poverty, inflation and corruption, as to the SEE Public Agenda Survey, the first ever professional measurement of public opinion undertaken simultaneously throughout South-Eastern Europe. These public concerns, however, have little connection with ethnic, historical and international issues which at least a section of the ruling elite in the region considers important. In addition, the survey also reveals a critical lack of trust in official institutions of all kinds, domestic or international, accross the region as as a whole, with the notable exception of Kosovo. This in itself can represent an important obstacle to development, as lack of trust means a lack of respect for rules and laws.

HOW FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY SPEAK TO PEOPLE?

»Foreign policy does not necessarily have to 'shout loudly to be heard a little'; it simply has to speak clearly and in familiar terms, perhaps rattling a few sabers for emphasis.« (Hurwitz&Peffley 1987: 1115) Scholars and practitioners agree that if policy-makers want to set the agenda and not leave it to the media, they must

have one. The existence of policy that can command public support against emotional swings stirred up by television imagery is key. In the absence of persuasive government strategy, the media will be catalytic (Hoge 1994: 2). Therefore, in the »media shaped« world public diplomacy, defined as »the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly another government's foreign policy decision,« (Signitzer and Coombs 1992: 138), adopts new dimensions, being concerned with media and communication management, and as some argue, developing to a genuine »communicative action« (Lose 2001).

While combining »soft« methods of media and public relations, on one side and on the other, also »hard« methods of persuasion and propaganda, more or less covered in subtle forms of cultural, education, promotion etc. programmes, it attempts to bypass the constraints of foreign governments and reach directly into the hearts and minds of foreign audiences. Hereby, the traditional »high politics« grounds become an ever-widening, »all walks of life« arena that encompasses non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations, regional and local governments, academic institutions, media and other important players. Therefore, also the actors in public diplomacy can no longer be confined to the profession of diplomats but include various individuals, groups and institutions who engage in international and intercultural communication activities which do have a bearing on the political relationships between two countries. (Signitzer and Coombs 1992: 139)

Specific communication activities support also peacekeeping operations - International Public Information encompasses traditional civilian public diplomacy, public affairs and press relations, international educational and other exchanges, professional media training, international broadcasting as well as traditional overt military information operations, press relations, public affairs and psychological operations. Here public diplomacy includes the use by the civilian foreign policy establishment of personal contacts, press and multimedia tools, training and long-term exchange programmes in order to inform foreign publics of a given policy, affect attitudes positively towards that policy and influence behaviour favourable to the foreign policy interests of the state employing it (Kiehl 2001: 138-145). When military information operation takes place in the absence of civilian public diplomacy or without close coordination between military and civilian practitioners of information operation and public diplomacy, there is a very real danger of counter-productive operations and working at cross-purposes (Kiehl 2001: 140). »Effective communication helps to dispel rumour, to counter disinformation and to secure the cooperation of the local populations. It can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of rival groups, enhance security of UN personnel and serves as a force multiplier.« (Kiehl 2001: 144)

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN ADDRESSING LOCAL SITUATIONS

Any communication programme or project in the South-Eastern Europe should be tailored to each specific environment, with specific economic, political, social, cultural, media situation, with specific needs and perceptions of local population, including understanding of security in all its complexity and diverse dimensions. How do initiatives and activities by international organisations meet such requirements?

OSCE

Through different stages of CSCE/OSCE evolution one can observe a consistent promotion and upgrading of freedom of expression, free flow of information and freedom of media as basic human rights. In order to ensure even higher level of commitment with the norms and standards accepted, the position of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media was established and Freimut Duve of Germany was appointed to take over the Vienna based office in December 1997. His mandate stems from the realisation that »freedom of expression is a fundamental and internationally recognised human right and a basic component of a democratic society and that free, independent and pluralistic media are essential to a free and open society and accountable systems of government«. He is endowed with the task to observe relevant media developments in all participating States and to advocate and promote full compliance with OSCE principles and commitments regarding freedom of expression and free media. Here, he assumes an early-warning function in relation to governments, parliaments, the media and NGOs, and concentrates on rapid response to serious problems caused by, inter alia, obstruction of media activities and unfavourable working conditions for journalists. The latter are addressed either through interventions with governments and visits, or by outlining issues and problems that are characteristic of more than one participating state, for example, so-called »censorship by killing«, »structural censorship«, misuse of libel and defamation laws, value added taxes on the media etc.

A report on International Assistance to Media in Southeastern Europe, commissioned by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and prepared by Mark Thompson, closely looked into many obstacles faced by the local media and governments in establishing free journalistic media in the region. It was an important lessons-learned study as it attempted to address questions of how the international community can help and whether there was a need for a relevant legislation to be introduced by the international community. It showed that OSCE has been the main international organisation involved with the matter of post-conflict

media development. Offices with this particular task are operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, OSCE Missions in Croatia and Macedonia (FYMO) also deal with support and assistance to independent media. After democratic changes at the end of year 2000 an OSCE Mission was newly established in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, carrying an important media mandate. In his capacity as OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Freimut Duve has done his utmost to improve the media situation in Serbia and counter the state propaganda: »...the basic questions of common security focus today, a quarter-century later, on other issues: above all, on how the always latent danger of ethnically motivated propaganda, and the instrumentalization of the media for that purpose, can be countered.«

Council of Europe

For many years, the Council of Europe has carried out a wide range of activities aimed at guaranteeing and promoting freedom of expression and information and freedom of the media in the countries of South-Eastern Europe, in accordance with the principles enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and other Council of Europe legal and political instruments in the media sector. In respect to the region the Council's Media Division attempts to set out a regulatory framework for freedom of expression and the media in line with Council of Europe standards, and to ensure that the day-to-day application of the regulatory framework complies with these standards and that the media can develop in such a way as to promote a climate of tolerance and mutual understanding. Its bilateral and regional activities include the organisation of information and awareness-raising activities for official circles (judges, civil servants, regulatory authorities) and training activities for media companies and professionals which complements the legislative expertise under the Council of Europe's co-operation and assistance programmes.

Consequently, a joint initiative by the Council of Europe and the European Union was made to adapt the legal framework in the media field in South-Eastern Europe, in particular in Serbia and Montenegro. This provides an urgent assistance to the media experts who are preparing a new legislative framework for the media, and assist also the competent ministries and other public authorities in the further preparation and subsequent application of new laws and regulations. A series of awareness-raising and training activities, expert and advisory missions, as well as expert conferences have been organised and carried out in the areas of broadcasting sector, general media law and European standards of freedom of expression.

Stability Pact

On 8 June 2000, the Regional Table of the Stability Pact adopted the Charter for

Media Freedom, a document which constitutes basic grounds for strengthening independence of the media in the region. Hereby, the participating states of the Stability Pact acknowledged »that freedom of the media, free flow of information and ideas and open discussion, without the interference of public authorities, play a fundamental role in the development of free, stable and democratic societies; are prerequisites for the establishment of mutual understanding and good relations among states and their peoples«. Beside that, they stressed the need »for a more active and better informed public debate in order to achieve the objectives of peace, stability and mutual understanding that underpin the Stability Pact«, as well as »for cooperation among media professionals from the region contributes to enhancing mutual confidence and reducing the risk of tensions in South Eastern Europe«.

The governments, the interested parties and organisations associated with the Stability Pact obliged themselves to cooperate to protect freedom of expression and to encourage observation and implementation of the leading principles of free media. Here special attention has been paid to the following: media and other relevant laws in accordance to international standards and commitments, including defamation laws and attempts for censorship; development of pluralistic and accessible electronic and printed media; provisions for economic independence of the media, for free access to information, for media access by minorities, and for protection of journalistic sources; development of media networks in the region; legal framework for Public Service Broadcasters and state news agencies; establishment of independent broadcasting regulatory bodies; importance of media codes of ethics and self regulation; enactment of laws related to the use of the media to incite unlawful acts of racism, xenophobia or violence; promotion of the highest standards of professional journalism, including independent and diverse information and opinion.

Accordingly, Media Task Force, which was established within the Working Table on Democratisation and Human Rights, prepared an Action Plan outlining necessary steps to implement the provision of the Media Charter. These include the publication and promotion of the Media Charter; establishment of national contact points and working groups; preparation of country-specific work-plans; development of regional co-operation in the media field; enhancement of the Media Task Force itself; support for the independent media in the FRY; encouragement of local ownership; and intensified efforts to inform Stability Pact partners and donors about activities of the Media Task Force. By the end of year 2000 donors committed in total 29.25 mio Euro to 30 media projects in the region, covering media education and training, media assistance, support for media institutions and networks in the region, media programmes for FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina etc. To date, Working Groups have been established in Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. While the Media Task Force works closely with country working groups, it attempts to involve local media professionals in the assessment of projects; to stimulate assistance to local organisations with a proven track record and to forge closer cooperation between donors, existing (local) organisations donors and government representatives.

In Media Task Force's latest strategy (2001-2004) one states that »despite positive developments, the media in South Eastern Europe are still hampered by political influencing, economic dependance, lack of sound journalism training, weak professional structures and - in many cases - an unclear and unfinished legislative framework.« Accordingly, further activities will focus on the following areas of action: laws and regulation, transformation of state to public media, support for private and independent media, regional cooperation, professionalism, minorities, content and archiving. Planned projects include concrete activities like legal assistance for decriminalising defamation, South-Eastern TV News Exchange, training journalism trainers for network of centres, permanent education of journalists from South-Eastern Europe, Summer school for young academics in journalism, Beta Economic news service, video letters, episodes on breakdown of JNA, investigative programme on war-related issues etc.

SLOVENIA - SHINNY STAR IN THE BALKANS?

It is commonly acknowledged that Slovenia plays a considerable role as a bridge between European countries and South-Eastern Europe, exporting stability and cooperation to the region. Or as put by former US President Clinton during his visit to Slovenia on 21 June 1999: »We must build a Europe with no frontline states - a Europe undivided, democratic, and at peace for the first time in history. And Slovenia can lead the way.« This point was again made in May 2002 at the opening of International Press Institute's World Congress, the largest global meeting of journalists, editors, media, governments' and international organisations' representatives, which was held, with no coincidence, in Ljubljana: »The Slovenian media profoundly influenced and enabled the political reforms, and helped to initiate the secession from Belgrade, which ended on June 25, 1991 with the declaration of independence.« With the realisation that the media was tragically entwined in the deadly cycle of violence in the Balkans, the debates at Ljubljana IPI Congress focused on what went wrong in the Balkans, and on specific questions of how to guarantee editorial independence and how to protect journalists in the regions of conflict. IPI's affiliate, the South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO) organised a topical seminar on »The Media and Conflict Prevention in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia«.

Thus, on the concrete level, how much is Slovenia truly involved with commu-

nicating security and cooperation in the region? Here one should point out to a study case of a highly successful project within the Stability Pact and its excellent implementation also in communication respect, i.e. the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the responding communication strategy »To Heal the Wounds of Earth and Soul« which in October 2000 received a prestigious award for public relations projects with social projects by International Public Relations Association in cooperation with the United Nations (Asanin & Vercic 2000: 126-132). Otherwise, evidence shows that Slovenia (again) takes a more laid back approach, with little concerted action and mainly through efforts by individual experts. Though co-chairing the Stability Pact's Working Table on Democratisation and Human Rights (January-June 2001), Slovenia's working plan included merely a workshop on Democratisation and Support for the Independent Media in South-Eastern Europe (by Slovene Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Culture); an expert conference of the Assisting Electronic Media in the South-Eastern European Countries (Slovene Ministry of Culture, Slovene media organisations); and an international conference on legislation in the field of radio and television - Public Services and Commercial TV and Radio (Slovene Ministry of Education, Science and Sport, Slovene National Commission for UNESCO).

So far no working group of media professionals has been established, and a sole non-governmental organisation, is partly involved with the media projects for the region. The Center for Media Policy at the Peace Institute focuses on the strengthening of the media community in Slovenia, the inclusion of experts in the drafting of media legislation, and the setting-up of self-regulation and accountability systems within the Slovene media. Besides, it encourages international contacts, the regional and international cooperation of media companies and professional associations, organises conferences and discussions, develops training, fellowship and exchange programmes for journalists and media experts, in particular from South-Eastern Europe.

CONCLUSION - A LOOK AHEAD

The outlined projects and initiatives by key European institutions in the media field surely work toward a common aim in a long run - establishing »rules of the game« for players in the public/media space and thereby, providing grounds for security and stability, as well as for further integration and cooperation. They are well aware of the fact that the western model of free media and democratic communication cannot be simply copied, but rather transferred to the particular political, social and cultural environment of the targeted countries in the region. Still the very sensitive factor of public opinion - the perceptions of the general

population, specific interest groups and opinion leaders, is complex to handle and that's why, it is often difficult to base relevant projects truly on local needs and initiatives. Here they use diversified approaches which all in all, produce both effects, of overlapping and of complementarity.

The OSCE Representative for Freedom of Media appears the most progressive in his »political/public appeal« authority, adequately supported by a media-development function of the institution. The Council of Europe consistently follows the line of its leading principles of human rights protection also in the media field, providing expertise and assistance on the most important questions of transition like new media and broadcasting legislation in the region. NATO in its efforts to compensate for communication failures during its intervention on the FRY tries to focus on broader (public) implications of its security and military activities. Also European Union will have to work more in this direction if it wants to effectively strengthen the role of its Common Foreign and Security Policy in the South-Eastern Europe. A potential infrastructure for synergy of all these activities is offered and also increasingly used within the Stability Pact. However, still more effort is needed to provide for a higher visibility of the Media Task Force activities and a closer involvement of local partners in its projects. This would also contribute to better state of being informed about the Stability Pact and thereby, boost its overall positive image in the countries of the region.

In my opinion Slovenia can share its unique experience of transition with other countries in the region and help them to avoid mistakes in this field. Furthermore, Slovenia with its infrastructure and know-how could become a meeting point and a communication network for setting, strengthening and promoting standards in public communication; ensuring and improving transparency of media regulation, media law practice and media ownership in the region; offering information, advise and expertise in the field of media and communication; educating for professional journalistic and PR practices in the region; supporting creative communication projects in the region etc.

Slovenia should and/or could »lead the way« under the following headings:

1. Media regulation: In the process of passing a new media legislation in all targeted countries, Slovenia protagonists should attempt to connect legal and media experts and professionals in the region, preparing the new legislation in accordance with the Council of Europe's and the European Union's provisions. Particular questions should be addressed in expert forums: the role of public television, protection of journalists, development of profession codes of conduct, establishment of press and media councils or complaint commissions. A Slovene institution should provide also for an easily accessible overview of key documents (with case law) and activities on media regulation

of the main European institutions, as well as comparative media legislation of the countries in the region.

2. Media ownership and privatisation: With the opening of the media markets one should provide for a systematic and controlled transition to new forms of (non-state) media ownership by private and foreign capital. An establishment of a regional media register with current data on the ownership shares and other relevant information under Slovene auspices would secure the necessary transparency in the field and at the same time attract potential reliable investors. Also exchange visits by experts from European institutions and countries in the region sharing experience and advise with media institutions still in transition largely contribute to this aim.
3. Media relations and public communication: As a heritage of former non-democratic and in-stability (war) driven regimes, perceptions of mistrust and even hostility prevail in the relations between media and state officials, thus various actors (PR officers, diplomats, NGOs) intensively communicate with domestic and foreign publics. Therefore, they have to be educated as to the established standards and practices of »fair play« media relations and responsible and efficient public communication. Slovenia competently could provide for such education and training opportunities.
4. Journalistic practices: Western models of professional journalistic practices are only gradually acquired by the media in the region, due to the past, but still existent state and political dependence as well as to strong nationalist mentality. Beside that, the transition to market regulated media created a vacuum allowing for yellow press driven, aggressive journalism and low quality journalistic stories. Therefore, one should provide for a proper education and training of the journalists and editors in the region - a regional journalistic school could be established in Slovenia.

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The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, constantly analyses events in the regions of the Middle East and the Balkans. Ambassador Dr Jožef Kunič, President of Slovenian Association for International Relations (SDMO) and member of IFIMES has analysed current events after the Parliamentary elections in Croatia. The most important sections from the comprehensive analysis are given below:

WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN CROATIA?

The elections were carried out in Croatia on Sunday, 23 November 2003. HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), once presided over by Franjo Tudjman, which advocates the national values and sovereignty, won 66 seats in the 152-seat parliament. The right-wing HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) won 10 seats, the radical-right HSP (Croatian Party of Right) won 8 seats and the other parties will hold 14 seats. The decisive victory of the right-wing is the result of voters' opinion that the left option, if it can be called so, did not meet the expectations set at the elections four years ago. It is interesting that the sound economic results did not play the key role in the decision making at the polling places. It is also interesting that in its election campaign the previous leading coalition did not emphasise the economic results as would have been expected. Instead it was more and more inclined to the national zeal, which is the main element of right-wing parties, and eventually became even subordinated, at least apparently, to this element. In spite of initial firm intentions to respect the demands of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) it was not able to send any suspects to the Hague. The pressures of the right opposition were too strong and influenced a large part of the nation so the national feelings became more and more powerful. On the other hand, its predecessor, Tudjman's HDZ, had sent a round dozen of suspects to the Hague since it was not forced to prove its national orientation by rejecting the Tribunal's demands. Even in the economic field the previous leading coalition was not able to function without the nationally conscious feelings. When the public invitation to tender was put out for the purchase of the hotel complex »Suncani Hvar«, located on one of the most beautiful Adriatic islands, the Slovenian offer was the most favourable one from all the viewpoints. But for the sole reason of its being a Slovenian offer it provoked national discussions in the coalition and the Slovenians were not allowed to invest. The left-wing coalition slackened in defending the so called national interests also regarding the border with Slovenia. The already concluded international agreement, which is in my opinion favourable to both parties and even more favourable to Croatia than to Slovenia, was not ratified in Croatia.

Although the elections in Croatia in 1999 raised good signs that Croatia would

show a great deal of readiness and good will to resolve the open issues with Slovenia and that co-operation would improve in all the fields, these proved to be only vain hopes. Croatia did not ratify the agreement on succession of the former SFRY which would resolve the majority of problems related to the heritage of the former Yugoslavia and is important for all the newly established states in the territory of the former SFRY. Neither did Croatia ratify the agreement on the border with Slovenia although it was initialled by both parties. The Croatian media have not forgotten the issue of holders of savings deposited with Ljubljanska banka which the Slovenian side believes to be part of the succession agreement. Furthermore, the problem of the Krško Nuclear Power Plant has not been resolved yet. Slovenia is not treated equally when it comes to foreign investments on the grounds of unresolved problem of the debt of Ljubljanska banka. The declaration of ecological and fishing zone by Croatia just prior to the November elections without Slovenia's consent and thus prejudicing the state border was the last »right« step of the »left« government. The slackening gave wings to the rightists and disappointed the leftists which was proven by the latest election results.

Moreover, Croatia has several other open issues with its neighbouring countries. It has to lay down the border with Serbia and Montenegro on the river Danube. The riverbed, the middle of which represents in principle the border line between the former republics and now states, is constantly changing and will not correspond for ever to the cadastral map. The river Danube has formed thirteen bends and if the border line was drawn along the middle of the stream the newly formed land would belong to the other state and Croatia would loose about 11,5 hectares. Another border issue is the Prevlaka Peninsula at the Adriatic Sea. This is the area of strategic importance since it is the entrance control point for the Boka Kotorska naval port of Serbia and Montenegro. Although the problem has been soothed, it still remains open. Furthermore, the Serbs who fled Croatia during the military operations in the Krajina region represent a large and potentially very serious problem for Croatia. All those who are now in Serbia and Montenegro represent certain economic burden for this state and sooner or later they will demand the right to their property, compensation etc. The problem is far from being resolved and is probably about to start aggravating.

Croatia has also numerous unresolved issues with Bosnia and Herzegovina which are the remnants of the Tudjman reign. The most important are the agreement on the port of Ploče, the Kostajnica border and the Neum crossing. The most difficult issue is the border at the river Una in the Bosanska Kostajnica area. Although it has been formally resolved, the inhabitants oppose those solutions. And finally, another two open issues should be pointed out: The relation of official Zagreb with Herzegovina and the Serbian refugees who fled from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia regarded the position of Herzegovina as the position of Bos-

nia and Herzegovina which is, of course, not the real situation. There is no doubt that the influence of Croatia on Herzegovina was significant and some analysts even described it as interference of Croatia in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The question is to what extent such relationship with a neighbouring state was exceeded. As regards the Serbian refugees, this represents a very complex problem since the same questions will probably be raised by Bosnia and Herzegovina and by Serbia and Montenegro.

Unfortunately, it is very clear that Croatia deals relatively slowly with unresolved issues which are the remnants of the former SFRY or which resulted from the wars during the 1990s. Croatia's geostrategic position is exceptional and that is why it would be of immense importance for the whole region to resolve the open issues with the neighbouring states much faster, with much more understanding for the problems or the goals of the neighbouring states and with much more co-operation in resolving the issues concerning Croatia and its neighbours at the same time. As an important state in the region, Croatia should function as the stabiliser of the region and not as the centre of unresolved issues. The EU and NATO policy should be oriented towards encouraging the guidelines leading as soon as possible to a stable region in which Croatia as a stabiliser could represent an important factor.

Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the unresolved issues with Slovenia differ from the unresolved issues with other neighbouring states since in May 2004 Slovenia is to become a full member of the EU and a full member of NATO. Consequently, the issues concerning Slovenia automatically become in a way the issues concerning the EU and NATO.

Surely, the goal of Croatia is to join the European Union as soon as possible. All the major parties adhere to this goal and in practice there is a national consensus regarding this issue. Many orientations and decisions will be devoted to this dominant goal. Croatia will have to prove in many fields its proEuropean orientation which is in diametrical opposition to persisting in great sovereignty, adopting decisions concerning neighbouring countries without their consent (the ecological and fishing zone being a typical example) and favouring very dubious rights over parts of the territory including the sea (such as the sea border with Slovenia) instead of good long-term relations, which have been long since outmoded practice in the EU. ProEuropean policy is definitely not congruent with revoking public invitations to tender for investments which apply to all except to those coming from certain nations (as in case of »Suncani Hvar«). ProEuropean attitude in resolving the refugee issue will be very difficult but just formal adoption of solutions without any real effects is not what we could call the European approach. ProEuropean orientation will also have to be proven in case of the suspects of the Hague Tribunal. The ostrich policy towards this issue will have to be modified. Showing

respect to the issue of real estate whose owners are from other states in the territory of the former SFRY is another example of proving proEuropean policy, as is the reconstruction of the demolished synagogue.

Croatia is aware that the present enlargement of the EU to the ten new member states is a very hard nut to crack. Facing the new constitution with new realities such as the »New« and the »Old« Europe or the »Europe of greater speed«, new economic flows etc., the EU will require a transitional period of certain duration. Despite the formal assurances that the door to the EU is open, the new enlargement will be practically impossible before the consolidation of the Europe of the twenty-five. Croatia's turn to join the EU might therefore be together with the other states of the West Balkans. Such waiting is surely not in the interest of Croatia. This is also one of the reasons for strengthened relations with the USA which are evident from the position of the representatives of the future Croatia's leading crew towards the participation in Iraq. Croatia certainly relies upon the effect of American support in its accession to the EU.

Croatia's goal is also to join the NATO alliance as soon as possible. However, many open issues in the region and disrespect for the demands of the Hague Tribunal will definitely not accelerate the accession to this defence organisation.

Most analysts believe that Croatia will behave acceptably towards the EU and that it will agree to the European principles and do everything to be able to take the shortest path to the EU. It will be very loyal to those European states which are important and old members expecting them to pose very few obstacles in its accession to the EU. The new crew will not have to prove its loyalty to the national values and sovereignty at every step and will therefore adopt much more easily the decisions expected by the EU. It will send the suspects to the Hague with much more ease, open the real estate market, adopt, at least formally, the resolutions required by the EU regarding the refugee issue etc. It will make effort not to be in the package with the other states of the West Balkans when joining the EU since it would represent a failure for Croatia. In those efforts it will try to rely on the European governments where there is the right-wing majority which could help Croatia significantly unless it disappoints them by some non-proEuropean decisions.

Croatia will be loyal towards the USA and will strengthen its co-operation. The right-wing winning party even offered participation of Croatian soldiers in Iraq which is, though only symbolically, an important political stroke. Another advantage of the new crew in the relations with the USA is that its leading members have no communist background.

The new Croatia's Prime Minister Ivo Sanader stated that the priorities of the new government regarding foreign affairs will be joining the EU, joining the NATO and relations with the neighbouring states.

The latter represent the most interesting issue. According to the European

expectations Croatia should carry out a constructive policy in relations with the regional states of the West Balkans. The open issues with the neighbouring states should be resolved constructively, with appropriate understanding, laying stress on the goal of resolving the problems (and not gaining direct benefits), which would enable Croatia to become the stabiliser in the region. Can Croatia achieve this? The success is far from self-evident. The nationalistic and populist pressures with stressed national symbols were very often an important factor in adopting certain decisions. The EU should take up a clear position on this issue, possibly that the good relations of neighbouring states are more important than minor, sometimes only symbolic benefits. Preferably, the USA should take up the position that Croatia should become the stabiliser in the region, which is only possible with properly regulated relations with the neighbouring states.

The essential questions for Slovenia are: What policy can be expected from the new Croatian government and the parliament towards Slovenia? What relations can be expected between the two states and how can Slovenia influence those relations?

Another question posed by the analysts is in what way and in relation to whom the new government will meet the more decisive expectations of Croatian voters, especially as regards the preservation of sovereignty and national values.

Many analysts believe that Slovenia will be the main safety valve for levelling the nationalistic pressures. In their opinion it will be necessary to show Croatian voters in some political fields that their expectations regarding the national values will be at least partly realised. Since Croatia will definitely not realise those patriotic expectations in relations with the EU, the Hague Tribunal, the other states of the West Balkans nor with the USA, it will compensate by placing even more stress on the relations with Slovenia. Some analysts believe that the relations with Slovenia will be somewhat radicalised while others even predict extremely unfavourable national attitude of official Zagreb towards Slovenia. They do not see any possibility for Croatia to consent to the finally valid agreement on the state border without international arbitration. In their opinion, the issue of holders of savings deposited with Ljubljanska banka will be intensified, there will be fishing incidents, Slovenian companies will not find it easy to invest in Croatia and it will be difficult to consult Croatia on a number of questions.

However, in my opinion this is not the only possibility. On 1 May 2004, Slovenia will become a full member of the EU although it is *de facto* already in this association of states. At that point it will become also a full member of NATO which will put additional weight to this state. There is a realistic possibility that although the opinion polls did not show very strong friendship of Croatians towards Slovenia, the Croatian politics will regard Slovenia in fact as part of the EU and that Croatia will assume the same position towards Slovenia as towards the other members of

the EU and Brussels.

The latter possibility is surely more favourable for Slovenia and will be advocated by the rational and calm part of Croatian politics. Many people in Croatia are aware that Slovenia will always be their neighbour and that in the long run Croatia can not benefit from the Balkan principle, according to which the direct benefit gained to the detriment of the neighbour is more important than good relations with the neighbour.

However, we are far from being certain that Croatia will decide to establish European relations with its north-west neighbour. Old states with traditional diplomacy and national interests in the field of foreign relations already »inherent in the little brain« are usually immune from the daily political events and relatively frequent changes of the leading crews. On the other hand, this is not the case in young European states where a change in the political option has a strong influence on both the domestic and foreign policy and it would not be realistic to expect foreign relations not to depend on the election results.

In order to achieve the above mentioned second possibility in relations of Croatia to Slovenia, the latter will also have to spare no efforts. The recommendation from the first talks with the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Dr Janez Drnovsek, in November 2003 was: »The future Slovenian foreign policy should be creative and not only responsive.«

Only a dialogue between the two states can lead to the desired goal. The dialogue should be carried out in a friendly atmosphere where the participants establish mutual trust and respect. Politics was and will always be created by people with their little but important human features. After the new government is established in Croatia, both countries should start intensive talks. Resorting to international arbitration, although not opposed in principle by any party, does not bring long-term benefits. It is very likely that one or both parties would be very unsatisfied with the decision of the arbitration and that would not represent a sound basis for good long-term relations between the neighbouring states and for strengthening regional co-operation.

The dialogue should be intensive and should be carried out at all levels with all Croatian political options. However, the dialogue, i.e. the talks carried out by two parties, should not exclude or replace the active role in international organisations and in the multilateral field.

Both parties should be able to understand the problems of the other party and Slovenia should persist on the issues of relevance for this country, for it seems that Croatia has been more persistent than Slovenia till now.

A prior uniform view should be assumed by Slovenia on all the arguments, not only by the politicians and diplomats but also, and as far as possible, by the experts. The interpretation and application of generally valid principles should be consist-

ent and oriented to the benefit of Slovenia. Namely, if expert opinions delivered in public differ they do not enable credible representation of the positions.

Slovenia should strengthen public diplomacy, i.e. the diplomatic activity encompassing wider circles of people in Croatia, especially the interested groups. This activity should be intensified in order to change the public opinion and achieve favourable attitude of the general public.

The international community, especially the EU and the USA, should demand Croatia to take active steps to realise the demands of the Hague Tribunal and to help the refugees return to their homes *de facto* and not only *de iure*. This will only be possible if Croatia reduces the populist rhetoric on the national or so called patriotic basis. Consequently, the populist pressures on the foreign policy activities of the new government will also be reduced which will enable a temperate, rational and tolerant dialogue and solutions to the satisfaction of both parties which is the basis for stable and good long-term relations in the region.

Now is the time for the international community and Slovenia to prepare for and start as soon as possible a dialogue with the new government and new leading crew in Croatia. The first steps are very important. A good start is half the battle.

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SLOVENIA - BRANDING A SMALL NEW EU NATION

ABSTRACT

The very ability to competently and convincingly communicate in international and diplomatic relations can importantly compensate the shortcomings in physical capabilities and potentials of small states, like Slovenia. It seems that Slovene foreign policy makers are aware of the fact in general principle, while mentioning the soft powers of Slovene cultural, civilisation and economic achievements that exceed its actual size. In particular one points to the importance of communication within the framework of the European Union, its common policies and the new European diplomacy. Slovenia at the EU doorsteps is surely not a nation without an image and known identity, however it has to figure out how to build on its communicative powers and how to improve its brand as a trust-worthy, constructive, principled and unproblematic partner Member State. The paper will explore the role of Slovene public diplomacy in national image building within the European Union.

INTRODUCTION

»Place de la Concorde, Paris, July 1, 2015, 0900 Euro time. Mr. and Mrs. Bridge approach the majestic iron fence protecting the American embassy and its entrance parking lot. It seems that a festival is going on. Red, white, and blue bunting is everywhere, LED and laser signs of a tasteful and stylish variety exhort readers to "Visit the U.S.", "Hunt buffaloes with Red Indians", "Descend into Grand Canyon on mules", "Smell the cool breezes of Banff", "Try a real American Tamale!"« (Schmitz, 2001)

Does this imaginary story depict how the U.S. or any embassy of the 21st century will look like? And does it actually show the direction in which the contemporary diplomacy and its future role will develop - merely to market a state / a nation while the technology will take over the ordinary diplomatic functions and consular services? In this context, can one talk about »the rise of the brand state with geographical and political settings that seem trivial compared to their emotional

resonance among an increasingly global audience of consumers« (Ham, 2001)? At the core of this puzzle lies a paradigm shift in the diplomatic environment influenced by the advent of revolutionary information and communications technologies. The paper will first introduce the renewed understanding of contemporary world politics and further discuss how (public) diplomacy has adapted to the prevailing trends of global communication and media interdependence. This will allow us to give a concrete and relevant estimations of how a small state like Slovenia can and should communicate within the international relations, in particular within the European Union.

BRAVE NEW (MEDIA) WORLD

Today's world is characterised by frammegration, »a concept that juxtaposes the processes of fragmentation and integration occurring within and among organizations, communities, countries, and transnational systems such that it is virtually impossible not to treat them as interactive and causally linked« (Rosenau, 1999: 3). Contemporary international relations and diplomacy take place within global networks of interdependent info-, media-, cyber- and idea-spaces which have spilled over the borders of states' / nations' territories whereby challenging the traditional concepts of sovereignty and power. »The (metaphor for the) international system which is now developing... is of an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty, but alongside it a global community omelet is cooking.« (Booth, 1991 and Rosenau, 1999: 6) More accurate than an old metaphor about realpolitik with states-billiard balls moving around on a pool table, would be a so-called post-Newtonian metaphor of the world politics. »The new metaphor should not only add balls for nonstate actors, but also show that what happens on the table depends on the dynamics of the table fabric as well as the interaction among the balls. And, metaphorically speaking, that fabric is changing in ways that make it-the fabric itself-a new and important factor.« (Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 1999: 8)

The very fine weaving of contemporary world politics is communication, or even more so imagination, which is today »a staging ground for action, and not only for escape.« (Appadurai 1996 and Rosenau, 1999: 7) New modes of production and networks of information have erased old and created new demarcations of power and identity, reality and virtuality. Within the converged »Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment« network, it is prevailingly important what and how is communicated, represented, virtualised and imagined, »how reality is seen, framed, read and generated in the actualization of the event« (Der Derian, 2000: 786-787). Therefore, contemporary international relations are also more and more led by soft power, i.e. »the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow,

or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others.« (Nye and Owens, 1996: 9) In such a common globalised context, any state can take on the potential of convincing, appealing communication and compensate for its limited sovereignty: »What states lose in control, they could regain in influence.« (Brown and Studemeister, 2001:3) One of the important threads in the world politics' fabric are media, not merely reacting to the international political events and developments, but rather increasingly being a part of the communication process between governments and publics about international politics. »The mass media of communication have broken into traditionally exclusive sphere of diplomacy and have themselves become an instrument of international conciliation and mediation as also of conflict.« (Kunczik, 2003: 409) Furthermore, with expansion of global communications international politics is more or less media represented and medialised, taking place in real-time, with a so-called CNN effect »where in international crisis situation global television has become the dominating actor in the conduct of foreign policy, replacing elected and appointed policy makers« (Gilboa, 2002: 732). World leaders and other actors in international relations have adapted to such a »media realit«, often bypassing established diplomatic channels and using the new technologies of global communication to transmit nonsecret messages directly to leaders of state and nonstate actors as well as to their respective publics (Gilboa, 2002: 738). In a so-called »wag-the-dog« foreign policy formulation and implementation one attempts to improve not only the content, but even more so the image of their policies. »What too often counts is how well the policy will play, how the pictures will look, whether the right signals are being sent, and whether the public will be impressed by the swiftness of the government's response - not whether the policy promotes America's long-term interests.« (Gergen, 1991: 48-49) However, past experience often prove that at points of policy uncertainty, in the absence of clear policy line or persuasive government strategy media can have disastrous impacts (Robinson, 2001: 532; Hoge, 1994: 138).

CONTEMPORARY COMMUNICATIVE DIPLOMACY?

Also contemporary diplomacy has adapted to such circumstances where »valuable information, observation, and suggestions from overseas diplomatic and intelligence sources may no longer arrive in time to have the desired influence on decisions, and, when information does arrive in time, it can hardly compete with dramatic televised images and ongoing reportage of crises and foreign policy issues.« (Gilboa, 2002: 737) Modern diplomats are inevitably locked in a specific relation of inter-dependency with the media: on one side they rely on media trans-

mitted information, whereas on the other, they use media as efficient communication means supplementing the classical diplomatic channels. They have not merely adapted to work with the media hand-in-hand, but have also learnt how to work with the media, stepping toward a more active involvement and management of media and communication to one's country purposes and advantages guided by national interests. Therefore, diplomatic profession nowadays resembles the profession of a public affairs practitioner, as it implements reasoning, tools and techniques of media and public relations (Plavšak, 2002: 116-117). It is argued that contemporary diplomacy takes on forms of various media formats and it is described in terms of »media diplomacy«, »tele(di)plomacy«, »foto(di)plomacy«, »soundbite-«, »instant-« and »real-time diplomacy« (Ammon, 2001; Gilboa, 2001). Most critical authors claim that particularly in the age of media wars »Western diplomacy has become sophisticated in packaging public information in a visually astute fashion, and television networks, which often operate in a symbiotic relationship with authorities, tend to conform the geo-political agendas set by powerful governments« (Thussu, 2000: 5).

All in all, contemporary diplomacy as such actually is public diplomacy, defined as »as the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government's foreign policy decision.« (Signitzer and Coombs, 1992: 138) However, roles are not completely interchangeable between contemporary diplomacy and media, each of the professions, diplomatic and journalistic remains delivering its basic functions, where they often intersect within the field of communication as described. As some scholars stress, superficial daily news and media accounts cannot compensate for in-depth diplomatic reports, richer in information, sources, analysis and recommendations (Vukadinović, 1994: 248-249). Also, public diplomacy is not merely a technique of state promotion, its basic content and quality is formulated and implemented foreign policy, which cannot be merely compensated by means of public relations, advertising and branding. The most important roles are still played by credible and competent foreign affairs speakers who are involved with the policy decision-making process (Plavšak, 2002: 114).

(Public) diplomacy as a system and a practice, today persists in its main international communication role, though, enduring a/n r/evolutional shift. As shown, within the new paradigm of world politics, in particular by means of the global reach of modern technologies and media images, international relations now flow above, below, around, through and in spite of diplomacy and the modern diplomatic system no longer is the master institution of international society. However, diplomacy still remains its central practice: »The less obvious or natural the identities of the agents appear and the thinner the social context in which they

operate, the more diplomacy is needed.« (Sharp, 1999: 50) Diplomats nowadays have to take on roles of agenda setters, issue raisers, coalition builders, regime or order builders, and catalysts of collective action. Contemporary diplomacy communicates with multiplicity of actors in international relations, including media, adapting to new functional modes, as »network diplomacy« (Livingston, 2002); it catalyses, translates and moderates between various actors and issues as »catalystistic diplomacy« (Hocking, 2002); and strives to add value in its outputs, to analyse, interpret, offer synthesis, multifold scenarios and solutions, also in its media and public appearances (Cooper, 2002). Thus, understanding of diplomacy in today's world should go more in the direction of a public partnership in foreign policy, where state becomes merely a moderator and diplomacy represents an intermediary and alternative channel between regulation and self-regulation. In such a model, contemporary diplomat can be actually anyone who identifies with values of a particular state within the international community and with humane models of solving open questions of globalisation.

At this point one can observe, or at least predict further r/evolution, toward a contemporary »communicative« diplomacy where communicative power, i.e. the ability of competent and convincing communication in international and diplomatic relations, has become essential precondition and asset for any actor entering the world stage. This can be only realised through social re-construction, interaction and communicative action - through so-called diplomatic communicative interaction which is characterised by behaviour oriented towards mutual understanding, where perceptions of reality, interests, preferences, and desirable behaviour are subjected to a collective process of interpretation guided by argumentative rationality and the claim of validity (Lose, 2001: 188-190; Risse, 2000). Crucial for understanding such a communicative approach to power is a specific concept of practices that includes not only interactive attempts, but also people's emotional involvement to political rites, routines, and discourses (Guzzini, 1993: 465). Within such an understanding, traditional concepts and perceptions of small states and their potentials in world politics can be completely repositioned and reframed. This simply means that any actor in international and diplomatic relations is as big and as influential as it is communicated, presented, perceived and agreed to be by the others. Or put in terms of open market competition: »Brand states still 'make war' (and are themselves 'made' - i.e. shaped and constructed - by 'war'), but here in a non-violent contest for market-share and visibility.« (Ham, 2002: 265). Here, Slovenia as a small, new, EU member serves as a case study of what public diplomacy in its communicative (branding) potential can or cannot do.

SLOVENIA: BRAND OF A SUCCESS STORY

Slovenia declaring its independence from Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, started off as »a nation without an image and known identity« (Serajnik, 1998: 687) or vaguely as a country »on the sunny side of the Alps«. Thus, today it is widely recognised as a stable, prospective country in the Central Europe, proved to be able to take on a model role of »an exporter of stability« to the region, a mediator and »an honest broker« in international community. The pictures and the words of the former US President Clinton during his visit to Slovenia on 21 June 1999 bear historic importance of communicating Slovenia's role in the world: »We must build a Europe with no frontline states - a Europe undivided, democratic, and at peace for the first time in history. And Slovenia can lead the way.« The international media report on the first summit meeting between US and Russian Presidents, Bush and Putin, taking place at the castle Brdo near the Slovene capitol Ljubljana in June 2001, only added to visibility and prominence of such an image.

While riding the wave of favourable international developments and coincidences, Slovene representatives also have made consistent, intensive efforts to make Slovenia's competent voice heard within the international community. Slovene diplomacy made an excellent use of its smallness and unproblematic position in particular as a non-permanent member the UN Security Council in years 1998-1999, at some crucial moments even in a presiding role, with all the international media attention (Jazbec, 2001). It has been further building on its »brand« of a regional leader also within other multilateral organisations (presiding over CEFTA in 2003, the Central European Initiative-CEI in 2004; the OSCE in 2005). At the moment Slovene decision makers are also aware of the importance of communication within the framework of the European Union, its common policies and the new European diplomacy. It is repeatedly stressed that, »as a small state we must build our recognition on grounds such as image of a trust-worthy partner, being constructive, principled and efficient. We can only succeed by means of expertise and professional approach, motivated and highly educated people.« (Rupel, 2003a)

After having accomplished a multifold, systemic shift like other East-Central European diplomacies - from previous socialist / federal systems to independent, internationally recognised and also multilaterally active diplomacies, Slovene diplomacy is facing yet another challenge with the accession to the European Union. Slovenia has indeed achieved a crucial breakthrough with the EU membership, however, therewith it has outsourced its main foreign policy aims, leading its identity (also its image and brand) formation for the past decade. This process has been specific and even controversy in the definition and relation to the signifi-

cant other - toward Europe / the European Union and the Balkans / Yugoslavia. Thus, one presented European identity as lying at the heart of Slovene national history and Slovenes always considering themselves as a European nation (with a leitmotiv »Slovenia. Home in Europe«). On one hand, the European identity became the desirable development model and main aim of Slovene sovereignty, on the other, the former Yugoslav federation represented the contra-identity, contributing to a large extent to the strengthening of the new Slovene identity. However, also the construction of European identity becomes a nationally and personally internalised process and at this stage of self-consciousness or even self-confidence Slovenes take an active position toward the important other, either the imperfect European Union or the unstable Balkans (Plavšak, 2001; also in Hansen, 1996). These socio-psychological developments reflect in several current, parallel attempts to question, rethink, reformulate and even to re-brand the very core of the Slovene identity. In search for a modern, recognisable and inventive Slovene image or even a positive, likable stereotype to be efficiently and convincingly communicate externally, new Slovene state symbols (flag, heraldry) were chosen through a concourse in October 2003. At the same time a major initiative for a new creative and communication action, branding Slovenia abroad, in particular as in Europe, has been launched by the Slovene Tourism Board (with one of the proposed new slogan: »«Slovenia - Eden of Europe«). In the same month, President of the Republic Janez Drnovšek brought together around 50 relevant speakers, representatives and experts from state institutions, academia, private sector, NGOs and media to discuss on »Active and recognisable Slovenia in the world« and to build a platform (i.e. network) for further debate on Slovenia's future.

Here, one of the conclusions was that public diplomacy should be included among the priorities of the future Slovene foreign policy, with no further explanations or recommendations at this point. The formulation follows the basic definition of public diplomacy, not yet taking into account all implications for contemporary diplomacy: »It is necessary to strategically plan and carry out a foreign policy of relations with foreign publics in order to improve the image and recognisability of Slovenia, of Slovene companies, of our values and potentials as well as of individual state and civil society initiatives in the international environment.« (Drnovsek, 2003) Still, it seems that Slovene foreign minister intuitively is aware of Slovenia's potential in contemporary world politics, mentioning the soft powers of Slovene cultural, civilisation and economic achievements that exceed its actual size (Rupel, 2001). He also pointed to the importance of culture and international cultural cooperation, thus, warned of the unsolved, crucial question of national language promotion within the EU. His psychoanalysis of the country was indeed significant: »In last decade Slovenia has achieved a lot; we have many achievements, however, they have been more or less introverted, self-protective.

Slovenia has fought for ourselves, for our own benefits; first for the existence, then for a respectable position within international relations.« (Rupel, 2003b)

TOWARD A NEW CREATIVE EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

In this respect, how can then Slovenia become even more »powerful« as a new EU Member State? I suggest to take into account some parameters within the outreach of public diplomacy, which can potentially affect the future, renewed Slovene brand in Europe and elsewhere abroad.

1. With the increasing dynamics of processes in the international environment, it is most essential to understand the ongoing changes in time, to be able to adequately react and to adapt to them. Therefore, holistic projections of middle- and long-term developments in the international relations, in particular within the European Union, are top priority for a foreign ministry. Slovene diplomacy should base its activities primarily on value-added analytical work, where beside expertise and specialisation also a skilled use of information access and material provided by new technologies and media, is essential to remain in track. This backup will equip Slovene diplomats with professional confidence to strive toward a non-stop, active, inventive and cooperative presence in the multilateral fora (the UN; the EU; the OSCE). Here, Slovene diplomacy should communicatively act with a creative ambiguity, as expressed by Slovene former long-time ambassador to the United Nations and nowadays the UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, dr. Danilo Türk (2003).

Also at the level of the European Union, in particular when knowing the developments within CFSP framework, Slovenia as a new Member states can take advantage of the potential shortcuts in communication. A study on concrete »emanations« of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy within the UN (Plavšak, 1996) showed that large credit for a successful policy implementation actually goes to every day communication, regular contacts, informal consultations, and coordination at lower levels and »in the field«, among the diplomats of the EU Member States at the embassies abroad whereby diverse actors within the EU constantly interact, parallel to regular institutional channels.

2. Slovenia should fully grasp on potentials of contemporary public diplomacy, mechanisms and techniques of 'imagination', i.e. media representation, image-making, branding. Slovene diplomacy should work toward being more transparent, inclusive and communicative - it should build networks on all levels to include all relevant actors and provide for a synergy of diverse efforts in the field of public diplomacy and international public relations.

Special attention should be devoted to media related work: work of Slovene diplomats to a great extent relies on international media reporting, and the international media in turn, can importantly strengthened Slovene foreign policy positions if dramaturgically well in time and place (as to the newsworthiness criteria). Here one observes that Slovene foreign policy actors tend to often use the domestic media as a communication channel and also, a testing variable, while Slovene media seem to be increasingly interested to perform as official representatives (and defenders) of Slovene national interests. Still, communication and messages by Slovene diplomats and foreign policy actors should be based on thorough analysis and well thought foreign policy formulations, on one side, and any foreign policy decision should take into account also public opinion and communication aspects.

For such changes within the diplomatic practices, some organisational, structural, creative support is most needed. The following adaptations and re-organisations within and among relevant institutions should be a priority:

- establishment of public diplomacy unit at the Slovene foreign ministry or at the Office of the Prime Minister with a high-ranking official responsible for overall planning and coordination of public diplomacy activities;
- expansion, re-organisation and coordination of public diplomacy activities in other government institutions (office of media and information, spokesperson's office, ministries and offices involved with promotion abroad - of culture, of economy, of tourism etc.);
- active involvement of media and public relations professionals, branding experts with the public diplomacy activities, also by employment and rotation in their job positions at the Foreign Ministry and the Slovene embassies abroad;
- cooperation and coordination with relevant outside institutions, involved with public diplomacy activities (Chamber of Commerce, Slovene Tourism Board, public relations and marketing agencies; NGOs, cultural and academic institutions, media);
- expansion of common research and policy oriented projects in the field of public diplomacy, potentially resulting in the establishment of a new independent (non-governmental, non-profit) organisation (think-tank) for such purposes.

However, proper education and training of modern diplomats for the communication and media age remains at the core of any public diplomacy efforts in Slovenia. Courses on public diplomacy with workshops on media and public relations should be introduced not merely for students of international relations, but primarily for serving diplomats at the foreign ministries and embassies abroad, as well as for all other interested actors involved with public

diplomacy. This could be followed up with relevant, tailor-made courses like communication and lobbying within the European Union, marketing communication and branding for states, creative, visual workshops etc. These could be expanded to more comprehensive training programmes in different aspects of public diplomacy at diplomatic academies, institutes and other (independent) organisations, as already functioning in Western Europe.

3. Last but not least, only a clear and comprehensive definition of Slovene national interests, aims and values provides stable grounds for systematic and efficient communication, represented and implemented by the state actors and the citizens themselves. The ideal of image making and branding is to be realised at high levels of identification and of active involvement.

Here, one should first pose the basic questions of how do we see ourselves within the European Union, what image we (want to) project abroad, what is contemporary Slovene identity as to the European identity. Answering to these is problematic in particular when looking into some survey results showing explicit mono-cultural, non-tolerant, xenophobic patterns in Slovenia, which are incompatible with plurality of ethnic and language communities, life styles and cultural practices within Europe. So far, Slovenes have based their perceptions of the »other« mostly on their monoculture experiences, fears and frustrations of a small, young nation, past history and migration from ex-Yugoslavia. Still, the future lies with the young population, which is characterised by new understanding of freedom, by individual life styles, by flexibility and openness to multicultural flows and dialogue etc. (Ule, 2003). If they are to be the future diplomats of Slovenia, their creativity as a particular lifestyle most certainly represents a distinct trait of contemporary Slovene identity and can work efficiently, if not contagiously within the new European home.

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***THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PLURALISM IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA BASED ON THE DAYTON PEACE
AGREEMENT***

In November 1995, a peace agreement was reached in the American town of Dayton which stopped the four-year war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war started in April 1992 when Sarajevo was under siege and shelled by Karadžić's Serbian forces aided by the Yugoslav national army after the citizen's referendum was carried out on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and after the state was internationally recognised.

Many perceived the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an interethnic conflict between the three autochthon nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. However, the war incorporated the elements of classical aggression by the Belgrade (Milošević) regime which wanted to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from achieving national independence so that it would remain a part of rump Yugoslavia, i.e. Milošević's »Great Serbia« (that is why Milošević did not recognise the AVNOJ republic borders in the Yugoslav socialist federation). To realise this goal the Serbian forces occupied 70% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina by mid-1993 and carried out ethnic cleansing of non-Serb inhabitants from Eastern Bosnia, Posavina, Bosanska Krajina and Eastern Herzegovina. 2.000.000 inhabitants were removed from their homes or places of living of all together 4.400.000 inhabitants according to the 1991 pre-war census. This course of war showed a clear tendency to exterminate the Bosniak nation as the most numerous of the three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such announcement was made in October 1991 in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Karadžić who was then president of the Serbian Democratic Party. The war could only be stopped with the interference of the international community. The announcement of a peaceful solution was made in 1995 under the American guidance lead by

Richard Holbrooke who took the initiative on behalf of the USA to find a peaceful political solution. After NATO strikes on Karadžić's forces in Summer 1995 the conditions were established for the peace negotiations in Dayton.

What did the Dayton Peace Agreement actually enable? The Dayton Peace Agreement is marked as the general framework peace agreement between the conflicting parties. The Agreement contains four main segments:

- the war segment
- the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (as Annex IV)
- the segment on the return of refugees (Annex VII)
- the segment on the establishment of democracy and democratic institutions in the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There are several important implications which the Dayton Peace Agreement enabled:

- The four-year war was ended
- The integrity and international legal status of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina are preserved
- The Constitution was adopted as the constituent part of the Dayton Peace Agreement which serves as the basis for the internal organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the state with two entities and with central institutions
- The protection of human rights was established according to international standards
- International guarantees were provided for the return of refugees
- The implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement is based on the principle of the involvement of the international community forces, both military and civil ones. The military forces are the NATO forces and the civil forces are represented by the High Representative of the International Community who is at the same time the supreme authority for the interpretation and implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Regarding the question what the Dayton Peace Agreement brought to Bosnia and Herzegovina, two predominant opinions appear in the theoretical and other discussions. The first argues that the Dayton Peace Agreement resolved the issue of the war by stopping it and that it created the basis on which Bosnia and Herzegovina can restore internal integration, build democratic institutions, strengthen peace and join the Euro-Atlantic integrations.

The second argues that the Agreement divided Bosnia and Herzegovina on ethnic basis since the ethnic principle became dominant in the internal organisation and functioning of the state. Bosnia and Herzegovina therefore became a nonfunctional and expensive state (Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state with 13 parliaments and

governments: 10 cantonal, two entity and one of the state). Two thirds of GDP are allocated for public expenses - the administration.

The discussion about the above two polarised opinions gave rise to the idea of upgrading the Dayton Peace Agreement in order to provide the basis for establishment of a functional organisation of the state as in the EU Member States. However, this idea is still far from a consensus both in the international community and in the political sphere of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE POST-DAYTON PERIOD AND THE RESULTS OF THE 2002 ELECTIONS

The Dayton Peace Agreement was the framework for the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-war period. During the past eight years Bosnia and Herzegovina distanced itself from the war's reality but it has still not found the answers to the major questions of economic and social development.

During the first post-Dayton years, the basic issues related to the life and security of the citizens were dealt with. Those issues were the freedom of movement and the reconstruction of infrastructure. Bridges, water supply, schools, hospitals, electricity supply network, telephone network and transport were reconstructed. The donations of the international community were certain and substantial. Bosnia and Herzegovina received \$ 5 billion of donations from the international community. Most of the funds were invested in the infrastructure and the reconstruction of the settlements for the returned refugees. However, no investments were made in the reconstruction of the economy. The investments were not possible without prior privatisation of the state property and state companies (privatisation started in 1997 and has not been completed yet). The process of privatisation is very slow. Even after several years of the process, major companies such as Energoinvest, Krivaja, Sodaso and Hidrigradja have still not been privatised. According to the estimations of economists, Bosnia and Herzegovina will achieve its pre-war level of production only in 2010. Unemployment is the most burning social and development issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rate of unemployment is 40% (in comparison with Slovenia where the rate of unemployment is 13%).

The issue which essentially affects the political development in the post-Dayton period is the issue of the return of refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war places of living. The return of refugees at the same time represents the reconstruction of the pre-war multiethnic structure of society in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the establishment of European and international standards for the protec-

tion of human rights. If the refugees and displaced persons have the right to return their property and if there is security and economic basis for the reconstruction of living conditions, it is the sign that the rule of law and the protection of citizen rights are respected.

The idea of the return of refugees had been obstructed by the leading political structures until the High Representative introduced special property provisions in 1998 which protect the right of the citizens to return their property: apartments, houses, land, business premises.

During the first post-war years the return of refugees represented a political instrument for three leading national parties: SDS (Serbian Democratic Party), HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) and SDA (Party of Democratic Action). An ethnic note has been attributed to the return of refugees. In the Republic of Srpska, the SDS discouraged the Serbs from returning to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the same time prevented the Bosniaks and the Croats from returning to the territory of the Republic of Srpska. The HDZ discouraged the Croats from returning to the Republic of Srpska and to towns in central Bosnia. In the Neretva valley, settlements called »Šušкова sela« were built for the Croats. The SDA advocated ethnic reciprocity and agreed to the return of the Serbs to Sarajevo, Tuzla and other towns in the number at which the Bosniaks were able to return to Banjaluka, Foča, Zvornik and Višegrad. The international community has gradually reduced the donations, especially since 2000, when its attention was redirected towards Kosovo.

According to available information, 900.000 refugees returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1996 to 2003. Most refugees returned to the areas where the ethnic population to which they belong represents the majority. During the same period, 100.000 citizens of Serbian nationality returned to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and more than 100.000 Bosniaks and 10.000 Croats returned to the Republic of Srpska. This figures are still of merely symbolic value in relation to the real reconstruction of the pre-war ethnic structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, there are several other issues related to refugees. Firstly, several hundred thousands citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (about 700.000) applied for the citizenship of the state where they were living as refugees.

Secondly, the returned refugees have no economic basis for survival, especially not in towns. The property is therefore being sold and a new wave of emigration of young people to the European and overseas countries has started. According to the estimations about 150.000 young people with finished education emigrated from Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1996 to 2003.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DURING THE POST-DAYTON PERIOD IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COMPRISES SEVERAL CHARACTERISTICS

The international community paid most attention to the organisation and realisation of the elections of public authorities. The first post-war elections were carried out in 1996 and the majority in the parliaments was won by the ethnic single-national SDS, HDZ and SDA parties. Those parties could not reach a consensus on any important issues in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The decisions on the coat-of-arms, the flag, the bank note and car plates were made by the OHR - High Representative of the International Community.

The 1998 elections brought no changes: the national parties were still predominant. Only the 2000 elections brought a change in the political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties of the democratic changes led by the largest opposition force, the Social Democratic Party, formed the Alliance for Change and on the basis of majority formed the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Council of Ministers in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Alliance was in power for two years. During that period, three projects of immense importance for the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina were realised:

- accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of Europe was achieved
- State Border Service was formed to control the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- discrimination on ethnic basis was abolished with the adoption of the constitutional amendment on the constitutiveness of the nation for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska
- parallelism was achieved in the exercising of power by SDA and HDZ.

However, the Alliance did not succeed in carrying out the economic reform which the citizens expected. It failed to stop the growth of unemployment. It failed to create the environment for foreign investments. It did not carry out the privatisation of large companies. It failed to stop the corruption. This further disappointed the voting body, especially the youth. At the elections in October 2002, the voting body (the citizens) in a way punished the Alliance for Change by failing to appear at the elections. Only 53% of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina took part at the elections. They further punished the Alliance by giving their votes to the national parties. The most votes were given to SDS in the Republic of Srpska and to SDA and HDZ in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This reflected

in a way the situation from 1990 and 1996 when the elections for the seats in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina were won by three national parties: HDZ, SDS and SDA. At the 2002 elections, the candidates of national parties were elected as members of the Presidency: SDA – Sulejman Tihić; SDS – Mirko Šarović; HDZ – Dragan Čović (Šarović was replaced by Borislav Paravac from the Serbian Democratic Party in 2003 by the decision of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The majority in the entity parliaments and the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed consensually by three ethnic parties: SDS, HDZ and SDA. In the formation of the parliamentary majority after the 2002 elections, the Party of Democratic Action was joined by the Party for BiH and the Serbian Democratic Party was joined by the Party of Democratic Progress.

58 parties took part at the 2002 elections. The structure of elected deputies to the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows: There are all together 14 parties with candidates elected to the Parliamentary Assembly (Table IV). The most (10) seats were won by the Party of Democratic Action. 10. The Party for BiH is at the second place with 6 seats. The Serbian Democratic Party and Croatian Democratic Union have 5 seats each, the Social Democratic Party has 4 seats and the Independent Social Democrats of the Republic of Srpska have 3 seats. The Party of Democratic Progress has 2 deputies and 7 minor parties have one seat each in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTY PLURALISM IN THE POST-DAYTON PERIOD OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In order to understand the main features of political pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period after the Dayton Peace Agreement it is necessary to look back at the time when political pluralism was introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The single-party system was abolished in 1990 when political parties were formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina which were to take part in the first multi-party elections held in November 1990. In contrast to the other former Yugoslav republics where the parties were formed on the basis of ideological and political criteria as the right-, central- and left-wing parties, two blocks of political parties were formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The first block comprised the national, i.e. single-ethnic parties: the Party of Democratic Action, the Serbian Democratic Party and the Croatian Democratic Union. These were new parties without any encumbrances from the past. They showed more characteristics of movements than of parties. The structure of membership was based exclusively on the citizens' nationality.

The second block comprised the non-national parties. They had one common

characteristic: they were citizen's parties. Their membership and expression of interest was based on a free citizen, therefore on citizens of all national groups. Citizen orientation and multinational composition were the main characteristics of the citizens' parties block. Another but not primary characteristic of these parties was their ideological and political adherence to the right, central and left wing. Since 1990 this group has included the Social Democratic Party, the Party of Reformers, the Democratic Party of Socialists, the Liberal Party, the Muslim Bosniak Organisation, the Citizen Democratic Party and other parties. These parties were totally defeated at the first multi-party elections in 1990 when over 80% of votes were given to the single-national HDZ, SDA and SDA parties. In December 1990 the three parties with absolute majority formed the government and the structure of power. In this way in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the population throughout the territory is ethnically mixed, political pluralism with an ethnic note was legally established (through free elections). Political adherence coincided with national adherence. Since then ethnic political pluralism started to develop in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which led to political opposition and conflicts of ethnic parties in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The coalition union of the three national parties, though not confirmed and signed through an agreement, started to disintegrate already during the first year of its power. That was the year 1991 which was marked as the historical turning point for the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the dissolution process of SFRY. In that year, decisions were made by the two opposing political options on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina while the Yugoslav socialist federation was dissolving. On one side there were political forces which favoured the option of the independent political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the realisation of citizens' referendum regarding this option. This group of political forces included SDA, HDZ and all citizen parties. The second option was represented by political parties which opposed the independent development of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Karadžić's SDA and Drašković's Serbian Movement for Renewal. The latter wanted to retain Bosnia and Herzegovina in rump (Milošević's) Yugoslavia, which was only a mask for the idea of the »Great Serbia«. The one-year union of the three ethnic parties disintegrated when it came to the issue of the status of the state or the independent development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The coalition of the three ethnic parties dissolved at the beginning of 1992 when the citizens decided in a referendum in favour of independent and internationally recognised state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian democratic party resigned from the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and started with political and military activities at Pale near Sarajevo. With its resignation from the structure of common state power of Bosnia and Herzegovina, SDA actually decided for the use of force in order to achieve its political goals which

were to join the whole or most of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia and Monte Negro. This political context led to aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the four-year war.

Why is the beginning of the war marked as aggression? Mainly because one party (SDS), backed with the Belgrade regime, used weapons and the forces of former JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) to occupy 70% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina by June 1992.

The period after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (i.e. since 1996) in a way reflects the pre-war structure of political pluralism. Three ethnic parties won the first post-war elections in 1996. The elections for members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina were won by the candidates of ethnic parties: SDA – Alija Izetbegović, SDS – Momčilo Krajišnik and HDZ – Krešimir Zubak. These parties won the majority in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the parliaments of the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their term of office was marked with constant dissent of the three parties regarding any issue related to the social, economic and political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The real transition was exercised only in so far as it was subject of international community engagement. The meetings of elected state bodies were held in the National Museum («Zemaljski muzej»). The SDS representatives refused to come to the centre of Sarajevo and to stay at the premises of the Presidency and the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Only at the second post-Dayton elections in 1998, new parties were formed emerging from the dissatisfaction with the national parties. A group of activists separated from the SDA and formed the Party for BiH led by Haris Silajdžić. Another group of activists separated from the HDZ and formed a new party called the Independent Croatian Initiative led by Krešimir Zubak. Biljana Plavšić separated from the SDS and with a group of followers formed the Serbian National Union. Consequently, the political monopoly of the three ethnic parties started to weaken. The union of two social democratic parties - the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Social Democrats - along with the formation and development of the Party of Independent Social Democrats led by Milorad Dodik in the Republic of Srpska further contributed to this process.

This brought a new structure and direction of the development for political pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the 2000 elections, the new structure of party pluralism was confirmed by the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina when most confidence was placed in the citizens' parties. Led by the largest opposition party - the Social Democratic Party - the citizens' parties were united in the Alliance for Change to form the government in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and together with some parties from the Republic of Srpska established the majority in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and formed the Coun-

cil of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to competent analysts the Alliance for Change had sound projects for the European path in the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and sound project for economic reforms. It managed to fulfil the conditions for accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of Europe. However, it was not decisive enough regarding the projects for economic reforms. It failed to prevent radically the processes of increasing poverty, emigration of the youth, corruption etc. The Alliance was in power for only 2 years which was too short to realise the intended projects.

Under those circumstances, a change happened at the elections in October 2002. SDS, HDZ and SDA gained again the dominant position but not with absolute majority. Namely, the social and political scene of Bosnia and Herzegovina saw the return of the parties which had failed to reach a consensus during their power in the previous decade regarding all important issues of the development of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the High Representative of the International Community who took decisions in the Parliament instead of them.

During the first year (2003) of his term of office, High Representative Pedi Eshdaun adopted over 70 legislative and other documents. The main disagreement between the ethnic parties in 2003 was the issue of the new concept of united army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of the conditions for the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Partnership for Peace and NATO Alliance. This concept was stubbornly refused by the Serbian Democratic Party though it eventually agreed to it in December 2003 after pressure was exerted by the international community. Bosnia and Herzegovina thus fulfilled the conditions for joining Partnership for Peace and NATO Alliance.

When the Study on the feasibility of accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the stabilisation and association process was made in November 2003, High Representative Pedi Eshdaun expressed his concern that the leading structure of the ethnic parties may not introduce at the required pace the European standards required for the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union.

CONCLUSION

A. Dayton Peace Agreement and Bosnia and Herzegovina

- The Dayton Peace Agreement marked the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- The Dayton Peace Agreement established a new internal structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a dominant role of entities in the functioning of the state.
- The functioning of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the past eight

years of the post-Dayton period has shown the limitations of the Dayton Peace Agreement as regards the possibility for an efficient functioning of the state.

- The European path to political development of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina envisages:
 - the upgrading of the Dayton Peace Agreement, amendments of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, establishment of economic regions, transfer of competence of entities to the central bodies of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the fields of defence, security and jurisdiction (the new act on single army defence was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of December 2003);
 - accelerated process of introducing European standards in the economic and political sphere with the aid of international community in the framework of accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union. This path has prevented the great national projects for ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the instability in the region of Southeast Europe. The European Commission has received the Study on the feasibility of accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. This represents the beginning of the Brussels phase in the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its accession to the European Union and the conclusion of the process of the internationalisation of the Bosnian issue.

B. Characteristics of party pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-Dayton period

- A stable development of democracy in a society primarily depends on the capability of political parties to establish a consensus on the economic, social and cultural progress of the state.
- Pluralisation of the political sphere in Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out in 1990 contrary to the modern concept of political organisation in the countries of West Europe: the basis for party organisation was not the citizen but his nationality.
- Instead of forming political-interest parties of citizens in the form of right, left and central parties, the block of ethnic parties and the block of citizens' parties were formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead of political pluralism, ethnic pluralism was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina which in itself (territorialisation of powers of ethnic parties) generates unstable political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- During the past twelve years of party pluralism, ethnic parties won four out of five parliamentary elections. They hold a monopoly in the economy and the

media and are supported by the religious communities. They carry out the territorialisation of power.

The abolishment of ethnic democracy and the weakening of national parties which during the whole decade failed to offer a consensus on the national development of Bosnia and Herzegovina involves:

- modifications of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and abolition of the predominant ethnic basis in the internal structure of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (while the democratic forces in 2003 advocate a reform of political system and the adoption of a new constitution, Borislav Paravac, member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from SDS, responds with a notion of separation of the Republic of Srpska from the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
- providing more support from the international community to the block of citizens' parties and to their striving for internal integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions (in November 2003 a united block of opposition parties was formed composed of two parties from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: SDP and NHI and two parties from the Republic of Srpska: SNSD and SP). This was the first attempt for united action of opposition forces from the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with an adopted platform for programme co-operation.
- One of the constant problems of the development of political pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fragmented political sphere with 58 parties.





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
In.life d.d., telecommunication carrier

In.life is an alternative telecommunication service provider in Slovenia and other countries in the SEE region (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia). In.life Corporation has started in Slovenia. Slovenia is because of its historical, geopolitical and business position naturally a gateway between EU and SEE region. With the region's development and accelerating economic activity growing telecommunications trends/needs are emerging. New state-of-the-art technology offers the opportunity to quickly set-up the business infrastructure and to gain leading position as an alternative telecommunications provider (Next generation telco) in this region. The company In.life d.d. headquarter is registered in Slovenia, Ljubljana and has offices in Belgrade (SCG) and Sarajevo (BiH).

The principal activities of the company are the following: performance and sales/marketing of telecommunication services (voice and data) based on NG (Next generation IP network). In the period from 2000 to now days the company has put in operation, successfully upgraded and managed the system for VoIP, TDM and Internet. Currently In.life serves more than 1000 business users. Services which are offering are following:

- ❖ Call-by-call service in Slovenia
- ❖ VOIP calls - in Slovenia (088xxx number) and in some others SEE
- ❖ International IP-VPN
- ❖ Internet access
- ❖ Wholesale services for operators

In.life holds the first license for international telephony operator in Slovenia (the access code is 100 00). To this end In.life is operating an telecommunication network between the SEE countries ('autonomous system'), and is acting as local Internet Registry for a range of IP addresses. In.life is interconnected with many operators like Belgacom, Swisscom, Telia, Colt, MCA, ... either on CCS7 or IP level.





For Successful Economy of the Ljubljana Urban Region



*Lilijana Resinovič,
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Ljubljana Urban Region
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During the last year, the Regional Development Agency of the Ljubljana Urban Region and the its 25 municipalities have been developing a Regional Development Programme for the period after Slovenia has joined the EU. It is an extremely important document for an investor with a global view. It comprises several measures which will help us reach our goal of making the region a quality business and living environment. We believe that the economy of the region will develop fast and successfully only on condition that good business connections and fast and efficient communication with the world are available.

The Ljubljana Urban Region and her competitive advantages


The Ljubljana Urban Region comprises 25 municipalities and covers 12% of Slovenia. More than a quarter of the entire Slovene population live in the region. Our people are very well educated and highly skilled in modern high technological industries. A quarter of all jobs in Slovenia are in our region. GDP level per citizen is approximately 91% of EU average. Regional economy structure is similar to the average structure of well developed European cities with a prevailing service sector.

In comparison with other regions, both in Slovenia and abroad, the Ljubljana Urban Region has three competitive advantages (they are explained in

detail in the Regional Development Programme of the Ljubljana Urban Region, which you can find at www.molur.si):

- o The authenticity of the Slovene language and culture, as well as a great variety of Slovene dialects, as an example of European distinctiveness.
- o Cultural events and institutions known in both European and global contexts.
- o The most preserved ecological network.

It is a mountainous region with a network of rivers, wetlands, forests, cultural landscapes, towns and villages. The quality of the environment is such that drinking water is drawn directly from groundwater beneath the city. The region plays an important role in connecting Slovenia, internally and to other countries, since it lies at the crossroads of two main European transport corridors; no. 5 (Barcelona - Kiev) and no. 10 (Munich - Istanbul).



The role of the Regional Development Agency of the Ljubljana Urban Region

The Regional Development Agency of the Ljubljana Urban Region was founded in 2001 by municipality of Ljubljana.

We are an agency that supports economic, social and cultural activities in the municipalities of central Slovenia. The main aim of this support is to make the region a friendly and recognisable entity with common goals.

We support recognisable and high quality projects in the field of regional development and provide all the necessary information for their effective implementation into everyday life.

Our main activities are:

- Development of relationships between the public and private sector at local, regional, national and international levels in order to promote development initiatives and enhance coherent regional development.
- Acceleration of integrated regional development.
- Planning and implementation of regional and other development programmes.
- Acquisition of domestic and foreign financial support.

The basic task of our agency is to connect the 25 municipalities of the region into a harmonious whole. The fundamental idea as the basis of the region will be respect for each individual unit and the intertwining of mutual business and personal relationships. This will lead to a better quality of life for us here and now, as well as for future generations. In addition, the Agency represents a bridge to the European Union for all the municipalities in the region.

Projects directed to improve economic vitality and growth of the region

Our vision is to develop the Urban Region of Ljubljana as a conurbation or network of towns intertwined with nature, with a high quality of life. The region aims to achieve a high level of global competitiveness by fostering creativity and co-operation, and to meet the challenge of being a

European capital. To achieve this vision, the region needs to secure the high quality of its institutions, informal networks and especially its infrastructure. This will enable our people and businesses to be globally competitive and simultaneously enjoy a very high quality of life.

The Regional Development Plan consists of seventeen sub-programmes including 48 projects, ranging from the regional municipal infrastructure, international business zones and a network of bicycle routes, to internet support for the job market and forming clusters of enterprises and educational institutions. The largest project with major structural impact is the development of the regional public transport system, combining existing rail infrastructure and bus services with modern tramway technology, thereby enabling sustainable spatial, functional and social development of the region. By reinventing a public transport system which has lost ground in the past decade, the region hopes to avoid the urban sprawl, revitalize its town centres and avoid environmental problems connected with increasing car use.

The implementation of this programme will be the first steps of an old Central European region in the European Union. Its success will benefit the region itself and will contribute to the sustainable development of Europe as a whole.

Contact

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Strategic goals		Functioning conurbation Creative people and successful businesses Capital region with the highest quality of life in Europe	
Priorities	Estimated cost	Goals	Sub-programmes
1. Co-operation within the region	231.000	To put to use the "dormant" opportunities arising from co-operation within the region.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Strengthening regional institutions o Support to regional networks o Exchanges of experience and preparation of joint projects
2. Accessibility	161.000.000	To secure quality access to the services of the city, towns and the region for all sections of the population through connectivity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Sustainable mobility o Environmental infrastructure o User friendly internet content o Supply of services in support of quality of life
3. Effective education and training for creativity	4.000.000	To exploit the current gap between the capacity of human resources and their impact on generating added value.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Clustering education and research with business o Opening culture to youth o Lifelong learning
4. Opening to the world	540.000	To actively involve a European capital region in the process of European integration and open to the world for the region and the country.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Development of international networks o Internationally competitive business zones o Support to the international community in the region
5. Ecological and cultural network	4.500.000	To benefit from the quality of our environment, natural resources and cultural heritage as one of the key competitive advantages of the region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Preservation of cultural heritage o Effective physical planning o Nature conservation o Development of possibilities for recreation and sports

which is different our common human essence, our wishes and goals, our common interests, coexistence and cohabitation.

World peace must be built on sound foundations with efforts and acts which foster understanding and coexistence not only in multinational but also in predominantly single-national regions and cities. The tasks of regional and local authorities as well as of the civil society, educational, scientific and cultural establishments are just as important as the work of statesmen and major international institutions.

Joint and integrated action at all levels gives us courage that we will eventually manage to step out of this vicious circle in which violence is answered by violence.

We are proud that Ljubljana has been the hospitable home and seat of the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) – the institution which contributes with its research, analytic and information activities to better understanding of events in the most critical regions of the south-east Europe, the Middle-East and the Persian Gulf.

With profound researches of political, economic and military issues, religious and interethnic relations and critical analyses of democratisation processes in those and other regions, IFIMES presents the reasons and roots of disagreements and conflicts.

Knowledge and deeper understanding as well as the possibilities and guidelines for resolving conflicts enable us to efficiently take part at home and in the world in joint efforts for peace and democratisation.

The activities of institutions such as IFIMES contribute to the awareness of the importance of human rights, to the implementation of values of equality, justness and understanding, to tolerance in resolving conflicts and to active co-operation of individuals and the community in striving for a safe and friendly world for all of us.

We wish you a lot of success in your future work.

Mayor of Ljubljana
Danica Simšič

