



IFIMES

**SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS**

Milan Jazbec

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THE WESTERN BALKANS**

MILAN JAZBEC

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LJUBLJANA, 2007

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SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

- The Experience of a Small State and Its Diplomat -

A Selection of Papers
(2000 - 2006)

Milan Jazbec

IFIMES
The International Institute for Middle East and Balkans Studies

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From the Same Author:

Konzularni odnosi
(*Consular Relations*)

1997, Ljubljana: FDV www.fdv.zalozba.si

Diplomacija in Slovenci (ur.)
(*Diplomacy and the Slovenes /ed./*)

1998, Celovec: Založba Drava www.drava.at

Slovenec v Beogradu
(*A Slovene in Belgrad – a collection of essays*)
1999, Pohanca: self published, first edition

*The Diplomacies of New Small States: The Case of Slovenia with some
comparison from the Baltics*

2001, Aldershot: Ashgate www.ashgate.com

Diplomacija in varnost
(*Diplomacy and Security*)

2002, Ljubljana: Vitrum

Mavrica izza duše
(*The Rainbow Beyond the Soul – novel on diplomacy, first part of the trilogy*)
2006, Gorjuša: Miš www.zalozbamish.com

Ein Slowene in Belgrad
(*A Slovene in Belgrad – translation in German*)
2006, Celovec: Mohorjeva založba www.hermagoras.at

Slovenec v Beogradu
(*A Slovene in Belgrad*)
2006, Pohanca: self published, second edition

Vojaška in obrambna diplomacija
(*Military and Defense Diplomacy*)
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Forewords

The Western Balkans: A View From Overseas

Dr. Milan Jazbec has produced an outstanding work that should stand as a pillar of scholarly and analytical study, adding substantially to our understanding of recent developments in Southeastern Europe. It should also stand as a beacon for our future policies there.

The perspective of the author is that of a government official and diplomat from what Jazbec himself calls “a small country” in the region. But the scope of the book is breathtaking, since it encompasses some of the most sweeping changes emanating from Eastern Europe in the 1990s and analyses international activity in this regard since that time.

More to the point, Jazbec focuses on how “a small country” – his country, Slovenia – has made a considerable contribution to the positive forward movement of these developments. As a participant himself in the process, Jazbec provides up-close first-hand accounts of how the Slovenians confronted these changes and what they did to assist the international community to deal with them.

Milan Jazbec refers to a new “security matrix” in Europe, and, against this background, he traces the emergence of 22 new states from the dissolutions of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. He highlights the past activities and the future capabilities of multilateral associations, such as OSCE, NATO, the EU and others. And, an entire section of the book on “The Western Balkans” gives detailed and thoroughly researched analysis of each of the Southeast European states.

Through all of this, one gains the impression that we are indeed standing at a crossroad concerning Southeastern Europe. With the appropriate engagement of states in the region plus international associations plus significant outside powers, like the United States, we should be able to guide this region into full integration with the Euro-Atlantic community.

In fact, the continued engagement of the United States in South-

eastern Europe would seem to be a key, without which the very phrase “Euro-Atlantic” would lose all meaning. The traditional relationship between the U.S. and Europe was indeed a formidable basis for taking decisive action in this region when it was needed. It will presumably continue to be the foundation of our policy-making in the future.

But we will only succeed in this if we resist the temptation of complacency and understand that negative forces can be very powerful. We will also only succeed if we move forward with full respect for the talents and capabilities of the peoples of this region themselves. The international community can assist, but it cannot impose solutions.

Though Dayton gave us an armistice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, it never provided a basis for a fully functioning state. And, though NATO actions in several places in the region provided a security umbrella allowing democracy to emerge, that does not take the place of regional homeland defense.

The future of Southeastern Europe lies in the hands of the states and the peoples of Southeastern Europe.

This monumental work by Milan Jazbec provides a vision from the perspective of a successful state in the region, a vision that all of us can gainfully study and implement.

Victor Jackovich
President, Jackovich International
U.S. Ambassador (ret.)

The Western Balkans: An EU Challenge

The book “Security and Diplomacy in the Western Balkans” is the result of many years of work and research by our Institute’s very respected and distinguished member, dr. Milan Jazbec. We are particularly delighted that the suggestion and initiative for publishing this book came from several world famous European and American professors, experts who deal with regional and global security.

The dilemma that faces us is whether to Europeanize the Western Balkans, or let it them become a ghetto. There are less than few choices. If we allow it to become a ghetto, we will continue to threaten the EU and the Balkans, but if we Europeanize and include the Western Balkans in the EU, both the Western Balkans and the EU would gain from this.

There cannot be any second thoughts about the region discussed. The Western Balkans are Europe, and will soon become integral part of the EU, thanks to the thought-out and visionary actions of brave men who have created the foundations of the modern EU and thereby created the opportunity that Europe will never again be the Europe of war, but a Europe of peace, co-operation, and co-existence. Some states in the Western Balkans have become full members of NATO, while others joined the Partnership for Peace and are steadily moving closer to full membership. If we desire peace and stability in the Western Balkans, the EU and NATO are the solution. There is, for now, no other way.

In this book, we are witness to thorough and very interesting reading that, aside from aspects of security and reform of armed forces in the Western Balkans, offers the reader the evolution of the security process in Europe and Slovenia, the role and importance of several international organizations, such as the OSCE and NATO, and finally the role, importance, and co-operation of the UN, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE for ensuring world peace and stability.

The Berlin Wall is gone, and so are internal borders in the EU. The EU is in a process of enlargement. That is why we must all strive towards defeating the physical borders and the borders in

our heads that separate the Western Balkans from the EU. Let us lend a hand to the Western Balkans, so that it may become an integral and indivisible part of the EU and NATO. This will be a victory for everyone.

We hope that dr. Jazbec's book will contribute to the understanding of the Western Balkans, and thereby do its part in the process of bringing this region closer to the EU.

Zijad Bećirović, M.A.
Director of the International Institute IFIMES

Introduction

From 1989 to 2006 and Beyond

This book is a collection of papers of mine, which were not written with the intention to construct a comprehensive volume but rather to reflect security processes and diplomatic projects. They appeared partially as follow ups of my presentations at various international gatherings and partially as contributions for various publications. Their main ambition has been the theoretical contemplation of practical experiences of the author and Slovenia with the region presented and processes analyzed. Their main message is supposed to be an increased need to cooperate, exchange and go Euro Atlantic. These thirteen selected contributions, published in seven consecutive years, cover a time span of seventeen years. It begins with the End of the Cold War in the *Annus Mirabilis* and closes in 2006, the year during which the international community has been heavily engaged in the issue of Kosovo. All articles have been published in various publications in several countries, from the USA to Slovakia and from Finland to Croatia.

When I look back now I can say for sure that my writings and understanding of contemporary international relations, including security and diplomacy, has been inspired as well as shaped by the *impetus* which the Fall of the Berlin Wall brought to the understanding of the international relations, both in theory and practice. Therefore, it is obvious how the texts concerned show my engagement in contributing to understand the mentioned processes in the international community. Since I also try to reflect on them, the same message is repeated here and there in some of the texts. I find it useful, as this shows not only the way I understand processes and projects but also where Slovenia contributes to them. Because of this, I didn't feel any need to update or adapt the articles while publishing them in the book - they were left intact also for the reason that it is good sometimes to repeat certain messages and point them out in various forms to different audiences. This ambition could bring closer the under-

standing of the complexity of security processes in the wider European area, but also the potentials of the region concerned.

The journey from 1989 to 2006 and beyond, which follows, shows the evolution of diplomatic endeavor in the Western Balkans and also of the selected topics, security in particular. The region discussed has been a theatre of diplomatic efforts of various international players. This has resulted in institution building, cooperation of international organizations, in complementarity of security processes and in the theoretical promotion of lessons learned. From this point of view I am grateful for having had an opportunity to participate in the mentioned processes; this collection of papers is a small sign of a diplomat's effort, aimed at contributing to the development and understanding, as well as the promotion, of the region. This has been combined with presenting the Slovene contribution and experience within the discussed framework. Let public diplomacy work.

My gratitude goes to many colleagues and friends who have supported me during writing these contributions and in finalizing this book; their encouraging attitude has strengthened me decisively. My special thanks goes to IFIMES and to the authors of the Foreword and the Afterword, for their support, understanding and cooperation.

I dedicate the book to my son Luka and to his friends from the region. They have matured during the mentioned time span and the future is theirs.

Ljubljana / Pohanca, August 2007
M.J.

Part One
SECURITY

The Small New States in Europe After the Fall of the Berlin Wall and Their Diplomacies¹

The Changed International Environment

An analysis of the changes taking place in the international community on the wider European continent² after the fall of the Berlin Wall leads us to the conclusion that the form these changes took was the result of the simultaneous effects of powerful processes of integration and disintegration. The end of the Cold War, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall,³ can be compared to the Peace of Westphalia and the major turning point it represented. The extent of these changes is confirmed by: the huge territory involved (the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, the European part of the former Soviet Union and Transcaucasia), the large

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- 1 *This article was originally published in The Sarmatian Review, XX.3: September 2000. Houston: Rice University. www.rice.edu It was prepared upon the lecture, which the author delivered at Rice University, The Center for Central European Studies, Houston, in February 2000. Footnotes, or their parts, in italics are not part of the original texts; they were added later for informational purposes.*
 - 2 In a geopolitical sense Europe encompasses, in addition to usually included territory and states, those states that are geographically only partially or not at all located on the old continent, but undoubtedly have a political and general influence on what happens on it. According to Grizold (1998:96), two groups of states belong here: a) Russia, Turkey and the USA; and b) the successor states of the former Soviet Union in the area of Transcaucasia. For our purpose, the whole group b) and from group a) Russia are of particular interest.
 - 3 Let me add here some further illustrations of the fall of the Wall: "The social changes are deep, all-encompassing and ongoing" (Dimitrov, Hofkirchner, 1995:76). "We are witnessing a social transformation which is, in my judgement, historically comparable only with the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age, with the discovery of America in 1492, and with the change of the means of production that came with capitalism" (Bötcher, 1995:150). Cooper (1996:7) states that "1989 marked a break in European history. What has happened in 1989 went beyond the events in 1789, 1815 or 1919. These days, like 1989, stand for revolutions, break-up of empires and the re-ordering of spheres of influence. (...) Historically the right point of comparison is 1648, the end of the Thirty Year's War when the modern European state system emerged at the Peace of Westphalia." Feltham (1994:2) evaluates the effect of these changes similarly: "We are living through an avalanche of history, and it is no exaggeration to say that the world is entering a phase of change and uncertainty in its international relations unparalleled recorded history."

number of people (150-200 million), the short duration of time in which the changes took place (approximately three years), the large number of states involved (25-30), the exceptional social energy that was released and the massive political shifts which occurred. And even now, a decade later, all the consequences of this event have yet to be recognized, particularly those, which relate to European stability.

The culmination of the two processes was very noticeable in the first half of the nineties, when the phase of the appearance and international recognition of new, predominantly small states⁴ ended and the stage of these countries coming closer to and being accepted into the Euro-Atlantic international organisations began. In trying to establish where and when these processes culminate and converge, we need to emphasize that they are not yet complete. There are many signs of their continuing, although it seems at the moment that their intensity is declining.

The Nation State and the Small New States

At the heart of these changes is the nation state. Its traditional role, particularly in the 20th century, has changed considerably, which is why some theoreticians quite clearly talk about a reduction in its significance and even about its decline. The traditional attributes of its political activities are being altered and partly removed both by centres of international integration and the growing significance of the various forms of regional integration. Here we should point out that in the modern international community we could observe the simultaneous existence of three different historical types of nation state.

The pre-modern state as an institution did not have any of the characteristics of the nation state: its function, in addition to that of force, did not extend beyond the administrative-social frame

⁴ The former Czechoslovakia disintegrated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia; the following states succeeded the Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into the following new states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Macedonia and Slovenia. (in alphabetical order)

and the state as a notion did not yet exist in the consciousness of its population. This type of state dominated in the period leading up to the Peace of Westphalia, when the borders between states were, as a rule, still very unclear and unstable. The traditional or modern state was based on a defined territory, a constant population and a sovereign and exclusive authority, which did not allow any interference in its internal jurisdiction. The nation state flourished in the 18th and the 19th centuries, and it is in the latter when the basic characteristics and elements of the international community were established, in which the post-modern state could appear. Its existence has been recognizable for at least the last decade. In this period, the attributes of the traditional nation state, due to the effects of the international processes of integration and disintegration, have started to change considerably. The post-modern state is based on a conspicuous and voluntary co-operation, on emphasised participation in the integration process and on the openness of its internal jurisdiction, with an obvious acceptance of commonly agreed rules of conduct. (Cooper, 1996)

The appearance of a large number of new states once more actualized the question of the necessity of the nation state⁵ and its attributes. Among them diplomacy stands out: it has the role of projecting externally, i.e. to the elaborate network of the international community, the social complexity of the nation state and of promoting its readiness for and intention of co-operating with other subjects of international law. By pointing out the pronounced complexity, universality and interconnectedness as well as interdependence of the contemporary international community, we have found the basic frame of reference for the effects of the changes in the traditional role of the nation state. Thus it is very interesting to note a great number of new small states which, in an international community with these characteristics, demand international confirmation of their existence and identity, whilst at the same time expecting to be accepted into the numerous forms of European integration. The task of setting up and organizing their own diplomatic organizations therefore presents

5 Additionally to Cooper we could also mention Benko (1997), Grizold (1999), Horsman and Marshall (1994), Kennedy (1993) etc.

itself as very important, necessary and unavoidable.

Another problem relating to the study of the new small states is how to define them. Different theoreticians have used many approaches and they more or less all agree that different elements of a definition are applicable in different research methods, if a definition is necessary at all.⁶ Bearing in mind these theoretical attempts, my definition is based above all on size of territory and population (10,000 - 100,000 sq km and 1.5 - 15 million, respectively).⁷ But in studying the characteristics of the new small states we can again establish that a lack of resources (particularly human ones)⁸ appears as a basic feature, which has a significant influence on the setting up of diplomatic organizations

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- 6 In the literature on small states there is general agreement that there is no satisfactory and acceptable definition of small states. Amstrup observes that "research on small states in the international system has been hampered by the problem of a definition of its own subject matter, the 'small state', and a substantial part of the literature is concerned with this problem. Nevertheless, no satisfactory definition has been presented" (1976:165). Christmas-Møller says that nobody doubts the existence of small states, "but the problem was to identify the phenomenon as a separate category distinct from neighboring categories, because the social world is not organized in distinct groups but on a continuum, with transition from one category to the next." (1983:40) In a similar way, Sieber adds that "the absence of a terminological clarity and theoretical coherence /is/ also a characteristic of small states studies. In particular, the problem of defining a 'small state' has not yet been solved." (1983:108)
- 7 Vital (1967) uses the criterion of 10-15 million inhabitants for economically developed small states and 20-30 million inhabitants for underdeveloped; Barston (1973) uses 10-15 million; Clarke and Payne (1987) use a considerably lower threshold - a population of 1 million or less, similarly Bray and Packer (1993) use 1.5 million; Senjur (1993) talks of a population of 1-10 million and a territory of 10,000 - 100,000km²; Stanič (1990) up to 10 million and up to 100,000km²; Kindley (1995:143, note 2) up to 16 million; Kramer (1994) 15 million. Checchio and Chlarson (1997:5) conclude that in all the literature by authors from the EU, population size is a widely used criterion for the division of the member states into large and small (Calingärt, 1996; Nugent, 1994; Sbragia, 1992; Westlake, 1995).
- 8 We could also use the following wording: Looking at various sources and authors, a common characteristic becomes obvious: small states have distinctly limited resources in every possible area. Bray and Packer use the term "pool" for this ("...small states have much more limited pools from which to recruit the personnel they need." - 1993:234). The same expression is used also by Papadakis and Starr ("...most small states are characterized by a limited pool of human and material resources..." - 1987:423), as well as Streeten ("... since it can draw only a smaller pool." - 1993:197). Eisenstadt uses the term "reservoir" (das Reservoir) and also "resources" (Ressourcen) (1977), whilst Geser uses "recruitment field" (das Rekrutierungsfeld) (1992:632), as well as "resources" (Ressourcen") (p. 647); Keber talks about "human potential" (1996:136), and Rupel about "the problem of insufficient reserves" (1994:276) and about an incomplete personnel structure (p.151).

and the typicality of their activities, thus at the same time being an important additional element in their definition. These diplomatic organizations, among their other activities, make a decisive contribution to the choice of the security options of the new small states and to their manifold positioning in the international community. During the 20th century, small states have appeared in four waves following extensive social changes: after the First World War, after the Second World War, in the process of decolonization and after the end of the Cold War.

In addition to the already-mentioned lack of resources, which directly influences the degree of development of the state administration and diplomatic service, let us also note as a weakness of these states their considerable sensitivity and vulnerability, as well as their dependence on both the immediate and wider international environment.⁹ To their advantage, we could note their great adaptability, facilitated by a smaller social system and organisation, as well as a greater transparency (in spite of the very

9 We could list the following four groups of characteristics of small states: a) general vulnerability; an international image of 'no problem'; chronic dependency on the metropolitan economies; permanent status of being spectators with regard to most major world developments; a tendency towards insularity. (Julien, 1992:46) b) general advantages: small countries have the sociological advantages of small systems (greater ability to adapt quickly, relatively simple process of decision-making); the mega trends in the modern world are favourable to small countries (cultural diversity); small countries can easily develop a niche strategy; small countries focus primarily on exports; small countries can direct themselves to process production more easily than large ones; small countries generally have elementary and secondary education of a fairly good quality. (Kropivnik and Ješovnik (1995:67-70) c) general disadvantages: small countries have neither a large territory nor a large market (therefore their economic structure is less differentiated); the small size of the internal market in small countries prevents local companies from achieving the real competitiveness enjoyed by companies in the economies of larger countries; because of their small markets small countries are dependent on international trade (export); when they raise loans small countries are not able to provide the same guarantees as large countries (limited access to the financial market); small countries are limited in the area of research and development as they are not able to call on the same financial and human resources as the larger countries; the language barrier can also often be a disadvantage faced by small countries; small countries have a greater sensitivity to natural disasters. (Kropivnik and Ješovnik, 1995:67-70) d) economic disadvantages: limited natural resources endowments and high import content; limitation on import substitution possibilities; small domestic market and dependence of export markets; limited ability to influence domestic prices; limited ability to exploit economies of scale; limited possibility for domestic competition; marginalization in international trade; high costs of public administration and infrastructural development due to indivisibility of overhead costs. (Briguglio, 1995:113)

noticeable overlapping of a great number of social roles filled by the same players). Small states therefore have to start focusing on specializing in narrow areas ('niche strategy') as well as being open to the international environment (the necessity of wide and manifold contacts, at both official and unofficial level).

The Security Question

The small European states that have appeared since the fall of the Berlin Wall are finding a solution to the problem of their security in membership of the Euro-Atlantic security organizations. But whilst studying the European security conditions after the end of the Cold War, many different characteristics and processes became discernible. Among these, one of the most noticeable is the fact that there exists a considerable number of international organizations providing security in Europe. We can list several like the UN, NATO, the EU, the WEU and OSCE. Among the small European states, both the new and already established ('old') ones, the fact that they participate at different levels in a number and not just one or two of these organizations, is very striking. It seems that there is a view that membership of a number of these organizations ensures a greater degree of security. This is not surprising if we take into account that in the European security environment there exist, from the viewpoint of small states, certain negative factors. Among these are threats originating in the internal development of these states (some post-socialist states), local threats, anxiety in some states because of what are regarded as threats to their national sovereignty as a consequence of integrational processes, a repeat of the division of areas of interest between the superpowers (e.g. South East Europe and the Mediterranean), as well as the modernization and professionalization of the military and the further use of the military as an instrument of the policies of modern states. (Grizold, 1996:68-69) For these reasons, the USA remains one of the main guarantors of European security.¹⁰

10 We could ask ourselves, on the basis of the membership in the mentioned Euro-Atlantic security institutions, whether it would be possible to draw conclusions as to who are the actual supporting pillars of these processes - for example, do more memberships also mean more influence and more security? And conversely, does membership of fewer institutions equal less influence and less security? What is the motivation of

The security of small countries is very dependent on their inclusion in the activities of various international integrational processes and organizations. A clear and useful participation of these states could thus be established, which is out of proportion to their size. Small states have an opportunity to participate and act as co-decision makers in these processes, which would not be possible if they stayed outside in isolation. The positive effects are even greater and more long-term in the case of participation in the highest executive bodies of the most important international organizations such as, for example, Slovenia's non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council (1998-1999). A small state thus becomes recognizable; it participates and becomes part of the decision-making process; it even heads bodies, which are involved in the preparation of global decisions on world peace and security. The effects on the diplomatic organizations of the small countries are also significant: they can be seen in a higher foreign policy profile, as well as in the increased diplomatic burden these countries have to carry. The new small states are required to deal with many new themes and their diplomatic organizations have to adjust to this fact, which has a great long-term significance. The international position of new small states thus becomes more solid and recognized - they enjoy a greater level of acceptability and security. This further affects their local and wider stability and, due to their involvement in international processes, these states are probably less likely to be targets of the potential foreign policy ambitions of other states.

the new (but also the old) small European states for membership in these security institutions and does the membership of one or two institutions not guarantee enough security, or if it guarantees enough security, does it not guarantee enough influence? A further important question is whether the USA, as the strongest military force in the world, is still the foundation stone of European security? (And if it is, how is that still the case?) Moreover, is the USA satisfied with this role, or there are any signs of either a gradual withdrawal from or a strengthening of their role on the European continent? What are the relations in the area of security between these institutions, which all differ from each other, in spite of the fact that they either totally, in most part or at least partially deal with security guarantees? Are these institutions, even including the UN, the ones which, with a precondition that "no organization is able to totally cover all the security and defence needs of the European continent" (Grizold, 1999:136), able to guarantee European security?

The Diplomacies of Small New States

In establishing their diplomatic organizations, the new small states that have appeared in the wider Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall have to contend – as we have already stressed – with both the changing role of the nation state and with the limitations resulting from their own characteristics. However, having in mind the origins and the development of diplomacy and examining various definitions,¹¹ we must conclude that diplomacy remains a necessary and irreplaceable instrument of the nation state and its politics with regard to the international community. The function of initiating and maintaining a dialogue among the subjects of international law is gaining in importance, whilst new forms of diplomacy, new subject matters and methods of activity, are changing diplomacy's traditional nature.

As already mentioned, the basic sociological characteristic and limitation of the new small states is the lack of human resources (in this, they are in the same position as other small states). Because of their late, sudden and rather hasty attainment of statehood there is a noticeable pressure for a rapid and urgent establishment of diplomatic services in these states, enforced by their ambitions to be included in the international community. The limited availability of personnel and other resources (in the latter, the new small states are not in the same position as all other small states) appears as a basic

11 Additionally, as an illustration, we could also list diplomatic functions and the tasks, which the diplomatic service (or diplomats) must perform, usually under instruction from the state. These functions are defined in detail in The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and Feltham (1994:3) summarises them as follows: representing the sending state and the receiving state; protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; ascertaining, by all lawful means, conditions and developments in the receiving state, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state; promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations (my italics throughout, M.J.). Diplomacy “as a state institution and as a factor in state politics and state interests” (Benko, 1997:257-259) must thus carry out three basic tasks: “representing, negotiating and observing” (ibid.). In this way it secures for its government information on the receiving state, thus facilitating more complete and considered decision-making on concrete policies towards this state. With this information diplomacy advises its government and, as and when the need arises, it also carries out negotiations on certain matters according to its government's instruction.

determinant of their sociological characteristics and limitations.

In studying this phenomenon – referring to the establishing of their diplomacies – at least two kinds of consequences need to be established, both short and long-term.

As short-term consequences we can list the following:

- An influx of unqualified personnel;
- An influx of politicians (who have different interests to the permanent staff in the diplomatic service);
- A very varied educational background of the personnel in the new diplomatic organisations (numerous and various educational profiles, including some relatively unsuitable ones and even some completely unsuitable);
- Very few people working in individual organisational units;
- Constant and intensive fluctuation between the foreign ministry and diplomatic missions, particularly in the initial stage, as a response to the necessary task at a particular time and the simultaneous, or almost simultaneous, setting up of both, the foreign ministry as well as the diplomatic missions network (the time lag is very small), which as a rule leads to the outflow of the best personnel to the missions;

As long-term consequences we can list the following:

- The influence of political recruits, which objectively hinders the setting up of a professional diplomatic organization, works in the direction of strengthening of political recruitment for the lower as well as higher diplomatic positions and this at least indirectly hinders the vertical promotion of career diplomats;
- Reduced competitiveness of the new diplomatic organizations in comparison with the already established ones;
- Long-term acceptance of the repeated solving of lack of personnel by means of extensive external recruitment, thus permanently lowering the professional level of these diplomatic organizations.

We could argue - mainly on the basis of Slovenia's experience, but throughout taking into account and supplementing this through some comparison with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - that for a successful diplomatic start the composition and size of a diplomatic organisation

at its inception, at “zero-hour” (irrespective of the relative difficulty of the definition of this moment), is of key importance. I consider this point of time to be the end of the calendar year in which the former multinational state broke up and the new small state emerged. This is December 1991 in the case of all above mentioned four states.

At the start, the Slovene diplomatic organization was founded basically on two homogenous groups: on the one hand, there were the diplomats who had worked in the former Yugoslav diplomatic service (and who joined Slovenia’s diplomacy or had been accepted into it), and on the other, persons who had participated in the international activities of the administration of the Republic of Slovenia within the former federal state. These two were strongly supplemented by a third group with growing significance: the very heterogeneous population of novices (complete novices and recruits from politics, economy, universities, etc.). In Slovenia’s case, this amounted to nearly 100 people. The situation at the inception of the diplomacies of the three Baltic States varied considerably, both in their composition as well as size. The first two groups practically did not exist, so novices of all kinds were of key significance, even though this group was quantitatively very weak. It was supplemented with recruits from the émigré population, particularly from North America, and to a small extent also with a recall of diplomats who had been active in the diplomatic services of the Baltic States during the first period of their statehood between the two World Wars.¹² In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania this amounted to approximately 10-20 people in each diplomacy at their beginning.¹³

12 Apart from my own experience and observations the sources for the Slovenian case are also Čačinovič (1994;1998), Jerak and Purkart (1997), Kosin (1997) etc.

13 A brief presentation of how the other four new states which appeared after the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia used the diplomatic personnel from the former common diplomacy shows following picture: Croatia took on a certain number of individuals from the first group (mainly from the clerical subgroup); in Bosnia and Herzegovina the extent of the recruitment from the first group depended on the tripartite structure of the state leadership; in Macedonia, most of the diplomats from the first group were included in the new diplomacy; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recruited into its diplomacy those former diplomats who were from Serbia and Montenegro (they constituted a good half of the former diplomacy, whilst Slovenia participated with 3-5%, Macedonia slightly more, Croatia just over third, and the rest came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Kosovo). The second group was included in the new diplomacies of all these countries and the appearance of the third group was also noticeable.

To summarize we could observe the following five groups in the compared new diplomacies:

- The first group (employees in the diplomatic service of the former state) consists of the political and clerical subgroups;
- The second group (employees in the former republic administration who dealt with wider international contacts) consists of the experienced and inexperienced subgroups;
- The third group (complete novices in the diplomatic service) consists of complete novices and other personnel: from politics, universities, the economy, as well as culture, the media and education;
- The fourth group (recruitment from émigré communities);
- The fifth group (reactivating of the retired diplomats).

Thus in the prevailing circumstances, which included a general lack of resources, Slovenia started off with a significantly larger personnel reserve, both in size and the amount of diplomatic knowledge and experience. There are several reasons (political, cultural, historical, ideological etc.) as well as consequences of this fact and they have been affecting the development of the four new diplomacies. However, it would be beyond the purposes of this article to explore them more detailed.

For the future development of new diplomatic organizations and their professionalisation it is very important how the relations among these groups develop. The competition between the groups, as well as between individuals in each group, is obvious. We can also observe alliances between individual subgroups, depending on their characteristics, as well as between smaller and narrower circles within groups and subgroups. Perhaps we could conclude that the most promising and important is the subgroup of complete novices (highly educated, with a knowledge of languages, rapidly gaining experience). In both the short and the medium-term these often became assistants to the experienced individuals. The latter constitute the medium-term nucleus of new diplomacies. This population of experienced diplomats is more numerous in Slovenia's case than in

the case of the other three states, whilst the recruitment of complete novices is about the same in its extent and intensity.

The Main Sociological Aspects of New Diplomacies

Because of the lack of personnel and financial resources we can observe a lack of diplomatic knowledge and experience in all the compared diplomacies. This is understandable in view of their composition. But it is undoubtedly a very unfavorable fact, considering that these diplomacies face an already large and still increasing number of foreign policy tasks. If they are to become an equal and accepted player in the international relations, these states have to catch up with the others or try to make up for lost time - hampered by diplomacies, which are still in the process of being established. The need for permanent recruitment of complete novices is therefore obvious and, short-term; it increases the lack of diplomatic knowledge and experience.

At the same time, this strengthens two other very important characteristics of new diplomacies: youthfulness and feminisation. On the basis of the publicly available information it would be possible to estimate that the average age of the four compared diplomacies at the time of their inception was 25-35 years and that half of them were women. This trend continued, especially with regard to feminisation (women constitute the majority of recruits). New diplomacies are thus, on the one hand, very young (i.e. young and inexperienced), which is relatively detrimental to their effectiveness, as this depends on accumulation of knowledge and experience in individual diplomats.¹⁴ On the other hand,

¹⁴ These ideas were confirmed to me, on her own personal experience and observation, by Andreja Purkart, a young Slovene diplomat (who joined the foreign ministry in the autumn of 1995), currently working at the Slovenian Embassy in Washington. According to her, the lack of personnel in the new diplomacies forces young people, who are completely without any useful working experience, to take on responsibility for projects which even their older colleagues in established diplomacies do not face daily. This means they mature very quickly, what is particularly noticeable when they are assigned to a mission abroad. With only, perhaps, three years working experience they carry out completely independent, very demanding work. The natural allies of these complete novices are the first subgroup of the first group and some individuals from its second subgroup as well as the political recruits. None of these, in contrast to some of the others, feel threatened by ambitious and hardworking young diplomats

they are recruited from a wide social spectrum and very noticeably from the female part of the population. This is important, as it is a new phenomenon in the sociological development of diplomatic services, which traditionally depended on elitist recruitment from narrow social circles, close to the ruler in power, and from the male part of the population.

The two characteristics point to the likelihood of an important social evolution of diplomacy, whilst posing a number of interesting questions. For example: what will be the age structure of the new diplomacies in 20 or more years and where will the different generations fit in? What influence will the various age groups have? What will be the effects of the already prevalent feminization (in particular, what will be the gender distribution in the highest positions)? Will the lack of diplomatic knowledge and experience turn into an accumulation of both of these? And so on.

Equally, both the quoted characteristics, which are partly the consequence of the lack of personnel, dictate a strong need for planned recruitment and professional training in the new diplomacies. Even though they are under a great pressure from the political sphere, the need for planned recruitment (fulfilling professional criteria) is very marked. Linked to this is permanent professional training, not only internal, but also at various international academies and on international courses.¹⁵

Both these sociological characteristics of the new diplomatic organisations are at the same time a limitation as well as an advantage. Youthfulness acts as a limitation because of the already mentioned lack of diplomatic knowledge and experience, and as an advantage because of the vitality, ambition and solid theoretical knowledge it brings. Feminisation acts as an advantage, because it widens the diplomatic reserve of diplomacy as so far a traditionally male profession and balances its gender representa-

¹⁵ Here it would be at least interesting to mention that Slovenia established its own Diplomatic Academy in winter 1996. A proposal for its formation was written by myself already in November 1990, while I was still serving in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. The whole text is published in my recent book »A Slovene in Belgrade, 1987-1991«. Now, a decade later, I am even more convinced of the usefulness of this idea and its later realization as well as of the fact that the Academy could further fulfill its mission only as an internationalized institution.

tion. It could have a negative effect if the trend of feminization becomes so strong that it starts to push out or even fully replace the male population (but these trends have to be dealt with within the wider social context). What the joint result is of these two characteristics with regard to the effectiveness of the new diplomacies, is a question which could be of great significance for their further development. This question is particularly interesting and provocative, as the results of diplomatic work, because of the nature of this profession, can be measured only indirectly and long-term, which hinders quick and on-going correction of the wrong activities.

But it is also a fact that the previously presented composition and such characteristics of the new diplomacies facilitate the greater mobility of their members. This is possible because the establishment process is still not complete and because of ever-changing working needs and tasks, manifested in the increasing extent and complexity of foreign policy activities. It is possible to advance faster in the new diplomatic organizations, at least in their first decade, than is the case in the already established ones. This has additional effects on the horizontal and vertical mobility of diplomats, motivating them in their work. They are additionally motivated in their vertical mobility by searching for and forming pacts with influential individuals and groups outside the new diplomacies. This kind of conduct is undoubtedly most rare in the complete novices, and most widespread among the political recruits.

Looking long-term, professionalisation of personnel is thus very significant for the effectiveness of the new diplomatic organizations. A large proportion of the young recruits, i.e. the complete novices, acts as a foundation for this process. It is also possible to assume that professionalisation is also in interest of these people themselves. In addition, well planned recruitment and permanent professional training make a decisive contribution to increasing the level of professionalisation. At the same time, we could, on the basis of empirical analysis, study in more detail and also most probably confirm the constant and not inconsiderable attempts for political recruitment. This kind of conduct could have nega-

tive consequences for the effectiveness of the new diplomacies and their conceptualization, as well as their development.

Conclusions and Dilemmas

It is certainly the case that in the contemporary and changed international community the nation state remains one of the basic and most widespread subjects of international law. Even in the process of its transformation, its attempts to adapt and persist in a central position are clearly observable - but this position is fundamentally different to the one it held when it first appeared in the 17th century. The post-modern state is a very flexible, open and dynamic institution. There has been a great increase in the extent, variety and nature of the contacts it has at different levels.

All this indicates that diplomacy will retain its role as an attribute of such a state. Maybe it would not be too bold to say that the significance of diplomacy in the modern world is growing. But its functions are also changing and adapting to new conditions, which is something the new small states have to take into account when planning and setting up their diplomacies and implementing their foreign policies. Diplomacy remains an irreplaceable state instrument for the implementation of the foreign policies of the new small states and for their establishment in the international community at the turn of the millennium. For the diplomacies of the new small states these tendencies and characteristics of the global society and their consequences represent an important challenge and a point of orientation.

The challenge is double: on the one hand, it is necessary to adapt to these conditions in order for the functioning of the new small states and their diplomacies to be possible and have any purpose at all and, on the other hand, it is necessary to face up to the question, which even the diplomacies of the well established states have to face - how to embrace and understand the complex situation which has arisen, so that it will be possible to find their way and act suitably.

As an answer to the first challenge, the diplomatic organizations of the new small states, because of the characteristics of the states

they represent, are forced to set up a rational diplomatic-consular network in order to meet all the basic foreign policy ambitions and ensure a permanent activity and presence in the international community. Being familiar with the changes above and taking them into account will enable them to:

- Make a more rational use of their resources;
- Carefully plan their foreign policy activities;
- Recruit suitably qualified complete novices and with their constant training and carefully planned mobility achieve a future high degree of professionalism of their personnel and working methods;
- Ensure a necessarily high level of technical preparedness for their performance.

An answer to the second challenge most probably lies in the necessity for their active participation in all the future currents of integration in the modern world.

If they do this, new small states will be able to satisfy the aim of their functioning in the period of an intensive “territorial de-hierarchization” (Mlinar, 1995) only by being tied into the network of international integration. Failing to do so ultimately means separation and isolation, and with it greater vulnerability and reduced security (Grizold, 1999) and particularly a smaller influence in the management of common affairs due to non-cooperation: “By joining the global community, they (the small states, note M.J.) have, ironically, strengthened their independence. In the process, many small states managed to recover their national identity and dignity, things that could have been seriously threatened had they not joined the United Nations. They have also shown that a small state can exercise sovereignty in a meaningful way within a global framework, and that they contribute to global wellbeing.” (Briguglio, 1995:110). The globalisation process in the international community is all-encompassing and irreversible, so it is impossible to remain outside its currents, isolated and independent: “No state is strong enough or weak enough to live in splendid isolation.” (Steiner, 1982:31).

The new small states, which have in just over a decade managed to free themselves from the grip of large multinational and hege-

monic state systems, will thus have to invest a variety of internal social efforts into a serious political contemplation of how to accept the inevitable (and partly self-evident) inclusion into global currents.

The Evolution of the Security Processes in Europe and Slovenia¹⁶

In the past centuries, the history of Europe has been influenced by specific, decisive events, which had multifaceted consequences. One could argue that some of these events were the series of Westphalian peace treaties that followed the end of the 30-year war in the middle of the 17th century, the industrial revolution in England, and the French revolution. The constantly changing system of balance between the great powers of the past and their conflict- and rivalry-oriented overseas economic expansion tendencies can today be seen as the origin of globalization tendencies. In the system of values, the source of these tendencies was Eurocentric ideas and the renaissance philosophic-humanistic tradition that relied on economic foundations. Politically, they were determined by the phenomenon of a nation state. Given this, the three key centuries that saw the evolution of the determining factors of the contemporary, one could say postmodern, image of the world were the 17th, the 18th, and the 19th centuries.

The tectonic, security-political movements at the beginning of the 20th century, which is characterized by many regional conflicts and confirmed by the first global conflict, radically change the relations. The series of peace treaties after WW I coincides with the collapse of some empires that consisted of several countries. The empires dissolve in numerous new countries which, among other things, shuffles the positions in the group of global protagonists and gives way to new factors although the leading one remains the same.

Therefore, the first half of the past century is impacted by great instability, which could also be called the second 30-year war. It is a period that brings radical changes to the global structure of rela-

16 This article was originally published in Weiss, Peter, Csabay, Marek (Eds.). 2003. *Slovensko a NATO*. Pp. 17-25. It was prepared as a compilation of a series of lectures, which the author delivered to the students of international affairs at the Faculty for International Relations at the University of Economics in Bratislava. The editors were kind enough to include this contribution in their publication.

tions. This is proven by the high number of actors involved in intricate events and the highly dynamic conflictive relations among them between both world wars. The period of marked instability and powerful destructiveness ends with a clear polarization between the winners and losers of the second conflict with global dimensions, but also with clear polarization within the winning coalition itself after WW II. These relations are consolidated in the confrontation between the blocks and during the Cold War, thus making ideology a clearly distinctive separating factor between both blocks. In the next decades, the ideology becomes the basic, distinctive criteria in global relations, with the United Nations, as the first institution in the history of human kind that could influence the establishment of peace and stability, acting as a catalyst at the universal level.

The majority of the second part of the same century can be described as a period of prolonged stability. This is a time of intensive polarization between the blocks, whose incredibly static society allowed for no instability, even though such stability was almost paralyzing. In reality, events were interrupted by many local conflicts which, however, never acquired global dimensions. As a partial exception to the rule, one could cite the period of decolonization in the 60s and 70s which significantly changed the structure of international relations but was always within the existing frameworks of global polarization and stability. The number of countries in the international community increased approximately twofold, which gave additional impetus to the relations among actors in the international community as well as intensifying the interaction, particularly in the world organization. Among other things, the intensified interaction permitted dialogue to maneuver its way onto the scene. This dialogue, which was able to go beyond block demarcation lines, was increasingly conducted, in the last quarter of the previous century, within the forum of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe.

In the 20th century, the second half of the 80s experiences how tectonic movements shake the global structure of relations, in particular in Europe. The symbol for the end of the Cold War and block polarization is the year 1989 - *annus mirabilis* - and the

size and the depth of the change is best explained by the fact that it encompasses the vast territory of Central and Eastern Europe, the European part of the former Soviet Union, the Caucasus with Central Asia, and an enormous population of 150 to 200 million people. It's also noteworthy that the changes take a very short time (about three years), that they involve many countries (25-30) and that they consume great amounts of societal energy and cause unheard of political tectonics.

As a consequence, the first part of the last decade of the previous century is marked by a certain security vacuum that facilitated the appearance of some post block conflicts and tensions, the most obvious among them being a series of interethnic and domestic conflicts, as well as conflicts between countries, and even wars on a limited spectrum. The most brutal and difficult to resolve were the wars in the Balkans that end with the signing of the Dayton Agreement at the end of 1995.

This period is characterized by a renaissance of international integration and cooperation. There are three actors in the wider European context. The NATO Alliance is setting up a mechanism of cooperation with partner nations which is completed in the second half of the 1990s with the first post-block enlargement and the announcement of a prospective one; the European Union accepts new members, three neutral European nations, in 1995 and sets up the framework mechanism for the next round of enlargement; the OCSE enhances its presence in the post-crisis areas and is striving to become a factor in keeping post-conflict security and revitalizing societies, in particular in the areas of institution building, electoral mechanisms and respect for human rights, which is where a joint area of work is established with the Council of Europe. Both the OCSE and the Council of Europe are gradually enlarging their number of member states. The last years of the previous century brought a higher level of stability and important localization of conflicts in the southeast of the European continent but they did not bring appeasement. The culmination of security integration and resolution might be observed in the most obvious way in the "millennium" summit of the OSCE in Istanbul which, by adopting a special declaration, outlines co-

operation among these organizations and emphasizes the need to establish peace and stability in Europe. Reference to the documents of the NATO Alliance Summit in April of the same year in Washington and the EU Summit in December of the same year in Helsinki is highly logical from the point of view of the contents. The year 1999, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, brings important progress in the contents of international regional organizations, which deal with ensuring various aspects of modern security in a wider European arena. In doing this, a further and essential complementary activity is called upon.

At the same time, through the work of numerous international—and especially European—political and legal institutions, it is possible to observe a very clear move towards the individual as more and more important or even a fundamental value in the post-modern world. The individual (in particular children, women, and marginalized groups, such as the disabled and homosexuals) is becoming a fundamental criterion and departure point for evaluating societies and their level of maturity. The focus on the individual is probably the most recognized in the fact that this very individual, who remains to be primarily defined as a citizen, seeks assistance from the supranational institutions for the protection of his or her rights when he or she believes that his or her nation state violates them. This fact signifies a big step forward in the perception and widening of the value framework and structural dimension of the post-modern world, in particular with the supposition that this perception, until not long ago, was measured by the level of openness of states in comparison to the international dimension; that is, the external view of those affairs that traditionally were understood as the internal competence of the nation states.

In a modern and more and more global society, it is still possible to note the further indispensability of some roles of the nation state. This is reflected in a noticeable manner in diplomacy as that function provides for formal and indirect communication with the subjects of international law. Even though globalization with its effects has influence on the contents and methods of the functioning of diplomacy, diplomacy continues to remain an in-

dispensable instrument for the implementation of foreign policy. However, it is also possible to assess that globalization brings more important consequences to the functioning of diplomatic organizations, and new small states have to take this into consideration when establishing their functions.

New contents are being introduced into diplomacy because diplomats, due to explicit integration and co-dependency, are not dealing exclusively with bilateral affairs or with those affairs that would be of exclusive interest to a particular group of states but rather their work consists more and more of contents that are of concern to the global community. Diplomatic organizations of new small states, in order to work in these circumstances, need appropriately established and rational representation networks that will meet fundamental and foreign policy ambitions and the presence of the work in the international community. In such a way these states will manage their resources in a rational manner and will thoughtfully plan their foreign policy activities. The aforementioned also has influence on the modification of the position and conduct of the fundamental proprietor of these processes, i.e., the diplomat. The diplomat has to be educated more and more broadly and in multi-disciplines due to the constant need to cope and deal with increased amounts of various pieces of information that *inter alia* fill up diplomacy with new contents. More and more often, diplomats appear in the media and they have to be adequately trained for this. Such an appearance in the media is always in the function of transmitting a specific, official position to the public. An experienced and skilled (trained) diplomat is thus becoming an important and noticeable investment and, by increasing his or her value, the level of his or her professional self-confidence is increased as well.

A comparative analysis shows that the diplomatic organizations of the new small states in development so far were established as small, flexible and transparent organizations and, in their structure, are not miniaturized copies of big diplomacies. It is possible that the characteristics mentioned are not as clearly seen due to the relatively short time available for their establishment, in particular in reference to the basic organizational completeness, but

in their fundamental trends they are completely apparent (with a tendency of a slow increase in the elements of virtual organization). Their organization allows for a great deal of room for the introduction of new work methods and additional organizational approaches brought about and dictated by the changes in the modern international community.

Globalization of the modern international community is in all its certainty, nonetheless, a still non-defined notion and it is not possible to give simple answers to many a question or dilemma. The fact that new small states established after the fall of the Berlin Wall a decade ago managed to persist in the international community as accepted subjects of international law puts forth additional evidence that the nation state will be able to find its place in the current development phase of the globalization movement regardless of its strength, complexity and also partial unpredictability. The diplomacies of these states function and contribute to the further international integration processes of their own countries and additionally illustrate the functioning of globalization processes and their complexity in which striving for security takes a more and more noticeable place.

The dominant feature of the European security processes in their current phase is surely their *complementarity*. In history, both in previous centuries and in the second half of the previous century, it was confirmed that European history could be achieved through complementary effect of national and international subjects. It seems reasonable to add some of the other most important current features of the European security processes (European or Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian, partly global, depending on the extent of their geographic, political and security determination).

They are as follows:

- *Complexity* (many participants at various levels: global level /UN/, regional level of the paneuropean /Nato, EU, OSCE/ and subeuropean /CBSS, CENCOOP/ levels etc.);
- *Complicated status* (the overlapping of NATO and EU membership, including the constituent member states, member states of the intermediate space and the entangle-

ment of their relations, relations of the applicant countries and other countries who participate in the Partnership for Peace Program);

- *Intensity* (of relations and initiatives, diversified dynamics leading to the common goal; i.e., the creation of a secure and stable Europe under the most powerful influence of the executed NATO and EU summits, which has contributed to the enhancement and new speed);
- *Basis of the US-Europe relation* (is the US still the key guarantor of European security, is the US still prepared to be such a guarantor, is Europe ready and able to provide for its own security, etc.);
- *Participation of the Russian federation* in the provision of European security and its management of the same.

The position of Slovenia as a regional security player is already clearly recognized today. This is true for its political, economic, diplomatic, military and other engagements. The Balkans is the area where Slovenia commenced its work to contribute to greater stability and security (participation in the ALBA Operation in 1997) and where its further role sees its increased involvement; e.g., Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (RACVIAC), SFOR, KFOR, and the trilateral brigade (MLF). Also activities in initiatives like SEDM and CENCOOP have to be mentioned (Slovenia chaired the latter in 2002). There are numerous reasons for this, from very specific ones (interest in its own security which depends heavily on the situation in the immediate and regional neighborhood) to general ones (global security processes are managed primarily at a regional level). The non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council in 1998 - 1999 and the forthcoming chairmanship of the OSCE in 2005 are the very illustrations for the contribution of a small new state to the international peace and stability. At the same time, Slovenia also shows a high level of understanding of the modern definition of security and of the positive consequences that such an understanding has for the post-conflict management of societal development. The International Trust Fund for Demining has proven to be an effective institution in its five years of existence; Together - the Fund for

Psychologically and Socially Disabled Children seems to be successfully following its path as well. This fact shows very clearly that developmental and humanitarian assistance is an important ingredient in Slovenian foreign and security policies.

During these days Slovenia marks the ninth anniversary since it has joined the PfP Programme. Later on Slovenia extended cooperation with Nato also to other areas and activities, like the Individual Partnership Programme, the Planing and Review Process, and joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (now EAPC) as well as the North Atlantic Assembly. The Slovene Armed Forces participated at numerous exercises, including hosting a NATO partnership exercise "Cooperative Adventure Exchange 98", with more than 6,000 soldiers from the allied and partner countries. As last but not least example the activities within the MAP should be mentioned. All these endeavours contributed to the invitation which was extended to Slovenia, along with other six countries at Nato Prague Summit. The invitation was therefore the logical result of almost a decade of increased cooperation with the Alliance. During last years Slovenia has also participated in various activities of the EU within the defense and security area (i.a. offered a contribution to the Headline Goal.)

A special aspect of these processes is surely linked to the intensive and extensive restructuring of European military forces. When we analyze today the development of events after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is worth emphasizing that the major part of their consequences is related to the modified position and role of the armed forces of the nation states, both Western and Eastern (or former socialist) European countries.

Features of the European security processes discussed, among which their complementary features are the most dominant, also signify the reflection of the fact that the definition of security after the end of the Cold War is the non-military aspect that, until now, took back stage. In such a way, the understanding of security is becoming wider, more diversified and more comprehensive even though it's worth emphasizing that the military aspect of security does not lose its importance. The described tendency is linked to the change in the value definition of the post-modern world

in which the main focus lies in individuality. Thus, international efforts for security have expectations of much more than just providing security to nation states and their sovereignty - modern security is aimed at the individual and his or her multilayered security needs and not merely military security. It is possible to say that the provision of security originates from individual security as a key aspect of the processes for ensuring national, regional and global security. In this sense, the focus remains on the concept of human security trying to encompass the comprehensive security of the individual against violent (military conflicts, violation of human rights, terrorism, organized crime) and non-violent security challenges and threats (environmental threats, economic crises, contagious diseases, natural disasters, drugs, etc.).

It is possible to outline the perspectives of European and, partly, global security in short-, medium- and long-term aspects and all three are based on the key relevance of the year 2002 (with contents reference to the changes in the year 1989). Here one should consider the NATO summit in November 2002 in Prague and the EU summit in December in Copenhagen, both of which has specified to a great extent the further dynamics of the enlargement processes. It's also worth keeping in mind the fact that a year and a half has passed since the terrorist acts in the US which this aspect of security challenges will outshine, in the short-term perspective, and will have critical influence on the perception of global security and the organizational perspective of its provision. All of the above is also influencing, to a great extent, the contents, size and difficulty of diplomatic work and the definition of diplomacy.

First, in the short-term sense; i.e., 13 to 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall: to define and ensure the practical carrying out of the second round of NATO enlargement after the end of the Cold War and definitively announce and formalize the commencement of the second EU enlargement in the same period; in the meantime, the operation of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has been enhanced ensuring that the network of institutionalized security efforts has widened and is contributing as an important catalyst to the stabilization of all of Europe and its immediate neighborhood.

Second, in the medium-term sense, by 2010, which is two decades after the end of the Cold War: specify definitively the third round of NATO enlargement after the end of the Cold War and, as a minimum, announce the third EU enlargement in the same period (or complete the second round of enlargement if it is to be extensive and with varied speed for accepting new members); the stabilization of European, Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian security and also partly global security; outline at least the basic aspects for widening the areas of stability and security from the wider European region outwards, isolate and calm down the key crisis spots and, at the same time, indicate methods, levels and participants of the global security dialog and its institutionalization.

Third, in the long-term sense, by 2030: globalization of the collective security and arrangement for its institutionalization through the UN and arrangement for its relations with regional security and defense organizations for the provision of security; instrumentalization of the global dialog among continental holders of political, economic and military power; globalization of the dialog with Africa and focus on the arrangement of global demography. In this period, the provision of security will finally have its philosophical basis in its contents, institutions, and pragmatic sense by forming an answer to the question as to what will happen after the end of the globalization process and what influence this will have on the functioning of democracy as the fundamental mechanism for regulating intra-state and integration relations; the individual as the fundamental heir to ancient and renaissance humanistic thought and the further provision of its central place in the main perspective of national/global attention should remain a corner stone criteria.

Globalization remains the fundamental feature of the post-block period and it seems to give space to both the enhancement of the nation state and the furthering of the integration processes. To illustrate, it seems appropriate to use as examples the US as a typical nation state and the EU as a typical European integration process. For the nation state and its wider— that is, regional and global— functioning, it will be more rational if that is achieved through a wide network of international institutions that weigh

the effectiveness of this functioning rather than searching for individual approaches and methods regardless of the eventual increase in the freedom of area of work. The international community is thus subjected to exceptional and further pressure from globalization tendencies. If these are observed in the perspective of attaining European security, then the most appropriate answer today is to more intensively further the integration process.

In this perspective, the NATO enlargement process is viewed as an exceptionally explicit and reliable perspective of the globalization process and a partial catalyst of its negative effects. Simultaneously, it is also clear that EU enlargement is at least an equally intensive perspective of these processes even though at certain moments it has not been possible to clearly see its imminence and clarity.

Nonetheless, both enlargement processes are complementary and only in their approximation can the European integration processes be developed in a comprehensive and effective manner. Eventual deviation from their further complementary status could be understood as the first existence of the deformation of the discussed processes.

Globalizing European Security Processes¹⁷

Introduction

The origins of today's European security picture have been fundamentally laid down in the tremendous stream of consequences caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall. The scope of the change which we witnessed in the *Annus Mirabilis* was unexpected, enormous and tectonic: »In just over three years, from the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9th November 1989 to 1st January 1993 (the peaceful and consensual division of the Socialist Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia), one European country thus ceased to exist (the German Democratic Republic), 22 new countries emerged and communism as a political system and state ideology disappeared.« (Jazbec, 2001:19). Up to 200 million people participated in that change on the territory of Central, South and East Europe, Transcaucasia, Central Asia as well as throughout the whole former Soviet Union. An enormous social energy was released and an unforeseeable political shift occurred.

The processes of integration and disintegration were at its peak in the first part of nineties, causing i.a. also a noticeable security vacuum and consequent instability. The expectations were high, the wave of disillusion which followed was big. Security as one of the most complex social phenomena gained on its importance, its nature being changed or at least seen as being changed. Environmental, economical, social and other aspects of security gained importance as societies become more and more complex and at the same time also more vulnerable. After a long period of preparing themselves to fight wars with the enemy across the Wall, modern European societies found themselves in a position where

17 This article was originally published in Gosar, 2005: 173 - 182. It was prepared upon the author's contribution at the international conference "Europe Globalized - Globalized Europe", organized by The University of Primorska, Koper, Slovenia, in spring 2003.

they are less and less keen on fighting wars. That much not only because of their public opinion, but also due to their structural complexity and increased vulnerability; as if the fall of the Wall swept away much of the cold war military and defence illusions.

Due to a changed security environment on the wider European continent, security threats and risks have also changed. Traditional military risks lost their utmost presence and importance, though did not disappear (Prezelj, 2001). Different security challenges emerged wearing a different face: nowadays they are nontraditional ones, dispersed, global, caused primarily by non-state actors and above all of combined nature. They are hard to predict and even harder to counter. There is no way to counter them on a single basis. Thus security actors have to combine their efforts, join their capabilities and implement an interagency approach. Countries feel safer and stronger within the integrations network, their area of activity and efficiency gets stronger with accelerated results.

No wonder that the majority of new and small states which emerged (or regained their statehood) after the end of the Cold War expressed strong intention to become members of both Nato and the EU. It is most probably not only a guess that at least some of them who were in the past members of the Warsav Pact also had the intention to definetly get away from the possible Russian influence.

European Security Processes

During the reflected period European security processes have undergone intensive, indepth and substantial change. Above all they gained on their structural dynamics.

This has been primarily affected by the two EU and Nato enlargements, accompanied also by the growth of the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE) membership. The role of the UN, though for some time already not in the first front, remains indispensable within this framework. However, the accelerated activities of the first three organisations – we could name them the European Security Triangle /EST/ (Jazbec, 2004a) – impacts the structure and

the stream of European security at most. In the current year both already mentioned enlargements have held the momentum and significantly influenced the postmodern creation of European security on a larger scale. The so called »big bang approach« still echoes: Nato increased its membership during last decade from 16 to 26 and the EU from 15 to 25. But it is not only numbers that count and impress. The structural interdependence within both organizations reached a much higher level and, from the insider's point of view, also technicalities (logistics, procedures, administering...) could affect substance in the future.

At the moment there are at least three major characteristics of the European security processes (Jazbec, 2002b : 265-266).

Complementarity is seen as the dominant feature of these processes in their current phase. Lessons learned from past European history show us that security could only be achieved through complementary activities of national and international subjects, the latter being nowadays indispensable and dominant. If such an approach seemed to be primarily theoretical only a few years ago (Rotfeld, 2000), the latest scope of activities and cooperation within the EST illustrates the way to proceed. With their different approach to security issues as far as the mechanisms, topics and timing is concerned Nato, EU and OSCE are capable to deal with the majority of actual, frozen and possible conflicts and security threats within the region. There would be at least two reasons which bring EST organizations closer on the complementarity basis. Because of the limited pool of resources even the biggest allies can not withstand an increasingly higher scale of activities, particularly out of area ones (strategic logistics, costs, deployable manpower). Also the complex nature of modern security threats and conflicts show that it is practically impossible for a single organization to develop the whole spectrum of mechanism to execute preconflict, mid- and postconflict management. Different approaches, various sets of mechanisms and networking must be combined and joined.

Complexity would be the next most important characteristic. No wonder, since we can observe many participants, i.e. security players on various vertical and horizontal levels. The pres-

ence of the UN as a global security player is followed by already mentioned actors (Nato, EU, OSCE, CoE) as well as Community of Independent States and Shanghai Organization for Cooperation which all occupy different horizontal positions on a same but lower vertical level. Proceeding down the scale we would meet on the next level, for example, the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Visegrad Group, Weimar Triangle, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, Southeast Defence Ministerial etc. Many participants at various horizontal levels (global, regional, paneuropean, subeuropean, local etc.) form a security matrix which is the most significant way how security as a goal could be achieved and its stream carved out. This tends to include all possible players and strengthens a multilateral approach as well as tends to exclude the still possible solo action approach of some players. The matrix is a living model which shows flexibility and offers the framework in particular for local players to emerge and fit in. One could speculate that the number of players on the higher levels will not increase and that their activities will be increasingly combined and rationalised. This would most probably also be the case with lower levels though the number of actors could probably increase. There are more and more players within the local scope which could add to broader security being active primarily within their closer neighbourhood.

The complicated nature of these processes seems to a certain extent to be the most natural outcome of crisscrossing the first two characteristics. Generally speaking this includes above all the management of the relations resulting from a) the overlapping of both organizations' members (founding and current), b) then the nonNato EU members and vice versa, c) as well as relations of all member countries towards applicant/candidate countries to both organizations and d) to other countries (PfP members and aspirants, countries with which both organizations have an institutionalized dialog etc.). The very feature could also tend to untransparency of activities and unnecessary overlapping not that much of purely membership but much more of competences of different players. In particular the overlapping of the EU and Nato membership causes certain problems which do not seem easy to

overcome. If the former could not (and should not) be avoided in the long run, the latter should be the matter of a clear, agreed and necessary compromise. As cooperation between both organizations improves, some problems still remain to be difficult (like the absence of the influence of the nonEU Nato members on decision making process when Nato mechanisms are activated for EU purposes). However the only way to get rid of them is to deepen cooperation and to enhance the complementarity of action (to agree on a general level and introduce rules of engagement on lower levels with enough flexibility to include lessons learned). Perhaps this is the very area where the postcold war approach and its atmosphere could be put to test: cooperation, trust and transparency. Enriched with solidarity this is the formula which both organizations try to sell to the new member and candidate countries in particular. If this could not work among them, how would it then work in the enlarged framework?

Without having an ambition to go deeper in presenting these and other single characteristics of European security processes one has to mention also their intensity and the decisive role of relations among the USA, Europe as a whole (leaving aside the question of definition of such a Europe) and the Russian Federation. Diversified dynamics among various security players and within already elaborated context origins from numerous relations and initiatives all leading to the common goal, i.e. the creation of a secure and safe Europe. It is the very goal to understanding of which we try to contribute with here presented thoughts on the globalization of the European security processes. One could say that the more these processes are interconnected, interdependent and complementary, the more chances they have to become global ones. Having in mind the EU Lisbon Declaration from 2000 as well as the European Security Strategy and the OSCE Strategy for the 21. Century (both adopted in 2003) it is only the ambition for Europe to go global which counts.

The triangle of relations between the USA, Europe and Russia dominantly effects the execution of the aforementioned ambition. Many question have been raised lately referring to the US presence and role within European security (Kagan, 2004). Also,

the participation of Russia in the provision of European security is still an excited issue. If with the US one gets an impression that they would slowly like to pull themselves out of these affairs, it is the very vice versa impression which reflects Russia and its interests. Possible contradictions and exclusiveness of these relations do not seem to be over so far.

With a strong and clear outreach to the Mediterranean, the Greater Middle East and Central Asia as well as beyond, European security processes do progress globally. They already have a strong Atlantic dimension and are increasingly tied in the Asian one (the Caucasus and Central Asia). Euroatlantic and Euroasian framework is emerging strongly within the EST context. New initiatives, projects and approaches make the ambition of going global possible but also - *via facti* - tend to further intensify and complicate its management. Here we reach the point where the question how to achieve the global dimension and effect of these processes comes onto the agenda.

Challenges of a Globalized European Security

There is as a matter of fact only one big dilemma - will Europe manage to reach the status of a global security player or not?

The basic precondition is to manage the security processes and threats in its home area as well as in its closer neighbourhood. Two kinds of players are important here, national and international. Speaking about the latter they already tend to cooperate as we have just tried to point out. Not that the picture is harmonized and coordinated, but recent progress is obvious and the project is developing well. The operation Amber Fox in Macedonia in the year 2003 is a good example. The preparations for the next one, Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is to start in early 2005 mark the next step. This shows that Europe has a chance of being finally capable of settling down problems at home. However, the most important topics which Europe has to settle down to support these ambitions are capabilities: strategic air and sea lift, integrated defence industry and an efficient and simple decision making process.

Only looking at the activities of national actors on the bilateral basis, one could get an impression that they are not that coordinated. Diversified interests of different member countries within Nato and the EU (the Iraq issue, for example) illustrate this. Also, the approach of EU member countries to establish qualified and deployable military and police manpower has not always been productive in recent years. With the development of Nato Response Forces and EU Capabilities, having in mind avoidance of unnecessary duplication, this could improve. It is also worth mentioning the different and controversial interests of the biggest European countries referring to the UN Security Council reform (to enlarge it with new permanent members also from Europe or to introduce one seat for the EU).

The Western Balkans remains the area where one in Europe can meet classical security threats as well as postcold war ones. The period of a general military danger and instability is more or less over, though the situation has not completely recovered yet. As the main source of current instability the combination of various factors has emerged. Namely, organized crime, trafficking (drugs, humans), corruption, weak institutions, stock piles and land mines prove to be the main critical security points within the region. This demands first of all strong cooperation among European partners, with Northatlantic allies and with Russia and second of all combined approach of EST. Having in mind that the military hard core phase of the Western Balkans conflict is declining, the role of EU and OSCE enters more strongly the present arena.

The way how Europe will manage and solve the Western Balkans situation, however difficult, complicated and partially also unpredictable it is, will determine its capability of being a reliable and a competent security player. Possible misfortune will not stop Europe from exercising its here discussed ambition. It could only stress the possible question of how much a global Europe can go beyond the already mentioned Atlantic and Asian dimension. As far as Africa is concerned there is no doubt about it being an important part of this ambition. At the same time it is obvious that European security endeavours in Africa are not enough consistent, complex and contextually carved out. It will for sure take

some more time to upraise the networking of this part of European global ambition.

One could speculate the further Europe will reach out of northern hemisphere framework the more it will depend on coordination with both the UN and the US. Both Nato and EU framework will help here only partially – perhaps the most important from this point of view is the provision of decision making process and capabilities.

At this point we could come back again to the Western Balkans experience. The effects of this year's double enlargements on the region could be the prevailing moment in future management of security processes. Nato member countries now form a strong security ring around the area. The EU members are not far away from that, having in mind strong candidates, Romania and Bulgaria as well as Croatia. Future PfP membership for both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro complete the possible security outcome. Never so far in the history of the region that many preconditions were on the spot to ensure possibly more security inwards and preferably less insecurity outwards. And at the same time perhaps never till now there were that many issues to be settled.

Globalization of European security processes also depends on two additional aspects. The so called out of area activities (»to defend values and not only territories«) which started with Nato intervention in Kosovo in spring 1999 and in different form appeared also in EU activities in Africa and in present engagement of international community in Afganisthan in particular (»to defend Europe out of Europe«) show all the complexity of being a global security actor. Such a role is still to a certain degree new in the conceptualization of Europe and its global appearance. Intensity and diversity of European security processes, not to speak about noticeable elements of their competitiveness, demand higher level coordination with full necessary political and military support. It is not only a rethorical question if Europe is at the moment capable of mastering it. The European presence in Asia is an important part of its global role, as we have already touched it. With OSCE and also Nato activities in Central Asia this dimension is

being gradually enhanced, too. But stronger outreach to Asia also brings issues of Pacific security on the agenda.

Global status in this case would mean to deal efficiently with Western Balkans issues as well as African, Asian and also Pacific ones, when the former also come on the agenda. If the current, so called new Nato and EU members in the past had some use of the slogan »think global act local« they have now partially to switch to »think global and participate global«. This would not mean that »act local« is oldfashioned, but that they will have to be capable of partially translating this »act local« to benefits and beneficiaries on a much larger scale.

The Role of Slovenia

Slovenia is the only double new member from the broader region. This result of both enlargements effects its foreign policy, activities and framework of action. Both memberships as a target never have been a sole point in the air which should be reached as soon as possible whatever the costs. They were not only main foreign policy priorities but above all tools how to transform societies, economies and also the national defence and security system. With this years' fulfillment, both goals were at the same time transformed to means for i.a. enhanced role of a security actor in South East Europe and in the Western Balkans in particular.

It is in the vital interest of Slovenia to contribute significantly to security and stability in the discussed region. Slovenia as a double new member is as safe as its neighbourhood is. Being part of both integrations enhances its spectrum of action, raises responsibility and expectation as well as the scale of demand. One would expect that its core activities referring to the Western Balkans could be as follows: a) transfer of its own experiences from the enlargement process to the region; b) constant support and encouragement of the regions potentials; c) understanding the region, its potentials and problems; d) promoting and explaining it to Europe and vice versa.

The way how to upgrade »think global act local« to »participate global« was perhaps best manifested during Slovene nonperma-

nent UN Security Council membership in 1998 – 1999. Those experiences will be put to a specific test during the next years OSCE Chairmanship and its much more concrete and daily challenges (Jazbec, 2004a). This could be an excellent opportunity for a new small country to go global in understanding, conceptualizing and participating and at the same time being able to remain local with executing concrete activities. While occupied with the here presented challenges the country will also get a chance to carve out additional and necessary political maturity on a larger scale.

It would be beyond ambitions of this paper to provide manuals for how to face these challenges and how to deal with concrete issues. The capability of dealing with them as a part of broader integration network will be decisive not only for Slovenia, as of now a constituent element of »go – participate global« process, but also to prove to which extent the new members of Nato and EU are ready to really fit in where they institutionally already belong.

Conclusion

A decade and a half after the end of the Cold War European security processes have undergone an intensive period of fragmentation and integration. Among current results one can mention the formation of EST, the noticeable ambition of going global and the management of its security processes. Globalizing European security points out necessary questions, like has it worked so far, will it work in future, how its management is going to look like etc.

Going global definitely means being capable of acting local first.

In Europe this would mean settling down open issues on the Western Balkans. In its current phase the best if not the only way would be to approach the region as a whole. It is very complex, interconnected and interdependent. Only within such a general approach one should focus on differentiation among states according to their development. In the security area it is MAP (Croatia, Macedonia, Albania) and PfP (BiH, Serbia and Montenegro) which form the division line – with the only intention to be capable of better management within the common framework.

Having in mind the reconfiguration of the set of values there is

one preposition which we would add to the previously suggested approach. If we would agree that historical experience in the region has created conflict as a basic means to solve problems and manage political life, then we could also agree that cooperation as a value and a means for solving open issues has to be adopted.

Cooperation instead of conflict would be the code. Cooperation means also trust and compromise and both lie in the fundamentals of the European ambition to go global.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Change of the Paradigm¹⁸

Introduction

The fifteenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War is by all means an appropriate opportunity to take a general view of the changes that occurred during the past fifteen years.

Assuming that the period concerned and, of course, the fall of the Berlin Wall represent one of the turning points in the modern history, we should evaluate the transitional period and its basic characteristics and do the same for the current period in order to be able to forecast the future. This analysis focuses on the global and structural changes in the international community and on some of its most important aspects. It tries to find out whether these changes have any common features and what would be their global consequences. It examines the nature and course of structural changes at the strategic level and the possibility for their development on the basis of a pattern or model. In other words, in this analysis we will try to prove that the recent turn of the century (which coincided with the turn of the millennium) has brought about changes in the social paradigm. Basically, the social paradigm is regarded as the broad unity of all relations between individuals, social groups and their national and supranational associations and the aspects of communication between them.

Some general characteristics of development until 1989

The end of the Cold War and the wave of changes which followed the revolution without the revolutionaries (Knežević, 2004) in

¹⁸ This article was originally published as an e-version by IFIMES, the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (www.ifimes.org) in October 2005 in Slovene, Bosnjak and English versions. It also appeared in the *Ifimes Yearbook 2004* (147-159). Translated from Slovene by IFIMES.

1989 – *Annus Mirabilis* – can be observed in a much more clear context fifteen years later. Due to the intensity, volume and dynamics of the changes this event can be compared with the major events in the written history of mankind.

A parallel may be drawn with the end of the Thirty Years War, which was ended by the Peace Congress of Westphalia in 1648. In order to understand the changes in the paradigm, we should take a closer look at the period between the Thirty Years War and the fall of the Berlin Wall covering about three and a half centuries.

Those few centuries were marked by the European domination of the world with a relatively changing composition of the main powers and the balance of their relations established on the basis of more or less controlled wars between them. It was during that period that the national state, the separation of ecclesiastical and secular authority and development of European (and world) history through the system of balance of changing imperial coalitions were formed. It was only by the end of the 19th century that noticeable movements causing long-term changes occurred in this rather closed group of main powers¹⁹, which controlled the world known at the time through maritime expansion of capital. The unification of Germany as well as Italy and the appearance of the USA in the international politics loosened the relations between the world superpowers, changed their configuration, deepened the opposing interests and led the international community into the First World War. Their conflicts crystallized and to a certain extent resolved after the end of the Second World War. The dominant and increasing constant in the following period was the ascent of the USA to the world superpower, which was confirmed during the course and at the end of the Cold War.

During this period the modern understanding of the world was founded (Cooper, 1996) and the relations and the rating system were established between the main actors, which was most evident in the previous century. National states are based on the principles of intangibility of borders and non-interference into internal matters, they train their armies for conflicts and make

19 A group of the most influential states comprises at least Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.

wars while human rights are only a relatively important notion for different political elites. Security is ensured through intimidation and an arms race while co-operation or opposition depends exclusively on momentary political interests.

However, this system experienced erosion and evolution already after the First World War with the League of Nations and after the Second World War with the establishment of the United Nations Organization. Both organizations strengthened the phenomenon of multilateralism in the international political scene as one of the prevailing principles for resolving disputes and ensuring global peace and security. The ravages of war and social devastation in Europe in the period from the beginning of the First World War till Stalin's death during the 1950s, when the first conditions for softening the rigid polarization of the blocks were created, can be compared with the Thirty Years War. The attempt to balance and loosen the world polarization was facilitated during the 1950s by the non-aligned movement and two decades later by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act (on the basis of which the present OSCE was founded). The emergence and development of the West European integration processes (especially the EU and NATO) and a series of political, economic and social crises shaking the Eastern (socialist) Europe, have contributed to further evolution of the concept of modern politics and its control over everyday life. The decolonization process, which resulted in a large number of new states also contributed significantly to the loosening of the monolithic polarization of blocks. Nevertheless, it still seems that during the period of the Cold War the world was regulated, safe and foreseeable and the actors had a hierarchical and continual influence. It is the modern paradigm of the world in which other "modern" concepts and values (e.g. state, diplomacy, international community, art, literature etc.) have their place.

The wave of changes and their consequences

However, *Annus Mirabilis* brought along a turnabout: the unification of Germany, the dissolution of three multinational hegemonic and socialistic states: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia

and Yugoslavia, with 22 new states emerging in their territory as well as the culmination of European integration and disintegration processes. The whole region faced democracy and market economy literally overnight, which caused a security vacuum and the revival of nationalistic movements. Old structures disintegrated and the illusions that sudden changes will bring prosperity soon disappeared. Two hundred years after the French Revolution, which was known not only for freedom, fraternity and equality but also for its violence, we are experiencing a velvet revolution without violence, which leads to freedom (Jazbec, 2004e; Knežević, 2004). The individual, his/her rights as well as social and personal emancipation have become the center of political interest. The era of heroes has ended; human rights have become the universal criteria of justice reminding us of the position of the handicapped and the marginalized. The revolution in communication technology and increasing accessibility of its products have increased the freedom and mobility of individuals, but also provided conditions for them to become more isolated and lonely.

These are recognizable elements of the new paradigm: "First of all, as the widest social phenomena the emergence of a new development paradigm should be mentioned. This paradigm encompasses the evolving of a social model based on knowledge and information as well as on their transfer and processing using high technologies. In the social context this represents on the one hand further individualization of human life and existence which has become less interdependent due to rapid scientific and technological development while on the other hand it presupposes greater interdependence and integration at the social (community) level which reduces the social entropy and increases the efficiency of those societies. Thus, we have marked increased individualization and independence at the level of individuals and at the same time increased social interdependence and integration at the level of the society." (Jazbec, 1999: 131)²⁰

20 The book was composed from 1987-1991 while the quoted part of the text was written in December 1990. The book was published on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The German translation appeared in summer of 2006 and the second Slovene edition in winter of 2006.

At the same time a completely different notion of security appeared after the end of the Cold War due to a changed security environment and new security threats and challenges. Those challenges have become dispersed, hardly or not at all foreseeable, non-conventional and combined. (Cvrtila, 2004:112; Donnelly, 2003:25; Rotfeld, 2003:76)²¹ This of course necessitates the reorganization of fight against those threats and challenges and at the same time questions the existing structures involved in the provision of security. The intensity in planning and realizing the enlargement processes of NATO as well as the EU is therefore not surprising. The enlargement of both integrations is accompanied by their intensive internal restructuring.²² NATO has lately been the target of criticism regarding the unnecessariness of its further existence. The main reason for its further functioning was supposed to be eliminated with the disintegration of the polarized blocks, what should prove it to be unable to deal with the new security challenges (Meyer, 2003). The United Nations have also been criticized for being a typical product of the situation at the end of the Second World War and as such unable to provide global peace and security in a completely different security environment. Nevertheless, the fact is that the functioning of UN was mainly oriented towards preventing wars between states at which they were successful since in the second half of the 20th century there were less wars than in the first half of the 20th century although the number of states increased four times during the same period. However, the United Nations has obviously failed to prevent civil conflicts although their mission has generated the basic principles of security for the people and intervention for humanitarian purposes (A More Secure World: 9-14). Criticism

21 Report of the UN High-Level Panel: the summary (2004:1) states that the modern concept of collective security is based on three pillars: today's threats know no national borders, they are linked with each other and should be dealt with at the global, regional and national levels.

22 Bennett (2004) points out two events which essentially influenced the process of NATO's transformation: the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 when NATO intervened after EU's failure and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA. According to Bennett the key challenge of the present time is to achieve consensus regarding the most appropriate strategy of fighting the threats posed by terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction.

has also been directed towards OSCE, although its ability to focus on the soft security offers possibilities for further functioning (Rotfeld, 2004).

The notion of security has therefore spread to the social, economic, environmental and other fields and it can be ensured only with increased co-operation of international stakeholders, who are not only national states and international organizations but - increasingly - also individuals, the civil society and non-governmental pressure groups. Due to their aggressive activities the latter sometimes become one of the key security threats. Instead of block confrontation we are threatened by terrorism, trafficking in drugs and human beings, light weapons, strengthening of international crime, corruption, unemployment, increasing needs for (or dependence on) energy, which is in decreasing supply and lack of drinking water. All this leads societies to a more and more vulnerable position.²³ Since we constantly want to improve our standard of living - which we do - the social systems are more and more complicated and vulnerable to simple means and threats and it is increasingly difficult to ensure security.

It seems that terrorism has been born anew and in combination with increasing availability of different and relatively simple weapons it has become an unpredictable and constant security threat (Bennett, 2004; Donnelly, 2004:30-31). As a rule, the victims are more and more often civilians, especially children, women and the elderly, i.e. individuals chosen at random. The most severe examples in the past few years were New York, Madrid, Budyenovsk, Moscow and Beslan when large numbers of civilians died in terrorist attacks (e.g. about 3000 in New York and about 500 in

23 The Report lists in the summary (2004:2) the following six groups of current security threats: firstly, economic and social threats (including poverty, infectious diseases and degradation of the environment), secondly, inter-state conflicts, thirdly, inner-state conflicts (including civil war, genocide and other atrocities), fourthly, nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, fifthly, terrorism, and sixthly, international organized crime.

However, it should be mentioned in this context that the number of victims of terrorist attacks in the first five years of the 21st century was less than five thousand while the recent largest natural catastrophe ever recorded (tsunami in the Indian Ocean in late December 2004 affecting the area from Indonesia to Kenya) took more than two hundred and fifty thousand lives.

the small provincial town of Beslan). Classical war clashes were rarely so destructive since the humanitarian law and conventions demand avoiding civil victims, especially children, who were, nevertheless, the main target in Beslan (Russia's Horror, 2004). It seems that the use of different weapons (of mass destruction as well as very simple and classical ones) by non-governmental groups is targeted mainly at civilians, especially children, women and the elderly, which clearly points to the emergence of a new paradigm.²⁴ It is therefore not surprising that the world seems to have changed completely and instead of its former static and balanced position it has entered the dynamic movement full of new, complicated and interdependent contradictions. The unknown, unrecognized and hardly predictable, has replaced the known and predictable.

The new development paradigm was also confirmed by the Report of the UN High-Level Panel, in which Secretary-General Kofi Annan determines the inseparable interdependence between development and security (A More Secure World, 2004: viii). Understanding security as the key development issue of the present time points to the necessity of complementary actions taken by security bodies and other stakeholders who can ensure global security only if they co-operate. The complementarity of security processes, which could be clearly noticed for the first time in managing European security processes, is gaining global connotation (Jazbec, 2002b:221-226). In this, both the inter-agency co-operation within individual national states (foreign, defense, interior and other ministries, intelligence services etc.) and the co-operation of national armies play an important role. Instead of fighting wars the armies of European States co-operate intensively. The urgent need to adapt to changed security circumstances requires among other the rightsizing of armies, their reorganization and professionalization and incorporation in the security and defense integrations (Jazbec, 2002b:238-42). One may say that we are witnessing the denationalization process in European armies, since it was their nationalization, which led them to wars

24 In various so-called "small wars" since 1990 more than 4 million victims were children and women (Donnelly, 2004:33).

in the past. Interference in the internal affairs of individual states, which used to be undesired or even prohibited, has today become the basis for functioning of numerous international institutions. Thus the basic activities of the Council of Europe and OSCE for example are institutionalized monitoring of human rights and the freedom of media. The EU and NATO expect their members to harmonize whole social structures, especially the security and defense systems. Transparency, co-operation and trust are the values, which have replaced exclusion and conflicts. The universal freedom of individual and his unappealable right to be protected even from his own state represent the orientation of values after the end of the Cold War.

The change of the paradigm

There is no more confrontation of blocks and the states of the northern and most of the southern hemisphere are not at war any more. However, there has been an immense increase in the number of inner-state conflicts caused and led by non-governmental groups which abuse the achievements of globalization (development of information technology and various kinds of weapons as well as the unprecedented availability of weapons left from the Cold War). The victims of those conflicts are primarily civilians. The basic principle of armies is no more their territorial dependence but their operability or ability to react. The development of modern societies makes them extremely vulnerable not only in the military sense but especially in terms of their social, economic, health and other systems.

If this paradigm is taken as a model and research instrument to present the widest context in which the social relations are determined as a whole, it is in principle possible to confirm the accuracy of the above presented view of the volume, dynamics and depth of changes after the end of the Cold War. The key change is the change in the security environment (Reiter, 2003) and its influence on the organization and functioning of social structures dealing with the provision of security. This security shift is followed by other aspects of changes (political, social,

economic, cultural etc.) affecting global societies after such radical changes.²⁵

According to Donnelly, a revolutionary change can be noticed every fifty years in the nature of military conflict caused by sociological, technological or other external factors. He perceives this process as the change of the paradigm. As examples he enumerates the introduction and development of the recruitment system during the Napoleonic Wars, development of quick firing guns in the mid 19th century, industrialization of military production and appropriate infrastructure during the period before the First World War and development of nuclear weapons and systems for its distribution during and immediately after the end of the Second World War (2004: 24). According to Donnelly we are now right in the middle of such sweeping changes, which started at the end of the Cold War and were accelerated with the events on September 11, 2001.²⁶

Taking into account the above time frames and development until 1989 when century-long trends can be observed in European political history one could agree with Donnelly's findings. He states that the period of duration of each paradigm lasts half a century. However, bearing in mind that the notion of paradigm (and its present change) is based mainly on the functioning of national states, their emergence and development as well as on the development of national armies which have been till now the key factor in ensuring peace and security, one must admit that the effects of individual paradigms extend over a much longer period of time.

The changes which the national armies underwent during the past fifteen years are mainly related to the functioning of the collective defense (and partly security) system in a changed global

25 A vivid example is the decline of social systems in most Eastern Europe immediately after the end of the Cold War with the introduction of the market economy. In the past, social systems functioned as a rule on the basis of state subsidies or budget funds, while the mechanisms of market economy no longer provided those funds automatically, which reflects especially in inefficiency of social functions.

26 Donnelly further states three key factors of those changes after the end of the Cold War: firstly, new global balance of power and its influence on the geostrategic importance of states, secondly, fast technological development, and thirdly, changed attitude to the use of army in western societies. (2004:24)

security environment and could be summarized in the following set of findings: During the past few centuries the national armies were primarily designed for national defense²⁷ and accordingly for independent functioning, while collective defense presupposes functioning within an alliance. Defending national states from aggression was the basic task of those armies while in alliance they have to defend from various threats. Defence from aggression against the state meant primarily functioning within the territory of own national state while an alliance presupposes functioning outside the territory of the state or even outside the territory of the alliance. The basic source of power for those armies in the past was their ability to mobilize its reserve forces while the capacity to react as a rule presupposes professional composition. National armies were organized for concrete tasks while collective forces have to be capable of carrying out various tasks.²⁸

Looking into the way national armies functioned during the period before the end of the Cold War one can find out that the practice (including aggressive wars) has been known since the period before the Napoleonic Wars. Even the several centuries long European domination over the known world was supported by those findings, therefore the functioning of the paradigm based on such military principles should be set in a much longer period of time. The same conclusion can be drawn by applying the criteria of emergence, development and functioning of a national state and some of its attributes (e.g. diplomacy). This corresponds also to the wider (art, literature, science, philosophy etc.) comprehension of the modern paradigm, which started with the period of Renaissance and lasted throughout most of the twentieth century. In any case, it was the end of the Cold War and the changes, which followed that eventually enabled the change of the paradigm to happen and to become identifiable.

What was regarded in the past few centuries as the absolute truth, the only practice, the rule and the motive power of history,

27 It should be stressed that in case of aggressive wars national armies operated outside their national territories (which, nevertheless, does not change the logic of demonstrating the difference in their functioning before and after the end of the Cold War).

28 Cvrtila who described the transformation of national defense and new tasks of armed forces made a similar comparison, though narrower. (2004:114)

has changed from the very bottom. The history of a national state encompassed ownership, management, control and protection of its own territory, of the inhabitants and of other resources, the national border being the sacred notion. The manner in which those issues were regulated determined the system of values and the structure of security, social and other systems. Totalitarianism and ideology were the prevailing features of the previous century and their end marked the expiration of the previous paradigm. Although its elements are and will be still present for some time, the new paradigm can already be clearly distinguished.

The paradigm, which expired during the past few years, can be regarded as encompassing several centuries. The most obvious proof perhaps arises from the above-mentioned fact that during that period the European main powers controlled global relations with accumulated and balanced power in various forms and through maritime expansion until the beginning of the 20th century when the USA gained important role in the international politics. As the Second World War ended and the Cold War started the leading European states were so exhausted in military and economic terms that the USA simply ousted them from the position of the monopolistic controller of global relations. Accordingly the history of the USA can be regarded as the process of constant expansion and development from a relatively weak state to the present global hegemonic power (Kagan, 2004). This transformation became apparent at the end of the Cold War when the USA became the dominant actor as the division of the world into blocks ended.²⁹

The year 1989 can be understood as a funnel through which the history decanted into a *camera obscura*, which changed its paradigm. We left the modern world and entered the post-modern world. It took us fifteen years of witnessing intense changes as well as unexpected and unpredictable events to realize that.

29 The global relations which will mark the new paradigm will be based on the fact that the USA, as Dahrendorf states, will remain the key global factor while China's role will continue to strengthen and will, in the foreseeable future, affect those relations with its political and military power. On the other hand, the future of Russia and of the states in its orbit, such as Ukraine, is uncertain, as is the future of Europe since its soft power does not mean much without a connection with the firm power of the USA. (2004).

The security vacuum, which appeared as one of the first and unexpected signs after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is apparently a long-term phenomenon. Although one may argue that the East European revolution in 1989 passed without violence it can be observed that the violence has merely spread out and manifested mainly through increasing terrorist attacks. Due to globalization changes, which brought about an unprecedented availability of just about anything, terrorism became one of the main threats in the world today. It could be even argued that the period of uncertainty has returned causing a post-modern topicality of Hobbs's war of everyone against everybody. It could be regarded as a post-modern Thirty Years War in which it is very difficult to foresee concrete forms of emergence or outbreak of terrorism and to anticipate or plan concrete ways of fighting each individual form in which those outbreaks occur.

The change of the paradigm is therefore most evident in the change of the security environment, threats and manner of addressing them. This is not surprising since in the history of human societies security has been of key importance for their survival and functioning. However, the present resolving of not only security but also political, economic, social, religious and other global issues seems to be not well enough considered since it largely generates further authoritarian approach which increases uncertainty and gives room to terrorism (Russia's Horror, 2004).³⁰

Conclusion

There is no doubt that a change of the paradigm has occurred during the past fifteen years. The turning point was the end of the Cold War in 1989.

After several centuries of European global ruling which was based on the concept of national state and oriented towards ensuring security of states (and indirectly of their citizens) due to inter-state wars, we are witnessing an increasingly dominant role

³⁰ The author of the quoted editorial from *The Economist* argues that fundamentalism would have very few followers were it not for the miserable living conditions of the local inhabitants.

of the USA and the growth of inner-state conflicts which make it difficult to ensure security especially to the citizen as an individual. Owing to the integration processes, especially in the northern hemisphere, states are not at war with each other any more. Instead, their armies intensively co-operate to tackle new and different challenges and threats concerning all the aspects of functioning of the modern societies at different levels. This requires on the one hand accelerated and strengthened co-operation between the states and other stakeholders and on the other hand inter-agency co-operation within states in order to deal with security challenges and threats.

In the post-modern value matrix the individual and his universal importance is placed on the first place which is evident from the fact that a person can resort to international institutions for protection from violence or injustice committed against him/her by the state whose citizen he/she is. At the same time in communication with others the individual (also as *zoon politikon*) has to take into account the principle of co-operation and consensus instead of the principle of conflict, which has been primarily applied till now.

The change of the paradigm enabled among other the emergence of a number of new states in the wider European space. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War a large part of those states also became members of NATO and the EU thus fulfilling their basic foreign-policy goals. By achieving those original goals, i.e. international integration, deideologization and ensuring functioning in a safe international environment, those states gained means with which they can constantly ensure welfare and security to people living in their territories.³¹ Paradoxically – or logically – goals converted to means.

Finally, the task of defining the new development paradigm no doubt poses problems at least at first glance. The simplest and most convenient approach would be to apply Cooper's classifica-

31 In case of Slovenia this has an important meaning: a millennium after the first written record of the Slovenian language and four hundred and fifty years after the first book was published, the Slovenian language has been, for almost fifteen years, an official language of a nation which has its own internationally recognized state with all the necessary attributes (Jazbec, 2004:641).

tion of states and their attributes into pre-modern, modern and post-modern (1996) and use the term “post-modern paradigm”.³² Since the paradigm is discussed here as the basic concept at the strategic level and taking into account the initial stage of its emergence, the term “post-modern” can be used as the starting point. However, in the long run, the definition and detail grounds for such term will certainly become one of the important issues, which will have to be dealt with appropriately.

32 The term “post-modern” was introduced by A. Toynbee in 1934 as the name for the European civilization after the modern period (modern times) encompassing both the continuation of and the opposition to the spirit of the modern world. In the beginning of the second half of the 20th century the term spread to various fields expanding their horizons (e.g. philosophy /Lyotard/, sociology /Habermas/, literature /Eco/ etc.).

Part Two
THE WESTERN BALKANS

Defence Reform in the Western Balkans: The Way Ahead³³

Introduction

This text aims to present and analyze defense reform processes in the European sub region of the Western Balkans. For this reason, it will also take a look at the countries concerned, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Macedonia and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (S-M).³⁴ This will be done by recognizing trends in the defense reform process and, consequently, in generalizing their characteristics. As a follow up, recommendations for the way ahead will be produced and laid down, having in mind *first*, the specifics of the sub region and its countries, and *second*, the substance of the text and the method of reaching conclusions. We can presume that this would provide us with a better understanding of the similarities and differences of the countries concerned, and enable us to draw useful general conclusions.

Therefore, this paper will focus on understanding the reform process and its various elements (like adoption and implementation of strategic-doctrinal documents, rightsizing and modernization of armed forces, etc), with a brief look at the changes of the South East European security environment (stabilization of the region, the effects of dual enlargements, stockpiles, etc).³⁵

33 *This article was originally published as a DCAF Policy Paper in spring 2005. www.dcaf.ch*

34 The following references support the mentioned listing of the Western Balkans countries: Caparini, 2004:251; Ifantis, 2001; Jazbec, 2004d; Pantev, 2001; Watkins, 2004a, etc. Regarding the name 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', it should be pointed out that the name 'Macedonia' or the 'Republic of Macedonia' is used in formal proceedings within DCAF. Therefore, the same approach is applied in this paper.

35 'Rightsizing' seems to be the focal point of each defence reform case. It enables us to define, understand, implement, and adapt the whole process. Therefore, it is up to each country to find out what is the right size of its armed forces. This understanding has to include the country's history, tradition, social environment, welfare, as well as its security environment. Once defined and articulated, this term should constantly be checked in its concrete adequacy referring to the changes in the environment. Hence, rightsizing would have a different notion in different circumstances and in different periods of time. Its substance is therefore not easy to cope with, thus requiring careful and flexible defense planning and evaluation.

This would mean that we understand the reform process within the overall post-Cold War context, which provided us with a fundamentally changed security environment, and threats, challenges, as well as vulnerabilities deriving from it.³⁶

Among the most important changes which concern armed forces, one could surely list the following: the end of the era of bipolarity and the disappearance of the known enemy; the need to form reaction forces (particularly during the first Gulf War), which resulted in the process of changes in size and structure of the armed forces; the decrease in defense spending, with a consequent decrease in military research activities and their applications, providing the growing technological gap between Europe and the USA; the surplus of military manpower, and a drastic decrease in interest of youth for military service. Armed forces of new or newly established countries were, generally speaking and apart from this, faced with the following problems in particular: large numbers of territorially-bound forces which were over structured and oversized, drastically lacking resources, and with a decreasing living standard; and which were also psychologically as well as linguistically unprepared to start cooperating with the former enemy (Jazbec, 2002:38-42). In return, all this has definitely changed the understanding and operationalising of security as one of the most complex social terms.³⁷

36 Today's threats are primarily unconventional, combined, dispersed and more diverse, less visible and less predictable, difficult to address, etc. Following a recent UN Report, "[t]here are six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead: economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; inter-state conflict; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime" (United Nations, 2004:2). According to a recent EU Report, Europe's security "...is confronted by a number of key threats: terrorism, in particular catastrophic terrorism that acts worldwide and seems willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular in combination with international terrorism; regional conflicts, which become themselves a source of other threats like extremism, terrorism, state failure, organized crime and WMD proliferation; state failure, often due to bad governance, creating the breeding ground for other threats like organized crime and terrorism; organized crime, which has developed an important international dimension" (European Union, 2004:9-10).

37 We could speak about collective security, which "...rests on three basic pillars. Today's threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected and must be addressed at the

Further implementation of defense reforms in the Western Balkans will without any doubt encourage integration of the sub region and its countries in the international community as well as the stabilization of the only remaining hotspot in Europe. The countries of the Western Balkans have to play an active role in this process and show constant progress. They have to enhance the role of their institutions and further implement modern standards in the defense area. This will bring them further away from the danger of becoming failed states. This paper should evaluate how far the reform process has come and what still has to be done.

Therefore, our intention is *first*, to summarize and generalize the achievements and processes of defence reforms in the Western Balkans, and *second*, to try to show the way ahead in this endeavour. For these reasons, the author draws heavily from various and numerous sources, including from his own broad experience while serving as State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, having had an opportunity to contribute to the process discussed.³⁸ Hence, this paper is a product of a theoretician and an empirical insider. It is the author's strong belief that a comparative approach with the aim of generalizing both experiences and further steps in the defence reform process is both advantageous and instructive.

It should be pointed out a how important it is to bear in mind the fact that defence reform is only part of security sector reform (including civil-military relations, which we will not touch upon in this paper). Discussing the former we go deeper in the substance, while remaining firmly within the context of the latter. This complexity does not make our task easier, though it may well take us to a more comprehensive and valid outcome.

global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today's threats" (United Nations, 2004:1). Therefore no player can achieve and guarantee durable security alone, but has to rely on an interagency cooperation: "[m]ilitary instruments can and do play a role, but in most cases intelligence, police, judicial, economic, financial, scientific and diplomatic means will be at least as important" (European Union, 2004:10).

38 From the methodological point of view the author draws significantly from using the method of 'observing with one's own participation' (Gilli, 1975).

Presentation of the Reform Process and its Elements

The Defence Reform Process

The issue of defense reform in the Western Balkans is complex and important. It presents a huge challenge for all countries concerned and is a test of capability and willingness to adopt and implement the rules of behaviour and functioning along the current, not only but primarily, Euro-Atlantic standards in the field of the defence. Conceptualisation and implementation of these reforms is a practical necessity on their way to integration with the international community.

There could be no question whether or not the reform process is a demanding, resource intensive, constant and painful effort to establish the defence system, and the armed forces in particular. It must be carefully planned, sensitively shaped in its implementation, and during the course of time constantly adapted, accompanied by strong political support. It requires clear understanding of the security environment, capability of translating threats and challenges into adequate force plans as a part of an overall strategic assessment, and the ability to achieve full governmental and parliamentary support, the latter being expressed primarily in providing sufficient resources to address threats and challenges. Perhaps these could serve as a basic formula for understanding the process:

- *First*, recognize the threats;
- *Second*, conceptualize plans for the force structure needed to address these threats;
- *Third*, provide sufficient means to implement these plans. The process as such – dynamic, ongoing, and depending on changes in the security environment and on the inflow of resources – comprises our understanding of defense reform.

It would, of course, be difficult to say there is something like a clearly accepted and agreed upon definition of defense reform. Nevertheless, one can certainly develop a clearer understanding of the process discussed and its basic elements from

different sources.³⁹

If we presume that NATO (through its programmes like Partnership for Peace) is among the main promoters of defense reform in the Euro-Atlantic area, we can clearly state that defence reform is “...as one of the top-priority objectives for both NATO members and Partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/ Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP) community”, and even more so “...in the case of Membership Action Plan (MAP) Partners [where] defense reform is considered to be [the] top-priority” (Katsirdakis, 2002:189). Although it is understandable that reform is perceived differently in different countries, at least “NATO members usually refer to three ‘baskets’ of ideas, or three areas of consideration, of defense reform” (ibid, p. 190):

- Defence restructuring and reform of defense management practices and institutions;
- Development of defense capabilities required to meet both new and traditional defence-related challenges; and
- Action that will increase countries’ ability to contribute to NATO-led crisis response operations.

Broadly, one could understand defence reform as a process “... which implies a change in the ways of doing business, of mentality on defense related issues, of objectives, of resource allocations, and of priorities” (ibid). Thus understood, we could put down that “[t]he main objective of the defense reform is to increase the overall capabilities of the armed forces, [while] the main characteristics are: downsizing, modernization, integration, interop-

39 Two primary sources for the following conceptualization of the defense reform and its elements should be mentioned here. First, Katsirdakis (2002) presents a highly useful picture of reform, its various elements, aspects and actors. Second, the author’s own experience from his MoD period, when as State Secretary he shared in an opportunity to create the process with which Slovenia achieved membership in NATO (e.g. see 2005b). This in particular would mean that his theoretical and empirical expertise are combined and merged in this paper. During 2000-2004 the author has met in person most of the decisive actors and foreign experts on the defence reform area in the subregion, discussed the process and shared experiences with them. A number of them are quoted in the country presentations (e.g. Bučkovski, Davinić, Edmunds, Gareljić, Ilijevski, Katsirdakis, Polić, Shalamanov, Simić, Turković, Watkins, etc). For an overview of the reform process characteristic in Central and Eastern Europe see also Donnelly (2002).

erability, [and] its aim is to create a small, modern, effective, deployable, interoperable force” (Watkins, 2004a:6). The views presented here could serve as a suitable starting point for the understanding and analysing the topic of our interest in this paper.

Basic Elements of the Process

In discussing various elements of the defence reform process we will focus our attention on presenting four primary aspects:

- *First*, the strategic and other documents necessary to develop a conceptual orientation of the whole defense reform;
- *Second*, issues or areas where the reform is being implemented;
- *Third*, the characteristics of armed forces achievable through the reform;
- *Fourth*, some basic principles for executing the process.

First, the point of departure for the reform process is without any doubt the need to define strategic and defense-related documents. This includes above all security strategy, defence strategy, a long-term development plan of armed forces, the financial aspects of the process (budgeting), as well as a strategic defense review. The latter is an umbrella document, complex in its structure and general in approaching the substance of reform. It could only be concluded after the most important documents are adopted and the whole process is laid down in its interdependence. The evaluation of the security environment and its translation into necessary and appropriate legislation is the starting point of the defense reform process. This also includes the “...adaptation of existing legislation to meet new understandings” (Katsirdakis, *ibid*), and the careful monitoring of further changes in the security environment.

Second, there is practically no area, which will not be touched or dealt with during the reform process. If we try to list the most important ones we will have to include an appropriate defence planning system; adequate, affordable resource allocation; a proper and efficient budgetary system; clear, transparent and efficient procurement procedures; modernization of the armed forces; changes in size and structure of the armed forces; human

management systems; appropriate social programmes to deal with the potentially adverse effects of the reform; adequate public communication strategies to develop understanding and public support of the defense reform efforts; a simple and efficient decision making system in defense related issues; etc. Many of these lead quite naturally to the conclusion of establishing professional armed forces, as opposed to conscript-based forces (including mixed approaches). This goes along with the changes in the current security environment; with ever-advancing military technology, which demands highly skilled and educated soldiers to master it; and the decreasing interest of young generations in participating in military service.

Third, through this process the armed forces, being the most important target of reform, achieve a new shape and evolve. If we sum up the various references used in this paper, the aim is to achieve an affordable, deployable, educated, effective, equipped, interoperable, modern, skilled, small, well-trained force.⁴⁰ One of the primary means in achieving this is the process of *rightsizing*. It comes mainly in the form of downsizing, accompanied either with reestablishing or establishing the armed forces.⁴¹

40 The author is of the opinion that some of these terms express more the political ambition rather than the rational and clearly measurable force characteristic. In his opinion the criteria to amount the force should stem from the country's specific needs (environment, resources, and goals) and not from a rather abstract way of comparison (like efficient vs. inefficient, modern vs. outdated, small vs. big, etc). From this point of view terms like affordable, adequate, deployable, and interoperable are more appropriate, because they draw from single country specifics.

41 Katsirdakis (2002:193-194) speaks about the following forms of defense restructuring: first, building armed forces where none exist (for example in the Baltic nations); second, downsizing forces where their size is disproportionate to current security and resource realities (for example, Russia, Ukraine); third, rebalancing forces where the ratio of regular officers to NCOs and soldiers is highly skewed and unrealistic, or the constitution of the forces does not reflect the ethnic or other makeup of the population (for example, in Central Asia), or the existing structures represent odd formations put together for specific reasons that should be corrected eventually (for example the forces in BiH); fourth, tailoring defense structures to new defense perspectives and priorities in the cases of countries where the role of the defense forces is perceived differently now compared to the past, and where new structures are created and former structures are dropped (for example, Romania, Bulgaria); fifth, making forces affordable where current economic realities can no longer support the structures from the past (for example, Albania); and sixth, some Partner countries may have to undergo more than one form of defense restructuring, depending on their circumstances.

Fourth, the reform process should be guided by basic, proven principles. The most important include a coordinated interagency approach (hence the reform process should be designed as a national project), transparency (particularly in planning, budgeting, procurement, and personnel issues), proper management of socio-economic issues of reform, and democratic control of the armed forces. Within this context one should add two brief remarks. First, the process depends highly on the amount of defense expenditures, and second, it is even more important how efficiently and rationally these resources are allocated.

As regards the success of defense reform in the Western Balkans, it is important to keep in mind that so far they have been driven to an important, if not primary, extent by involvement of the international community. NATO's outreach has played an indispensable role and reforms are one of the priority issues, carried out in particular through its various programmes (EAPC; PFP; MAP; and the Planning and Review process, known as PARP). These programmes are "...a vehicle to promote essentially the same vision of defence reform, depending on each Partner's [needs]" (Katsirdakis, 2002:193). Also, in the two countries from the subregion which are not PFP members, namely BiH and S-M, NATO is present through different forms of assistance and cooperation.

A General Overview

Trends and Characteristics

Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War and almost a decade after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the subregion of the Western Balkans remains the only, at least in security terms, unfinished business in Europe: Macedonia seems now on a better track but the large demonstrations recently against the decentralization law show that NATO and the EU must still keep a careful eye on the situation. Serbia and Montenegro as well as Bosnia are not yet members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are still wondering when they will be able to join an Alliance which has taken in no fewer than ten new members over the last five years. The Balkans thus has

not yet been either fully stabilized or integrated. (Shea, 2004)

If the already mentioned should be taken as a starting point for a general overview of the results reached so far, there are plenty of reasons to continue with the defense reform process. Having in mind the fact that only five years ago the sub region was a mixture of introverted and isolated states, with a number of conflicts and open issues unsettled, this is even more important. The shadows of the Bosnian war were still reflecting the past decade of disaster, isolation and conflict. With the death of the Croatian leader Tudjman and the imprisonment of the Serbian leader Milošević at the turn of the century, stakes rose higher and expectations brightened. However, the events that followed showed the whole spectrum of difficulty regarding the execution of overall reform, defense reform included. The latter managed to start a process of reengineering defense structures and armed forces in particular, which were still under the influence of both an outdated heritage from the former socialist Yugoslavia (and Albania), and the Bosnian war (Albania and Macedonia excluded, although each having their own similar and dominantly negative experiences).

Several patterns emerge from this matrix: BiH, Croatia and S-M were in the midst of the Bosnian war, consequently also parties in the DPA; while Macedonia remained outside, although on the edge of a civil war; and Albania, still recovering after almost a decade of collapse, with its armed forces brought to the brink of dismantlement. However, Croatia recovered rather quickly and managed in spring 2002 to join Albania and Macedonia in the Adriatic Charter group of NATO candidate countries. BiH and S-M remained behind due to difficult, though inevitable, tasks to be done - in particular establishing one ministry of defence and military as well as providing full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Due to a highly complicated state structure in both cases, defense sectors included, reform processes have taken a rather slow and inefficient path.

Apart from being marred by current security challenges (organised crime, trafficking, drugs, and corruption), the sub region

also suffers from past military burdens. The area is full of military forces and matériel, which together with international forces exceed figures from times of the former socialist Yugoslavia (Albania excluded). These old, useless, and partially destroyed stockpiles and installations present a heavy burden, having no future utility (Jazbec, 2002b:223). To sum up, the heritage of both the Cold War and the Bosnian War is disastrous, leaving huge surpluses of weaponry, infrastructure, and personnel. This usually stalls the beginning of a reform process, which manifests itself in the unwillingness and unpreparedness of "...the armed forces' leadership [because they] rally to protect and preserve their military systems, striving to retain as much of the old force structure and infrastructure as possible" (Donnelly, 2002:37). Such cases have resulted in situations when "...all too often, the military establishment closed ranks to protect itself" (*ibid*). It is all the more difficult to start a thorough and difficult, albeit necessary, defense reform process in such circumstances.

Defence reform processes in the Western Balkans, however difficult and complex, will also have to deal with these problems. This presents a huge burden not only for the defense sector alone, but also for the whole society, the environment, and the international community. Before proceeding to the country presentations, one also should ask the question 'what is the *de facto* driving force behind the intention of these countries to approach defense reform?' Is it a genuine desire or rather the pressure from the West, or merely shortage of resources?⁴² Whatever the true answer is, reform processes are a given, yet long-term success will, to a major extent, depend on the answers to the previous question.

⁴² The intent of country presentations is not to give a full and detailed account of each country, but merely to point out some of the most important evolutionary characteristics related to the issue of defense reform. From one point of view, we try to focus on those aspects which would lead us to a generalization of the issue discussed in order to show the way ahead, and from another point of view, there is already a number of solid, useful and indepth case studies, some of which are also listed in the references. The author of this paper would not like in any case to compete with the latter, but would, however, like to present a text in the full meaning of the former.

Country Presentations⁴³

*Albania*⁴⁴

During the last decade of the previous century, Albania witnessed an extremely difficult transitional period and "...has experienced every sort of crisis that a state could possibly undergo..." (Pasha, 2002:173). This has exposed the weakness of democratic institutions and their building process as the major security challenge to the country. Due to several crises and structural shocks the wider social environment could not possibly support defense reform, in particular having in mind the fact that "...the events in 1997 and 1998 resulted in widespread looting of military establishments, and as a result, the mass possession of weapons is a particular problem" (Turković, 2002:211). It is not surprising that "...defense reform has not gone very far" (Katsirdakis, 2002:202-203). This again has not been so much influenced by the events in the closer security environment as it has been by "...frequent changes of defense, a lack of any realistic resource management system, and a tendency to develop plans for force structures that try to save the jobs of the existing officer corps..." (ibid). The situation has changed in the first years of this decade, when "...[with] assistance of the international community experts and advisors, Albanian politicians and security experts changed quickly and willingly their views on national security..." (Starova, 2004b.:241-245). Basic strategic documents were adopted, like the National Security Strategy and the Defence Policy (both in February 2000), the Military Strategy (August 2002), while the White Book is still being prepared. These have provided plans for the implementation of the reform process up to 2010 and have paved the way for the approximation of the defense-military legal background with the NATO, following changes in the security environment and current trends in

⁴³ Figures and data for the country presentations are picked out from various references, which sometimes differ for several reasons. The author follows the opinion that, as far as the defence expenditure figures are concerned, SIPRI (2004) is the most reliable source.

⁴⁴ For more on Albania see: Caparini, 2004:259-262; Ifantis, 2001:108-109; Katsirdakis, 2002:189-204; Ordanoski, 2002:159-171; Pasha, 2002:173-182; Starova, 2004a.:125-139; Starova, 2004b.:241-255; Turković, 2002:211-231.

the PfP area. The Military Strategy set three main goals of defense reform, namely "...to develop a professional army, reducing the number of conscripts and increase defense budget per 0.1% of GDP annually till 2010" (Caparini, 2004:260).

As far as changes in force size and structure through 2010 are concerned, "[t]he total number of the Albanian Armed Force in peacetime will be 16.500 soldiers out of 31.000, which is the present number of soldiers. In wartime, the respective number is 35.000 out of 120.000" (Starova, *ibid*). According to these plans, the present military budget (1.3% GDP) will amount to 2% in 2010. It amounted to 2.5% in 1994, then steadily decreased to 1.1% in both 1998/99, and then began to increase and reached 1.2% in 2002 (SIPRI, 2004:359). The structure of defense expenditures for 2003 showed that "[o]perational expenses cover 91% of the defense budget, out of which 76% are allotted for the personnel, 15% for maintenance and 9% for equipment" (Starova, *ibid*). During that period the following areas received most of the resources: training of the military forces, support with modern equipment, and doctrine development (*ibid*).

This brings our attention to the three most important characteristics of defense reform during the last years: the downsizing of the armed forces, the increase in defense expenditures, and the increase of operational capability. There is no doubt that the reform process is being strongly supported by the MAP activities and Adriatic Charter cooperation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina⁴⁵

It seems that the most complex state structure in the sub region lays at the foundation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Created by the DPA, the country consists of three nations and two entities, numerous local authorities, and a three-member state presidency. This has also reflected itself in a no less complicated organization of the defense sector: "[b]y the end of war, BiH de jure had two

45 For more on Bosnia and Herzegovina see: Caparini, 2004:262-267; Katsirdakis, 2002:189-204; Pejanović, 2003:204-214; Šolaja, 2004:205-214; Turković, 2004:141-156.

armies, and de facto three.”⁴⁶ This resulted in two separate defense systems, originating from classical territorial defence doctrine, none of which were capable of defending anything but merely maintaining a rough equilibrium among the three armies. Due to the slow establishment and evolution of state functions, both deriving from the previously mentioned complexity, real defense reform processes were only initiated as late as spring 2003.

The presence of the international community in BiH, SFOR in particular, encouraged slowly growing cooperation in the defense sector, which was supported by an emerging ambition for PfP and also NATO membership (expressed by the Presidency in June 2001). The crucial step forward was the decision of High Representative Ashdown in May 2003 to establish an internationally composed Defence Reform Commission with the aim to prepare the necessary laws, to harmonize defense structures with PfP standards, and to unify the armed forces command structures. Additional efforts were made towards achieving “...proper state-level command and control over the armed forces; effective parliamentary oversight of the armed forces; and, a state-level budget for defense” (Turković, 2004:141). As far as force size is concerned, “...by the end of the year 1995, the armed forces numbered 430000 troops. By early 2004 they had been reduced to a total of 21000 regulars, 12600 conscripts and 360000 reserves, with further cuts expected in the future” (Caparini, 2004:263, footnote 55). Referring to the latter, the authorities “...announced in February 2004 that it would make major reductions to the BiH armed forces, downsizing to 12000 professional soldiers in three ethnically based brigades: 8000 in the Federation Army and 4000 in the Bosnian Serb Army” (Caparini, 2004:265). However vague and restrained, the reform process had obviously begun, with downsizing as the focal point and including related activities,

⁴⁶ The Army of the Federation of BiH consisted of the BiH Army, mostly a Muslim-Bosniac national armed component, and the Croatian Defence Council (the HVO), an armed component of Croats. The army of the Republika Srpska almost completely consisted of Serbs from the Republika Srpska. The armies did not have any contact, except those indispensable within the Standing Committee for Military Matters (SCMM), Standing Military Commission, inspection controls consistent with Regional Arms Control Agreement, and periodical activities initiated and organized by the international community (Solaja, 2004:206).

such as restructuring defense expenditures.⁴⁷

In September 2003 the Commission managed to reach an agreement ...on recommendations for a legislative solution that will keep two entity armies, but also one headquarters commanded under the supervision of the Presidency of BiH. The state will have, in accordance with these recommendations, its own Ministry of Defence, and a common command of the armies at the state level. (Turković, 2004:150) In the same year the BiH Defence Policy document was adopted. It is hardly imaginable that any of these changes would occur without constant, firm and strict pressure and guidance of the international community. However, having in mind the extremely difficult recent years, the progress achieved so far is clearly encouraging and could stimulate development in other areas as well. This also gives additional meaning to the issue of PfP membership, which "...is important to us because it is a recognition of certain achievements and motivation for reforms in other areas" (JDW, 2004a:34).⁴⁸

The future path of an overall reform process, defense included, will depend from one point of view on simplifying and strengthening the complex federal system of government, and from another point of view on encouraging Bosnia's own elected institutions to take over greater responsibility for the process. The EU should, particularly now with Operation Althea underway, spend additional resources to support positive development of defence

47 SIPRI (2004:359) refers to a figure of 9.0% GDP for the year 2000 as the defense expenditure amount, which is the result of an OSCE audit. One should also bear in mind that "...the country has spent more than 5 percent of GDP in defense every year since the conclusion of the 1995 DPA" (Caparini, 2004:263).

48 The evolution and results of defense reform so far could be summed up as follows: "[t]he armed forces consist of 12,000 professionals and some further 60,000 reservists. There are also up to 10,000 conscripts very year. The ratio between forces in the Federation and Republika Srpska is two to one. That means there are 8,000 soldiers on the Federal side, and 4,000 in Republika Srpska. The same ratio, more or less, also applies to the reservists and to the number of generals. We now speak of the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as two elements of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are more and more elements of jointness rather than of division. There is now, for example, one law on defence and a whole range of different policies, covering areas such as resource and personnel management, as well as training and doctrine, which are either already being applied everywhere or will be very soon. We can still identify differences, but there are more and more common elements" (Radovanović, 2004).

reform (integrating the Bosnian army into Euro-Atlantic security structures, and attaining military and functional interoperability). Having in mind that the integration process is the most effective tool for consolidating and strengthening the Bosnian state, this is even more important.

*Croatia*⁴⁹

Croatia's defense reform process started roughly five years ago, after the death of the country's first president Tudjman and the political change, brought about by the parliamentary election, which followed. Conditions for defense reform at first seemed appropriate: "[a]lthough Croatia became a member of PfP in May 2000, it was only in 2002 that it intensified its defence reform programme, having received unsatisfactory signals from Brussels" (Watkins, 2004a:5). The process was encouraged with admission of Croatia to MAP in May 2002 and simultaneously receiving the NATO candidate country status. A move from plans to concrete steps followed with more radical reform under the first female defense minister in the sub region, Željka Antunović, who came into office in July that year.

While an increase in capabilities had been set as the main aim of the reforms, the areas, which needed immediate attention, were personnel, budgetary and procurement procedures (particularly in the medium and long-term), and policy implementation (*ibid*). It seems that a lack of expert staffing in the form of foreign advice hindered the efforts of previous years, while the depoliticisation of the military and a difficult, but improving, economic situation proved not to be main obstacles. During last few years basic strategic documents were adopted, for example the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy (both in 2002), the Military Strategy (in 2003), and several laws on defense issues – among them the Law on Defence and the Military Service Law, both in 2002, as well as the Long-term Development Plan for the Croatian

⁴⁹ For more on Croatia see: Caparini, 2004:267-270; Edmunds, 2003c; Gareljčić, 2004:217-233; Polić, 2003:17-20; Staničić, 2004:157-164; Tatalović, 2004:149-161; Watkins, 2004a; Watkins, 2004b:136-148.

Armed Forces (CAF) and the Government Working Plan for the period 2004-2008. The size of the CAF was defined by the Decision on the Size, Composition and Mobilization Development of the CAF in 2002. It set down approximately 30,000 peacetime personnel, including 8,000 conscripts, which together with 110,000 wartime personnel make a total strength of some 140,000 (Watkins, 2004a:8). Also the first Defence Review and the Study on the Professionalisation of the CAF are being prepared; the former scheduled to have been completed in 2004 (Caparini, 2004:269). These documents "...are based on the principle of conceptual and legal order in the area of national security and defense" (Tatalović, 2004:152), which makes a solid background for preparing the Strategic Defence Review.

Institutional reform of the defense ministry followed; it was restructured, reduced in size, and the General Staff (GS) was brought under its command. Nevertheless, personnel issues seemed to dominate the reform process, due to the oversized CAF and high personnel expenses. They amounted to over 65% of the defense budget, leaving no more than 5% for modernisation. Defence expenditures on the whole have been continuously decreasing in recent years: from 9.4% of GDP in 1995 to 5% in 1998, and 2.5% in 2002 (SIPRI, 2004:360), with 2.2% as a target figure for the coming years.

Although in recent years Croatia "...fulfilled important preconditions to improve its security status and initiated armed forces reorganization" (Tatalović:159), the following seem to be the main challenges in the future: the continued reform of legislative documents; addressing the continued 'confusion' in institutional relationships (especially between the MoD, the GS and the president); the improvement in education in military security issues (including English language proficiency); addressing civil-military relations; and raising public awareness and interest in defence issues (Watkins, 2004a:11). Defence reform in Croatia obviously is progressing, but perhaps without enough strategic vision and most probably being driven primarily by outside pressure and short term goals. However, reform potentials seem to be sufficient, receiving strong support and expertise from internationally binding frameworks (MAP, PfP).

Macedonia⁵⁰

The ambition to establish a defense system following current Euro-Atlantic trends and to become part of the wider transcontinental integration process was incorporated into the very beginning of the Macedonian state. The aim has been to build its own defense system and to incorporate its defense strategy into collective defense and security (Bučkovski, 2004:195). From this point of view the reform process started early and has been, though rather slow in the first decade, constant. It was characterized in the past decade by the fact that Macedonia was not involved in the war in Bosnia, but found itself on the edge of the civil war during 2001.

During the last few years the reform process has advanced, partly due to the successful incorporation of various and numerous foreign assistance as well as PfP and MAP activities. The government decided in May 2003 to conduct a Strategic Defence Review, which was reflected in the adoption of the new National Security and Defence Strategy as well as the Policy Framework that same year. This legal framework aimed to reshape the military from territorial defense to deployability and sustainability. The areas of main concern were the reduction of personnel, the adequate representation of ethnic minorities in the military in accordance with the Ohrid Agreement, the full equipping and training of personnel, as well as modernization (Bučkovski, 2004:200-203). The issue of force restructuring is dealt with in the Resolution on Defence and Armed Forces Transformation, adopted in the parliament in May 2004, which aims to "...have an active component of about 8,600 including a reserve component of about 5,000" (ibid). Plans also include a fully professionalised army by 2008 (Caparini, 2004:271). According to governmental decision, the defense budget will in the future amount to between 2.3% to 2.6% GDP and is expected to decrease by 4.4% in real terms. It amounted to 3% in 1996, was steadily decreasing to 1.8% in

50 For more on Macedonia see: Bučkovski, 2004:195-204; Caparini, 2004:270-273; Ilievski, 2004:165-174; Ordanoski, 2002:159-171.

1999, and began slowly to increase to 2.8% in 2002, with an unexpected, but logical jump to 6.6% in 2001 (SIPRI, 2004:360). Personnel expenditures are to be about 50% of the available funds, operations and maintenance are to be reduced to about 30%, and equipment expenditures are to be increased to about 20% of the available budget (Bučkovski, 2004:203).

One could get a strong impression that the high level of intensive cooperation with the international community has paid off well for Macedonia. With the successful outcome of the EU-led Operation Concordia in late 2003, when the Berlin Plus formula was activated for the first time, defense reform process should be well on its way. It has been strongly driven by NATO's Open Door policy, reconfirmed at the Alliance's Istanbul Summit, and by the dynamic cooperation of the three MAP and Adriatic Charter countries. Additionally, the issue of defense reform and NATO membership enjoys high support in public opinion. It seems that after the crisis experienced during 2001, the activities on defense sector were enthusiastically resumed (Compare Katsirdakis, 2002:203).

Therefore it may easily be that the defense reform process, at least on a mid-term basis, could turn out as a success. This would, without any doubt, send a strong message to the sub region and to countries on their way to integration with the international community. A clear understanding of, and broad support for, the reform process makes Macedonia a highly positive example within this context.

***The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro*⁵¹**

The turning point towards serious defense reform was the removal of former president Milošević in 2000. Still, the complex characteristics of the Union (an increasingly loose federation, ongoing internal political rivalry in Serbia between progressive and conservative nationalistic forces, economic and social pauperization, and the issue of Kosovo) present major reasons for the very

51 For more on Serbia and Montenegro see: Caparini, 2004:273-276; Davinić, 2004:215-226; Edmunds, 2003c; Mišković, 2004:256-262; Simić, 2004:175-187; Watkins, 2004a.

slow pace of the reform during the last years.⁵²

However, it looks like that crucial step forward was achieved during the service of Defence Minister Tadić, before he was elected as the President of the Union in spring 2004. Being faced with the fact that early reforms were "...mainly aimed at downsizing, with little impact on operational capacity" (Watkins, 2004a:14), he managed to place "...the GS and the military security services under the jurisdiction of the MoD, thus contributing to civilian and democratic control" (ibid). But practically, the MoD structures remained to a large extent "...unchanged, characterized by an oversized, bureaucratic and complex system of command and control with significant segments of duplication and competition" (Watkins, 2004a:16). There is a strong impression that most of the structures are in the hands of military personnel, with only a few civilian ones, who are handicapped by a lack of expertise and are marginalized in the decision making process (ibid).

The reforms aim to shorten the conscription period; reduce the armed forces; and solve the question of navy; all within the framework of downsizing, restructuring, and modernising (Davinić, 2004:219). While the S-M military remains organised on the territorial principle, improvements in its organisation follow the aim of developing more flexible and operationally independent forces ('a smaller, better equipped and better paid army' - JDW, 2004b:34). Still, the military remains large and outdated, and the modernisation process is jeopardised by the shortage of money and surpluses of old equipment. Related to this is the issue of a large and also outdated defence industry, which nonetheless still employs some 30,000 personnel (Davinić, 2004:223). The current military force amounts to approximately 78,000 personnel, out of which there are 30%-35% conscripts and 20% civilians (Wat-

52 "The loose state union between Serbia and Montenegro provides a special factor of uncertainty. The Agreement on the Union of Serbia and Montenegro of March 2002 [known also as the Solana Paper - M.J.] transformed the state into a union of two semi-independent entities, with common foreign and defence policies and a federal presidency, but separate economic systems, currencies and customs services. However, both republics are entitled to review the status of the federation within three years and hold the option of withdrawing from the arrangement. [...] So long as Kosovo's final status remains unsolved, the constitutional composition of Serbia, and hence of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, will be uncertain" (Caparini, 2004:275).

kins, 2004a:17-18). For the past few years, defence expenditures averaged 3.5% GDP (from 4.8% in 1997 to 4.5% in 2002 - SIPRI, 2004:360), aiming at 2.9% in 2007, currently with over 70% personnel expenses and under 10% for modernisation (ibid). As far as strategic documents are concerned, the Constitutional Charter did not change much. Nevertheless, ...a number of key documents are now being revised, including, at the federal level, a new version of the Defence Strategy, completed at the end of February; a revised Military Doctrine; and a White Paper on defence sector reform, due in the spring 2004. National security strategies are also expected to be developed and adopted by the republic parliaments. (Caparini, 2004:274)

But the main obstacle for the further advance of reform is not part of the defense sector. It is primarily the political arena where a lack of support is obvious and constant. For the benefit of overall reform, the international community will further prioritize and insist on increased cooperation with the ICTY. But there seems to be a sufficient core understanding within the MoD (also in the officer corps), within some parts of the government, as well as within a small portion of the political leadership. They are ready to continue with reform. One could even argue, "...that defense reform, although slow, is one of the most significant areas of change in S-M, when compared to other sectors as justice, finance, etc" (Watkins, 2004a:21). Striving for Pfp membership as a priority clearly demonstrates this trend, which should be more obviously encouraged and also recognized by the international community (NATO in particular). This would strengthen a fragile democracy, support radical change in the defense sector, and provide more trust in progressive forces.

Comparison

As we have seen from the presentations above, there are some important aspects, which dominate the shape of defense reform in the Western Balkans at this current stage.

First, it is the historical reasons: the military heritage of both former socialist Albania and Yugoslavia, as well as the leftovers

from the Bosnian war.⁵³ The former is reflecting primarily in the structural problems of the S-M defense system and armed forces in particular, while the latter is primarily noticeable in the case of BiH, struggling to establish one single MoD, military, and chain of command. Both countries also present complex and complicated state structures, where outside pressure so far has played an important role in achieving any progress. Perhaps the issue of PfP membership is the most illustrative one. Croatia seems to almost have overcome, or at least is well on the way to doing so, what it inherited from the Bosnian war.⁵⁴ For the three MAP participants as a whole, the situation is more promising because of being part of a well functioning framework of mechanisms, which encourage and drive the reform tempo.

Second, it is the strong intention and ambition of the countries concerned to integrate with the international community. Successful implementation of defense reform offers perhaps the most important tool and opportunity for achieving this goal, after a decade of war devastation and de facto isolation, when the presence of the international community was more or less reduced to various forms of intervention. This membership ambition, or the prospect of integration, is connected with the double role, which the international community has in the sub region. This ambivalence "...is inclined or obliged to push reforms not fully willed or even understood by the local population, because it is motivated in large part by its own security concerns regarding a region so close to European heartland" (Caparini, 2004:280-281). There are at least two instruments with which the international community imposed its will and intention to either end the war

53 Historical background is highly important. It is the military, political and social traditions, which primarily determine the behaviour of individual actors. In times of immense change this impact is obvious and effective, and it may easily prove to be a burden.

54 However, full cooperation with the ICTY remains to be the condition: "To be sure, challenges remain that should not be underestimated. Individuals indicted for war crimes from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro remain at liberty and undermine their countries' prospects of further Euro-Atlantic integration. Serbia and Montenegro's international rehabilitation may only become irreversible when it has met all the requirements for PfP membership, including surrendering the most notorious war-crimes suspects on its territory, and is admitted into the programme" (Serry, Bennett, 2004).

or prevent it in the sub region, and highly influenced the institution building process, namely the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Both crucially influenced the situation in the countries concerned and at least in the sub region as a whole, serving from one point of view as a means of regulating terms among formerly warring parties, and from another point of view as a procedural framework that governs future development (ibid).

Third, there are important similarities and differences in how defense reform has been pursued. In all five countries concerned the decisive push for real reform occurred in the beginning of this decade. It has primarily come as a consequence of regime changes in Croatia and S-M, which directly resulted in changed security conditions. However, significant progress only came later during 2002-2003. Basic strategic documents were adopted in various countries, which influenced the process of rightsizing (primarily downsizing, and in some cases combined with the reestablishment of the armed forces). The realistic approach to reform still seems to be difficult everywhere, hence there are often delays in adopting these documents and implementing tasks according to plan (which often used to appear in the form of promises to outside actors). There is still no sufficient influx of budgetary resources guaranteed, while we can at the same time witness the decrease of defense expenditures in practically each country's case. This is primarily a structural paradox: too high expenditures exhaust national economies and too much money goes for personnel costs of oversized armies, which lack modern equipment. The necessary political, as well public, support for defense reform varies in different countries. It seems, however, that in some cases there is already enough core political understanding and support, with at least sufficient support and preparedness within military circles. This influences the need to keep in mind the necessity of constant adaptation of mid- and long-term reform plans according to changes in the security environment.

Fourth, it is quite obvious that membership ambitions and activities are the main driving force of the reform process. This means practically that the reforms so far have been primarily the

result of constant pressure from the international community, combined with both the decreasing amount of defense expenditures and changes in the security environment. It is important to bear in mind that the mentioned external pressure has been accompanied with constant donations (resources, expertise, and support) pouring into the sub region as well as in the countries concerned.

The Way Ahead

It is our guess that two starting points would make the way ahead possible. From one point of view it is strong awareness that all of the five countries' problems and concerns are closely interconnected and relate heavily to "...the region's complex and rapidly changing security environment" (Ifantis, 2001:115). This will have to influence more the behavior of local actors and drive them strongly towards closer cooperation – not posing a threat to each other anymore but instead being willing to address risks and challenges together. From another point of view, it seems that after last year's dual enlargement, the sub region is more strongly than ever bound in a firm security structure, which should be able to produce more security than was the case in the past.⁵⁵ One could suppose that the security ring which NATO and EU members form around the Western Balkans would produce more stability and security in the sub region, and would help to prevent that increasingly lesser degree of instability and insecurity which is generated and spread out of the sub region. This enhances our strong belief that there can be no development without integration and that further stability will rely even more on the successful implementation of defense reform. It would also underline the importance of the relationship between development and security, which are 'inextricably linked' (United Nations, 2004:viii).

55 At this point we could bring our attention to various characteristics of European security processes. Their complementarity stands out, having in mind that it can certainly be described as the basis for the enlargement processes, and be explained in the following way: the more subjects are included, the wider is the area of security and stability, and the wider is the network of security institutions which have a positive effect on releasing tensions and reducing generated conflicts (Jazbec, 2002b:35).

Having in mind the sub region's complex and still uncertain stability, this may also be stated in another way: positive and continuing progress of defense reform (and security sector reform as whole) in the sub region, regulated through democratic political means, will surely have a positive effect on the overall situation; whereas any clearly articulated negative trends in whichever country will adversely affect the situation in each country and in the sub region as a whole. This is even more important, bearing in mind the sub region's security environment is more susceptible to negative effects than it is to positive influences. The former unfortunately still far outweigh the latter. It is, therefore, obvious that the Euro-Atlantic perspective gives an extremely powerful and crucial momentum to the development of these countries, irrespective of their existing political configuration. Since defense and other reforms are mainly driven by the Western Balkan states' membership ambitions, it will be important also in the future to tie these ambitions to the fulfillment of the membership criteria. For the three countries, which were involved in the war in Bosnia full cooperation with the ICTY, is of utmost importance. Extradition of persons who have been indicted for war crimes shows the ability and willingness to comply with the mission of the Tribunal. Additionally, this issue may also provide insight into the sustainability of the overall reform process, especially if the criteria are weakened in the interest of smooth integration.

The way ahead has two sides, one for the international community and one for the countries concerned. The international community should continue applying pressure, though this should gradually evolve in its form and substance. It is questionable if the pure form of conditionality (Compare Lunn, 2003) is still suitable and acceptable, while more cooperative and stimulating approaches could be implemented ('more patient and focused and better coordinated' - Watkins, 2004a:21). This would mean that at the same time, the international community needs to gradually reduce the sponsorship function where some of its bodies act as more or less *de facto* authorities (as in BiH). Consequently, such an approach should coincide with more tangible strengthening of the local administrative and democratic authorities, i.e.

with the institution-building processes. It is also the case in the Western Balkans that reform processes, defense included, "...[are] not only to identify suitable policy content but also to ensure the political process by which it is developed, implemented and sold to key stakeholders and the public opinion is one that strengthens democracy itself" (Caparini, 2004:282). Having in mind last year's transition from SFOR to EUFOR in BiH and the Berlin Plus operation in Macedonia, it is advisable to further strengthen the passage from the hard security approach to the soft security approach. This goes well with the possibly increased role of the EU, PfP and NGOs in the subregion.

With the presented approach one could expect that the countries concerned would finally not only understand but also accept the necessity to replace all types of confrontation with cooperation. The international community needs to be able to contribute to this fundamental change of values as well: "[p]articipation in IFOR/SFOR and in KFOR missions provided the best lessons in co-operative security and the evolution of the regional strategic culture of the European and Euro-Atlantic type - a fundamental prerequisite for improved homogeneity of the states in the region" (Pantev, 2001:130). This would mean that they would no longer be willing to rely on conflict as a historically proven means of solving disputes, but would be ready to progress and accept all possible types of cooperation. It is also upon the international community to help face this challenge, to introduce the customs of addressing open issues through political means, and through consensus building as a way of finding solutions.

Finally, some concrete recommendations should be mentioned for the further orientation of the defense reform process in the Western Balkans. They primarily draw from the efforts of the countries in transition and NATO members as well, who have been facing this major post-Cold War undertaking for some time already (Katsirdakis, 2002:203-204).

First, after coping with and accepting the urgent need to create the conceptual basis for reform, these strategic documents, including the legal framework, have to undergo regular updating. This part of reform is under constant influence of changes in the

security environment and should be undertaken consequently.

Second, an effective defense planning system, once established, should remain the basic framework for pursuing reform. It should be constantly adjusted and updated.

Third, a constant influx of resources should be provided and guaranteed. Hence the reform process is a long-term one, at no stage easy nor comfortable.

Fourth, public support remains among the most important conditions. This requires political understanding, constant transparency in the decision making and budgeting, as well as full information availability.

To sum up, one should strongly recommend that, as far as the defense reform process is concerned, the

- a) *Croatia*, being already out of the critical stage and midway on the success path, sustains and spills over the positive effect to other countries in the sub region;
- b) That Macedonia, and Albania in particular manage to fully keep in touch with the quickening pace of cooperation, stemming from MAP, PfP and related activities;
- c) That Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro both fully adopt the PfP framework and then proceed step by step up its scale, constantly strengthening their institutions at the same time; and,
- d) That all the five countries, while absorbing provided experience and expertise, fully demonstrate the necessary willingness to learn from each other.

Conclusion

We could state that the group of the Western Balkans countries, while being strongly and decisively pushed by the international community, began implementing an “...overall defence system and armed forces reform due to [their] recognition of changes in the security environment, reduction of defense resources and new international commitments” (Tatalović, 2004:157). Generally speaking, the countries concerned pursue this endeavor with “...the aim to develop modern, capable, well equipped and cost effective

armed forces” (ibid). The latter also could be described as the goal of defense reform *per se*. With the adoption of strategic documents and legal frameworks, and with rightsizing already going through its beginning stages, the first phase of reform is most probably finished. One can not say it was easy, and much remains to be done.

The constant adaptation of strategic documents to changes in the security environment; the task to incorporate into them the current trends of NATO, EU, OSCE, UN and other international players; and the constant evaluation of the force structure and the defense system organisation are only a few of challenges that stand out. This goes well with the necessity of maintaining the continuous process of long-term planning for the defense sector, as well as the need of adapting, reviewing and implementing these plans. Also, the international community faces additional challenges, while increasing its sensitivity to events on the ground.

The general and basic desire of the Western Balkan countries remains clear: a gradual and certain integration of the entire area into the system of Euro-Atlantic establishments.⁵⁶ This depends on compliance with the criteria and the constant demonstration of progress, as well as on substantial support from and participation of the international community. However, political oversight by international representatives should not undermine the developing democratic institutions, but rather encourage them strongly in assuming their role and responsibility. This even more, having in mind some of important characteristics of the current year: 2005 is the first year of the EU-led operation in BiH, but also the first year after the 2004 dual enlargement of both NATO and the EU; it is the year of expecting evident progress towards PfP membership of both BiH and S-M; for the latter it is also a strong reminder to tackle soon the question of a loose federation’s future; and last but not least, the year when the future of Kosovo and its formula ‘standards before status’ are expected to be addressed. The atmosphere of a ‘post-conflict stabilisation’ (Caparini, 2004:251) period marks the broader political and security framework which determines the

56 This would be even more clear having in mind that the crucial question “...that has to be asked is: will keeping the country outside Euro-Atlantic integration processes aid or hinder the further development of peace and stability in the region?” (Watkins, 2004a:25).

future tempo and dynamic of the overall reform process. Hence, there are no reasons that this should discourage the advance of defense reform in the sub region.

However, it could stimulate this process, having in mind its importance for the internal development in each country concerned, as well as its integration potential for the subregion as a whole. Defence reforms have already proved themselves as one of the most important and influential parts of the overall reform process in the countries discussed. Further successes of the latter will also in the future undoubtedly depend on the continuous progress of the former.

With an ambition to wrap up the discussion on the subject presented, three groups of main conclusions seem to be appropriate to point out.

First, only after the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement were the circumstances to initiate the process of defense reform present, although two countries in the subregion were not involved in the war in Bosnia.

The following years brought the necessary political will as well as outside pressure, which pushed reform forward in particular during 2002 and 2003. This has contributed to the stabilization of the sub region, and has resulted in the first tangible returns from establishing a defense sector according to modern standards. All of the five countries adopted basic strategic and legal documents, and all started with rightsizing their oversized armed forces.

Second, cooperation among countries, MoDs, and their militaries has increased and contributed to improved regional networking.

Consequently the enhanced confidence has helped to decrease tensions between the countries. Outside instruments, in particular MAP, Pfp and numerous NGOs have decisively contributed to this changed configuration. The need to replace conflict with cooperation and consensus building is being experienced increasingly, and is supported by the international community.

Third, a tangible contribution to the new security, political and defence environment of the sub region has been made. Countries of the region no longer present a threat to each other, but instead are beginning to cooperate on an interagency level in order to address current security risks and challenges.

Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Way Ahead From a Slovenian Perspective⁵⁷

Introduction

Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, we also see the end of the ninth year, which marks the onset of a period of stabilization and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (December 1995 in the USA). The war in BiH represented the brutal climax of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the most tragic event on European soil since the end of World War Two. As such, it was mainly the consequence of century-long contradictions, which had been accumulating and had never been resolved properly, but it also was due to the failure and the lack of preparedness on the part of local politics to settle the differences through political means. The failure to agree to negotiations and to reach and implement compromises demonstrated a great unwillingness to see politics as an instrument for attaining peace and prosperity. The intervention by the international community only became effective with the USA's decisive military and diplomatic involvement in the resolution of the conflict.

The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords signified an important milestone also with respect to the relations Slovenia, as one of the five countries to emerge from the former Yugoslavia, had within the Balkans (including BiH). The wider international area was created for maneuver space, which facilitated a more evident and active involvement of Slovenia in the settlement of regional issues.

In August 1995, representatives from the Slovenian Armed Forc-

⁵⁷ *This article was originally published in Reiter, Erich, Jureković, Predrag (Hrsg.). 2005. *Bosnien und Herzegovina: Europas Balkanpolitik auf dem Prüfstand*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag. Pp. 53-62. www.dnd.ddb.de It was prepared upon the author's participation at a series of workshops on the ESDP and the Western Balkans, organized by the Office for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence in 2003 and 2004. Translated from Slovene by Division for Translation, Ministry of Defense of Slovenia.*

es took part in “Cooperative Nugget 95,” a military exercise in the USA, and at the end of December of the same year the Slovenian Parliament ratified the SOFA agreement. By signing the Status of Forces and Transit Agreement for IFOR (later SFOR) with NATO, Slovenia became involved in the “Combined Endeavour” operation in BiH. These activities also indicate that Slovenia was actively engaged with the first practical steps in the implementation of the Dayton Accords. Moreover, this was a direct opportunity for Slovenia to start appearing in the role of a promotor of security in the Balkans.

To date, Slovenia’s activities have been multi-faceted, structured and extensive, and there will be many future opportunities for them to become more focused, enhanced and comprehensive. It is important that these activities be based on three pillars; that is, official policy, economic co-operation and civilian society activities. The Slovenian Armed Forces have nearly 160 people in the international SFOR forces⁵⁸ – a motorised company, a military police unit, a medical unit, a national support element, an aircraft crew and one representative in the operation command. From October 1997 to December 2003, the Slovenian Armed Forces also provided a helicopter unit for the operation command’s logistic requirements. Slovenia also has civilian experts in various international institutions in BiH.

All the above shows that Slovenia is currently an important stability and security factor in the Balkans. Future Slovenian policies related to this region will be based on this conclusion as well as on the fact that the future of this region as part of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration is a necessary condition for its future development. There can be no development without integration. Both of these conditions are, at the same time, also the key to understanding the present conditions in BiH and the future development of stabilisation and security processes in this country as well as in the entire region.

58 As of March 2004.

Overview of the present situation

The key event to understanding the present state of affairs in the region and in BiH is the enlargement of both the EU and NATO, which has included this region and its wider neighborhood. After the spring of 2004, the geopolitical situation in this part of Europe will be as follows: the Western Balkans will be within a solid NATO security circle consisting of (clockwise) Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. This will be additionally strengthened with the network of EU members; i.e., Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Hungary and Greece.

We may justifiably conclude that the most obvious consequence of the enlargement of both institutions will be the fact that the unstable region within the above mentioned security circle will undergo two positive effects. There is bound to be more stability generated inwards and less instability outwards. This is of key importance for the further stabilisation of the region and for the strengthening of security conditions. Although we can with considerable certainty expect individual outbreaks of violence in the narrow region, mainly with a view to achieving certain political goals (e.g., the independence of Kosovo), large-scale conflicts are highly unlikely. This is also how the low assessment of risk should be understood which, however, does not exclude the possibility of unpredictable minor escalations that could acquire a wider dimension. Both enlargements thus appear as effective factors in the reduction of conflicts and as accelerators of the further strengthening of security links. In the background of the understanding of the enlargements is the logic of the complementarity of the European security processes seen in a wider context. This complementarity can certainly be described as the basis for the enlargement processes, and it can be explained in the following way: the more subjects included, the wider the area of security and stability and the wider the network of security institutions which have a positive effect on releasing tensions and reducing generated conflicts (compare Jazbec, 2002b:35). All this is, of course, to a large extent dependent on the continued positive actions by individual countries and the wider region, particularly

by the new NATO and EU members.

The facts stated above can also be underlined with the findings of the European Security Strategy (A Secure Europe, p. 3), which considers the establishment of good cooperation with countries from problematic areas as a necessity. This is particularly evident in the Balkans. According to the strategy, the EU has, in collaboration with the USA, Russia, NATO and other international organizations, succeeded in eliminating the likelihood of threats to the stability in the region as the result of a potential outbreak of a major conflict. The credibility of EU foreign policy relies, therefore, on strengthening the attained achievements, with the European vision being the strategic objective and also an incentive for reforms in the countries concerned.

Within the previously mentioned security circle, there are several security and political processes. In terms of their dynamics, the strongest is probably the process facilitating or leading to the next round of enlargement of the Alliance. The Membership Action Plan involves the participation of Croatia, Macedonia and Albania. These three countries have also been referred to as the Eastern Adriatic dimension of NATO enlargement. The other two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro (CSM), are candidates for the NATO-led Partnership for Peace programme, while Bulgaria and Romania (candidate countries), as well as Croatia, are aspiring for EU membership. All of the countries referred to are members of the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, which makes the complexity of the security relations in this part of Europe very compact. If the image were expanded with a straight time line, it would become clear that, during the past decade, this security circle has been progressing towards the Western Balkans and has been gradually narrowed. The announced further enlargements and the underlying Euro-Atlantic perspective of the area concerned suggest future trends in this reduction process.

One may even claim that the most important common issue in the present Balkans involves the process of the further enlargement of NATO and the EU. The dynamics of the integration of the countries concerned into the various programmes or the com-

pliance with the requirements for a more enhanced integration have a direct effect on the internal development of the individual countries. In the long run, this can be crucial for the stability, security and economic development of the region.

Given these facts, the continued stabilization processes will depend upon three types of factors:

- The network of international organizations operating in the wider area, their further development and influence on the areas concerned;
- The internal developments in individual countries which will become increasingly dependent upon the adoption of values and norms from their wider environment and the effects of their mutual influence;
- The direct and coordinated bilateral and multilateral actions by the players in the wider region.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The very core of these processes involves Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The complexity of its internal affairs, the fragile security balance, strong influences from its immediate vicinity and the presence of the internal community have a direct impact on its position and the further development of security and stabilization processes.

From the period from the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords onward, the progress attained in BiH has indeed been remarkable. The country enjoys stability and there are no major potential conflicts posing a risk to its peace. A number of elections have been held, and no major irregularities have been discovered by the OSCE during the most recent ones. Ethnic disputes and conflicts have been minimized as a result of the administrative division of the country, the full authority of the international community, notably the EU High Representative, and the strong military presence.

However, one may get the impression that a lot more could be accomplished. One of the most striking facts is that although almost nine years have passed since the end of the war, some of

the culprits or actors most responsible for the war still enjoy their freedom. The complex administrative government structure is quite often the major obstacle to an efficient, decision-making system. This may lead to the impression that the High Representative constitutes the only authority for making concrete, complex and efficient decisions. The security balance has been, and will remain, clear for quite some time. Yet it is also very fragile and highly vulnerable to effects both from its neighborhood and internal affairs. This indicates the necessity for the long-term presence of the international community and its direct influence on the internal development of the country. Further stability will, therefore, rely even more on the successful implementation of defense reforms. The reforms will specifically direct the fusion of the former three⁵⁹ armies into a uniform BiH army, which will be subordinate to a unified ministry of defense. Undoubtedly, this case will serve as a unique test of the capabilities necessary for the modern organization and function of the institution which has always been crucial to any nation state. This nation state, showing its political will for the adoption of the Euro-Atlantic standards and consisting of three homogeneous ethnic communities, will have to undergo an even more demanding process. The organization of a uniform armed force and a ministry of defence headed by a civilian are key prerequisites and test the abilities and readiness for the adoption of democratic standards.

As a military conflict within BiH is unlikely, the greatest security challenge remains the high level of corruption and organized crime and their connections with high governmental and political structures. This has a direct impact on inappropriate actions by central and local authorities and is reflected in weak leadership. This is by no means one of the current major BiH weaknesses or the cause of the slow progress of reforms in all areas and levels which have resulted in arrangements beyond the governmental institutions often referred to as the phenomenon of parallel au-

59 Officially, BiH had two armies as it was made up of two entities, Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH. But, since the Federation consists of two national components, Bosnian and Croatian, the Federation also had two armies; hence, BiH had de facto three all together.

thority. Based on the conclusions of the European Security Strategy, the restoration of good governance practices in the Balkans, the promotion of democracy and the creation of conditions for the relevant authorities to cope with organized crime are regarded as the best possible ways for preventing organized crime in the EU. (A Secure Europe, p. 6) This, of course, influences the forms and structure of the presence of the international community in BiH (fewer military units and more civilian police forces).

The security balance relies heavily on the influence of the immediate neighborhood. Both of the neighboring countries, Croatia and CSM, represent a potential source of support for their ethnic communities in BiH. During the past years, this influence was greatly made use of, but it has been reduced to a minimum as a consequence of the recent democratic changes in both countries. It may even be claimed to a certain extent that this influence has, in terms of its form, contents and scope, grown into an inversely proportional process through the cooperation between the previously mentioned countries and the Hague Tribunal. The previous, clearly demonstrated Euro-Atlantic posture of the Croatian government (and the positive consequences associated with the internal political behavior and operations of its institutions) can also be considered as a factor which may further reduce its previously significant influence on BiH. This is an illustrative example of how positive implications can be integrated into the actions of a nation state's institutions following a decision for "Europeization". At the same time, analysis of the situation in CSM have long been unveiling an era of political instability and (security) uncertainty which are also reflected in an almost constantly ongoing government crisis. The issue is how such a prolonged confusion could affect the attitude of the Republika Srpska, which has shown a great deal of reservation towards the central government in Sarajevo. The BiH situation is, additionally, at least directly influenced by the further development of the situation in Kosovo and the question of resolving its future status. Moreover, the future development of relations between Serbia and Montenegro within CSM will have a significant impact on developments in the country itself. All of this raises a set of questions related to

the further fragmentation of some of the countries of the former Yugoslavia.⁶⁰

The latter may also be worded in a different way: a positive and continuing progress of developments in CSM, regulated through political means, will surely have a positive effect on the situation in BiH; whereas, any clearly articulated negative trends will adversely affect the situation in BiH. If its extremely complicated state construction is at all prone to positive trends in its immediate environment, it is even more vulnerable to negative effects. The absorption of negative lines of force unfortunately far out-reaches the ability to respond to positive influences. It is, therefore, obvious that the Euro-Atlantic perspective gives an extremely powerful and crucial momentum to the development of these countries, irrespective of their existing political configuration.

Presence of international community

Quite naturally, the continued presence of the international community in BiH will remain a key contributor to the country's stability and the long-term success of the complex processes it's undergoing.

If previous analysis reveals certain and noticeable progress attained in BiH, this also significantly determines the form, contents and structure of the further presence of the international community. The period of focusing efforts primarily on the assurance of security stability through the presence of a number of military troops is definitely over. With the aim of stabilizing the security situation and in view of the poor leadership practices and inadequate efficiency of the authorities, there is a great need to strengthen support and assistance for the authorities. This is relevant to all government agencies, notably internal affairs, justice, intelligence services (and their relevant de-politicisation), and social and educational institutions. The latter is particularly important given the future development and activities of the gov-

⁶⁰ Richard Holbrooke, the creator of the Dayton Peace Accords, said in early March 2004 that, according to his opinion, there would be two new countries emerging in the Western Balkans in a few years. Compare also Jazbec, 2001:52.

ernmental and other institutions in terms of the country's integration into Euro-Atlantic establishments.

All of these activities are linked with the anticipated handover of the SFOR mission in BiH to an EU mission where the emphasis will be put on the integrity of social reconstruction and the further assurance of a comprehensive security framework. According to assessments, conditions are deemed present so that SFOR could complete its mission and the EU could assume the leading role in the predominantly non-military areas. The projected, structure-related transformation of the presence of the international community in BiH will undoubtedly represent the stepping stone for the "Berlin +" agreement and ensure consistency in the military and security areas.

At the same time, the international community needs to be able to take two more steps. On the one hand, it will need to gradually reduce the sponsorship function where some of its bodies act as de facto authorities in BiH. This process will have to coincide with a more tangible strengthening of the in-country authorities and more professional support from the international community. On the other hand, cooperation needs to replace all types of confrontation, and the international community needs to be able to contribute to this fundamental change of values. It is conflict that has always been the main means of settling disputes, which puts the burden on history and memories in BiH. Therefore, the international community is facing a great challenge on how to present and introduce the ability to address open issues through political means and to establish compromise in the daily political picture as a way of finding solutions.

All of this is especially important for Slovenia and Austria. Both countries will be safe only insofar as their immediate and wider security environment is safe. In this respect, the Western Balkans and BiH are of key importance not only because of their geographic proximity, but also because of the many latent threats that currently exist in this area, threats such as international crime, corruption, and potential destabilisation of the situation and the consequences of such a destabilisation. Given this, it is highly appropriate that both countries have announced joint ac-

tivities, through the regional framework of CENCOOP, with international units deployed to BiH. These activities are an important further step in our bilateral cooperation and a concrete contribution from both countries to security and stability in South-East Europe. It is also important that both countries follow and study the situation in BiH, through the traditional security-political dialogue between both Ministries of Defence and through the organisation of different conferences and meetings.

Slovenia's position and contribution

The activities of the Republic of Slovenia in the Western Balkans and also in BiH are based on our awareness of the importance of NATO and EU membership and the responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in this area. These statements rely on three starting points:

- First, Slovenia is very interested in peace and stability in BiH and in the Western Balkans as a whole.
- Second, the countries in this area also expect Slovenia to play an active part in the future.
- And, third, as a NATO and EU member and through the OSCE presidency in 2005, Slovenia will be offered additional formal and informal opportunities to make final arrangements for this cooperation, to intensify it and incorporate it into the long-term policy of the European security triangle.⁶¹

At the same time, Slovenia's membership in NATO and the EU provides a very practical and a model illustration for the region of how to become integrated into Euro-Atlantic organisations. Therefore, Slovenia is in a position where it can both demonstrate and prove the importance of the integration in a more convincing and tangible manner than the "old" members and make a constructive contribution to the further enlargement in South-East Europe. This contribution will not only be evident through the highlighting of existing problems and support of the solutions to these problems but also through presenting specific suggestions

61 For the latter, compare Jazbec, 2004a.

and initiatives aimed at their solution. The fact that one of NATO's goals is to close the political and security framework in Europe⁶² fully overlaps with Slovenian priorities. In terms of the Western Balkans and BiH, this means to support the process of further NATO enlargement and the development of the PfP. Our knowledge of the situation and the network of contacts provides a very good basis for the continuation and promotion of these activities.

In this respect, we will have to take full advantage of the existing regional mechanisms, in particular the Stability Pact for South-East Europe and the PfP. In reference to this, SEDM (The South-East Europe Defence Ministerial) has been important as a link between the countries in the region in the defence and military arena and has enhanced mutual trust among them. Taking into account the specific problems in the Western Balkans (organised crime and corruption and the involvement of political and state circles), one should consider the possibility that ministries of the interior and security and intelligence services should be integrated in this cooperation. At the end of 2004, Slovenia will be hosting a SEDM ministerial meeting, which will provide a forum for further discussions on this topic.

To sum up, the Slovenian contribution could be viewed as multi-faceted and oriented towards political cooperation, economic investments and the provision of hard, soft and civic security and stability. In this process, it is important that we mention the confidence building measures (the trust of BiH citizens in the Euro-Atlantic establishments and vice versa), the transfer of knowledge and lessons learned, and the promotion of cooperation and solidarity as important values. These activities need to be aimed, in the first place, at social, educational and positive psychological results as factors promoting development.

Perspective and development

The general basic perspective of the Western Balkans and of BiH is clear: a gradual and certain integration of the entire area

62 From the speech by Dr Jamie Shea in Ljubljana upon the accession of Slovenia to NATO, Monday, March 29, 2004.

into the system of the Euro-Atlantic establishments. This depends on compliance with the criteria and the constant proving of the progress, with substantial support and participation on the part of the international community.

In the case of BiH, it is of key importance that an internal political structure be established that will assure the democratic development of political processes independent of an exclusively national party structure. In the current constellation of relations, these parties have a blocking rather than a promoting function. To put it in other words: the political and administrative behaviours in the internal politics in BiH are characterised by a situation where two parties make a pact on the account of the third party in pursuit of their partial interests. In each case, the individual roles (in particular "the third actor") are taken by a different national political party, but the principle remains the same. Unlike the political scene in most European countries where this logic underlies the formation of coalitions following elections and relies on the election of non-national political parties, in BiH the three large national political parties always run this activity. One could claim that, in the case of BiH, the activities of the political mechanism follow the same pattern but with completely different grounds. Also, the consequences of such activities differ to a great extent from what they should be for the democratic development of the country.

This fact constantly results in political and other activities setting up new obstacles. At the same time, it gives external influences more room for manoeuvre.

In the future settling of the difficulties in the Balkans, one should think of three aspects.

First, the situation has to be viewed as a whole. We need a comprehensive concept of approaches and solutions that include the actors directly involved; i.e., BiH, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as Albania and Bulgaria, and rely on active contributions from the countries in the immediate and wider vicinity. Within this comprehensive approach, individual countries need to be addressed in terms of their achievements. An active role for the key actors in the international community

is indispensable for a comprehensive approach. A decade after the last Balkan wars, the situation is now stable enough so that a comprehensive approach is required rather than the putting out of individual fires. A system of linking bowls is the best validation for this approach. Historical experiences, especially those from the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, show the need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach by all actors. Different interests, in particular those of big powers, have always caused wars in the Balkans.

Second, European norms, standards and values need to be implemented. This area cannot be addressed separately, because it is a constituent part of Europe. It has always been and it will always be. The hatred, ethnic conflicts and the we-cannot-live-together-anymore attitude are a consequence of inappropriate solutions to these issues rather than putting up with the situation in the area as and where it is.

And, third, in terms of the contents, the approach needs to be planned within the framework that is already offered by the EU Security Strategy. The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed, democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reforms, dealing with corruption and the abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means for strengthening the international order. (A Secure Europe, p. 10)

A united Europe, stronger because of an enlarged NATO, has the rare opportunity to finally stabilise and democratise the Balkans and, along with it, also BiH. It is only within the mentioned legal and political frameworks that we can take full advantage of the huge potentials in this traditionally restless area.

Part Three
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

NATO

Slovenia and NATO – What are the Lessons Learned?⁶³

Introduction

It was only possible to put oneself the very question after the end of the Cold War, in the time of big turbulences across the European territory, when old structures began to collapse and the notion of new ones started to articulate. Before that, the circumstances did not make it possible for such questions to appear on the practical and political agenda. One could also dare to say that theoreticians weren't bothered much with speculations of such kind either.

This has been the conceptual framework within which Slovenia has successfully executed its ambition to become member of Nato. The most important lessons learned and experiences gathered throughout the process are presented in this article as well as some basic contemplations of the whole project and its nature.

Chronology

A brief chronology shows us that a whole decade was needed for Slovenia to enter the Alliance. The idea about Slovenia being member or at least part of the Euroatlantic area was for the first time put down in the 1989 May Declaration. The Slovene opposition movement pointed out this ambition as a constituent part of what later seemed to be *de facto* the Independency Charta. The adoption of the Amendments to the Resolution on the Starting Points of Slovene National Security in January 1994 officially de-

⁶³ This article was originally published in *Yearbook Šipan 2004* (Čehulič, 2005). www.politicka-kultura.hr It was prepared upon the lecture, which the author delivered to the young leaders from the South East Europe at the Šipan Summer School of International Affairs, organized by the Atlantic Council of Croatia in September 2004.

clared membership in Nato as a primary foreign policy goal. A couple of months later Slovenia entered, amongst the first partner countries, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and started with other activities within the Nato cooperation framework as well – like Planning and Review Process (PARP), Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) etc. At the June 1997 Nato Madrid Summit Slovenia was not invited, although expectations rode very high. Both high expectations and disappointment, which followed, were wrong and unnecessary. This is an important experience for everybody. In autumn 1999 the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was offered to the candidate countries as another and demanding tool for executing reforms what should led to membership. During the current parliamentary period (2000 – 2004) after comprehensive, systematic and intensive work Slovenia managed to gain the membership invitation at Prague 2002 Summit. Membership entered into force on March 23, 2004, roughly a decade after its start in the PfP.

It is worth mentioning while contemplating lessons learned through this process that for Slovenia membership in Nato has never been understood as a point in the air which should be reached as soon as possible whatever the costs. Membership was primarily a tool for establishing the Slovene national security and defence system and within it above all the Slovene Armed Forces along the lines of current Euroatlantic criteria and praxis. This would at the same time mean to be capable of defending ones' own country, to offer host nation support and to participate in the activities of the Alliance. We understood that only such an approach would develop Slovenia to be interesting for the Alliance and raise awareness among Slovenes to understand what membership means. Activities in Slovenia were coordinated through the Interministerial Working Group for Cooperation with Nato, the first body of that kind among all candidate countries.

Aspects

Nato membership was originally conceptualised as a state project. It wasn't only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the

Ministry of Defence (MoD) which should work on the execution of this goal. Although their activities were the most important ones it was the whole set of processes which led to membership. According to the MAP structure five areas could have been seen, namely political and economic issues, defence, resources, security issues and legal affairs. Additional to this, national and international aspects of the project were obvious.

The security aspect could have been seen as the most important and comprehensive one. It has been primarily security, understood in the broad postcold war terms, which was targeted mostly. No wonder, if we understand Nato membership as an ambition for a structural adaptation of national security and defence system and armed forces in particular. The international aspect would derive from intensive harmonization and cooperation within PfP and the Alliance in particular. This would deepen the understanding of cooperation, consensus making and solidarity which led to the acceptance of a new and different set of values. Behind this is the understanding of relations among modern societies and armies which do not fight wars anymore, but cooperate and integrate.

The defence and military aspect is the most important one judging from the Ministry of Defence's point of view. Membership helps to create and establish a national defence system which is a logical part of a bigger international system with clear and proven rules. Such a framework accelerates the scope and the efficiency of activity. Military becomes downsized and adapted to the changed nature of security threats, with an obvious impact on deployability, leaving behind the concept of narrow national territorial dependency of armies. The switch from territorially founded big armed forces to the rapid reaction concepts illustrates the fact how armed forces of the Alliances' members are in constant change. This is even more important for the new members and the candidates, which had to restructure and reshape their armed forces from socialist to modern ones. Slovenia could be seen as an exception because it did not start with big dinosaur armed forces at the beginning of its independency. Such a situation enabled her to immediately focus on the establishment pro-

cess instead of first dismantling old military structures. This has spared a lot of time, resources and energy.

The organizational aspect counts a lot. Classical ministries of defence were in the past rigid bureaucratic organizations with very low internal dynamics. Fixed hierarchy and tough promotional rules were providing slow and uncertain promotion. With membership in the Alliance this aspect is changing rapidly. Cooperation of armed forces and their bureaucracies stimulates inter- and intraorganizational dynamics. Organizations are more flexible because otherwise, they can not execute demanding processes of countering modern security threats. Restructuring and downsizing leads to flexibility and enables personnel to be seconded more often. This becomes almost a daily routine that enhances the need for constant education and new skills. Being part of a big and efficient political, security and military bureaucracy means going along the same rules. Adaptation and change replace previous statics.

The psychological aspect goes along the already presented. Membership in the Alliance and the way how this works offers more promotional opportunities for soldiers in both ways. Seconded ones are replaced by newcomers, which increases vertical promotion, more individuals participate in horizontal promotion as well. Networking spreads within bigger framework, which is not binded primarily by national limitations anymore. Communication with colleagues within the Alliance strengthens personal identity, language skills and operational flexibility.

Also the sociological aspect benefits. More relations are developed, they get stronger and open and social networking plays increasingly important role. Only when national armed forces go international, i.e. when they denationalize through cooperation along same rules, procedures and agenda, is this possible.

Experiences

Perhaps the most important experience which one absorbs through the membership process is to become realistic. Although this could sound simple, it has been a demanding lesson. The ex-

periences from the first and partially also the second MAP cycle show this very obviously. The then seven candidate countries hastily put on the paper all of their possible ambitions and only at the conclusion of the first year they saw that not much of it was realized. It was simply just not possible. They want to appear big, important and sophisticated with everything, which was certainly a mistake. Instead they should point out only that what was achievable and what they had resources for.

The realistic approach would mean that you start from the evaluation of security threats and risks in your environment, see how much of resources you have at disposal and what you can do (troops, structure, acquisition) to counter those threats and risks. As the security environment changes, one also has to adapt evaluations and plans. Never promise what you can not fulfill, that would be the most important experience from the enlargement process. Each contribution counts, big or small.

The second experience would be an ability to constantly show progress. The MAP process is designed in the way that a candidate country is being screened all the time. Through a series of consultations and discussions on various levels (from expert to ministers) both sides assure the process going on. It is much easier to correct the development on a basis of regular and frequent consultations with a follow up reaction than executing the corrections only at the end of the process. That is why transparency is of utmost importance. And through transparency also comes solidarity and knowledge about each other, which leads to mutual trust. In such an atmosphere it is easy to discuss weak points and get away with them. Both the Alliance and the candidate country share interest in progress and hence they also share information on weaknesses.

Cooperation with the parliament is necessary and this would be the third most important experience. It is the national parliament who at the end of the day adopts laws and resolutions in the national defence and security area. It monitors the role of armed forces in society and executes democratic control over them. It is of extreme importance to have continuous, productive and transparent relations with the parliament and its bodies. The support

which members of the national parliament can offer to the MoD is enormous, important and vital. Regular dialog with the Defence Committee helps to clarify priorities, sharpens their articulation and encourages their execution. It is the parliament who makes the final decision about defence expenditures.

Within this respect there are two kinds of relations between the parliament and MoD. From one point of view there are issues about which MPs take the decision and consequently have to be informed about. From another point of view, a set of issues exists where there is no obligation for the MoD to inform the parliament. But informing MPs also about the latter would mean to gain their broader support and understanding. Even more, MPs share responsibility with MoD officials via that. This is an enormous additional backing of MoD work towards public opinion. When both executive and legislative branch of power share same views on certain issues, public opinion is much likely to be in favour of them. The very Slovene experience is highly positive within this framework.

Last but not least, one also has to point out the experience with the media and public opinion. Slovenia is the only new Nato member country who held a referendum vote on Nato membership. This means that the government, with important parliamentary support, prepared and executed an indepth public awareness campaign. This was anyway part of a special Information-communication Strategy which was adopted in 2001 before the decision on the referendum was even taken. A couple of hundred public discussions, debates, round tables, live TV and radio shows were organized, with participation of both Nato pros and cons. Nato membership yes or no was an object of huge public debate for almost a year before the referendum took place on March 23rd 2003. It was organized at the same time as with the EU referendum. The turnout was 60 %; almost 90% were in favour of EU membership and 66% of Nato. The results proved the governmental policy and equipped Slovenia with a strong political *credo* when entering the Alliance.

For the MoD alone public debate was important also from another point of view. It has helped to establish direct contact be-

tween the MoD and the public. This has raised the understanding of projects on the agenda and the support for them. It has been very important because of the success of the reform processes going on and in particular for the professionalization of the Slovene Armed Forces.

Way Ahead

Being a new member is important – as one could grasp it after a couple of months – to show an in-depth, overall and constant activities. Participation at the creation of European security processes demands careful observation, constant participation and giving initiatives, in particular within the niche capacity strategy.

Being equipped with fresh memories of the accession process, one has firmly in mind the necessary support for the future perspective of the Nato enlargement. It is the enlargement of the Alliance which expands the area of security and stability, deepens solidarity and trust across the continent and encourages reform processes in the national armed forces as well.

The latter also goes for the existing member countries. The Alliance finds itself in an intensive and demanding transformation process which, above all, means adaptation to the changing security environment and different kind of threats.

Conclusion

With the membership in Nato Slovenia has found itself in a position to enhance and additionally institutionalize its role of provider of security and stability in the broader region. Perhaps the best *credo* for a small state being a security player would be think global, act local. Although an old saying, it is even more important nowadays, especially because of offering the necessary support and encouragement to candidate and aspirate countries. The continuation of close cooperation with those from the region would for sure contribute to firm security networking and more stable development.

Slovenia and NATO – One Year After⁶⁴

Introduction

There is no simple answer to the simple question, what are the Slovene experiences after the first year of NATO membership?

Much has changed, indeed, although from one point of view some of these changes are obvious only to the administration's insiders. But even they take a good part of these changes as an advanced routine part of their daily work. There are some changes as well, which heavily occupy bureaucrats, diplomats and politicians. Some of these changes are also obvious to the Slovene public, which sometimes pays attention to them and sometimes does not. However, from another point of view, there are not so many changes. This is particularly true having in mind that Slovenia – as well as other six invitees – participated already before membership in March of 2004 in the work of most of NATO bodies, though without the right to vote.

In this article we will try to focus our attention on those aspects, which will tell us what has changed, how it has changed, what is different and what are the experiences, which one could transfer to countries on the way to membership.

What has changed?

Membership means a conceptual and formal change of all previous activities. From this point of view it practically does not matter how intense and high profile the activities or forms of cooperation with the Alliance were before membership.⁶⁵ Slovenia

64 This article was originally published in *Yearbook Šipan 2005* (Čehulič, 2006). www.politicka-kultura.hr It was prepared upon the lecture, which the author delivered to the young leaders from the South East Europe at the Šipan Summer School of International Affairs, organized by the Atlantic Council of Croatia in September 2005.

65 Perhaps the most important and the hardest experience or form of cooperation before gaining membership, at least judging from the Slovene experience, was the inclusion in the Force Goals System in the last stage of preparations. Still, after membership, everything was deeper, more demanding and extremely target oriented.

gained highly useful experience and its expectations about its preparedness were high, but nonetheless one should be critical also to its own achievements, asking a question, were these expectations realistic? One can never be prepared enough.

Changes on the substantial level affect participation of the member countries in the Alliance's work. This means contribution to policy making, which demands well-oiled diplomatic machinery as a whole. There isn't any decision which can be seriously met without efficient, but "complex diplomatic and information gathering machinery". (Paterson, 1969:122) It is easy to make a decision, but it is not easy to adopt it as a result of a process as such. This would mean that among the most important changes are those of organizational nature, since they directly affect the efficiency of policy making.

From this point of view one could say, that perhaps the most important and obvious change from the organizational point of view is the adaptation to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) formal meeting's weekly routine. This means that the organization of work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in particular, but also of some other ministries and agencies, has to follow how NAC operates.

Briefly, NAC meets in formal and regular meetings each Wednesday late morning. Permanent representatives (PR) of the member countries meet at an informal morning meeting already a day before (Tuesday morning) to check the agenda and look at the reactions from the capitals, referring to the agenda and possible decisions to be taken. After Wednesday's formal meeting, Ambassadors gather also at lunch to discuss any remaining issues, as well as to have a look at some basic issues in the pipeline. After the meeting their teams write reports and inform the capitals about the meeting, the decisions, the leftovers and the agenda of the next meeting. This would mean that during Thursday and Friday morning at the latest, various departments in the MFA, MoD etc. in capitals are informed about the results of the NAC meeting. Information is distributed; experts start preparing first draft decisions on various topics and Monday late afternoon first decisions have to be prepared. Tuesday morning Ambassadors are informed about as many draft decisions as pos-

sible to be prepared for the informal preparatory meeting. Usually on Tuesday late in the afternoon the last cables with instructions are sent to Brussels. Wednesday early morning is the high time for the last instructions to be delivered to the missions.

Information distributing, coordination of opinions and preparing draft decision as well as sending them to capitals once they're met at NAC meeting, is a complicated bureaucratic and political process. It has to be finished, at least theoretically, from Wednesday late afternoon (in a case that some urgent and important news from NAC meeting are delivered already by protected phone lines) till next Wednesday morning, before the next NAC meeting starts. Usually the whole decision making process in capitals has to be finished in even shorter time (from Thursday till Tuesday).

This rhythm is ongoing, hard and necessary, but also efficient. It makes NATO an outstandingly efficient bureaucracy. New member states have to adapt to this way of functioning as soon as possible. It demands above all an efficient, smooth and rational administration, which provides decision makers with enough information for also the toughest decision to be taken in due time. The above-described work is shown in table No 1. It presents the already described in three layers: NAC level (consultations, preparatory meeting, formal meeting, time for discussions, negotiation, informing, coordinating etc.), support level (Brussels teams and capitals) and the process level (elements of the process).⁶⁶

Table No 1 – NAC formal meeting's weekly routine

	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
NAC	Consultations	PR Prep Meet	NAC Meeting		
Support	Position preparing	Position gathering	Final position gathering	Information transferring	Information
Process	Decision preparing	Decision taking + Instructing	Decision taking	Informing	Distribution

⁶⁶ One has to add to this cycle also various extraordinary and informal NAC meetings, which all, of course, are squeezed in the same time. This only means more workload for teams and complicates already fully burdened agenda and process.

All three processes are simultaneous and divided by daily specifics. The first one shows the formal way of operating, the second one the activities behind it, which enables the formal process to go on, while the third level is more contemplating oriented and is an analysis, which helps understand the dynamics of activities. However, it would be difficult to mechanically divide the various phases of the whole process, which is also not the intention of this presentation. It is only the illustration of the complexity of the process to be able to understand its mechanics easier.

The already analyzed activity is the most important decision making process within NATO and from organizational point of view also very illustrative one. To have a better impression of the complexity of the Alliance's work we have to add also numerous and frequent meetings of more than a couple of hundreds of bodies. Some of them require the presence of Brussels team members only, some of them participation of representatives from the capitals, and some of them both. The point of coming to Brussels is not only pure participation at meetings as such, but taking care about the whole processes going on. The here mentioned Brussels meetings are only part of the whole process, which is primarily managed in the member states.

It is necessary to add to these two tracks of meetings, which provide highly dynamic organizational nature of discussed processes, also a series of political meetings on the highest level. Namely, foreign and defense ministers meet a few times annually at formal and informal meetings. Occasionally, also heads of states and governments meet at summit meetings.⁶⁷ To fully cope with the organizational dynamics within the Alliance's (and tasks, deriving from its results), we have to add here also numerous and frequent meetings of the Alliance's military authorities and experts. They are an indispensable part of the here presented dynamics.

For a new member country participation in all these activities

⁶⁷ The first NATO summit after the Prague 2002 one will take part in November 2006 in Riga. In the same year the defense ministers will meet in Ljubljana in September. Both gatherings will be for the first time in these two new member states.

means a huge organizational workload⁶⁸, which has to be taken with an utmost serious approach. From the very first day of membership, the country and its representatives at whatever level are part of this machinery, which demands participation, solution taking capability and implementation efficiency. Being one of the equal members of the Alliance also means the ability to fulfill the daily workload.

What does this mean?

At least a few important consequences could be drawn from the previous presentation. We will focus only on those, which Slovenia has experienced during its first membership year. Our starting point here is that the new member country has an ambition to include itself in as many activities as possible and with due motivation. But we will also keep in mind the possibility, that there are for sure some barriers, which do not always enable full and efficient participation.⁶⁹

First, at least certain imbalance between the capacity and quality of administration in the capital (MFA and MoD in particular) and Mission to NATO (MNA) appears. The intention to send the most qualified personnel to MNA is to a certain extent fully understandable. But after some time such imbalance is obvious and also disturbing. One shall not try to fully meet the demanding work in Brussels with sending everybody who at home stands out there and leaving him/her on the spot more than normal posting period. Therefore careful personnel management as well as clear division of labor, smooth cooperation and coordination, educating and training is necessary. In brief, the process of defense planning, speaking from the MoD's point of view, is a must. One should bear in mind that diplomatic missions, no matter how important they are, have to fulfill instructions from home primarily.

68 Our starting point here is that only smooth and efficient management of organizational issues enables efficient decision-making process.

69 New environment (i.e. membership) requires some time to fully adapt to, procedures have to be upgraded in practice, coordination has to be checked etc., which can not be fully drilled before actual membership. A newcomer is always a newcomer, but with different approach the warming up time could be substantially shortened.

This means that the capitol (MFA) plays the dominant role and missions abroad have the executive role only.

Second, an optimal and constant flow of information must be established. This is even more important, since with the membership the information input increases heavily (including various classified documents). This foresees vertical and horizontal circuit of information and combination of both, like from various governmental bodies through MFA to MNA (and back), within different bodies and institutions etc. Key persons in different bodies have to be informed about practically everything (like PR in Brussels, heads of most important departments in MFA and MoD etc.), so that they can react immediately to most of the issues. Policy positions have to be coordinated and key persons have to be authorized to meet certain amount of decisions without consulting anybody.

Third, as a direct consequence of the second experience, the “need to share” approach must be developed and implemented. Each person, dealing with NATO issues, has to receive all the information, which are necessary to understand and manage certain parts of the process. Information has to be distributed, delivered and operationalized, i.e. be available, not closed. It is important to bear in mind that information has to be shared on the basis of the “need to know” principle. This also means that each person dealing with NATO issues⁷⁰ has to obtain security clearance to be allowed to handle classified documents. Since there are numerous documents of various classification levels, one cannot imagine management of the process without this authorization. However, to obtain it, one has to undergo several procedures, which take time, in particular because there is always huge number of such persons to be processed. None of the new NATO members after the end of the Cold War were sufficiently prepared for the membership from this point of view.

Fourth, obtaining membership is the beginning of the process,

70 As a matter of fact, we have to put it another way round: security clearance is the necessary precondition for handling any classified document, be it the country's own or NATO's, EU's etc. Paradoxically, it was primarily NATO (and EU) membership ambition, which has moved these countries to settle down this issue.

not its end. Regardless of how familiar and routine this does sound, practically each of the previous ten new members has overseen this simple but important fact.⁷¹ For the full and successful start it is not only important to maintain high level of activities but even to upgrade them. This is, hopefully, already clearly seen from the so far presentation in this article. From one point of view this message is important for each area of the activity within the Alliance and perhaps above all for defense planning system and for activities within the military structures. And, from another point of view, it is necessary for the whole range of communication activities with public.

It is important to maintain the support of public opinion for NATO also after membership. As it is known, Slovenia has organized a referendum on NATO membership and the result was very encouraging (more than 60% turnout with 66% in favor of membership). This was primarily achievable because of a carefully prepared and substantial public awareness campaign. Representatives of the government and parliament as well some others (Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia, the Slovene NATO Council etc.) were traveling around the country and participated in numerous discussions.⁷² These activities created an important link and exchange of information between government (MoD in particular) and public opinion. Though not without criticism and skepticism, this relation was open, mutual and provided both sides with important understanding and also certain amount of trust. After membership this direct communication with the public vanished. This at least meant less direct contact between public and high governmental officials, fewer opportunities for direct dialog and potentially also less support for

71 It is my personal guess that this has derived from the near obsession of the political elite of the candidate country with the exact date of the acceptance to the Alliance. Being focused too much on the date as a single part of the process takes much of the needed attention and concentration away from important issues of the membership (like structural change and adaptation). Everybody knows this in advance, but still it is difficult to fully cope with it. Judging from my ten years long experience of intensive dealing with NATO I can just confirm it. This aspect is therefore much interesting for various social researches.

72 The author of this article participated in roughly speaking a hundred such discussions and gave as many interviews for Slovene and other media.

NATO related activities.⁷³

Fifth, membership heavily increases the amount of activities, which can be described as “running daily business”. It is important, though, not to be absorbed by them. Sooner or later they have to become routine: highly demanding and responsible, but still a routine. Therefore, an important amount of daily activities has to be devoted to substance, what would with another words mean policy making (discussing, contemplating, analyzing, writing position papers, exchanging experiences, consulting etc.).

This is even more important, since each new member should absorb three additional lessons. First, it is an ongoing practice to learn from previous members. Each has some specific experiences, which are important to know and are useful sooner or later. Second, each new member has something to add to the experiences of previous (old) members. None has entered the Alliance from the same environment, with same experience, preparedness and expertise. They all learn from each other. And third, each member should transfer this experience to the candidate and other interested countries.

And last but not least, NATO membership provides constant and excellent opportunity to manage an important part of previously classical bilateral activities between member countries within a multilateral framework.⁷⁴ Some of those activities are not foreign defense policy anymore, but were converted into Alliance’s internal policy, while those, which still remain issues of bilateral foreign policy, are much easier settled through discussions and negotiation within the multilateral framework. For small countries this is of utmost importance, since they have limited personnel and other resources. (Jazbec, 2002b:124-127)

In other words, this what can be to a certain extent described as necessary “overlapping” of multilateral and bilateral issues, increases the output and has as a consequence more efficient and substantial policy making.

73 The latter depends also on the concrete activity: meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in May 2005 in Slovenia gained huge media criticism, while the expert meeting of NATO Russia Council was welcomed.

74 Evolution of military diplomacy to defense diplomacy is a proof of this observation.

A Brief Comparison

One could presume that it would be useful to compare, at least on a general level, the experiences from the pre-membership period with those gained through the first year of membership.

Perhaps the most useful lesson would be that there was basically nothing important what Slovenia⁷⁵ hasn't heard about or wasn't told about the membership already during the pre-membership period.

The next lesson would be that membership business is a highly upgraded version of all previous activities. Even more, not only upgraded, but also broader in scope and deeper in substance. Therefore the mindset shift to membership philosophy is not easy, fast and smooth. It would be difficult to say without empirical research if this shift is harder for the political elite, bureaucrats, the military or for the public. Having this in mind it is fully understandable, why it is important to maintain high dynamics of mutual communication among all these parts of the process also (or in particular) after membership. There are many issues and challenges which membership brings, where understanding, support and transparency among them is a precondition for being a successful member country.

One has to point out at this stage also the utmost importance of defense planning system. The sooner it is adapted to the Alliance's cycle, the better. With this we of course refer to the relevance of defense reforms for each single country⁷⁶. From one point of view this is important since modern societies and their armies do not fight wars anymore, but cooperate and integrate. (Jazbec, 2005.b: 146) Cooperation, integration and solidarity, with other words sharing of values stands very high in the Alliance's focus. From another point of view it is important to bear in mind that the process of defense reform is the very backbone of hardcore membership. Resource management and capabilities efficiency derive directly from successful defense reforms. At this point membership stands or falls.

⁷⁵ One can most probably generalize this experience also to the other six new members.

⁷⁶ More on defense reforms in Jazbec, 2005.a.

From the recent Slovene political experience there is another highly important aspect to be pointed out. Slovenia held in 2005 the Chairmanship in the OSCE.⁷⁷ The majority of reactions after finished Chairmanship praised Slovene approach and results (adoption of the budget /scales of contribution/, a new secretary general, the road map, balance between the three dimensions, renewed spirit of optimism etc.). Without going into details one can for sure say that this was to much extent also possible since Slovenia has already been NATO and EU member. It was easier, though also more responsible for the Slovene foreign minister, being Chairman in office (but also foreign minister of a NATO and EU member) to deal with difficult, intensive and also controversial issues on his OSCE agenda. This gave Slovenia additional weight and brought additional, very useful experience, which without double membership would not be possible.

Conclusion

At the end, one could sum up the above presented in three general conclusions and also add a list of concrete experiences⁷⁸, which were gained during the first year of the NATO membership.

Firstly, a realistic approach in all activities, referring to the NATO membership, is a must. Everybody had to undergo this lessons and it has always proven useful. This cannot be avoided, though it might sometimes seem that some countries would like to make a shortcut.

Secondly, a consistent and transparent policy is the only approach, which helps both sides in the process. The Alliance gets to know the candidate and vice versa, mutual trust is created and

77 The author of this article spoke about the Chairmanship in his Šipan lecture. However, this article was written in the beginning of 2006, what made it possible to include the referred statement.

78 Some of these experiences are pure statements, some warnings and some advices, but they all have in common the appearance during the first membership year. An in-depth empirical research on this phenomenon would be highly appreciated and for sure very useful. The author of this article would be glad to share his experience and advice with an interested scholar on this topic.

the relation is constantly strengthened.

Thirdly, it is the whole process, which has to be managed, not only some of its (most attractive) parts. With such an approach the structural dynamics of the process are stronger, the results are firm, and the dynamics are being kept on also after the membership.

The concrete experiences, which were elaborated in this article, are listed in the table No 2.

Table No 2 – Concrete experiences from the first membership year

1.	Adaptation to the NAC formal meeting's weekly routine.
2.	The imbalance between the MFA and MoD on one side and MNA on the other.
3.	A necessity for an optimal and constant flow of information.
4.	Principles of "need to share" and "need to know".
5.	Maintenance of high organizational dynamics (membership is the beginning, not the end).
6.	The ongoing communication activities with NGOs, public and media.
7.	Relation between running daily business and policy creating activities.
8.	To use multilateral framework for settling bilateral issues among member states.
9.	To learn from previous members, add one's own experiences and share them with candidate and interested countries.
10.	The importance of defense planning system and defense reform process as a hardcore of the membership.

From the empirical point of view these are among the most important experiences, though for sure not the only ones. However, it is important to know, that the above listed were experienced by at least one of the seven new members during the process of gaining membership. At the current stage of the Alliance's development the above presented should be viewed within two parallel and simultaneous processes, namely the transformation and enlargement. Seven countries, which in early Spring 2004 entered the Alliance, now also create the former and strongly support the latter.

Having an ambition to conclude with a simple answer to the simple question, posed at the beginning, one would say that the simple message is in a highly serious approach to the membership issue. This would mean realistic planning, efficient execution and an open ear to absorb experiences from others. There is no doubt that the three MAP and other interested countries have shown much of this so far.

The OSCE

The OSCE and Interest Management in the Western Balkans⁷⁹

One decade after the adoption of Dayton Peace Accords and two years after the dual EU and NATO enlargement the region of the Western Balkans faces some crucial challenges, which decisively affect its further development. The issue of the increasingly loose federation of Serbia and Montenegro (S-M), the issue of Kosovo, as well as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) are three cases, all on the top of the agenda. The MAP countries are closer to membership than they have ever been, Bulgaria and Romania are practically EU members, and Croatia and Macedonia are proceeding along the road to membership, while both S-M and B-H still remain outside the PfP.

With both the EU and NATO firmly present in the region, how could we see the current role of the OSCE and its soft security mechanisms and advantages in the region?

Being the biggest of all its missions, the Kosovo one has been successfully managing the complicated and complex interest heterogeneity in the international framework provided by the UN SC 1244 resolution. The transformation of UNMIK offers an additional challenge to be mastered by the OSCE experts, while struggling to enhance the institution building, confidence and security building measures and the crucial role of the civil society. The latter is perhaps also one of the key arguments for enhancement of the organization's role in B-H. This goes along the demanding, deep and tough process of the security sector reform, with special emphasis on both defense and police areas. However, it is the discussion about the future B-H constitution, which overshadows

⁷⁹ This article was originally published in *The European Security, an OSCE Review*, No 1/2006, p. 5, Vol. 14, published by the Finnish Committee for European Security - STETE under the title "Lessons from and for the Western Balkans: Hard test for soft security". It was later published also at www.ifimes.org.

all other topics. Last but not least, one possible outcome of the May referendum in Montenegro could be the newest OSCE field mission in Podgorica. Again, we face three issues where expertise and advice of the OSCE will remain not only indispensable, but also highly preferable and welcome.

We argue this above all with huge, useful and proven field experience, which is one of the biggest advantages the organization has. It is primarily up to the organization itself how to benefit even more from it and how to include its empirical expertise in its relations with other international fora in the very theatre. We could additionally argue that the OSCE is in the position to step ahead in the field and complement the activities of NATO and the EU. While the former is managing hard security challenges, heading with the demanding process of defense reforms, the latter is achieving this with overall restructuring of the societies in the region. This provides clear maneuvering space for not only successful establishment but also the development of civil society mechanisms and related value systems, with one top message in particular: in spite of the historically dominant value of conflict as a means of solving open issues, consensus is the one which should stand out. It is our firm belief that this shift could be achieved primarily as a result of the OSCE activities.

Increasing cooperation with the EU and NATO as well as with the Council of Europe (CoE) shows how to cement the way forward. One could say that the complementarity of the security processes in the Northern hemisphere has been finally laid down. This is even more true having in mind the successful and efficient field synergy of all three OSCE dimensions, which is one of the outstanding achievements of the previous year's Slovene Chairmanship. Bringing together economic and migration issues as well as launching the Education for Rights of Children Pilot Project proves the necessity and the expectation for a combined matrix approach. In an ever demanding and complex world only such an approach could bring added value and renewed interest to our activities. Perhaps one could also argue that it would be our interest and care for children, elderly and disabled, expressed through well thought projects, which could attract the necessary

attention of political elites.

If the mentioned pilot project has achieved to bring together representatives of various ethnic groups in different places around the Western Balkans and if the experience of the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims are applicable through the OSCE area, this could be a lesson learned from the successful work of the OSCE in the region discussed.

This conclusion would have at least three important consequences.

First, it praises hard and usually widely unseen, but highly efficient, work of the OSCE experts and other field activists. This is for sure the organization's advantage.

Second, it has already been transferable to other regions and this should be done even more, with new topics and a combined, refreshed approach. This has proven the organization's vitality and flexibility.

And third, complementarity of the security processes in the mentioned area has gained momentum after last year's Memorandum between the OSCE and the CoE. This presents an example of how to tackle soft security issues in an ever changing environment, where threats and challenges merge and cannot be tackled otherwise but with the joint effort of security players.

Organizational Challenges and Experiences of the Slovene OSCE Chairmanship⁸⁰

Introduction

To assume the OSCE Chairmanship would primarily mean to co-create and bear responsibility for the security and interest management in the Northern Hemisphere in the current calendar year. Furthermore, for the country concerned and its Foreign Ministry it also means a specific test of its organizational flexibility and an ability to provide substance for this co-creation and decision making process. Additionally, it also includes an active participation in the global security processes, since at least major security players have developed a reasonable degree of cooperation so far.

In this contribution we will try to analyze the organizational challenges and experiences of the Slovene OSCE Chairmanship in 2005. Hence our attention is focused on the organizational management of the process and relations within the Slovene diplomatic organization⁸¹ as well as on those with and within the OSCE structures. This has provided the necessary substantial output for the policy and decision making process, which has supported the Chairman in Office (CiO). Our thesis would be that only efficient diplomatic machinery, which is capable of ensuring constant, smooth and rich in substance provision of information, could enable an efficient chairmanship of the OSCE as an

80 *This article was originally published in Helsinki Monitor, Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Volume 17, 2006, No 3, pp. 269 – 278. Helsinki Monitor is published by the Netherlands Helsinki Committee, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. www.brill.nl It was later published also at www.ifimes.org*

81 With the term 'diplomatic organization' we understand a permanent body or an institution consisting of the foreign ministry and the diplomatic consular network (embassies, missions to international organizations and consulates), entrusted with the implementation of a foreign policy through diplomatic activities. More on this in Jazbec, 2001:147-150.

example of managing a demanding and complex international policy-making process.

While concentrating on the case of Slovenia, a small and still new country in the international community, we will also try to generalize this experience. From one point of view, this could present a comprehensive impression of the concrete chairmanship, and from another point of view, it could add to the institutional memory from which the future chairing countries would draw.

Presentation of Basic Organizational Aspects

Slovenia announced its ambition to host the chairmanship at the Istanbul Summit in December 1999 and was granted it at the Porto Ministerial Meeting in 2003. Consequently, during 2004 its Mission to the OSCE in Vienna was enlarged with additional diplomats, the OSCE Task Force in the Foreign Ministry was established and other related activities were initiated (like financing of the project etc.⁸²). Also a small OSCE Project Group was established towards the end of 2003 at the Ministry of Defence, which kept contacts with the Task Force.

The Task Force consisted of 15 diplomats. Two of them were detached from the Defence Ministry, one from the Ministry of the Interior and one from the Slovene Intelligence Service; four of them were detached from different other divisions of the foreign ministry (one was soon included in the Task Force for the whole year, two for only part of the year). One third of the Task Force consisted of junior diplomats and one fourth of middle-ranking diplomats, the rest were senior ones, among them one former State Secretary⁸³; almost half the group were women with varied experience. The former Foreign Minister headed the Task Force.

82 These aspects are not given any attention in this contribution.

83 The author of this article served one term as a State Secretary at the Defence Ministry (during that time he chaired their OSCE Project Group). During 2005 he was member of the Task Force in charge of political military issues. He also had the opportunity to follow closely as a Slovene diplomat in Stockholm the Danish (1997) and the Norwegian Chairmanship (1999). Therefore, by preparing this article, he drew heavily from his experience, using the method "observation with one's own participation". Gilli, 1975.

As it has transpired later on, this was a highly useful combination of knowledge⁸⁴, experience, an eagerness to work and the necessary feeling of contemplation. The Task Force existed from the summer of 2004 up to the end of January 2006. It dealt only with substantial issues; for handling the bureaucratic part of the business, the Division for OSCE was established within the foreign ministry. Its members were only those diplomats from the Task Force, who weren't detached there to (the so-called core group). The deputy head of the Task Force headed the Division.

The Head of the Task Force was subordinated and directly responsible to the Foreign Minister and the CiO, and was acting also on his behalf, where and when this was necessary and possible. He was also a member of the Board of the Ministry. The Deputy Head of the Task Force (i.e. the Head of the Division) attended all other meetings in the Ministry and accompanied the CiO during all his traveling. The Task Force met regularly twice a week (in principle on Monday and Thursday); the core group also met more frequently. Because of the preparations of the Ministerial Council Meeting, the representatives of the Protocol Division attended meetings of the Task Force from late October 2005.

Members of the Task Force were in daily contact with colleagues at the Slovene Mission to the OSCE, at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna and at various OSCE institutions and bodies, at the OSCE field Missions, with Personal and Special representatives of the CiO, with representatives of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, members of the Panel of Eminent Persons and with other diplomats (such as missions to the OSCE of other participating countries; at foreign ministries of various participating countries; with Slovene diplomats at various locations within the OSCE community and participation in the Asian Security Forum in Seoul etc.). The minister's cabinet was, naturally, heavily involved in this process. They were in contacts also with various NGOs, think-tanks and institutions in Slovenia and in the participating states, both from the academic community and from civil society, which all took part at various OSCE activities.

84 Four diplomats held PhD, three M.A.

They also kept contact with different representatives of the media.

The Slovene Mission to the OSCE in Vienna consisted of 11 diplomats. More than a third of them were women⁸⁵; almost half of the whole team consisted of junior to middle-ranking diplomats. Two senior diplomats were recruited from the Defence Ministry. The CiO appointed the former Slovene Prime Minister and Foreign Minister as his personal representative for Central Asia; he was supported by a senior Slovene diplomat, who was residing during the second part of 2005 in Bishkek and was frequently traveling around the region.

Organizational Aspects and Challenges

There are at least some important political and organizational aspects of chairing the OSCE, which determine and challenge the country in charge. From one point of view, they originate from the characteristics of the OSCE, and from another point of view, they have to be kept in mind while managing the chairmanship and providing the necessary as well as the expected functioning of the organization.

Our first step here would be to present both these aspects, one after the other. As far as the first, conditionally speaking, political cluster of aspects is concerned, we could name the following:

- The OSCE mission to provide and maintain security derives from its firm presence on the ground. Through its 17 field missions⁸⁶ the organization keeps contact with reality and does not only operate in the spheres of high politics;
- Through its three dimensions the OSCE agenda covers a wide spectrum of topics and areas. This adds to the demands and complexity of the chairmanship;

85 Three young Slovene female diplomats chaired the afternoon and evening session of the PrepCom on the eve of the Ministerial Council Meeting. To the author's knowledge this has never been the case so far.

86 After the independence of Montenegro one could expect that the 18th OSCE mission would be established in Podgorica.

- Because of the consensus-based decision-making process, the chairing country has to seek consensus continually. It does not have to favour its own position; as a matter of fact, the position of the Chairmanship and the national position of the country, which holds the current chairmanship, are two different aspects. The position of a chairing country is shown indirectly through the well-oiled running of the organization;
- It is only the current CiO who speaks on behalf of the chairmanship. There is no replacement for him/her during the 365 (366) days of a calendar year;
- The CiO has to divide carefully and transparently his/her duties of the Chairman and of the country's foreign minister. As a CiO, he/she has a decisive yes vote in many issues, though limitations imposed by sometimes very inflexible procedural regulations could be frustrating;
- There is no direct relation between the higher or lower level CiO activities and progress on the ground. Sometimes his/her endeavors can be highly stimulating and encouraging, sometimes they practically do not matter.

Moderating between various interests and ambitions of the participating states could be very productive, although it is limited to motivating, encouraging, stimulating and similar activities. Nobody can force member states to do anything.

One should also add here a few comments regarding the agenda of a small country's chairmanship. Basically there are no differences between the small and larger countries' agenda when executing the chairmanship process. The chairing country and the Secretariat shape the agenda, taking into account issues which are in the pipeline. This also holds true for how to manage the whole process. However, each country could bring some of its own aspects to the process. With such specific aspects the country characterizes its chairmanship. Ideas and suggestions of other countries are welcome, but there is no necessity to accept them, in particular if they try to politically affect the process.

The Slovene Chairmanship was originally marked with 'a 3R approach', namely the ambition was to revitalize, reform and rebal-

ance the organization. This was put to a concrete test when the crisis in Kirgizstan occurred. The crisis erupted during the second half of March 2005, between the second round of parliamentary elections (March 13) and the day when the provisional government was sworn in (March 28). The upheaval appeared literally overnight and the Chairmanship had to react quickly, adapting to the situation. The personal representative of the CiO was sent to monitor and follow the situation, and the CiO was in contact with the most important actors, and a senior member of the Task Force was also dispatched to the region to provide constant information from the area. This provided the framework within which the situation was managed and brought under control.

This consisted of monitoring the situation, discussing it with all the parties involved, meeting with other representatives of the international community as well as expressing expectations that the rule of law and democratic standards would be followed and respected. The role of the OSCE, which was at a certain moment the only international organization active in Bishkek, was in particular to strengthen the process of democratization. The personal representative of the CiO *inter alia* established permanent coordination between the Ambassadors of the RF, the USA and Germany (representing the EU); he met frequently with the country's highest authorities and organized a meeting between the OSCE Ambassadors in

Bishkek with the representatives of the provisional government. The CiO visited Kirgizstan twice (on March 31st and on April 17/18th). With all these activities the Chairmanship showed an ability to react and to adapt, to listen and to be listened to; to be received and to get parties around the table. Generally speaking, the management of the crisis achieved so that transfer of the organizational efforts and a substantial input, along the rules of procedure, into political efficiency could be attained. Having in mind the second, organizational cluster of aspects, we could speak of the following issues:

- The OSCE Chairmanship is a highly complex and complicated organizational project. As we have seen from the Slovene experience, presented in the previous section, there

are many permanent and ad hoc bodies and individuals, which are involved in the process;

- The organization of the Ministerial Council meeting stands out as a particular and overall demanding project.⁸⁷ However, it should anyway become part of advanced routine management, which represents important part of the contemporary diplomatic activities;
- These bodies are placed in different vertical levels and are spread within various horizontal levels, within and outside the foreign ministry; within the chairing country and out of it; within governmental structures and outside;
- Cooperation with other international organizations is gaining in importance, also having in mind complementarity as one of the most important characteristics of contemporary security processes⁸⁸;
- These bodies have in common the provision of all possible information for the CiO, coordination of the activities, sharing of information and management of the entrusted parts/phases of the process;
- These relations and connections provide a sensitive and flexible network, where the center is clearly defined (the Head and Deputy Head of the Task Force). However, the majority of the communication heads in various horizontal directions, where the communicators make decisions constantly, while preparing reports and suggestions to the center, which then, upon

agreement within the network meetings transfers the decision vertically to CiO.

Such flexibility enables and allows the smooth and well-oiled functioning of the whole machinery, which supports the CiO. There are some important relations, which directly involve the CiO (like those with the Secretary General of the OSCE, the foreign ministers of participating and other states, the highest rep-

87 Approximately 40% of the diplomats employed by the Slovene Ministry of Foreign Affairs were engaged in this project. This argues in favor of outsourcing as an increasingly important management method in diplomatic organizations.

88 The CORE Report (Zellner et al, 2005:33-34) speaks about the UN, the EU and the Council of Europe; we should add also NATO, see Jazbec, 2005.d:447-462.

representatives of various international organizations etc.). The caretakers of this communicational aspect must be clearly defined to ensure the correct dispersion of the information, to everybody within the network who would need this information. If this is not the case, the CiO will receive different, even contradictory background information, which will inevitably affect his/her work.

With our second step we can try to imagine the picture, which will result from overlapping of the already presented political and organizational clusters.

This shows us what are the necessary⁸⁹ political and organizational aspects of a complex and sophisticated process, which is called the chairmanship. The management of this process should be (and usually is) entrusted to two, perhaps three persons, who have to establish constant, smooth and highly operational communications among them. In our opinion, they are the Head of the Task Force and his/her Deputy as well as the Permanent Representative of the country chairing to the OSCE. They form the running team of the chairmanship.

From one point of view, they collect decisions, suggestions and information from the previously described network and transfer these to the CiO, while from another point of view, they accept his/her reactions and transfer them the other way round. They have to watch out the inflow from the direct communication between the CiO and various players (see the organizational cluster, number six) and ensure its delivery to the network. They have to be able to react to each issue, which comes on the agenda, and to sense possible unpredictable complications, and bring them into the process machinery. They have to depend and rely on each other, and have to be in constant contact; this could be described as a kind of organizational-communication dispatch centre. Only this can ensure that the CiO is constantly and well equipped with concise, substantial and proactive information support, which

89 It is not only the author's strong belief, but also his personal experience that this "necessary political and organizational substance" has been empirically proved during the Slovene chairmanship. Because of the limits of this article it is not possible to present them in a graphic way, which would make it easier to cope with the complexity, which derives from the overlapping of both clusters.

provides an adequate, consistent and streamlined policy of the chairmanship. Therefore, their contribution to the chairmanship is noticeable not directly from the results of their work but through the smooth functioning of CiO, who does not need to take care of anything except doing his/her work (focusing on the political substance only).

The already presented organizational and personal chemistry has to reduce the room for improvisation to constantly oil the machinery, to upgrade the substance of the decision and policy-making process as well as to allow organizational flexibility in order to be able to react to everything that comes on the agenda.

Our third and final step in this chapter would be to ask how such experiences from a highly demanding management process could be implemented in the organizational concept of the diplomatic machinery of a small state. It is a well known fact that small states have to devote a great deal of attention to human resources and organizational management, since they never have enough resources and capabilities⁹⁰ to be able to develop extensive and complex diplomacies. This would be the reason why they have to react in a flexible way and constantly adapt their diplomatic organizations. But this reaction has to be built into the system and shall not be primarily a question of ad hoc improvisation. As we have seen, the high number of bodies, involved in the chairmanship process calls for a flexible and loose bureaucratic structure. It should be able to react more within a network principle than in a classical, rigid bureaucratic one. This would mean in particular that challenges (or information input) from the diplomatic and political environment have changed dramatically. They are constantly dynamic, constant and changeable all the time and demand rapid reaction with an increased level of coordination and information sharing. Generally speaking, this also characterizes the chairmanship process as such.

Hence, it would be logical and understandable to implement most of the overlapping experience in the organizational con-

90 More on this in Jazbec, 2001:110-118.

cept of the diplomatic organization.⁹¹ With the high dynamics of policy making within the EU and NATO, member countries are exposed to the constant challenges presented above. From this point of view we could describe the OSCE chairmanship as a highly useful experience, which contributes a great deal both the institutional memory and the organizational vitality of national diplomacies.

Therefore, how the chairmanship is managed and organizationally approached should also be the standard way as to how to organize a foreign ministry as a whole nowadays. Without any exaggeration, this could be close to the ideal organizational approach in small foreign ministries. Hopefully, at least the small countries which have so far chaired the OSCE have either already been organized in that way or have experienced this. For the former chairmanship it was an additional test how such an organization works efficiently, and for the latter, hopefully, an additional and perhaps also decisive argument as to how to organize the ministry.

This would mean that the diplomatic organization of a small state should be small, flexible as well as being clearly and functionally designed. It should be open and able to absorb experiences from its immediate environment as well as showing strong trend to flatten vertical levels and disperse authority and responsibility across the horizontal level. The players should be able to coordinate their work, sharing information and reacting quickly.⁹² They should only forward already digested issues and leave open only a few most sensitive ones.⁹³ It is our strong belief and hopefully also as evidenced by the topics discussed,

91 Here, we can point out three important events in the case of Slovenia: non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council (1998-1999), the OSCE Chairmanship in 2005 and the future EU Presidency in 2008. (Compare, Jazbec, 2006). They add to continuous and increasing experience as well as demonstrating, how to organize a small diplomatic organization to be able to compete with those of bigger and more experienced states.

92 With this remark we come close to the nature of multilateral diplomacy within the United Nations: "Multilateral diplomacy in the UN requires an astonishing grasp of detail, speed of movement and ability to capitalize on one's gains." (Edwards, 1994). Compare also Jazbec, 2001:66-72.

93 The already discussed running team of the chairmanship should in principle forward to the CiO only agreed and closed issues.

principles are very well exercised in the OSCE chairmanship. Its organizational challenges argue and call for their implementation also in the regular organizational chart of the diplomatic organization.

Lessons Learned

Coming back to the Slovene chairmanship and its experiences, with generalizing it, we could pick up some of the most typical and useful lessons learned. They present a mixture of political, organizational and sociological aspects. An important part of this process is exercised through a purely pragmatic approach:

- The chairmanship demands from a small diplomatic organization that it is adaptable and flexible. Primarily this provides useful output for a smooth decision-making process;
- To achieve this easily, adaptable organizational solutions have to be implemented. While drawing from them on a daily basis during the chairmanship period, they should be included in the subsequent regular organizational concept;
- The organization of the Ministerial Council meeting stands out for its complexity and the scope of demands. It highly mobilizes the whole diplomatic organization and brings at least for a few days all other activities to a lower level of dynamics;
- The need for outsourcing as a management method becomes not only obvious but also necessary in various areas (organization, logistics, security, personnel, research etc.)
- Various expected and unexpected issues, which complicate the management of the process, appear throughout the chairmanship. This could be the conversion of purely technical issues into political ones (like the question of the budget and contribution scales), the shortage of consensus, maintaining a balance between the three dimensions etc.; It is rather usual, although not at all preferred, that the discrepancy appears between the activities of the CiO and an absence of the consequent progress on the ground. The

higher level of CiO activities does not necessarily result in the same level of progress on the ground, although they are decisive for the tempo of the chairmanship. This could be frustrating, because progress is sometimes achieved due to the certain events, which hardly have any direct connection with the (current) chairmanship;

- It is not unusual, that the high tempo of CiO activities brings results during the next⁹⁴ or even later chairmanship period. However, this is another organizational aspect of the OSCE processes, which helps to keep the process rolling on and is perhaps most noticeable through the Troika principle.

From what has been presented so far it is rather easy and obvious to notice that the organizational dynamics of the chairmanship concentrates on two, perhaps three vertical levels and is widely spread throughout the horizontal ones. This results in a specific, loose and possibly very efficient network⁹⁵, where individual players enjoy a high level of independence and responsibility. In the author's long experience in human resource management this is primarily a highly effective and stimulating approach. Above, we have described the running team of the chairmanship (two to three persons) as a focal point of such a network, where all the information and coordination processes go through (apart from the CiO's direct contacts on a high level). These activities should share organizational synergy and be combined with the personal rationality of players involved and this should be stretched on a bipartisan basis. Apart from having a strong organizational character, these are also important sociological characteristics of diplomatic organization. Coordination and information exchange, which must be constant, widespread and brief, should provide the outer limits of this network, as defined by the topics of mutual concern (i.e. the current OSCE chairmanship agenda).

94 The long awaited decision to again hold the Seminar on Military Doctrines was made towards the end of the Slovene Chairmanship and was executed at the start of the Belgian one.

95 Conditionally speaking, we could describe a network as a variety of cross-organizational processes on a low number of levels, which do not have any specific central point or that this point is a moving nucleus of interactions, which refer to a small group of exposed individuals.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this article has been to present, on a general level, with the ambition to generalize and with a structural approach, the organizational experiences of the Slovene OSCE Chairmanship, as well as to argue that such a process can only be efficient if it ensures a constant, smooth and rich in substance provision of information. This demands a loose and horizontally-oriented organizational network, which affects the traditional organizational concept of diplomatic organization as a classical bureaucracy. Therefore, the chairmanship process which is only manageable with a flexible approach, based on project teams and task forces, which also include outside experts.

This would perhaps be the most important conclusion that has been reached in this contribution. Here, we feel the need to combine this experience with the advice that such an organizational approach could be accepted as the basis for the overall functioning of diplomacies of small state diplomacy. This is even more important bearing in mind that with EU and NATO membership they are exposed to upgraded dynamics, which sooner or later become daily routine.⁹⁶ However, only the successful management of organizational issues enables these diplomacies to establish substantial policy-making and decision-taking process, along with achieving the appropriate results.

The experiences here presented and argued could confirm our general starting proposition that two dimensions of the process (organizational and substantially political) have to complement each other; in the long run, policy making cannot rely on organizational improvisation, which would only react to the changing environmental output. And vice versa, also organizational consistency as the backbone of each diplomatic organization would be threatened by possible constant policy making improvisation. Therefore, implementing the OSCE chairmanship experience for the whole diplomatic organization is a way of organizing a complex bureaucratic machinery in a contemporary, highly interconnected and interdependent international community.

⁹⁶ This can be confirmed as the Slovene experience after two years of both memberships.

The EU

The Development of the ESDP: The Role and Perspectives of Slovenia⁹⁷

Introduction

During its fifteen year long development as a state, Slovenia has made several important and internationally recognized moves. Based on these, one can form a thesis of conducting constructive, rational and, in particular for a small state, important foreign policy. The starting point of this was, naturally, the formation of a state (of its nationals and citizens living on its territory), as well as achieving international recognition of this state by the international community and membership status in the most important of international organizations.

In the middle of the 1990s, intensive and wide-reaching activities for structural conformation with the EU and NATO began, the long-term goal of this being membership status in both institutions. Initial ambitions were high, while the process of achieving membership status itself lasted a decade, having been concluded in the spring of 2004. In the years 1998 and 1999, Slovenia was a non-permanent member of the UN's Security Council, while in December of the latter year, during the OSCE Istanbul summit, she announced her candidature for chairmanship of the OSCE, this candidature coming to fruition in 2005 when Slovenia took over this role. In autumn of 1999, Slovenia began to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a NATO programme for candidate countries, and a year later participated at the first EU

⁹⁷ *This article was originally published in German as a special edition by the Office for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defense in Spring 2006, during the Austrian EU Presidency. www.bundesheer.at/wissen-forschung/publikationen An extended Slovene version was published in *Bilten Slovenske vojske*, September 2006 – 8/No 2, pp. 57-71. Translated from Slovene to English for this publication by Luka Jazbec.*

Capabilities Commitment Conference, whilst pledging its own contribution in the then-formed ESDP. In Autumn of 2004, a few months after achieving membership of the EU, a resolution is passed, designating Slovenia as the first of the ten new member states to hold the EU Presidency, the date for this being decided as the first half of 2008.

In this contribution, Slovenia's experiences in the two aforementioned large multilateral projects (non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council and chairmanship of the OSCE) will be analyzed and summarized, as well as projected onto the third such project, that being the future EU Presidency. The conclusions that will arise from this analysis will be used to consider the future role of Slovenia in the development of the ESDP. The question at the centre of attention will be how one can generalize the aforementioned experiences for small states altogether, and how to use this in connection with specialized fields and institutions such as the ESDP.

Slovenia in the UN Security Council 1998-1999

Slovenia was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, not even six years after being internationally recognized as a nation state (January 1992 - Autumn 1997), as a representative for the regional group of Eastern Europe.⁹⁸ For a small state with limited financial and human resources, this was not only a big political but also organizational challenge. It is possible in such a case to speak of at least two groups of experiences, which are not only useful for the state concerned, but for every state that faces such a situation (Jazbec, 2001:66-72). On the one hand, these are the consequences and experiences which have a positive and encouraging effect on diplomatic organization⁹⁹ (in particular an increase in the amount of recognition a small state

98 The Slovenian state came into existence directly after the end of the Cold War and thus one can speak of her (as well as of similar states) as a new country.

99 Under the term diplomatic organization, we understand the ministry of foreign affairs and the network of consular and diplomatic representatives as a single entity (Jazbec, 2001:147-150).

receives in foreign policy circles, which in turn increases its operational possibilities), and on the other hand, experiences which discourage and work negatively for the small state (in particular when an exceptional strain is placed on a small state).

The first group would contain the following:

- The diplomacy of a new small state begins to meet, intensively and on a daily basis, with new and additional, up till then less present and also less known, themes of foreign policy, with which it may have had little or no contact with previously;
- This requires from diplomatic organization a perpetual acquiring of new information about these themes, that is, themes which the diplomatic network did not report much about earlier;
- Dealing with new themes in foreign policy broadens knowledge about international issues and eliminates previous 'grey areas', and consequently, recognizing and dealing with international issues becomes a much more efficient process, this being particularly important in this area due to the daily need of re-aligning political positions towards solving such issues as they may arise; in turn, all of this expands and strengthens the work of diplomatic organization, not only by improving its knowledge and awareness of, and response to, current international issues but also regarding the creation of appropriate foreign policy documentation;
- Regarding organization, this poses a challenge and a need to temporarily reform diplomatic organization to enable an immediate, unified, and effective way of dealing with, and working towards solving, all the issues that come with membership in such institutions;
- The aforementioned challenges and requirements have a dual influence on the functioning of diplomatic organization: on the one hand, diplomatic effort is focused and directed towards those issues which, in a particular time span, are most urgent, whereas on the other hand, diplomatic effort diffuses and is also able to be directed towards perpetual focus on issues that arise spontaneously on a day-to-day basis and as such cannot, with any accuracy, be predicted;

In the second group, one would find the following:

- Increased activity of foreign policy in such cases also means inevitable increases in the functional expenses of diplomatic organization;
- When examining the demand for increased acquisition of foreign policy data, one can observe that diplomatic organization of a small state is likely too limited to fully satisfy this demand, which, to a certain extent, leads to a decrease in the number of sources providing relevant information for decisions made in the Security Council, and narrows, content-wise, the spectrum of acquired information;
- For diplomatic organization with little history and few far-reaching experiences, such inevitable and unavoidable oscillations are very demanding and can have a highly negative effect on the stability of content and organization, and in turn on the flexibility of diplomatic organization;
- Due to the exceptional strain placed upon diplomatic organization of a small state by the combination of current issues, relevant information, the necessity of immediate response, and limited resources, situations can arise in which weak handling of international issues occurs, and this in turn can lead to forming foreign policy decisions which may not be all that suitable to the issue at hand;
- Intensive operational dealing with all international issues to be found on the agenda of Security Council sessions and their subsequent appearance in the media can create an impression of effective foreign policy activity of a small state, although there is no guarantee that this efficiency holds true in all circumstances (dealing with issues that may be of priority to a small state can also lag behind, or less attention may be paid to them due to too much strain caused by other issues);
- Dealing with global issues concerning peace and security can produce a stagnation effect, where foreign policy activity of a new small state, once its term as non-permanent member of the Security Council is over, finds itself in a situation where it seems that 'nothing is happening', because comparing to previous highly dynamic daily activity, the regular working dynamic seems unusually low, effectively constituting a form

of diplomatic vacuum.

The consequences listed above cannot always be mechanically separated. Many experiences have both positive and negative aspects; however, one particular quality is common to all, namely, the exceptionally increased workload of diplomatic organization, the highly increased number of issues that require dealing with, and, consequently, an increased amount of information received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This also means an increased need for traceable input and the urgent mobilization of human resource potential. Yet, the most demanding aspect is finding the right way in which to use the knowledge and experience acquired in the long run. In connection with the theme dealt in this paper, this is of crucial importance.

In summarizing the key experiences from this project, emphasis must be placed on the fact that during the period of non-permanent membership, the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a Task Force reporting directly to the State Secretary for Multilateral Affairs. The Minister himself directly participated in the entire process only the most important of decisions (among others, he once chaired a session of the Security Council), which effectively means that the work dealt with in this project did not consume more than one fifth of his time. The diplomatic missions were regularly and intensively part of consultations regarding topics which were on the Security Council's daily agenda. This was especially intensified in the states that made up the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council as well as in the states that were in any way connected with the issues dealt with. The largest part of the additional work load was understandably placed on the mission to the UN in New York. The Task Force had regular contact with the office of the Prime Minister, who contributed to forming the most important decisions, whereas the Ministry of Defense was hardly included in the process.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Regarding this, one might find useful the fact that during the period of Slovenia's non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council, one of the members of the Slovenian permanent mission was a high-ranking military diplomat (brigadier general)

Using the aforementioned experiences as a basis, a comparison will be made regarding the other two projects dealt with in this paper.¹⁰¹

The OSCE Chairmanship 2005

If non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council, is signified by dealing with issues of global peace and security, that is, global politics, which is often too far removed from reality, then the OSCE Chairmanship is signified by (nearly) the opposite. The largest international institution for security carries out 17 field missions and its functioning is explicitly tied to dealing with largely concrete security issues. These issues encompass a wide spectrum, and are dealt with by work in three dimensions (the political-military, the economic-environmental, and the human dimension).

Although in both cases the challenge faced is similar, the difference between the organizational, operational, and thematic approaches is rather large. Decision-making is based on consensus, and the state currently holding chairmanship holds the responsibility for reaching this consensus and should not place special emphasis on its own positions. Often, it cannot even have its own positions, so to speak, and this can be very frustrating. The key position during chairmanship is held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the chairing country (CiO – Chairman in Office). This means that only he personally decides about a number of things, as he and only he represents the chairing country and by

who worked on peacekeeping issues. After the expiry of his mandate in the spring of 2001, nobody was appointed in his stead.

101 The conclusions made will, through a comparison of all three projects dealt with in this paper, highlight the organizational demands of individual projects, the amount of inclusion of the Ministry of Defense, and the possible use that can be made of these experiences regarding Slovenia's participation in the ESDP. The author has based the assessments in this paper on the method of observation through own participation (inclusion in these processes at different diplomatic locations and positions as well as exchange of experiences with diplomatic colleagues from various countries). Due to limitations imposed by space and the level of complexity of the topic, the conclusions drawn from the comparisons made here will be quite simplified. Yet, this is useful and important for a better look at the strategic level of functioning and the obligations of small states and their diplomacy when carrying out such projects.

that the OSCE itself. The work required is thus very extensive, and the CiO's time and attention is always stretched between the obligations of chairmanship and the obligations of running his own state's foreign policy. At the same time, forming decisions is limited through a rather inflexible set of procedures and the need for consensus among all 55 participating¹⁰² states.

Additionally, there is no direct causality between the intensity of the CiO's work and solving problems on the field. In certain cases, more activity by the current CiO influences the solving of open issues, but in some cases, it may have little effect, or even none at all. For a successful OSCE Chairmanship, therefore, two factors are important: on the one hand, the capability for moderating all the positions held by the various participating states, and on the other hand, the capability to motivate and encourage states engaged in conflict to be themselves active in solving said conflicts.

The OSCE Chairmanship is also a demanding project when seen from the organizational point of view. The CiO has at his disposal, aside from his cabinet, also a team in his ministry, which takes care of thematic and organizational support, as well as the mission of his own state to the OSCE. In all these activities, the OSCE Secretariat at the seat of the organization in Vienna, all field missions, and the numerous representatives of the CiO all take part. In his daily work, the CiO must, to a certain extent, coordinate his activities and the positions held with those of the participating states, with the Secretary General of the OSCE, and with other international organizations (in particular the EU, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations). He also must take into account reactions of the public, civil society and the media in his own state, in participating states, and the states in conflict. This sums up to be a highly complicated mechanism, in which various vertical and horizontal methods of communication, decision-making, transmission, and coordination overlap and inter-connect. Because diplomatic orga-

102 Legally, the OSCE is not an international organization and has no legal subjectivity, and for this reason, we refer to »participating states« rather than »member states«. Due to this, one of the more important suggestions made by the group of experts for OSCE reform in 2005 was the suggestion to have the organization acquire the aforementioned subjectivity.

nization is »complex machinery for gathering information« (Paterson, 1969:122), the CiO is highly dependant on its functioning. Communication grey zones and organizational entropy easily lead to disruptions and stand-stills in the working process and to the forming of inappropriate decisions.

The characteristics of the OSCE Chairmanship mentioned above therefore present a quite different sort of foreign-policy experience than non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Of course, both processes have many aspects in common, but in administrating said processes, there exist large thematic and organizational differences. For a small state that goes through both types of experience in a relatively short time, as was the case with Slovenia, this is very demanding and warrants exceptional organizational effort. At the same time, however, it is an excellent opportunity for intensive accumulation of complementary experiences. The diplomatic organization of such a small state can gain much institutionalized knowledge, experience, and diplomatic memory. For a small state which is a newcomer to the international community, this presents the opportunity to bolden itself thematically and organizationally in a relatively short time, and consequently the state is able, in principle, to shorten the time needed to achieve the level of competence needed to effectively compete with other states in pursuing its national interests.¹⁰³

From the topic dealt with in this paper, complementarity is of particular importance because it greatly improves the UN's extensive work of ensuring global peace and security through additional security and defense issues dealt with by the OSCE. In this way, the security-defense agenda and the experiences of a small state and its diplomatic organization come very close to the spectrum of issues dealt with by the EU through the CFSP and the ESDP.

As mentioned previously, during the period of the OSCE Chairmanship, a special Task Force was formed in the Slovene Ministry

103 When speaking of a member of the EU and NATO, as is the case with Slovenia, this competition is, to a certain extent, lessened due to the greater choice of mechanisms offered to by these organizations to their members, and due to the greater weight offered to it by such institutional background.

of Foreign Affairs, the head of which was linked directly to the Minister, that is, the CiO. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had, with his activities, put a mark on the entire process and directed its dynamics, its contents, and the way it was carried out. This means that this work was highly demanding and took up four fifths of his time. The diplomatic missions were included in these activities during field visits by the CiO and during additional ensurance of suitable information. Understandably, the main part of the additional work load was placed on the mission at the OSCE in Vienna. The Task Force kept contact with the office of the Prime Minister, who occasionally joined the process (e.g. speaking at the Ministerial Meeting in Ljubljana in early December 2005). The Ministry of Defense was actively included in the entire process, and this in at least three aspects (representatives in the Task Force at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives in the mission at the OSCE, and participation in field missions of the OSCE both through ensuring the availability of professional staff as well as donations for implementation of various projects). In the carrying out of the Chairmanship, the remaining ministries and governmental institutions as well as civil society were also included due to the aforementioned three-dimensions of the OSCE.

The EU Presidency in 2008

When Slovenia takes over the EU Presidency in the first half of 2008, this will happen, as observed and analyzed, precisely ten years after its non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council, with the experience of the OSCE Chairmanship under its belt as well. Since one should perhaps not analyze and elaborate challenges of the caliber that is the EU Presidency before they actually occur, this section will highlight some thematic and organizational aspects present in all large and demanding international processes, aspects which have been mentioned earlier on in this paper. The starting point for this reflection and consideration will be the accumulation and upgrading of similar previous experiences and the extension of fields in which these experiences are applied. The latter highlights a strong causality between the

accumulation of experience through carrying out large international projects and the efficiency of diplomatic organization and the state itself regarding international relations.¹⁰⁴

The ten years mentioned represent a relatively short timeframe, which diplomatic organization will surely, to a certain extent, be able to draw upon previous experiences when dealing with the process of the EU Presidency. Due to the high level of complementarity (Jazbec, 2005e) of previous experiences, the EU Presidency will, from a thematic and partly from an organizational aspect, be easier than it would be otherwise (although it in no way will be easy). For dealing with certain situations, there already exists an extensive body of knowledge regarding the content and scope of the processes concerned and the organization thereof, and at the same time, both had been experienced in practice. Simultaneously, the EU Presidency will be a completely new and unknown challenge regarding other situations.

This is particularly true regarding numerous specific areas that a small state, as is the case with Slovenia, had previously little or no contact with (e.g. the question of swordfish). The latter presents, at least from the organizational point of view, a big difference compared to previous projects. The EU Presidency will certainly have to be carried out in a way that some member states will be included in it in a very visible way, these member states being those who have extensive knowledge and experience in fields where Slovenia's own is, for various reasons, lacking. The fact that Slovenia will preside in the so-called trio formula (Germany, Portugal, Slovenia) already hints at the states, which will be immediately useful for such co-operation. The aforementioned specific example (swordfish) confirms this claim, since e.g. Portugal is an Atlantic country and has much experience in this field, as well as displaying a certain amount of interest in it.

The deduction on the need for closer co-operation with other member states during the period of the EU Presidency is also very important for other new member states of the EU, whose turn to

¹⁰⁴ Put simply, the more wide-reaching and quality the experiences acquired are, the more effective the diplomacy of a small state is. Of course, the validity of this hypothesis can only be proven by empirical analysis.

preside will come later. As is surely in the Slovene interest to form thorough and goal-oriented thematic and organizational connections and begin co-operation with suitable and other interested member states already at this point in the preparations, so it should be in the interest of other new member states to have a similar position regarding the Slovene Presidency. This interest is based on the ambition for gaining knowledge and insight regarding the process and gathering wide-reaching and important experience regarding the administration of said process. This has a decisive effect on better administration of these processes and on strengthening direct and thematic co-operation between member states. In the most direct way, this means co-operation and co-forming EU politics in various areas, which is, after all, one of main goals of membership. In this sense, the fact that in the next period the EU Presidency will be held three - including Slovenia, four - small member states (namely Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Slovenia) is a very welcome fact in the way it concerns active incorporation of new member states into EU processes.

Since eight out of the ten new EU member states are also members of NATO, the interest of these states for participation in the ESDP should be very high. These eight states thus have a very important and responsible role for contributing to the strengthening and development of the ESDP, its complementarity with NATO, and to the clear articulation of the ESDP as an European project. Its development is very much dependant on the quality and content of continuing the European process of integration as a whole and on the capability of cohabitating in the North Atlantic area. Since all new members of NATO which have also become new members of the EU have already gone through the intensive process of defense reforms and are still continuing them, it is possible to assume that their interest in developing and strengthening the ESDP is beyond any doubt. They will - and already can - contribute their experiences, from which the understanding of the necessity of co-operation on the level of niche capabilities is among the most important. Undoubtedly, there exists a strong conviction among the actors in the Euro-Atlantic region that one of the key points of ESDP development is precisely its rationality,

that is, its combining of resources. Surely, from further use of this deduction and with constructive and reinforced contributions from new member states, the ESDP would benefit in its thematic and organizational dynamics.

In the Slovenian case, the key organizational role during the Presidency period will be played by the Office of the Government for EU Affairs, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will ensure basic thematic, i.e. substantial contributions. Already this highlights the fact that, in comparison to the previous two projects, this one will benefit from a higher and more wide-reaching organizational level. Dealing with this project will entirely occupy the agenda of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the duties of the Prime Minister (and to a large extent that of all other members of government). The diplomatic missions in EU member states will be included, intensively, in all activities, in particular those of Portugal and Germany due to the already mentioned trio principle. The presidency will also yield an increased working rhythm in the diplomatic missions in the third states, in important world capitals, and especially at international organizations. The work done by the mission to the EU in Brussels will be of key importance. All government resources and numerous other institutions will be included in the project, as will, to a certain extent, civil society. The Ministry of Defence will have a very important role in the processes of the ESDP.

Slovenia and the ESDP

When observing Slovenia's presence in the international community from its independence up to its present day, a perpetually growing intensity of its activities can be noticed. Since the beginning of the 1990s, when Slovenia achieved international recognition and membership in several of the most important international organizations (the OSCE, the UN, the Council of Europe), its presence in different fields and in different projects has been increasingly felt. At the same time, its presence and activities in the fields of security, military, and defense has been solidified. The first such surge can be noticed after the signing of the Day-

ton Peace accords (Jazbec 2004d); the second appears with active and growing engagement in the Western Balkans (in particular SFOR); the third is shown by membership in the EU and NATO. Slovenia has, with much attention, followed the creation and development of the ESDP since its conception, and participated in the process itself (offering contributions during the conference on force contribution, the functioning of appropriate bodies from spring 2002 onwards, EU-led operations in the Western Balkans, battle groups, etc.).

The presentation of the three large international multilateral projects in which Slovenia has participated and will participate in and the subsequent comparison of the experiences, which arose from these projects, can confirm the aforementioned conjectures. Surely, the ESDP process has become a strong point of identification for the Slovenian defense, security and military system in the past years. At the same time, it is important that relations with the ESDP have developed and fortified through active inclusion in various international projects. From this, the conclusion can be made that the outlined trend will continue. If this in fact occurs,¹⁰⁵ it will be important from two aspects: on the one hand, it will come useful for the continued actions of Slovenia in the international community, since, as an EU and NATO member, it has access to important multilateral mechanisms (through which it can also handle a large portion of its bilateral issues), and on the other hand, in a concrete case, this will be important for the development of the ESDP. From the point of view of the aforementioned complementarity of European security processes, Slovenia can also contribute to fortifying co-operation between the EU and NATO, which is of great importance regarding the development of the ESDP. (Lindley-French and Algieri, 2004:11)

As a continuation of the analysis thus far, the most important general conclusions, which can be drawn from Slovenia's leadership of the three projects discussed are presented in the follow-

105 The author of the paper personally has no doubts regarding the continuation of the trend, but believes it is important that in the role of a scientist, the statements made be infused with doubt, be argued from different angles, and be constantly and consistently evaluated for practical implementation.

ing table. The intention of this presentation is to draw attention to the development and escalation of inclusion in certain key management processes, which occur in the international community, and to elaborate upon the accumulation of experience and knowledge of particular fields.

Table: Experiences From the Management of Multilateral Projects

<u>1.Project</u>	<u>2. PG</u>	<u>3. FM</u>	<u>4. PM</u>	<u>5. MoD</u>	<u>6. OM</u>	<u>7. Area</u>
<i>UN SC</i>	State Secretary	20%	Very little	Little	A Few	Peace, Security
<i>OSCE</i>	Foreign Minister	80%	Little	A Lot	Some	Security
<i>EU</i>	Prime Minister	100%	<i>Completely</i>	Extensively	All	All (ESDP)

Legend:

PG - Project Group

FM - Foreign Minister

PM - Prime Minister

MoD - Ministry of Defence

OM - Other Ministries

The first column contains all three projects; the second the subordination of the project team; the third the strain placed upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the project in question; the fourth the strain placed upon the Prime Minister by the project in question; the fifth the degree of inclusion of the Ministry of Defense in the project in question; the sixth the degree of inclusion of the other ministries; and the seventh column contains the field in which the organization, under which the project occurred, operates.

The basic conclusion, then, that can be drawn from this comparison is that the degree, that is, the intensity of inclusion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, and other ministers, in specific projects, beginning with non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council, increases. The rate at which this inclusion increases varies among the actors, but it rises quickest

for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Simultaneously, the number of fields included and dealt with in individual projects increases as well. In all of the three compared projects, the presence of fields and areas that deal with similar, and to a certain extent the same, issues as the ESDP is evident. Managing the three projects mentioned was - and in the case of the EU Presidency will be - a highly useful and stimulating experience for efficient functioning of a concrete country in the ESDP. Due to the growing complexity of managing the three projects, the rank of the person leading the project, and/or to whom the project team is subordinated, raises accordingly.

Aside from the assured increase of strain placed upon diplomatic organization (and upon the government administration) during the carrying out of individual projects, there also exists the high likelihood of increasing accumulation of understanding and mastering individual professional fields and of organizational knowledge and experience. The level of this accumulation depends on appropriate articulation of ambitions and the capabilities to make these ambitions come true. It is possible to foresee that this should be, or become, of interest to the small states, which became EU and NATO member states in 2004.

Final Thoughts

The deductions and experiences determined in this paper can be summarized in two groups. On the one hand, there is the group of general conclusions, and on the other hand, the group of concrete experiences which could, to a certain extent, be considered as instructions for managing such situations and, in regards to this paper, especially for participating in the ESDP process.

The following three serve as general conclusions:

- a) A small state's participation in, or leadership of, large multi-lateral projects contribute to said small state being better recognized in international relations. Along with this, its place in the structure of the global community fortifies, and both in turn contribute to more possibilities for successful foreign policy moves and for success in pursuing national goals.

- b) The aforementioned activities, without a doubt, present an increased strain on the diplomatic organization of small states. This could on the one hand have an encouraging effect on the long-term financial budget for carrying out such projects, and on the other hand it could mean a push towards rational distribution of all types of resources.
- c) With just as little doubt, carrying out the aforementioned activities presents a great opportunity for deep and wide-reaching accumulation of mainly diplomatic knowledge and experiences in various professional fields.

From all concrete experiences mentioned, the following four should be stressed:

- a) Diplomatic organization (and through that, the entire administration of a state, particularly its classic state-forming ministries) gains a variety of concrete and useful deductions and experiences regarding the functioning of specific institutions and processes. This is, in particular, a large volume of insider information that cannot be attained in any other possible way.
- b) Each participation in, or management of, such projects presents, at the same time, the most concrete, direct, and effective method of preparation for future leadership of such projects.
- c) Gradual and increasing inclusion of other government resources into multilateral projects is also present. From this analysis, the gradually increasing inclusion of the Slovene Ministry of Defense into the ESDP is evident. Inclusion also creates internal structural adaptations to the workings of international structures and processes, which, regarding the Ministry of Defense, can be designated as defense reforms. For those new members of the EU, which are also members of NATO, defense reforms were of key importance for attaining NATO membership and simultaneously were an important experience for successful inclusion in and functioning within the ESDP.
- d) The experiences mentioned surely enable easier inclusion into forming and carrying out the ESDP, through which

such a state also contributes to the strengthening of the European integration process as a whole.

Taking everything mentioned into account, the discovery must be made that Slovenia¹⁰⁶ alone can not have a fundamental influence on the scope and speed of EDSP development. Nonetheless, it can contribute to its development indirectly through constructive participation in developing the process itself, through a strong approach to carrying out its politics, and with well-thought out participation in various operations regarding its own niche capabilities. This may as well be the best way, within the framework of realistic possibilities, to contribute to the development of the European integration process as a whole.

106 Here, attention should be once more drawn to the interest of a small state, formed after the end of the Cold War, to participate in and contribute to integration process (and thereby widening the scope of integration) despite its limited potential. In this context, it is easily understood that the Slovenian example highlights the interest and functioning of small states formed within the same time period. After all, it is not only the timing and the context of their formations that they share, but also interest in the EU and NATO membership, which they accomplished in spring 2004.

The Role, Organization and Functioning of the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE in Performing Peacekeeping Operations¹⁰⁷

Introduction

This article aims to present and analyze the activities and mutual cooperation of certain international organizations in performing peacekeeping operations – namely the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Its focus is on general and common characteristics of the stated activities, particularly on points of cooperation and complementarities of these organizations.

A brief presentation will be given as to the features of the aforementioned organizations, their competences in terms of security, their convergences and particularities. Furthermore, conflict development will also be presented, along with the role assumed by individual organizations in certain stages of this process. The article then goes on to outline and analyze certain peacekeeping operations. The conclusion encompasses observations, findings and suggestions, as well as some issues arising from peacekeeping operations which participants should become familiar with.

Organizations

This article covers the following organizations: the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Slovenia became a member of the Organi-

107 *This article was prepared upon two lectures, which the author gave at two training courses for the participants of peace support operations in the Center for Defense Training Poljče, Slovenia in May 2005 and May 2006. An early version of this article was published in Pipenbaher, Bojan (ur.). 2005. Vključevanje civilnih zmogljivosti v operacije v podporo miru (How to Include Civil Capabilities in Peace Support Operations). Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za obrambo, pp. 108-117. www.mors.si A revised and updated English version of this article was published in Pipenbaher, Bojan (ur.). 2006. Collaboration Civil Capabilities into Peace Support Operations. Ljubljana: Ministry of Defense, pp. 116-125. Translated from Slovene by the governmental Service for translation, interpretation and lectorship.*

zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Organization (UN) in March and May of 1992, respectively. In March and May of 2004, respectively, Slovenia also became a member of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

The UN is the only universal international organization. It was founded in 1945 in San Francisco with a principal mission to pursue international peace and security – specifically, to foster *collective security*. It acts in accordance with the principles of its Charter and includes various specialized agencies. Maintaining peace and security is the mission that the UN implements on its own and within its system; at the same time, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, its mission may be delegated to regional international organizations, such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE. These organizations share the same goals and engage in mutual cooperation. The system of peacekeeping operations was developed by the UN and, on account of cooperation with other organizations, subsequently expanded. The UN endeavours to prevent international conflicts, and has been quite successful so far. Recently, its effectiveness has been reduced due to an increasing number of internal conflicts and an inadequate UN peacekeeping system for dealing with such conflicts. After the end of the Cold War, UN intervention operations have often failed (in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, for example).

The NATO Alliance is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is committed to pursuing the *collective defense* of its Members based on Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, signed in April 1949 in Washington. Formed after World War II, NATO's mission was to provide security in Western Europe and North America and to serve as a deterrent against aggression that at that time was emanating from the Eastern Block. After the Cold War, NATO has undergone two expansions with ten new Members; in parallel, it implements thorough political and structural reforms. Its political actions and roles are becoming increasingly important, while developing forces and resources for intervention operations and adapting its structures to operations outside its own territory. Since the Prague Summit in the Autumn of 2002, NATO has been

pushing the development of response forces to carry out operations over long distances, which should enhance security. NATO deployed IFOR and SFOR forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the intervention in Kosovo in the Spring of 1999 was the first military operation outside the territories of Member States. Ongoing NATO operations include those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Mediterranean; NATO forces are also still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To avoid duplication of activities between European members of NATO, and to enable more independent action of the EU on security issues, the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements were agreed upon, making it possible for the EU to undertake crisis-management operations through access to respective NATO mechanisms.

The European Union was established with the Treaty of Rome in 1955 to prevent repeated outbreaks of hostility and war between European countries. At its core are four key freedoms: the free movement of persons, capital, services and goods. These freedoms form the basis for the European integration process in other areas as well. Since the Helsinki Summit in December 1990, the EU has been dealing with security issues and development of a system and capabilities for civil and military crisis-management. The Maastricht Treaty is a milestone for forming common foreign and security policy, while the Treaty of Nice has resulted in enhanced cooperation in the field of European security and defence policy (ESDP). In this area, the operating political and military structures comprise the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Chiefs of General Staff Committee; moreover, meetings of the EU defence ministers are held on a regular basis. In 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established with the aim of consolidating the European defence industry, increasing its effectiveness and achieving greater coherence. Since 2003, the EU has been developing its combat forces to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its crisis-management operations. The EU has conducted the following peacekeeping operations: “Artemis” in the Congo, “Amber Fox” and “Concordia” in Macedonia, and, at the end of 2004, “Althea” in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a seamless transition from NATO’s SFOR mission.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1972. Its basic framework document is the Helsinki Final Act, signed in Finland in August 1975. The negotiations that resulted in the conclusion of this Act set in motion a dialogue between the two blocs, and subsequently expanded it to cover civil society (the media and human rights). The turning points in the history of the OSCE were the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed in October 1999 in France, followed by the later institutionalization of the CSCE into the OSCE (with a permanent Secretariat along with other bodies and institutions). Today, the OSCE is the only international organization associating 55 participating countries from the Northern Hemisphere, and the most comprehensive security structure uniting the cooperation of all European countries, the USA, Canada and all new countries emerging in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

OSCE activities focus on three dimensions: human rights, economics and the environment, and the political-military dimension; decision-making in the organization is based on the principle of consensus. The OSCE sets out democratic standards and monitors compliance with them; its endeavours are directed towards strengthening, supporting and assisting democratic institutions. Its work is done through 17 field-missions, the largest of which is in Kosovo. The OSCE approach to providing security is, on one hand, through preventive diplomacy (a developed system of crisis-management), and, on the other hand, by promoting democracy, institutionalization and respect for human rights. In other words, this means the establishment of a state governed by the rule of law, the creation of civil society and an atmosphere of confidence and security.

Concerning the provision of security, we can observe that the organizations discussed herein differ in their scopes of activity and range of competences. The United Nations is a universal organization, while the other three organizations complement each other in their activities. Their areas of operation, methods of work and competences differ, though in certain areas their activities meet, overlap or even duplicate. Given the contemporary security chal-

lenges, which are noticeably transforming, unpredictable and complex with the increasing number of external factors, it is essential that these organizations cooperate and complement each other. These activities also involve numerous other governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions dealt with in this article (such as the Council of Europe, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization).

Stages of the situation development process

In order to comprehend, address and take part in peacekeeping operations, familiarity with the situation development process and its individual stages is required, in addition to knowledge of key international organizations in charge of peacekeeping operations.

This article is based on the assumption that, for various reasons, a period of peace and stability often ends with an escalation of tensions and aggravation of relations that may lead to a new conflict (or even war).

It is necessary to put an end to such a conflict and to begin post-conflict social rehabilitation, which, through different stages, results in a period of re-established peace and stability. To this end, we will be dealing with four rehabilitation stages: occurrence of tension, outbreak of conflict/war, conflict/war cessation, and post-conflict rehabilitation. The discussed organizations assume different roles in these stages according to their competences, capabilities and resources. None of them usually participate in every stage, although their activities in particular stages sometimes converge and intertwine. As for individual stages of these organizations, there is no clear delineation of their work, functions and competences, which is due to the complexity of the processes. In general, we tend to determine the role each organization plays in a certain stage, as each stage normally requires the performance of specified functions that can be efficiently carried out by one organization only.

The inclusion of particular social subsystems (diplomatic, military, law-enforcement, etc.) differs according to individual stages. The role of diplomacy is important in all four stages referred to above. If

tension is eased by means of diplomacy through preventive action as early as the first stage, the conflict may not even occur. Should this not be the case, it is essential that diplomacy be included in further stages, seeking to ease the tension and resolve disagreements or to terminate the conflict and start the reconciliation process. The role of the army is undoubtedly important towards the end of the first stage (escalation of tension), in the beginning of the fourth stage (providing conditions for post-conflict social rehabilitation) and in the third stage when efforts are made to terminate the conflict or hostility. Working hand in hand in the second part of the first stage, diplomacy and the army may terminate the tension and stabilize the situation. If the fourth stage runs smoothly, the necessity of a military involvement is reduced, while the tasks of restoring security and stability gradually turn into tasks of maintaining order and pass over to the police. The police normally assume a major role in the course of the first stage and in the fourth stage. In the fourth stage, the activities also increasingly include other institutions, such as justice, administration, education and social structures. This, however, does not imply that some of the above institutions do not function in previous stages even if, on one hand, their functioning is reduced to a minimum due to the crisis situation (even war) and, on the other hand, if such a situation imposes the priority to ensure security, which is the reason that other institutions significantly reduce their functioning.

Considering the features of international organizations presented above, the development of preventive action and crisis management tells a great deal as to which stage a certain institution is to be included and given a predominant role. Thus, we can better understand the process of peacekeeping operations and the role and competences of individual international organizations in conducting them. The following chapter presents the analysis of some operations.

The following scheme¹⁰⁸ shows the process by stages:

108 The purpose of the scheme is to provide the schematic, indicative and generalized logic of the process in order to highlight the differences in the functioning of individual organizations and different uses of resources by individual stages. Each stage can be further divided into several sub stages.

Stage:

Tension and Escalation	Outbreak of conflict/war	Conflict/war cessation	Post-conflict social rehabilitation
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Means:

Law-enforcement, Diplomacy, Military	Diplomacy	Military, Diplomacy	Law-enforcement, Diplomacy, Military, Institutions, Civil society
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Organizations:

UN, EU, NATO	Various intervention missions	NATO, EU, UN	EU, OSCE, NATO
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This scheme may also be explained by using theory, which focuses on the notion of security and power and organizations providing different forms of security.

Hard security relies on hard power, which involves the military and its institutions. In our case, in particular, this is the NATO Alliance providing collective defense to its Members (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). In the present international community, NATO is the only international organization capable of providing such security (in addition, of course, to numerous national states and their armies, which the present article does not deal with).

Soft security relies on the soft power arising from the activities of governmental and non-governmental institutions, such as the legal system, democratic institutions, the economy, social structures, health institutions, infrastructure, independent media and human rights organizations. We might say that the more an institution contributes to soft security in terms of its competences and methods of functioning, the softer are its power and provided security in relation to the army. Contemporary societies are very complex and demanding but also vulnerable systems. These systems are subjected to vulnerability in the case of applying hard, military power, as well as for other reasons (collapse of power systems and health institutions, economic recession, etc.). Among the organizations, soft security is

provided by the EU and the OSCE, as well as by the Council of Europe and the UN. Among social subsystems, soft security is ensured by the police (particularly in the transition to the fourth stage) and diplomacy. Due to differences in the choice of resources, they belong to two different sides in the provision of soft security.

This scheme presents the logic of situation development and the significance of key organizations functioning in individual stages. We can see that, in addition to certain national states (such as the USA), the NATO Alliance is the only organization with the capacity to put an end to armed conflict or war and secure conditions for post-conflict or post-war social rehabilitation. The competences and work of all the organizations converge and intertwine, though in each stage the leading role is played by one organization only.

Illustrations

Based on the facts presented so far, this chapter provides analyses of some characteristic peacekeeping operations. This will help in understanding the role and competences of particular organizations and their functioning in individual stages. The analyses of five operations are given: the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo and Iraq. Each analysis highlights the most distinctive and didactic elements for understanding the discussed process.

The United Nations peacekeeping operation in *Cyprus* is a classic example, where the representatives of the world organization – the “blue helmets” – supervise the cease-fire between both sides of divided Cyprus. Their presence ensures security and stability. The participants in the peacekeeping operations have no right to intervene between both parties to the conflict; the nature of their work requires permanent presence along the cease-fire line. In the contemporary world, this type of peacekeeping operation is becoming less frequent since inter-state conflicts have been decreasing while intra-state conflicts have been increasing.

The experience gained in the case of *Bosnia and Herzegovina* since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia can illustrate the entire process presented in the second chapter, along with the at-

tempts at crisis resolution in each stage by particular international organizations (and nations). The international community was not capable of preventing the escalation of tensions and the outbreak of war, which lasted from the fall of 1992 to the winter of 1995 (in this period, the United Nations forces operated under the name of UNPROFOR). A lot of intervention missions by the UN and the EU failed since no cease-fire or peace agreement was respected. After the tragedy in Srebrenica, the USA and NATO intervened, which as a result of successful negotiations facilitated the end of the war and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. The NATO Alliance ensured hard security with its IFOR and SFOR forces, which enabled the process of social rehabilitation. A significant role was played by a High Representative of the International Community – a kind of international administrator of state and social rehabilitation (one of the major achievements was the beginning of defence reforms in 2002). At the end of 2004, the NATO-led SFOR mission successfully concluded and the concern for security and rehabilitation was taken over by the EU and the EUFOR. The OSCE mission to Sarajevo was established at the end of 1995. Evidently, a crucial role in ending the war was played by NATO, though the leading role was assumed by the EU and the OSCE after the situation had stabilized. If the key role was given to the military (hard security) after entering the peace agreement, the most important task of the international community today is to support the functioning of national and civil or social institutions (soft security). The operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a good illustration of the situational development by stages, and of the role played by the international organizations in these stages. Its importance is also relevant in terms of understanding the development of operations as well as in terms of the role of international organizations in this development.¹⁰⁹

109 The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) performed operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina from February 1992 to March 1995. On 20 December 1995, the mandate was taken over by IFOR (Implementation Force). A day later, by resolution 1035, the UN Security Council established IPTF (United Nations International Police Task Force) and a civilian office referred to as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The mission's mandate was successfully completed on the last day of December 2002, based on Resolution 1423 (2003), adopted on 12 July 2002. In 2003, the tasks of UNMIBH were taken over by the European Union Police Mission (EUPM). NATO's Operation Joint Endeavour, performed by IFOR, lasted from 20 December

In the case of *Macedonia*, the experience and lesson learned is different. In the spring of 2001, the state was on the verge of civil war; armed conflicts on a local level and of varying intensity lingered a few months longer and a final cease-fire was achieved by signing the Ohrid Agreement in the Spring of 2003. In ending the hostility, the international community did not use hard power, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina; its engagement was mainly through diplomatic efforts and later by two EU-led peacekeeping operations: “Amber Fox” in 2003 and “Concordia” a year later (both operations were intended for civil crisis-management).

The engagement of the international community in *Kosovo* sets a good example of cooperation among international organizations. Hard security is provided by NATO’s KFOR, while the responsibility to ensure soft security¹¹⁰ rests primarily with the United Nations, the EU and the OSCE. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is organized into pillars: two pillars of the UN are responsible for civil administration, the police and the judiciary; one pillar, responsible for reconstruction, is assigned to the EU; and one pillar, responsible for building democratic institutions, is assigned to the OSCE. One important project, resulting from the Ohrid Agreement and entailing the participation of the OSCE, NATO and the EU, is the development of joint border management and monitoring. Taking into consideration the numerous non-governmental organizations in Kosovo, we can see that, on one hand, significant progress has been made in the post-conflict rehabilitation, and, on the other hand, this stage is complex and

1995 until the same date in 1996. This was NATO’s first peacekeeping operation out of its traditional area of operation. The task of IFOR was to implement and secure peace pursuant to the Dayton agreements. IFOR was succeeded by SFOR (Stabilization Force) and its Operations referred to as Joint Guard (21 December 1995 to 19 June 1998) and Joint Forge (20 June 1998 to 2 December 2004) with the role of stabilizing and consolidating the peace. The difference between the tasks of IFOR and SFOR is reflected in their names (to implement peace and to stabilize peace, respectively).

110 The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK, performs local governmental or administrative functions, while as of 12 June 1999, KFOR (Kosovo Force) has been responsible for ensuring the peace in Kosovo. The KFOR-led Operation Joint Guardian was performed from 11 June 1999 until the end of the same year. Operation Allied Force was NATO’s military (air) operation in Kosovo that lasted from 23 March to 10 June 1999.

demanding (the fourth in the scheme).

The latter becomes more obvious in the case of *Iraq*. The post-conflict social renewal lingers within extremely uncertain security conditions, and therefore the provision of security still remains one of the biggest and most demanding projects the international community and Iraqi society have to deal with. This emphasizes how important and demanding yet unavoidable it is that post-conflict rehabilitation be planned long before its actual beginning.

Conclusions

With the goal of achieving a better insight and understanding of the role, organization and functioning of the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE in conducting peacekeeping operations, this article covers the competence of individual organizations, the overall process and its stages, and the analysis of certain exemplary peacekeeping operations.

It has been established that differences exist in the approaches taken by individual organizations – on one hand, with respect to the area they are engaged in and their competences for ensuring different types of security, and on the other hand, with respect to the stage of the process entailing their cooperation. Cooperation and division of activities are the key principles, and the justification and understanding of the complementarity of European security processes are also based on these principles. This applies to the areas and levels of cooperation among international organizations, which, with different approaches in different areas and based on the principle of cooperation, contribute to the joint effect of functioning. Such a viewpoint of complementarity should also give due consideration to the functioning of international players (different organizations) and nations.

In this respect, at least two key issues appear; specifically: the coordination of work between different governmental and non-governmental and other organizations in the field, and the duplication of activities and costs due to sometimes less than transparent cooperation.

As to guidance for participating in the organizations being discussed here, direct participants should bear in mind that the work involves assignments in the international environment, with intertwining activities of different international organizations, and that each individual is appointed for a specified mandate. The mandate should be known before departure, as it will significantly facilitate work in the field. This results in an increasingly complex network of relations and competences within which individual participants operate. For achieving efficiency at work, rational use of resources and for avoiding duplication of activities, it is essential to be familiar with the mandate in an international organization, specified operations and a participant. This is also relevant on account of operations involving the participation of representatives from different countries, cultures and working procedures or methods, which requires coordination and efficient teamwork. The resources for peacekeeping operations are limited; their rational use is possible only through concerted action and by completing the mandate.

It is particularly important that each participant in these operations undergo preliminary preparations, adequate and permanent training and exchange experience. The first participation in a peacekeeping operation is the most demanding and involves major efforts. Subsequent participations are less demanding for the participant due to the acquired experience and the possibility of making comparisons. However, the most important aspect of all is the fact that each system (such as a military organization) provides official documentation of experience and continuous transfer of experience to future participants.

Cooperation of the OSCE with International Organizations¹¹¹

Slovenia holds during this year¹¹² the OSCE Chairmanship, what appears to be decently big and demanding foreign policy project. The OSCE is actually the only international security arrangement, which with its 55 participating states includes all European countries, the USA and Canada as well as all the successor states from the former Soviet Union, what would mean the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The organization is characterized by the principle of consensus as the basic decision making rule; it defines as well as oversees the implementation of democratic standards, it stands for enhancement of democratic institutions, strives for their capacity building, and offers them support. The OSCE has established a broad and large network of various activities, which are demonstrated through three dimensions (human dimension, economic-environmental and politico-military dimension) and carried out by 17 field missions (with the biggest one in Kosovo).

Such demanding tasks, which primarily promote a comprehensive concept of security, is possible to carry out in the current interdependent global community only on a basis of a close cooperation with other international players. This derives from the nature of contemporary security threats and challenges, with which no single state or organization could cope efficiently on its own. This cooperation is from one point of view enabled by the Chapter VIII of the UN Founding Charta and from another point of view by the so called OSCE Security Strategy (“Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century”), which was adopted at the end of the Dutch OSCE Chairmanship in December 2003.

111 *This article was originally published in Integracije (Integration), the quarterly bulletin of the Youth Section of the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia, Vol. II, No. 2, June 2005, Pp. 7-8. www.euroatlantic.org The aim of the article was to bring closer the understanding of the OSCE to young leaders, to reflect the way it operates and to present some basic aspects of its complementarity with other international players.*

112 *This was the year 2005.*

In its part four the Strategy calls for an obvious necessity of coordinating the activities of all related organizations by providing security. This should be carried out by political dialogue, by cooperation, and by structural complementarity, as far as various regions and topics are concerned, with all this having in mind a more successful and synergetic output. The Strategy addresses in particular the UN, the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe, with which the OSCE intends to continue the exchange of information and coordinate various expert meetings. The final part of the document invites the participating states to carry out and to upgrade the Strategy with an aim of being better equipped to face security threats as well as to improve security and stability.

This would bring our attention to a brief reflection of cooperation between the OSCE and the organizations concerned.

Cooperation between *the OSCE and the UN* is a well-oiled one. Numerous representatives of the World Organization are traditionally and actively engaged at various conferences, seminars and workshops organized by the OSCE (and vice versa). This is the way they contribute to the policymaking process and support the implementation of values, which the OSCE stands for (and vice versa). A highly important aspect of this cooperation is linked with the UNECE and is manifested in particular through the economic-environmental dimension. This to a great extent includes topics like environment, energy, sustainable development, trade and transport, poverty, social exclusion, education, public and corporate governance etc. A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the OSCE and the UNECE was signed at the Sofia Ministerial meeting in December 2004. The Slovene Chairmanship organized within this context a highly successful meeting of the OSCE Economic Forum in Prague in May this year.

The background for a broad and successful cooperation between *the OSCE and the EU* lies in fact that the EU member countries, after its 2004 enlargement, represent the biggest group within the OSCE (25 out of 55 participating states¹¹³) and

113 *After the referendum on independency of Montenegro in May 2006 and after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in January 2007, this proportion is even higher (27 out of 56 states).*

that they consequently contribute more than 70% of the budget. Therefore one could understand their interest to increase the influence within the organization and to become such an influential player as the USA and Russia are. Senior representatives from the EU member states (capitols) meet regularly in Brussels on a monthly basis within the COSCE, while the EU diplomats in Vienna meet at weekly coordination. The role of the EU within the OSCE will gain on visibility during next years, when even for EU member states in a row hold Chairmanship: after Slovenia in 2005 also Belgium in 2006, Spain in 2007 and Finland in 2008. Hence there are two ambitions in front of the EU as well as of its focus on the OSCE: enhancement of relations between the two organizations and an upgrading of the role and influence of the former within the latter.

While elaborating this relation one should also bear in mind that certain activities of both organizations overlap and that certain similarities of interests and goals exists as well. However, the EU has always supported the OSCE at paving the way for norms and standards at all three dimensions. It is also a common goal of both organizations to continue with promotion of security and stability within the OSCE area on the basis of principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect of human rights. At the December 2004 meeting of GAERC the EU adopted a document on its role within the OSCE, what has contributed to improve its relation towards and cooperation with the OSCE.

Cooperation between *the OSCE and NATO* is based upon the Platform for Cooperative Security, which was adopted at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in December 1999. Representatives of both organizations meet regularly on a weekly basis in Vienna. They deal with various substantial, regional and organizational issues and aspects of mutual cooperation; senior representatives of both secretariats meet quarterly and exchange views upon current issues, too. This speaks in favor of a pragmatic approach at the cooperation in the theatre, at avoiding of duplicating of their activities, and at aiming to reach synergy of work. Topics of mutual coordination and cooperation include the Istanbul commitments, CFE, SALW, stockpiles, terrorism etc.

Also cooperation between *the OSCE and the Council of Europe* is good and stems from many common aspects. The recent May Summit Meeting of both organizations in Warsaw has marked an important and substantial step forward in mutual cooperation by signing the declaration on cooperation. Topics of common interest include fight against terrorism, police training, migration and integration, minorities, sustainable development, fight against human trafficking, education for human rights, racism, xenophobia, intolerance, election, the rule of law, intercultural dialogue, human rights in armed forces etc. Among other, also cooperation in the field, like revision of election legislative, reform of prisons and election monitoring in 2004 in the South Caucasus stand out.

The above listed and presented examples show very clearly that complementarity is becoming the main characteristics of European security processes and an increasingly important principle of broad cooperation of international organizations at their provision of comprehensive security. One could find a highly obvious and concrete illustration of such cooperation in the pillar structure of UNMIK in Kosovo, which includes the UN, the OSCE, and the EU.

Finally, Slovenia as a new EU and NATO member, which currently also holds the OSCE Chairmanship, advocates eagerly, substantially and in a thought over manner its contribution to the enhanced cooperation among mayor, here discussed security players.

Afterword

The Western Balkans - A Structural Overview

This book is well worth reading by anyone interested in international organizations or foreign policy, and especially foreign policy of small European states. It is also an invaluable text for scholars and policymakers from European countries that are yet to seriously embark on the integration processes that Slovenia has managed so well. Jazbec's comprehensive description of challenges that Slovenia faced (and continues to encounter) as a new member of the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are detailed enough to be very helpful to policymakers when estimating what to expect and how to prepare for membership in these organizations and integration processes. On the other hand, his conceptualizations and generalizations are very useful to more theoretically oriented students of international relations and regional experts. Indeed, these essays are a "theoretical contemplation of practical experiences of the author and Slovenia."

Jazbec suggests that Slovenia's core activities in the Western Balkans include, *inter alia*, transfer of Slovenia's experience from the enlargement process to the region and explaining Western Balkans to the EU. This collection of essays is a great example how an individual can contribute to this dual task. For Jazbec this seems to come naturally perhaps because of his long diplomatic experience in the region which started during the dusk of the former Yugoslavia and has stretched to the present encompassing Slovenia's quick and relatively smooth integration into Euro-Atlantic integration processes. During those nearly three decades Jazbec has acquired an insider's knowledge and understanding of the Western Balkans and of the West.

Like his diplomatic career, his academic career has been forged at the crossroads between the West and Western Balkans. The conceptual underpinnings of these essays have been slowly built at both the University of Klagenfurt and the Ljubljana University, always considered one of the best educational institutions in the

former Yugoslavia. That he acquired professorship at Ljubljana University will surely reinforce the University's standing as one of the best places of scholarly contemplation in the wider region. Hence, given his dual but complementary careers it is not at all surprising that the main message of this book is "cooperate, exchange and go Euro-Atlantic."

Anyone interested in foreign policy knows what a daunting task it is to find good studies about foreign policies of small and even medium powers. A search on foreign policies of small states on Amazon.com or BarnesandNobles.com produces only a handful of relevant entries, some of which are interesting but outdated. This subfield of international relations, like the field in general, is dominated by studies of great and emerging powers. Even the theoretical scholarship tends to embark on theory-building by heavily relying on empirical work that draws from the experience of great powers. Perhaps this is a vestige of the Cold War when small states did not have much space for autonomous action.

Whatever the reason may be for this intellectual void, the increasingly interconnected European scene requires paying greater attention to small states. Addressing the challenges that NATO faces will also benefit from a better understanding of its smaller members. NATO's role and image will largely depend on how it adjusts not only to the post-Cold War period, an issue it has been focused on until now, but on how NATO's decision-making procedures (formal and informal) adjust to the interests of its smaller members.

Jazbec knows that small states "demand international confirmation of their existence and identity." Interestingly, he also suggests that integration has strengthened, not weakened their independence. However, he notes, perhaps not explicitly enough, that in order to fully benefit from membership in global and regional organizations small states have to reform their foreign policy and defense institutions. Slovenian and Baltic states' foreign services developed into "small, flexible and transparent organizations..." This characteristic facilitated timely "introduction of new work methods and additional organizational approaches brought about and dictated by the changes in the modern international commu-

nity.” Youthfulness is another characteristic of these diplomacies (average age of Slovenian and Baltic diplomats in the early 1990s was between 25 and 35). As with many other characteristics that the author identifies, youthfulness is both an advantage and a disadvantage. While it is frequently associated with inexperience, it also brings vitality, ambition and solid theoretical knowledge.

Jazbec notes that the long-term success of reforms in the defense sector and, I would add, in other sectors will largely depend on the answer to one fundamental question. Namely, is reform an internally driven process or is it primarily driven by pressure from the West? The author argues that in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and in Serbia and Montenegro, reforms in the defense sector “have been primarily the result of constant pressure from the international community...” This is to be expected given that in some of these countries there is no social consensus about some fundamental issues that are inseparable from defense matters. In Serbia the issue is whether Serbia should at all seek membership in NATO. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the issues is even more basic; should Bosnia have a single military?

Compared to Bosnia’s problems, Serbia’s dilemma is somewhat easier to resolve and it hinges on what its security strategy ought to be. Small new states that appeared in the 1990s opted for NATO membership as a solution to their security concerns. However, as Jazbec notes, since the fall of the Berlin Wall a considerable number of international organization began providing security in Europe. This tendency will most probably continue. In the first foreign policy speech of his presidency, President Nicolas Sarkozy indicated that “Europe must progressively affirm itself as a first-rank player for peace and security...”¹¹⁴ It is yet to be seen how compatible all these multilateral security processes will be. Also, it is yet to be assessed whether membership in all organizations is needed in order to ensure a satisfying level of security.

Whether Serbia should seek NATO membership should depend on how it assesses its security environment. Public opinion shows a strong reluctance toward NATO and an equally strong embrace

114 Quoted in EUobserver.com, 28 August 2007.

of the EU. The most recent public opinion polls confirm a long trend. While 76% of respondents support EU membership only 32% support NATO membership. Since June 2005 support for EU has varied between 60 and 76%. During the same period support for NATO membership has been constantly low, between 22 and 32%.¹¹⁵

These numbers ought to worry NATO supporters in Serbia because eventual NATO membership will have to be decided on a referendum. The problem is that the opinion of the political class reflects popular opinion. (Or is it *vice versa*?) Only the Democratic Party of President Boris Tadić, G17 (a small member of the current governing coalition) and Liberal Democratic Party (a small opposition party) are openly in favor of joining NATO. Other political parties seem to be either explicitly or implicitly against membership. Interestingly, when Serbia joined Partnership for Peace past winter all democratic parties favored membership and this was reflected in an overwhelmingly supportive public.

There is little doubt that the 1999 war between Serbia and NATO over Kosovo makes the job of pro-NATO parties much harder. Embracing membership will be even harder if Kosovo acquires independence. Nonetheless, Slovenian experience is instructive. Jazbec notes that because Slovenia held a referendum on NATO membership (something that Serbia will also most likely have to do), the government prepared and implemented a coherent "public awareness campaign." "A couple of hundred public discussions, debates, round tables, live TV and radio shows were organized with participation of both NATO pros and cons." This set off a "huge public debate" that lasted for almost a year. The referendum took place in 2003 with EU and NATO membership on the ballot. The turnout was 60% with 90% in favor of EU membership and 66% in favor of NATO membership.

The book has many other very practical recommendations that are weaved into the text and can easily be teased out. For example, the essay on "Organizational Challenges and Experiences of the Slovene OSCE Chairmanship" is a particularly good confirmation that insider's insights are invaluable. The organizational arrange-

115 See Politika, 17 August 2007.

ment Slovenia developed is so clearly described that it could easily be used as a blueprint by other countries. Slovenia chaired the OSCE in 2005. The author argues that successfully fulfilling this task required that Slovenia's small diplomatic service with inherently limited resources needed to find a way to ensure a constant, smooth, and rich provision of information in order to manage a demanding and complex international policymaking process. Slovenia embarked on organizational adjustments to the new task when it was granted chairmanship in 2003. During 2004 Slovenia enlarged its Mission to the OSCE in Vienna, established an OSCE Task Force in the Foreign Ministry and an OSCE Project Group in the Ministry of Defense. Task Force's staff came from the Foreign, Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior as well as from the Slovene Intelligence Service. The head of the Task Force was a former Foreign Minister who was directly responsible to the Foreign Minister and the OSCE Chairman in Office. The Task Force dealt only with substantive issues. It was in daily contact with the Slovene Mission to the OSCE, the OSCE Secretariat and its various institutions and field missions, with Personal and Special representatives of the Chairman in Office, and with diplomats from other countries, NGOs, think-tanks, and the media.

Equally detailed are the more politically substantive insights Jazbec provides. Because of space limitations it is impossible to describe them in detail but one is worth emphasizing. Namely, the author notes that given the complex and multilayered mandate of the OSCE "policymaking cannot rely on organizational improvisation" nor can organizational consistency be established if policymaking is ad hoc.

While the study has a strong foreign policy approach it is no less an analysis of international organizations. It seems that what the author finds most interesting when exploring the interaction between the UN, NATO, OSCE, and the EU is their complementarity. For him the current complimentary nature of international organizations, which are active in Europe was an outcome of a long historical process which strongly indicated that security could be achieved only through complementary activities of national and international actors. Two more immediate factors played a role

as well. First, pooling national resources was needed in order to respond to the higher scale of activities. Second, modern security threats and conflicts made it increasingly difficult for a single organization to develop the entire spectrum of capabilities needed to address pre-conflict, mid- and post-conflict situations.

While almost every essay discusses one or more international organizations the one on peacekeeping largely focuses on the complementary nature of their activities.¹¹⁶ How these international organizations complement each other, Jazbec suggests, is best seen when one demarcates four stages through which all conflicts pass – occurrence of tensions, outbreak of conflict, conflict cessation, and post-conflict rehabilitation. “The discussed organizations assume different roles in these stages according to their competencies, capabilities and resources.” Much of it, however, seems to depend on whether the organization wields hard or soft power. Needless to add, out of the four organizations NATO is the only one that can project substantive hard power.

Jazbec is of course aware that complementarity is a work in progress. Coordination between different international actors is much better in Kosovo than it was in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author suggests that further improvement of coordination is required, as is avoiding duplication of activities due to insufficiently transparent cooperation. Above all, actors in peacekeeping operations should provide “official documentation” of their experiences in order to facilitate the work of other actors engaged in current and future peace operations.

Although peace-building in the Western Balkans has been a learning experience for all international organizations, the author makes two interrelated recommendations that have, unfortunately, not been embraced yet. First, the area has to be viewed as a whole. And, second, all actors have to take a coordinated approach. Had this been the approach from the outset it would most likely not have taken the region almost two decades to stabilize. That, however, is the past. What is important now is to keep those recommendations in mind when thinking how to fully make Bos-

116 See the essay entitled “The Role, Organization and Functioning of the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE in Performing Peacekeeping Operations.”

nia and Herzegovina a self-sustaining democracy and how to resolve the Kosovo issue.

One theoretical issue that the author only touches upon but that could be fruitfully tested in the Western Balkans is how much do states actually change when they immerse themselves into the Euro-Atlantic network of international organizations. Does state behavior change because integration alters the cost-benefit equation and, hence, state preferences? Or, does the increased level of interaction and cooperation change states' identity and hence their behavior? Either way, it seems that the citizens of the new small states in the region could only benefit from increased security and socio-economic development. Empirical evidence strongly indicates that this is what European integration brought to other countries. There is little reason to doubt that given time and appropriate conditions all inhabitants of the region, and hopefully peoples of other world regions as well, will begin resolving their differences through negotiation and compromise. Jazbec's well researched and insightful book should bring us a step closer to that goal. Achieving the goal would itself constitute a change of identity.

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About the Author and His Work

Milan Jazbec originates from Sp. Pohanca, Slovenia. He achieved the highest score at matura in Gymnasium Brežice (1975), graduated from journalism (1981) as well as from defense studies (1983) at the Faculty for Social Sciences in Ljubljana, Slovenia, and gained his PhD from sociology of diplomacy at the University of Klagenfurt, Austria (2000).

He's employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia as the Policy Planning and Research Director. From December 2000 till November 2004 he was State Secretary for Defense Policy and International Relations at the Slovene Ministry of Defense. He contributed decisively to the Slovene membership in NATO. He was member of the OSCE Task Force in 2005 during the Slovene Chairmanship. Since June 2004 he's been Assistant Professor for sociology of diplomacy.

He was Head of the Consular Department (1996) and of the Department of Analysis and Development (2000) in the Foreign Ministry and the first Slovene Consul in Klagenfurt (1992) as well as the Deputy Head of Mission in the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary at the Slovene Embassy in Stockholm (1996), accredited to the five Nordic and three Baltic countries. He finished the Diplomatic Academy in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (1988) and was also the last Yugoslav Consul in Klagenfurt (1991). He has broad and deep experience from journalism, private and public sector as well as from politics. He has chaired many international events, participated at numerous conferences and supervised various important processes.

He is the author of more than one hundred various articles, specialized in diplomacy and security after the end of the Cold War, combining this area with sociology, defense and organizational sciences, and has published ten books so far (six on diplomacy). He's lectured at many universities in Europe and America (like the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna; Faculty of International Relations, Bratislava; Columbia University, New York; Rice University, Houston; Graduate School of International Studies, Denver; Ren-

im University, the School of International Studies, Beijing; College University Victory, Prishtina). He is i.a. the Vice Chairman of the Euro Atlantic Council of Slovenia and member of IFIMES, and holds memberships at various associations.

In March 2005 he received the fourth highest Austrian decoration “The Grand Golden Decoration of Honor with Star for Merit for the Republic of Austria”.

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